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1“We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves
forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of
previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving
and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself.
Philosophy especially has to welcome its appearance and acknowledge it, while others,
who oppose it impotently, cling to the past.” 
G. W. F. Hegel, in a lecture on September 18, 1806, 
quoted in Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992)
“There is enormous inertia – a tyranny of the status quo – in private and especially
governmental arrangements. Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change.
When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying
around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing 
policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes
politically inevitable.“ 
Milton Friedman,  Preface to 
Capitalism and Freedom (1982) 
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6Introduction
Since  the  end  of  the  Soviet  Union in  1989,  it  has  largely  been assumed  that  liberal
democracy or democratic capitalism provides people with the best social  institutions
possible.  While capitalism ensures individual economic freedom, democracy provides
people  with  political  freedom.  Private  property  coupled  with  markets  and  periodic
elections ensure that people receive the most efficient economic and political systems
that they could possibly want. Francis Fukuyama famously propagates this thesis in his
book The End of History and the Last Man from 1992. Here, Fukuyama writes, 
“The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they
will organize themselves politically and economically has been diminishing over
time. Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human
history, from monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist
and communist dictatorships of this century, the only form of government that
has  survived  intact  to  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century  has  been  liberal
democracy” (Fukuyama 1992, 45).
Although Fukuyama admits that much can be improved in this system, he nevertheless
believes that “we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own,
or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist” (ibid., 46). After the fall of
the Berlin Wall, people’s ability to imagine a better and different world has supposedly
come to an end. Thus, humanity has reached the end of history, at least regarding its
political and economic institutions. 
It might appear somewhat tedious to begin a book on democracy, markets and commons
with a reference to Francis Fukuyama. Many people have already written about his bold
thesis.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Fukuyama’s  book  articulates  a
widely-held idea that has taken hold of Western society: That democracy and capitalism
exist  in  a  mutually  supporting  relationship.  However,  the  assumption  that  open,
competitive markets and the material wealth that results therefrom are preconditions
for democracy is not new and has also been supported by more recent studies  (Lipset
1960, 48-50, Boix and Stokes 2003, Boix 2011, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Bühlmann
and Kriesi 2013, 31-33). A central pillar of this argument is the Hobbesian and Lockean
postulation that individual private property  secures the basic liberty that is necessary
for a free and pluralistic society (Hobbes 1985, 234, Locke 2008, II, V, Epstein 2011a, b,
Hayek  2013).  As  Jan  Narveson  succinctly  puts  it,  “Liberty  is  Property”  (1988,  66).
7Generally speaking, the justification of individual private property is largely based on
critique of common property with reference to two diverse yet interrelated arguments.
Firstly, it is largely assumed that common property would normally not be cared for and
overused.  This  age-old  idea  is  already  expressed  by  Aristotle  who  says  that  “what
belongs in common to the greatest number, receives the least looking after” (Aristotle
2002, 24). A more recent interpretation of this notion is formulated by Garrett Hardin in
his article The Tragedy of the Commons from 1968. Here, he concludes that “[f]reedom in
a commons brings ruin to all”  (Hardin 1968,  1244).  As Hardin – and many others –
believe, there are only two alternatives to this tragedy: State ownership or privatization
or, in other words, socialism or capitalism. This leads us to a second critique of common
property. Here, it is often argued that the historical examples of socialist regimes during
the 20th century demonstrated that common property arrangements ultimately lead to
an inefficient economic system, totalitarianism and oppression. A combination of these
theoretical  assumptions  and  historical  experiences  has  thus  led  to  a  widespread
consensus that individual private property or, more generally, democratic capitalism is
the only game in town. Or, in the (in)famous words of Margaret Thatcher: “There is no
alternative” (Berlinski 2008).
However,  since  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  diverse  political,  economic  and
environmental crises have increasingly put this grand narrative of democratic capitalism
into question.  I  am aware that the term “crisis” is problematic because it induces an
alarmist and apocalyptic interpretation of reality. Apocalyptic narratives have probably
existed since the beginning of human history and crisis theories have been prevalent
ever  since  democracies  and  capitalist  market  economies  were  developed  (Merkel
2014b,  11-12).  Nevertheless,  the existence or resurgence of these debates in diverse
fields  suggests  that  democratic  capitalism  is  facing  some  fundamental  challenges.
Without  going  into  the  details,  I  would  like  to  mention  some  central  issues.  Firstly,
current  political  “crises”  revolve  around a decline  in  political  participation since  the
1980s  in  many  Western  countries  (Whiteley  2012,  Merkel  2014a,  118-120,  Schäfer
2015), the internationalization of politics and democratic deficits in many supranational
political  institutions such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank  (Held 1991,  1995,
Glenn 2010, Bellamy and Staiger 2013, Lavenex 2013, Habermas 2015) and, finally, the
more  recent  resurgence  of  populism  (Mudde  2004,  2014,  Gherghina  et  al.  2013).
Secondly,  economic  “crises”  became  most  apparent  in  the  global  financial  crisis  of
82007/8 and has its roots, among other things, in the deregulation and denationalization
of  the  economy  (Streeck  1998,  Stiglitz  2010) and  in  increasing  socio-economic
inequalities  in  many  Western  countries  since  the  mid-1970s  (Piketty  2014,  Streeck
2014). Thirdly, environmental “crises” can generally be defined as the overstepping of
planetary  boundaries  and  are  caused  by the  degradation  of  soil  fertility,  the  loss  of
biodiversity  and  global  warming  (Rockström et  al.  2009,  Steffen  et  al.  2015).  These
changes  have  led  scientists  to  argue  that  humans  have,  after  approximately  11,700
years, left the geological epoch of the Holocene behind them and entered the new and
increasingly  unstable  epoch  of  the  Anthropocene  (Steffen  et  al.  2011).  As  we  see,
contemporary democratic and capitalist societies are facing diverse and rather serious
political, economic and ecological challenges.
What do these diverse political, economic and environmental “crises” have to do with
each other – and with democratic capitalism? This is one central yet underlying question
that I will attempt to answer in this book. For now, it is sufficient to declare that I do
believe  that  these  crises  are  interrelated  and  have  a  common  core:  An  open  and
competitive economic system based on individual  private property that  enables and,
importantly, requires perpetual and exponential economic growth – on a finite planet. I
will demonstrate that these background social arrangements lead to the appropriation
and unequal accumulation of resources from socio-ecological systems, which not only
cause detrimental effects on the environment but also large socio-economic inequalities
which,  in  turn,  both  hinder  political  participation  and  cause  economic  instability  or
“crises”. Furthermore, the prioritization of negative rights in individual private property
and  a  belief  in  the  self-regulation  of  competitive  markets  structurally  limit  people’s
ability to democratically alter their social arrangements and thus to collectively solve
the negative  effects  of  these  market  arrangements.  It  is  interesting to note that  this
situation is similar to – if  not identical with – Garrett Hardin’s previously mentioned
tragedy of  the  commons.  However,  it  is  not  the  commons that  is  the  main cause of
tragedy here, but rather privatization and the open and competitive market. Or, in other
words, Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the open and unregulated commons also turns
out  to  be  a  story  of  the  tragedy  of  the  unregulated  and  supposedly  self-regulating
market. 
9As  a  reaction  to  the  widespread  acceptance  of  Hardin’s  theory,  one  answer  to  this
tragedy of democratic capitalism that has increasingly been debated since the turn of the
millennium is the notion of the commons. A main reason for this upsurge of interest in
commons is the  work of the political  economist  Elinor Ostrom who received the so-
called  Nobel  Prize  in  Economics  in  2009.  Since  the  1960s,  Elinor  Ostrom  and  her
colleagues  have extensively studied existing examples  of  sustainable  self-governance
common pool resources such as water systems, fisheries, forests and alpine meadows. A
central point that can be drawn from her work is that her empirical research refuted the
widespread belief that commons inherently lead to destruction. Instead, she was able to
demonstrate that the management of common property by those who use the specific
resources was an alternative  form of democratic  and ecological  governance “beyond
markets and states” (E. Ostrom 2010a). This, in turn, has led to an explosion of literature
on commons that developed the concept in relation to diverse goods and resources such
as information,  open-source software,  genetic  code,  seeds,  food,  land,  housing,  urban
space, firms and credit (Shiva 2005, Hess and Ostrom 2007, Benkler 2006, Tortia 2011,
Bollier et al. 2012, Bollier and Helfrich 2015). A main focus in this literature is often the
contrast of commons to individual private property. As the renowned commons scholar
Yochai Benkler states in his book The Wealth of Networks,
“‘Commons’ refers to a particular institutional form of structuring the rights to
access, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of ‘property’ in the following
sense:  With  property,  law  determines  one  particular  person  who  has  the
authority to decide how the resource will be used” (Benkler 2006, 60).
Although  Benkler  is  somewhat  imprecise  in  his  use  of  the  term  property,  because
commons can also be structured as property arrangements, the juxtaposition remains
significant:  While  individual  private  property  is  based  on  exclusion  and  dominion,
common property is structured according to the principles of (regulated) access and
democratic (network) governance. The emphasis of commons theorists on inclusion and
democratic  regulation  has,  more  generally,  made  commons  a  buzzword  for  an
alternative  and  emerging  form  of  social  organization.  Here,  economic  activities  are
based on needs-oriented and non-hierarchical “peer-production”,  which short-circuits
the competitive market, the price mechanism and perpetual monetary growth  (Rifkin
2015, Mason 2015). In this sense, it can be said that commons are providing people with
concrete  examples  of  how  to  create  a  more  inclusive,  democratic  and  ecologically
sustainable society within or beyond democratic capitalism. 
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To assess this possible solution to the diverse challenges contemporary societies face,
my dissertation will examine whether – and if so, how – the concept of commons can
strengthen  democratic  practices  and  institutions  by  limiting  or  even  overcoming
negative socio-economic, political and ecological effects of capitalist markets. I will begin
my  paper  with  a  discussion  of  democracy  to  lay  an  important  stepping-stone  for
subsequent arguments. Here, I will reflect on the diverse and conflicting definitions of
democracy  and  conclude  that  democracy  fundamentally  implies  the  rights  and
capabilities of people to co-determine their shared social conditions. In a second step, I
will  turn to the justifications of  competitive and self-regulating markets and analyze
their  relations  to the (democratic)  state.  I  will  demonstrate that  a  belief  in  the self-
regulating  market  highly  limits  and  undermines  people’s  democratic  capabilities  to
collectively solve social, economic and ecological problems. As an answer to this, I will
turn to the concept of commons as a possible alternative to the market-state dichotomy
that  underlies  democratic  capitalism.  I  will  begin this  discussion with an analysis  of
Garrett  Hardin’s  article  “The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  from  1968.  After  this
preliminary discussion,  I  will  examine the works of  Elinor Ostrom and her husband,
Vincent Ostrom. Here, it will  be demonstrated that tragedy can be overcome through
communication,  reciprocity and trust,  on the one hand,  and democratically governed
institutions of shared resource systems, on the other hand. 
As  will  become  clear,  however,  the  Ostroms’  work  not  only  lacks  a  critique  of
privatization  and  markets  but  also  a  more  fundamental,  normative  justification  of
commons  in  the  name  of  ecological  sustainability  and  human  freedom.  Due  to  this
weakness, I will then develop an ecological understanding of commons that prioritizes
the common reality of humans, the non-human world and their co-creation thereof. In
turn,  this  will  enable  us  to  develop  an  ecological  understanding  of  freedom  that
recognizes the rights of other human and non-human beings in the co-determination of
their shared socio-ecological systems. I will thus argue that ecological freedom is based
on  the  principles  of  care  for  others  and  on  the  civic  tradition  of  democracy,  which
enables us to understand commons not simply as a resource, but rather as a practice of
commoning in, with and through nature. 
With this theoretical background, I then shift my focus and explore what a commons
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theory of property might look like. To do this, I contrast such an exemplary theory with
John Locke’s classical labor theory of property and John Rawls’ more recent theory of a
property-owning democracy. In my critique of Locke’s labor theory of property, we will
discover  that  the  pillars  of  a  commons  theory  of  property  are  guardianship,  non-
domination  and  needs  satisfaction.  In  the  following  re-interpretation  of  John  Rawls’
property-owning  democracy,  I  argue  that  a  more  ecologically  sound  theory  of
(pre)distribution should not  focus  on productive monetary assets,  but  rather  on the
access  to  material  resources  and  their  sustainable  maintenance.  In  a  final  step,  I
emphasize that a commons theory of property must also include access to collective
consumption goods, thereby increasing the freedom of individuals and the number of
convivial  social  arrangements,  while  simultaneously  decreasing  humans’  detrimental
ecological  impact.  Ultimately,  I  hope  to  demonstrate  that  commons  property
arrangements  enable  the  creation  of  a  relative  abundance  on  a  planet  with  limited
resources. 
After  this  development  of  a  commons  theory  of  property,  I  examine  the  relations
between commons and the state and then between commons and the market. In both
cases, I argue that a commons-based or commons-creating society requires a significant
democratization of both the state and the market. With reference to the Ostroms’ notion
of co-production, I maintain that a commons-creating society would not only imply that
access  to  vital  goods  and  resources  should  be  provided  by  the  state,  but,  more
importantly, that state provision of public goods is transformed into a state support of
commons and commoning. I illustrate this through the examples of housing, healthcare
and education. Finally, in my analysis of the market-commons relationship, I contend
that we should not simply condemn the market, but that we should, rather, transform
the open and competitive market into what I call a market commons. While the former is
supposedly self-regulating, the latter is democratically governed and regulated by those
largely affected by it. I explore this notion of the market commons with reference to the
concepts  and  examples  of  associative  and  corporatist  democracy,  the  social  and
solidarity economy and, finally, community-supported modes of production. In all these
examples, antagonistic and thereby competitive relationships between isolated agents
are  mitigated  through  institutional  arrangements  of  democratic  negotiation  and
cooperation. Ultimately, I will argue that this democratic form of governance that lies at
the heart of commons has the potential to solve the diverse and interrelated political,
12
economic and ecological problems that we face today. That being said, it becomes clear
that  commons  provide  us  with  normatively  robust  and,  simultaneously,  practical
alternatives to the tragedies of democratic capitalism. Yet as I will show, this alternative
does  not  exist  beyond  markets  and  states,  but  lies,  instead,  in  the  democratic  and
ecological transformation of these institutions through commons and commoning. 
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1. The Concept of Democracy 
I  begin my analysis of the relationship of democracy, markets and commons with an
analysis of the concept of democracy, because it can generally be said that during the
20th century democracy has become, as Hans-Peter Kriesi affirms, the “only legitimate
[political;  LP] game in town”  (Kriesi  2013,  1).  Despite this broad agreement,  it  often
remains rather unclear what democracy actually means.  For this reason, I  will  firstly
discuss  the  contested  nature  of  the  concept  of  democracy.  In  a  second  step  I  will
critically reflect diverse models of democracy,  with a main focus on the work of the
political scientist Wolfgang Merkel. In a third step, I will argue that we must unearth a
more foundational meaning of democracy that lies at the heart of all of these different
models.  Here,  I  will  conclude that democracy inherently entails that people have the
rights and capabilities to co-determine their shared social conditions. This definition of
democracy will ultimately lay the normative foundation for my subsequent development
and defense of the commons.
1.1. Democracy as a Contested Concept
As is common knowledge, the word “democracy” etymologically means the rule (kratos)
of  the  people  (demos)  (Held  1987,  2).  What  this  means  precisely,  however,  is  quite
unclear and often highly contested. With Michael Saward (2003), we could even say that
democracies exist wherever there is a debate over the definition and interpretation of
democracy (Cheneval 2015, 18). Or, in more general terms, it can be agreed upon that
there is no agreement on the definition of democracy. 
Despite this general disagreement, most democratic theorists assume that democracy
provides a method of legitimizing political authority or rule and that there exist different
models of democracy. Let us therefore begin with the legitimate use of political power.
Although he was no democrat, since Thomas Hobbes, it has generally been assumed that
the use of political  authority and a monopoly on the use of coercive force in society
should be legitimized through the consent of  the people – be that  with an actual  or
hypothetical social contract or periodic elections and votes in a ballot box (Held 1991,
203). Democratic or, in the words of Rawls, liberal legitimacy makes it possible for social
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order  to  be  created through the understanding  and acceptance of  and therefore  the
identification with the rules and institutions governing society (Rawls 2005, 137).1 This
form of legitimacy differs, for example, from a theocratic or customary legitimation of
political and legal power in which the right to use coercive force is either justified on the
basis of a specific religious order of society (transcendental beliefs) or hereditary rights.
In both cases, however, the people in power are not necessarily accountable for their
actions and their responsibility towards others because their positions and rights – at
least theoretically – cannot be questioned, challenged or altered. In contrast, democratic
legitimacy not  only requires  consent,  but  also provides people  and citizens with the
possibility to criticize and alter the rules and regulations of one’s society either through
public debate or simply through the ballot box. Ideally, the withdrawal of support from a
political authority increases the responsiveness and accountability of those in power to
the demands of the people (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013). 
There are different implicit factors in this notion of legitimacy that lead us, in turn, to a
better understanding of democracy. These are most clearly formulated in Robert Dahl’s
classic  statement  in  which he  broadly defines  five  criteria  for  a  democratic  process.
These  include  effective  participation,  voting  equality,  enlightened  understanding,
exercising final control over the agenda and the inclusion of all adults (Dahl 1998, 37-8).
Similarly,  Francis  Cheneval  defines  the  essence  of  the  adjective  “democratic”  as
“members recognized with equal status that are included in collective decision-making
processes”  (Cheneval  2015,  19;  transl.  LP).  While these definitions are  very broad,  I
would  agree  with  Bühlmann  and  Kriesi  that  “[u]nder  contemporary  conditions,
democracy essentially means representative government”  (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013,
46). Although representative democracy appears to be the most widespread, it can take
on different  shapes,  including  “liberal  democracy,  protective  democracy,  competitive
elitism, pluralism, or legal democracy” (ibid.: 45). Despite these differences, a common
feature of representative models of democracy – in comparison, for example, to more
participatory models – is that there is a clear separation between governors and the
governed.  Furthermore,  the  democratic  process  and  the  legitimacy  that  results
therefrom are confined to the public sphere and the state’s use of coercion. While this
1  According to Rawls, “[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human
reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy” (Rawls 2005, 137).
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may  be  the  most  widespread  understanding,  to  assume  that  it  is  the  best  form  of
democracy would be a naturalistic fallacy. In contrast to this assumption, I will argue
that  democracy  and  democratic  legitimacy  cannot  be  confined  to  elections  of
representatives in government but that they must deal with the question of power more
generally and be extended to the sphere of economics in specific. To make a case for this,
I will turn to incremental models of democracy as described by Wolfgang Merkel with
reference to those especially developed by C.B. Macpherson and David Held. 
1.2. Models of Democracy
In discussing the question whether contemporary democracy is in a crisis,  Wolfgang
Merkel  distinguishes  between  minimalist,  medium-range  and  maximalist  models  of
democracy.  Merkel  associates  the  minimalist  model  with  Joseph  Schumpeter’s
competitive and elitist model of democracy. Here, “free, equal, and secret ballots are not
only the core of democracy, but democracy itself” (Merkel 2014b, 12). Other names for
this  type  of  democracy  are,  for  example,  Max  Weber’s  “plebiscitary  leadership
democracy”  (Held 1987, 158) or the “pluralist elitist equilibrium model”  (Macpherson
1977, 77). Competitive elitist democracy emphasizes the existence of social inequality in
the  form  of  a  ruling  elite  as  political  producers  vis-à-vis  the  less  well-off  and  less
educated  masses  as  political  consumers.  The  model  presupposes  a  pyramidal  and
bureaucratic structure of society and is based on what Vincent Ostrom calls “machine
politics and boss rule” (V. Ostrom 1997, 19). Political power is located at the center and
top of society and is made responsive and vertically accountable through competitive
elections. Due to the danger of such centralized power, this competitive elitist model of
democracy is often coupled with protective and legal models of democracy (Held 1987,
37-71, 243-254, Macpherson 1977, 23-43). To further limit the power of the state and
the representatives in office, the minimalist concept of democracy also requires a clear
separation of the public from the private and of political from economic spheres. This
separation supposedly provides people with a realm of private economic freedom that
protects  them from state  coercion.  This  is  what  is  normally  understood  as  negative
freedom: The freedom from arbitrary interference by the state or public  (Berlin 2008,
169-78). In turn, this freedom also disciplines the state through the power of private
individuals,  which is  mostly based on their  “countervailing power of private capital”
(Held  1987,  160).  We  will  return  to  this  model  of  democracy  when  discussing  the
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justification of open and competitive markets later. According to Wolfgang Merkel, this
minimalist  model  does  not  provide  us  with  the  information  to  discern  whether  a
democracy  exists  or  is  in  crisis  because  we  cannot  know  whether  the  elected
representatives  are  governing  on  behalf  of  the  people  or  “on  behalf  of  large
corporations, banks, lobbies, and supranational regimes” (Merkel 2014, 13). 
In comparison to this minimalist model, Merkel argues that a medium-range democracy
goes  beyond  periodic  elections  and  vertical  accountability.  Here,  he  argues  that  a
medium-range democracy must be “embedded in guaranteed human and civil rights and
in checks and balances” (Merkel 2014, 13). Although Wolfgang Merkel only discusses the
rule of law as a central element of democracy in the mid-range model, I would argue that
Merkel does not differentiate between specific types of the rule of law. In a minimalist
model, the rule of law is limited to the protection of private property, the enforcement of
contracts and the guarantee of periodic elections. In the medium-range model, the rule
of law is  extended to other civil  rights which include,  most importantly,  the right  to
participation in political decision-making processes (Merkel 2015, 12). This comes close
to Cheneval’s second definition of the adjective “democratic”, which “means a decision-
making procedure of a political community or people, in which all citizens have the right
to participate in the organization of collective action and to control the use of political
authority/power”  (Cheneval  2015,  19;  transl.  LP).  The  focus  lies  here  on  the  input-
dimension of democracy and background institutions that provide just procedures. The
specific output of democracies is not included in this definition, but, rather, depends on
the outcomes of deliberation processes. Input and output, form and substance are torn
apart.  The emphasis  on political  procedures and participation implies that  a middle-
range democracy includes certain forms of developmental democracy such as the one
propagated by John Stuart Mill, in that it enables people to develop their intellect and
moral  capabilities  through this  participation  (Macpherson 1977,  44-76).  This  can,  in
turn, be understood as a formal understanding of positive freedom, or the freedom to
reflexively develop one’s self in deliberative interaction with others (Honneth 2014, 29-
41).  Furthermore,  Merkel  (2015,  12)  argues  that  this  model  of  democracy  also
theoretically includes more demanding forms of participatory democracy as propagated
by Benjamin Barber  (1984) and Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright  (2003). It appears,
therefore, that Merkel’s notion of medium-range democracy is very broad and includes a
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wide  variety  of  specific  democratic  concepts  ranging  from  representative  to  more
participatory forms of democracies. 
In contrast to this procedural understanding of democracy in the medium-range model,
Merkel  argues  that  the  maximalist  model  of  democracy  emphasizes  the  output
dimension. According to Merkel, this 
“include[s]  public  goods,  such  as  internal  and  external  security,  economic
welfare,  welfare  state  guarantees,  fairness  in  the  distribution  of  basic  goods,
income, social security, and life chances. In particular, they emphasize the need to
avoid extreme inequalities in the distribution of income, and view the provision
of primary and social goods at the core of democracy” (Merkel 2014, 13).
This,  in  turn,  comes  close  to  Cheneval’s  third  concept  of  the  adjective  “democracy”,
which  “generally  means  the  normative  ideas  of  a  form  of  living  that  is  egalitarian,
inclusive,  deliberative,  transparent,  free  from  oppression  and  exploitation,  fair,  etc.”
(Cheneval  2015,  19).  The  inclusion  of  the  output  dimension  into  the  definition  of
democracy implies an extension of the rule of law to include social and economic rights
such  as  the  right  to  education,  housing,  health,  a  minimum  wage  or  the  means  of
production.  This  maximalist  model  attempts  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  a  purely
procedural concept of democracy in which the door to participation might be wide open,
but  if  people  lack  the  resources  and  capabilities  to  enter  the  realms  of  politics,
participation becomes an empty promise. The model attempts to give substance to form
– and transforms formal freedom into a more substantive, positive freedom. However,
Merkel  is  critical  of  the  maximalist  model  because  it  does  not  necessarily  require
democratic procedures and can easily be realized in more authoritarian regimes (Merkel
2015,  13).  Furthermore,  Merkel  rejects  the  maximalist  model  because  normative
standards are supposedly so high that “only a few democracies can pass their ‘social-
democratic test’” (Merkel 2014, 14). And because the minimalist model is so meager,
Merkel argues that it is necessary to adopt a medium-range definition of democracy that
enables people to measure the grades of a democracy without automatically assuming
that all democracies are either in perfectly good health or permanently in crisis (Merkel
2015, 14).
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1.3. Surplus and Foundational Meanings of Democracy 
Wolfgang Merkel’s three-tier model of democracy is sufficient if one wants to measure
existing democracies.  Yet,  because the model’s focus is on measuring the qualities of
existing  democracies,  especially  with  reference  to  their  procedural  institutions,  it
obviously lacks the ability to grasp the full potentiality of democracies. This would be
like attempting to measure a child’s future height and weight when it will be an adult.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that a democracy must forever remain in the specific
form  that  it  currently  exists  in.  Just  because  a  certain  form  of  democracy  is  more
widespread or easier to measure does and should not imply that this specific model of
democracy  must  be  maintained.  This  would  be  a  naturalistic  fallacy  in  democratic
theory.  In this  sense,  I  would agree with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal  Mouffe that  all
terms  and  identities  are  “polysemic”  and  therefore  “overdetermined”  (Laclau  and
Mouffe 2001,  121).  This  implies that they bear a “surplus of meaning” that  disrupts,
breaks up and goes beyond the present dominant and hegemonic understanding of a
word (ibid., 97-114). In the words of Laclau and Mouffe: 
“The  practice  of  articulation,  therefore,  consists  in  the  construction  of  nodal
points  which  partially  fix  meaning;  and  the  partial  character  of  this  fixation
proceeds from the openness of the social,  a result,  in its turn,  of  the constant
overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity” (ibid.,
113).
 While this potentiality cannot be easily measured, this does not imply, in turn, that it
does not exist. On the contrary, it implies that meanings – and realities – change over
time, for better or worse. In relation to democracy, this is easily shown by the expansion
of the enfranchised population from only male adults who own property to all  male
adults, to women and to people who were previously considered to be slaves. However,
the understanding of democratic inclusion must not stop there but could, in the future,
also  include  immigrants,  teenagers  and  children or,  as  I  will  later  argue,  even non-
human beings. The same can be said about the understanding of democratic equality
which is for some the central  aspect  of  democracy  (Christiano 2010,  199,  Christiano
2008). There exist, however, different interpretations of democratic equality. We can,
for  example,  understand  equality  as  the  equal  protection  of  property  rights  for  the
existing distribution of resources and the equal right of citizens to elect a representative
every four years (minimalist model). Another notion of equality implies the equal right
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to participate in politics more actively (medium-range model). Yet another denotes the
rough equality of material resources to enable people to lead a self-determined life in
concert  with  others.  Merkel,  for  example,  accepts  the  shift  in  the  rule  of  law  from
minimal  property  rights  to  other  basic  civil  rights  that  aim  to  secure  political
participation  but,  in  turn,  rejects  the  further  shift  to  equal  socio-economic  rights.
Furthermore,  the  question  of  why  democracy  is  limited  to  the  public  sphere  is
completely ignored. Put in such a historical  context,  Merkel’s normative demarcation
appears  contingent  and  arbitrary  and  suppresses  a  more  fundamental,  normative
understanding of  democracy.  To  be  fair,  we must  distinguish  here  between political
science that aims to measure reality and political theory that opens up possibilities of
how this reality can or should be transformed. While Merkel is of the former camp, I
would position my argument, which I will develop here, in the latter group.
That being said, I would like to push this argument for a more demanding understanding
of democracy a little bit further. In the description of models of democracy in this paper
so far, there appears to be an implicit normative linearity from bad to good to best. One
could  argue  that  this  linearity  corresponds  with  the  chronological  linearity  of  the
development  of  democracy  from  a  minimal  model  in  the  late  19th and  early  20th
centuries  to  a  medium-range,  proceduralist  model  since  the  Second  World  War and
possibly  to  more  substantive  forms  of  democracy  in  the  future.  Here,  substantial
participation is  nice  to  have,  yet  not  a  necessary and inherent aspect  of  democracy.
Contrary to this account, I would argue with numerous others such as Chantal Mouffe,
Axel  Honneth  and  Charles  Taylor  that  both  minimal  and  proceduralist  accounts  of
democracy  are  already  expressions  of  substantive  values.  As  Mouffe  explains  with
reference to Wittgenstein: 
“Rules [of law; LP], for Wittgenstein, are always abridgements of practices, they
are inseparable from specific forms of life. The distinction between procedural
and substantial cannot therefore be as clear as most liberal theorists would have
it. In the case of justice, for instance, it means that one cannot oppose, as so many
liberals  do,  procedural  and  substantial  justice  without  recognizing  that
procedural  justice  already presupposes  acceptance  of  certain  values.  It  is  the
liberal conception of justice which posits the priority of the right over the good,
but this is already the expression of a specific good”(Mouffe 2000, 68).
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As we can see, this procedure-substance dichotomy is based on the “liberal” distinction
between the right (form/procedure) and the good (substance). Mouffe argues, however,
that the specific definition of the right is also always an expression of a specific good. In
other words,  while procedural democracy emphasizes an individual  or particularistic
concept  of  the  good,  the  realization  of  such  individual  rights  is  based  on  more
fundamental social freedom. Along these lines, in his book Freedom’s Right (2014), Axel
Honneth defines  the  concept  of  social  freedom in  contrast  to  negative  and  reflexive
positive freedom: 
“While the idea of negative freedom […] must fail because the ‘content’ of action
cannot  itself  be  grasped as ‘free’,  the  idea  of  reflexive  freedom  is  insufficient
because  it  opposes  the  actions  it  views  as  free  in  substance,  viz.  as  self-
determined acts,  to  an objective  reality  that  must continue to be  regarded as
completely heteronymous. […] Not only must individual intentions be developed
without any external influence, but the external, social reality must be able to be
conceived as  being free of  all  heteronomy and compulsion.  The idea of  social
freedom, therefore, is to be understood as the outcome of a theoretical endeavor
that expands the criteria underlying the notion of reflexive [positive; LP] freedom
to  include  the  sphere  that  is  traditionally  set  in  opposition  to  the  subject  as
external reality. […] The idea is rooted in a conception of social institutions in
which subjects can grasp each other as the other of their own selves […] Because
the individual’s striving for freedom can thus be fulfilled only within – or with the
aid of – institutions, the ‘intersubjective’ concept of freedom expands once again
into a ‘social’ concept of freedom. A subject is only ‘free’ if it encounters another
subject, within the framework of institutional practices, to whom it is joined in a
relationship of mutual recognition; only then can it regard the aims of the other
as the condition for the realization of its own aims” (Honneth 2014, 43-4). 
Or in somewhat simpler terms: “We must first regard all subjects as integrated in social
structures that ensure their freedom, before they then participate as free beings in a
procedure that monitors the legitimacy of the social order”  (Honneth 2014, 57). This
implies that form and content, procedure and substance, other and self, and an objective
social  order  and  subjective  freedom  always  exist  in  circular,  dialectical  and
interdependent relationships that advance each other. In the debate between liberalism
and communitarianism, this implies that social, democratic freedom and the definition
of a common good are inherent ontological preconditions for individual freedom (Taylor
2003).  Or in other terms, democratic  rights can only be realized through substantial
participation  in  (countervailing)  collective  action,  irrespective  of  their  specific  type.
Translated  back  into  the  debate  on  democracy,  this  implies  that  the  supposed
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“maximalist” model of democracy in fact underlies both minimalist and medium-range
models. 
This normative reversal of the sequence of democratic models opens our insight, firstly,
to the fact  that  procedure and substance in democratic  models  cannot  be  so clearly
separated and that means and ends are reciprocally determined (Dorf and Sabel 1998,
284).  Second,  it  has  become  clear  that  democratic  freedom  should  be  inherently
understood as deeper and broader than minimalist and medium-range models. But what
does this mean for our definition of democracy? It suggests that although democracy is
often understood either as a representative democracy or the more active participation
in political  decision-making procedures,  the word democracy simultaneously bears a
normative surplus,  which invariably points to transformations and – in an optimistic
interpretation – improvements of social arrangements. On the one hand and, in Rawls’
words, this refers to the realization of a more just or democratic basic social structure
that realizes a “fair value of political liberty” (Rawls 1999, 226). On the other hand, this
dynamic  and  social  reading  of  democracy also  demonstrates  that  democracy has  an
inherent tendency to overflow from political spheres into other spheres of social life, be
that  the  family,  church,  media  or  the  economy.  However,  this  does  not  imply  that
democracy originates in the political sphere. Instead, I would agree with John Dewey’s
well-known saying that a “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily
a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience”  (Dewey 2008, 93).
Nevertheless, I would, go further than this vague notion and specify with Joshua Cohen
and Joel Rogers that a democratic way of living implies “the idea that free and equal
persons should together control the conditions of their own association”  (Cohen and
Rogers  1983,  18).  In  this  definition  it  remains  unclear,  however,  how  the  specific
relation  between  the  individual  and  democratic  freedom  is  to  be  understood.  To
comprehend  this  relationship,  it  is  helpful  to  turn  to  David  Held’s  “principle  of
autonomy”,  which takes the relationship between individual and democratic freedom
into account: 
“[I]ndividuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of
their own lives; that is,  they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly,  equal
obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the
opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to
negate the rights of others” (Held 1987, 271). 
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Although this concept of autonomy is framed as individual, it is essentially social and
democratic  in  that  it  enables  people  to  participate  in  the  co-determination  of  one’s
institutions. Important aspects of this principle for Held are the “key conditions for the
realization of the principle of autonomy” (Held 1987, 275), which include, for example,
the  limitation of  private  property,  access  to resources  and necessary changes  in  the
organization  of  household  or  care  activities.  Here,  our  concepts  of  democracy  and
politics are broadened to deal with the distribution of resources and questions of power
more generally:  
“[Democratic  politics;  LP]  is  about  the capacity  of  social  agents,  agencies  and
institutions to maintain or transform their environment, social or physical. It is
about the resources that underpin this capacity and about the forces that shape
and influence its exercise.  Accordingly,  politics is a phenomenon found in and
between  all  groups,  institutions  (formal  and  informal)  and  societies,  cutting
across public and private life. It is expressed in all the activities of cooperation,
negotiation and struggle over the use and distribution of resources. It is involved
in  all  the  relations,  institutions  and  structures  which  are  implicated  in  the
activities of production and reproduction in the life of societies. Politics creates
and conditions all aspects of our lives and it is at the core of the development of
problems in society and the collective modes of  their  resolution”  (Held 1987,
275-7). 
For this reason and according to Held, politics are considered “a universal dimension of
human life” (ibid., 277), which should be subject to democratic legitimacy based on the
principle of autonomy and democratic decision-making procedures. It can be said here
with  Laclau  and  Mouffe  that  politics  become  more  “political”  in  that  they  are  now
understood  as  “a  practice  of  creation,  reproduction  and  transformation  of  social
relations [that; LP] cannot be located at a determinate level of the social” (Laclau and
Mouffe 2001, 153). Democracy thus becomes more “political” as it is understood to be
the  ability  to  alter  and  determine  the  diverse  arrangements  that  structure  society.
Furthermore,  democracy  is  understood  as  a  means  to  deal  with  the  distribution  of
resources,  power  and  the  problems  that  result  therefrom.  It  is  this  broad  yet
fundamental  concept  of  democracy  that  I  will  further  develop  in  relation  to  the
ecologically grounded concept of commons.  
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For the moment,  however,  let  us turn to an analysis of the relationship between the
market  and  the  state  in  order  to  see  to  what  extent  this  concept  of  democracy  is
compatible with the open and competitive market. 
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2. State Monopoly and the Competitive Market 
Besides  democracy,  the  other  main  social  institution  that  has  gained  widespread
acceptance is that of the capitalist or open and competitive market. In this section, I will
therefore analyze the justifications of the open and competitive market and its relation
to both the state and to democracy. I will begin this analysis with a short discussion of
Thomas Hobbes’ influential work on the state-market relation. In a second step, I will
argue  with  reference  to  Montesquieu  and,  most  importantly,  Adam  Smith  that  two
central justifications of the competitive market are its creation of a peaceful social order
and the unlimited generation or, rather, accumulation of monetary wealth. Thirdly, I will
demonstrate  with  reference  to  diverse  and  more  contemporary  economists  that  a
central feature of the competitive market is that it operates in a self-regulating manner,
which requires both limited state interference and an open institutional structure. In a
final  step,  I  will  argue  with  reference  to  Friedrich  August  von Hayek that  the  strict
implementation of  an open and competitive  market severely undermines democracy
and can potentially lead to a type of authoritarian liberalism.  
Before beginning with this discussion, I would, however, like to shortly explain why I do
not speak of capitalism here, but instead use the term market or, more precisely, open
and competitive markets. The reason for this is not only because capitalism is often used
in a critical or pejorative manner, but also because it describes a more encompassing
historical  socio-economic transformation of  society  (Kocka 2014,  6).  In  contrast,  the
terms “market” or “market economy” is not only less polemical, but also refers to the
more idealized and, thus, somewhat ahistorical model of the market. It is this idealized
institutional arrangement of the open and competitive market that I would like to focus
on here. As I will later demonstrate in my discussion of the market commons, openness
and  competition  are,  however,  not  characteristic  of  all  markets,  but  merely  specific
institutional arrangements of  capitalist  markets.  And within the existing “varieties of
capitalism”  (Hall  and  Soskice  2004),  they refer  to  the  ideal  model  of  liberal  market
economies. But for now, let us turn to the origin, justification and implications of the
open and competitive markets in the history of political thought. 
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2.1. Hobbes: Anarchy, Leviathan and the Competitive Market
In the history of ideas, it can generally be said that the concept of the competitive market
arose with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and his individualistic portrayal of humans in
antagonistic  relationships  (Hobbes  1985[1651]).2 In  Hobbes’  book  Leviathan, an
absolute sovereign should overcome the anarchic state of nature, then enabling people
to pursue their self-interest in a less destructive manner. By possessing the monopoly on
the use of coercion,  this Leviathan can secure individual property rights and enforce
contracts. Similarly to the minimalist notion of democracy, here freedom is understood
negatively  as  non-interference  that  provides  people  with  the  legal  framework  and
security to trade and accumulate goods freely in a competitive market.  According to
Hobbes, the monopoly of the state shall overcome an anarchic state of nature by creating
a competitive market economy. 
Because it is important to understand Hobbes’ theory in its historical context, I would
argue  with  C.B.  Macpherson  (Macpherson  2011) that  Hobbes’  Leviathan  was  not
primarily an answer to an imagined anarchic state of nature, but more concretely to the
development of a merchant class with “market-made wealth” that then led to the English
Civil  War of 1642 that went on until  1651 (ibid.,  65).  Here,  “war was an attempt to
destroy the old constitution and replace it with one more favorable to the new market
interests” (ibid.). This social disorder that Hobbes experienced was then projected onto
a theoretical state of nature. In turn, Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan was not utilized to
legitimate and secure a minimal, parliamentary democracy, but to legitimate the rule of
an absolute sovereign. It could be argued that with Hobbes’ contractual theory of the
state,  absolute  authority  was  secularized  and  shifted  from  the  Church  to  a  socially
legitimated state monopoly. Nevertheless, both the Leviathan and laws were understood
as virtuous and absolute and the people constituting the social order as corrupt. Social
order was therefore conceived as a dichotomy of coercion and repression from above
and adherence by the  people  below.  Here,  the  sovereign  is  to  be understood as  the
watchmaker of an “automated machine” (ibid., 31) of a competitive market society that
is held together by the overarching monopoly of the state. 
2  For a discussion of this individualistic and antagonistic portrayal of social reality,
see for example, C.B. Macpherson’s introduction to Hobbes’ Leviathan (Macpherson 1985, 48-53).
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2.2.  Justifying  the  Market:  Social  Order,  Protection  from  Arbitrary
Powers and Unlimited Wealth
The rise of bourgeois society and Hobbes’ new understanding of a competitive market
economy was utilized soon enough not only for the legitimization of a Leviathan, but
also  for  the  creation  of  a  more  peaceful  and  prosperous  social  order.  As  Albert  O.
Hirschman convincingly  explains in his  book  The Passions and the Interests:  Political
Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Hirschman 1997), the pursuit of economic
self-interests was not only intended to overcome the capricious and belligerent passions
of  feudal  lords,  but  also  to  limit  the  monopoly  of  power  of  absolute  monarchs.
Hirschman demonstrates that this assumption is most clearly declared by Montesquieu
in  his  Esprit  des  lois (1748),  who assumes that  “commerce […] polishes  and softens
barbarian ways” (Montesquieu quoted in Hirschman 1997, 60). Put somewhat simply,
steadfast economic interests in trade and commerce should tame wild and capricious
passions. Or, conversely, irrational passions should be channeled into rational economic
interests as in a process of sublimation. For these reasons, commerce can not only tame
feudal lords, but it can also pacify entire peoples and nations. Furthermore, in enabling
people  to  pursue  their  economic  interests  and  move  their  capital  about  freely,
Montesquieu saw an economic means to check the abuse of unlimited political power
(ibid.:  77-8).3 This  is  what  was  previously  implied  by  the  “countervailing  power  of
private  capital”  (Held  1987,  160).  Simply  put,  market  competition  should  not  only
overcome the anarchy of warring feudal lords, but it should also limit the monopoly of
power of absolute sovereigns. 
We find another twist to this general legitimation of competitive markets in the works of
two other writers of the same time period, Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) and, more
importantly, Adam Smith (1723-1790). It could be said that Mandeville made the point
most bluntly in his postulate that through competition and commerce, “private vices”
will transform into “publick benefits” (Mandeville 1924). Although Adam Smith was no
cynic like Mandeville, this conviction appears very similar to Adam Smith’s well-known
metaphor of  the “invisible  hand” in  The Wealth of  Nations from 1776 in which self-
interest leads to social order and an increase in society’s material wealth (Smith 1994,
3  It  should be differentiated here that while  Montesquieu was concerned with
limiting the unlimited power of  the king,  Adam Smith was more concerned with the pacification and
limitation of the power of feudal lords (Hirschman 1997, 102).
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485).4 The  importance  of  this  paradigmatic  shift  in  moral  and  political  philosophy
cannot be underestimated.  In line with other “modern” thinkers such as Hobbes and
Machiavelli and, possibly, for the first time in human history, social order and well-being
should not be created by combatting vice with virtue, but instead through the collision of
vice  or  self-interest  with  the  self-interest  of  others.  As  with  Hobbes,  in  the  social
arrangements of Mandeville and Adam Smith individuals are conceptualized as separate
and  self-interested  entities  that  find  themselves  in  antagonistic  and  competitive
relationships  with  each  other.  Similar  to  Montesquieu,  Adam  Smith  emphasizes  his
somewhat surprising and paradoxical  conclusion that  by unleashing self-interest and
competition, a more orderly and thus more orderly society should arise. Adam Smith
explains this in relation to corporations and the monopoly of coercive force:   
“The  pretence  that  corporations  are  necessary  for  the  better  government
[management; LP] of the trade is without any foundation. The real and effectual
discipline which is exercised over a workman is not that of his corporation, but that
of  his  customers.  It  is  the fear  of  losing  their  employment which restrains  his
frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive [monopolistic; LP] corporation
necessarily weakens the force of this discipline” (ibid., 149; emphasis added).
Adam Smith’s notion of corporations is to be equated with the guild system that owned
rather  large  monopolies  spanning  most  trades  and  markets  in  medieval  Europe.  In
contrast to the belief that a monopoly of coercion, which in this case is understood as the
guild system, is the best instrument to provide social order, Adam Smith argues that it is
the competitive market that does a better job at disciplining its citizens. The reason for
this is that, in order to survive in a competitive market, people have to satisfy consumer
demands and offer (better) products at lower prices. Simply put, the fear of losing one’s
job  forces  people  to  work  harder  and  produce  more.  In  this  sense,  competing
interactions  between  self-interested  individuals  on  the  market  create  a  disciplining
mechanism that is not exerted by any individual or organization. Thus, social order is
brought  about  not  (only)  through  coercion  from  above,  be  it  through  guilds,
corporations or the state,  but through the disciplining mechanism of the competitive
market itself. 
4  As is common knowledge, the “invisible hand” is only mentioned twice in Adam
Smith’s works. Once in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 2009, 215) and a second time in The Wealth
of Nations (Smith 1994, 485). Although the term is only mentioned twice in his works, I would argue that
the  concept  itself  maintains  a  central  position  throughout  his  economic  theory  and  is  also  implicitly
expressed in his concept of harmony between supply and demand. 
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This market mechanism leads to Adam Smith’s second important assumption that the
competitive  market  –  or  what  he  calls  “perfect  liberty”  –  leads  to  greater  material
wealth. The increase in material social wealth results not only from the mechanism of
competition,  but also from the positive connotation of self-interest and therefore the
release of egotistical springs in human action from other moral obligations. 5 This moral
transformation  is  closely  intertwined  with  the  changes  in  the  legal  framework  that
enabled possibilities to accumulate property. It can generally be said, therefore, that a
shift occurred both in moral philosophy and in political and legal philosophy. Similar to
John Locke’s labor theory of property, Adam Smith declares, “The property which every
man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is
the most sacred and inviolable” (ibid., 140: emphasis added). This concept of individual
property is a clear critique of earlier, medieval forms of property that were based on
feudal,  customary  law  and,  in  certain  cases,  collective  rights,  in  which  individual
appropriation was highly regulated and the possibility of the arbitrary confiscation of
property through lords and monarchs was pervasive (Holt 1972, Schneider 1997, Blickle
2000,  Zückert  2003,  Linebaugh 2008).  With this  new concept  of  property –  and the
increase in durable, mobile property (money) – individuals could, at least theoretically,
appropriate  property  through their  labor  and trade and accumulate  it  freely  (Locke
2008, II §25-51). We will discuss Locke’s theory of property in further detail later, but
for the moment, it is important to note that this economic right to private property was
understood as a natural or sacred right that stood above the political rights of absolute
monarchs and states.  We must therefore understand these new property rights as a
central means to not only limit the power of the state, but also to open the door for
wealth generation and accumulation. Here, the monopolistic structure of the sovereign
ruler over a clearly delineated territory is replicated in the absolute sovereignty of an
individual over its clearly delineated private property. From this perspective, the sacred
5  Although Adam Smith expresses an ambivalence towards this paradigm shift and
emphasizes the importance of non-economic motives in human action  (Smith 2009,  Hirschman 1997,
108),  he  argues  similarly  to  Montesquieu  that  economic  motives  enable  the  satisfaction  of  all  other
noneconomic values – or conversely, that all noneconomic motives (including “passions”) “feed into” and
“reinforce” economic motives (Hirschman 1997, 109-110). I would, however, agree with Hirschman that
although Adam Smith supported the positive  outcomes of  a  competitive  market  (social  order and an
increase in material wealth), he found the means to this end problematic and unfortunate (ibid., 105). This
ambivalence can be found in his description of the flipside of the division of labor which greatly increases
material  wealth yet simultaneously weakens the moral and intellectual capabilities of laborers (Smith
1994, 840).  Elsewhere in Adam Smith’s Lectures, he also expresses the problem of commerce leading to
“debilitating luxury and corruption” (Hirschman 1997, 106).
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character of the subject and of the right to absolute rule is maintained yet dispersed in
the  hierarchical  and  Cartesian  structure  of  man’s  ownership  over  res  extensa,
irrespective  whether  one merely has  property  in  one’s  own person or  also  in  other
things of the world. In this sense, the “possessive individualism” (Macpherson 2011) of
the competitive market should not only limit the monopoly of power of absolute rulers,
but should also – at least theoretically – undermine the monopoly power of corporations
and guilds (Smith 1994,  136-156).  Thus,  the divine right  to private  property should
ultimately provide the individual with the protection it needs from arbitrary political
intervention,  the decentralization of economic power and the freedom to accumulate
property without limit,  thereby supposedly increasing the general material  wealth of
society. 
2.3. Self-Regulation, Limited Politics and the Open-Access Market
Aside from these moral and legal paradigm shifts to a society geared towards material
wealth accumulation, let us now discuss the concept of the “invisible hand” a little more.
Although the “invisible hand” has often been criticized (Stiglitz 2006, Dupuy 2014, Amir-
ud-Din and Zaman 2016),6 it can be said that the metaphor still holds a central place in
both economic thought and the social imagination in Western societies, ultimately laying
the foundation for the legitimacy of the competitive market. Besides its disciplining and
wealth generating function, another aspect of the market’s ability to create social order
is its supposed ability to self-regulate economic activities. First and foremost, this notion
of self-regulation is not to be understood as democratic self-governance as previously
discussed.  Instead,  supply  and  demand  of  goods  and  services  are  brought  into
equilibrium on their own –  without political or state intervention. But how does this
magical mechanism work? In the words of Adam Smith: 
“It is thus [in a competitive market; LP] that the private interests and passions of
individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards the employments
which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society. But if from this
natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments,
the fall of profit in them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them
to alter this faulty distribution.  Without any intervention of law,  therefore,  the
private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute
6  In  this  somewhat  famous interview,  Joseph Stiglitz  argued “Adam Smith,  the
father of modern economics, is often cited as arguing for the ‘invisible hand’ and free markets [...] But
unlike his followers, Adam Smith was aware of some of the limitations of free markets, and research since
then has further clarified why free markets, by themselves, often do not lead to what is best. […] [T]he
reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is often not there” (Stiglitz 2006).
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the stock of every society among all the different employments carried on in it as
nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the
whole society” (Smith 1994, 680; emphasis added).
In this passage, it is assumed that a competitive market economy will, first and foremost,
serve  the  demands  of  consumers  and  therefore  society  at  large.  As  we  can see,  the
motivation for this service is a pecuniary profit incentive. If too much investment from
competing firms flows into a certain good or service, however, both the price and the
rate  of  profit  then decrease.  This  allocates  investments  into  the  production of  other
goods and services that  are in demand and into places where greater profits  can be
realized. This balancing process also occurs for changes in demand, which drive prices
and profit rates up or down and thus theoretically bring about changes in production. 
These descriptions, images and metaphors that Adam Smith presented during the 18th
century are readily found in today’s economic discourse. The image that arises from this
description  of  self-regulating  competitive  markets  is  that  of  individual  entities  of
resources, producers, products and consumers freely and harmoniously interacting in a
vacuum-like space. This is portrayed by the well-known simple graphs of introductory
economics courses in which supply and demand curves shift and intersect according to
changes  in  production and consumption.  This  balancing-out process between supply
and demand is later renamed by neoclassical  economists such as Walras,  Arrow and
Debreu  as  the  general  or  competitive  equilibrium  theory  (Walras  1965,  Arrow  and
Debreu  1954).  The  assumption  that  a  competitive  market  economy  most  efficiently
allocates  society’s  resources  is  understood  today  as  Pareto  efficiency  or  Pareto
optimality.7 Although  Friedrich  August  von  Hayek  later  criticized  these  notions  of
perfect  equilibrium  and  Pareto  optimality,  his  notion  of  catallaxy must  still  be
understood as a re-interpretation of this old notion of a social order that spontaneously
arises from the dynamic self-regulating functioning of the competitive market  (Hayek
2013, Butos 1985, Vaughn 2013). 
7  Amartya Sen criticizes the term Pareto optimality because it  “is an extremely
limited way of assessing social  achievement”  (Sen 1988,  35).  He explains this with a rather alarming
example: “A state in which some people are starving and suffering from acute deprivation while others are
tasting the good life can still be pareto optimal if the poor cannot be made better off without cutting into
the pleasures of the rich – no matter by how small an amount. Pareto optimality is faint praise indeed”
(Sen 1984, 95).
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Furthermore, the self-regulation of the market must also be understood as a process in
which power is supposedly shifted from producers consumers. This has already been
mentioned in relation to Adam Smith’s quote on the discipline of the market. Today, this
is  known  as  consumer  sovereignty  as  presented  by  William  H.  Hutt  in  his  book
Economists  and the Public (Hutt  1936,  1940) and as propagated by Milton and Rose
Friedman in their book Free to Choose (1980). Along the same lines, Ludwig von Mises
equated the choice to buy a product on the market to a vote. Mises writes,
“When we call  a  capitalist  society a consumers'  democracy we mean that  the
power to dispose of the means of production, which belongs to the entrepreneurs
and capitalists, can only be acquired by means of the consumers' ballot, held daily
in the marketplace” (Mises 1951, 21).
This  interpretation  of  consumer  sovereignty  gives  the  market  a  political  twist  and
reinterprets  the  competitive  market  as  a  consumer  or  market  democracy.  While
decisions are made daily and producers must react accordingly to regular changes in
demand in the market, in political democracy, citizens often only have the possibility of
electing  a  representative  every  four  years.  According  to  this  argumentation,  the
competitive  market  not  only  holds  a  quasi-divine  and  harmonizing  self-regulating
authority  but  is  ultimately  also  a  better  form  than  any  other  secular  political
organization. 
For specialists  in  the field of  economics,  it  might appear to be highly imprecise and
anachronistic to superficially compare classical economists with neoclassical, Austrian,
and  Chicagoan  economists.  Nevertheless,  I  would  strongly  argue  that  despite  their
different interpretations of (partial) equilibrium theory, in the end the main gist of their
arguments  often boil  down to a  common belief  in  the  self-regulating abilities  of  the
market and a more general common political vision. As has already been mentioned, a
main economic problem for Adam Smith was the monopoly of power of guilds, on the
one hand,  and the interference of the state in the pursuit of  material  wealth,  on the
other.  In  fact,  Adam  Smith  argues  that  it  is  precisely  the  intervention  of  politics  in
economic matters that lead to inequalities or disequilibria, 
“[f]irst, by restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number
than would otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it
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in others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the free
circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment and from
place to place” (Smith 1994, 136).
The  state  should  therefore  neither  limit  nor  support  free  competition.  However,  it
remains quite unclear where this “perfect liberty” truly lies. Nevertheless, it is a main
consensus  amongst  economists  that  for  markets  to  be  competitive,  no  monopolies
should exist, and this supposedly works best in markets that are open and free. Here, it
is  assumed that  unlimited and self-regulating competition will  eventually  destroy all
monopolies and decentralize economic power.  While Adam Smith’s work was mostly
aimed against the monopolies of guilds and the support thereof through the mercantilist
system, economists of the late 19th and 20th centuries similarly criticized the socialist and
welfare  states  for  the  same  reasons.  In  all  these  cases,  a  main  critique  is  the  basic
interference of the state’s monopoly of power in the “private” sphere of economics. The
objection to state interference is thus not only based on the principles of negative rights
to  individual  private  property,  but  also  on  the  maintenance  of  the  self-regulating
mechanism of the competitive market. States should therefore keep their hands off the
invisible  hand  and  be  highly  limited  in  their  attempts  to  “artificially”  constraint  or
abolish competition by closing markets or managing economic affairs. 
Since Adam Smith, the answer to this state interference has therefore generally been, at
least  in  principle,  the  opening  of  markets.  For  this  reason,  the  new  institutional
economist  Douglass  North  understands  capitalist  markets  as  “open  access  orders”
(North et al. 2009). Similarly, Friedrich Hayek argues that economic freedom8 cannot be
limited to any community or nation,  but  that  it  is  inherently open and international
(Hayek 2007, 226). All national boundaries restricting the free movement of people and
capital  should  be  limited  to  a  minimum,  integrating  all  economies  into  one  single
common market  (Hayek 1980, 258). Due to the international character of the market,
nation states must pass their powers on to international bodies. The role of the state is
thus limited to the impersonal and impartial implementation of international economic
laws  and  the  preservation  of  the  apparent  independence  of  economic  and  political
realms of human interaction. As Douglass North et al. explain, 
8  I refer here to the “negative” freedom to trade or exchange goods with others
through  contracts  and  the  freedom  to  accumulate  private  property  –  without  illegitimate  state
intervention. 
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“Open access societies limit access to violence [through the state monopoly on
coercion;  LP]  while  ensuring  open access  to  political  and economic  activities.
Because the political  system in an open access order does not  limit economic
access, it appears that the economy exists independent of the political system. As
the  neoclassical  economists  fiction  holds,  markets  exist  and  then  politics
intervenes.  This  seeming  independence  of  politics  and  economics  in  an  open
access society overlays a much deeper and fundamental connection.  It is here
that  impersonality occupies  central  stage”  (North  et  al.  2009,  121;  emphasis
added).
As we see, this political neutrality of the state should create a legal setting in which all
humans  are,  at  least  theoretically,  equal  and  included  in  the  impersonal  market
exchange. The separation of political matters from economic matters should ultimately
secure the desired competition in the market that, in turn, should enable self-regulating
markets to function properly (ibid.: 110-115, 121-2).9 
2.4.  Economist  Kings,  Authoritarian  Liberalism  and  Structural
Constraints
In all these theories of the competitive market from Thomas Hobbes to Douglass North,
the  political question remains: Who shall rule? And who possesses the knowledge and
insight to create economic laws and policies of the golden mean between hindrance and
support  of  competition?  The  problem  becomes  most  clear  when  we  juxtapose  the
assumption of humans as self-interested and egotistical beings, on the one hand, with
the necessity of a strong and neutral government that impartially imposes law on the
other hand. Furthermore, a tension appears to arise between the necessity of a strong
and  overarching  Hobbesian  state  that  enforces  strict  property  laws  and  contract
agreements and its simultaneous self-limitation of not interfering in economic affairs. 
For this reason, it is interesting to turn to the work of Friedrich August von Hayek, who
provides a rather insightful solution to these tensions between the state and the market.
Importantly,  Hayek transforms  the  simple  mechanistic  understanding  of  equilibrium
9  As Douglass North et al. explain, “Open access orders prevent disorder through
competition  and  open  access.  Consolidated,  political  control  over  violence  combines  with  the  rules
governing the use of that violence to reduce and control access to violence. Constitutions and rule of law
provide limits on governmental policymaking, thus limiting the ways in which citizens can feel threatened
by  the  government  that  in  natural  states  induce  them  to  support  the  use  of  violence  and  extra-
constitutional action to protect themselves. In addition […] competition is intimately involved in enforcing
the constitution and rule of law that support these limits on violence” (North et al. 2009: 115).
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theory into a more dynamic and evolutionary concept of perpetual social  adaptation.
This evolutionary adaptation occurs in a spontaneous manner and therefore cannot be
planned by any political  body.  Here,  we are reminded of the self-regulating invisible
hand. Furthermore, he also admits that the distribution of wealth in a market economy
is not just and that the category of “justice” supposedly cannot be applied to markets.
The reason for this is that there exist no individuals or groups who are responsible for
the “spontaneous” distribution of resources (Hayek 2013, 233). Put somewhat bluntly,
Hayek acknowledged that  the open and competitive market can create much human
suffering  through  as  bankruptcies,  unemployment,  inequalities  and  economic  crises
(Dupuy 2013, 163-4). Yet, for him, these effects were merely inherent elements of what
he  understood  as  a  dynamic  and  spontaneous  social  order.  For  this  reason,  he
recognized that if people possessed the power to alter their social conditions – in what
he  named  an  “unlimited  democracy”  –  they  would  most  likely  do  away  with  the
competitive market or would not develop it in the first place. In the words of Hayek: 
“If in a society in which the spirit of enterprise has not yet spread, the majority
has power to prohibit whatever it dislikes, it is most unlikely that it will allow
competition to arise. I doubt whether a functioning market has ever newly arisen
under  an  unlimited  democracy,  and  it  seems  at  least  likely  that  unlimited
democracy will destroy it where it has grown up. To those with whom others
compete, the fact that they have competitors is always a nuisance that prevents a
quiet life; and such direct effects of competition are always much more visible
than the indirect benefits which we derive from it” (Hayek 2013, 415).
From  Hayek’s  perspective,  people  do  not  desire  an  open  and  competitive  market
arrangement  because  it  implies  a  threat  to  what  he  calls  “a  quiet  life”  (ibid.).  But
understood more generally, the opposition to such a social arrangement is not only due
to a desire to live a peaceful life, but also most likely due to a deep aversion towards the
perpetual change, injustices and existential insecurities that open competitive markets
bring about. It is interesting and important to note that Adam Smith also recognized this
aversion towards open and competitive markets, as he writes, 
“To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in
Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be
established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more
unconquerable, the  private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it”
(Smith 1994, 501; emphasis added). 
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According to Adam Smith, this aversion is due to the monopoly position of guilds and
manufacturers  who  perceived  open  and  competitive  markets  as  a  threat  to  their
economic power.  However,  it  can be assumed that  this  opposition is  also  shared by
farmers and craftspeople, who also saw their existence to be threatened by increased
competition. Interestingly, Adam Smith admits here that open and competitive market
arrangements are somewhat utopian considering the egotistical nature of people. But
isn’t this peculiar? Suddenly, we see that both Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek believe
that people are in fact  too self-interested and that they therefore want to limit market
competition to their advantage. This can be interpreted as a social counter-reaction to
the  creation  of  open  and  competitive  markets  through  economic  deregulation  that
Hayek’s contemporary Karl Polanyi describes as the “double-movement” in his book The
Great  Transformation (Polanyi  2001,  136-157).  Polanyi  understands  this  reaction  to
open and competitive markets as an attempt to alter and socially “re-embed” economic
activities in order to satisfy their  needs and desires (i.e.  the desire to have a secure
income and lead a somewhat stable life). In contrast, it appears as though Adam Smith
and Hayek perceive these people to be blinded by their egoism which disables them
from  recognizing  the  supposedly  more  subtle  and  indirect  achievements  of  a
competitive market economy and, ultimately, from believing in the providence of the
self-regulating market. 
But who, then, is there to implement the rules of such a social arrangement that a large
portion of the population does not desire? Interestingly, Adam Smith remains silent on
the question of who shall rule. For Hayek, the creation of a spontaneous social order
requires people who have an insight into its hidden fruits and impartial laws. Only these
people are able to restrain themselves from the hubris  of  collectively creating social
institutions according to their  particular needs and desires.  Paradoxically,  only these
people can implement social arrangements against the private interests of other people
in order to enable a social order “spontaneously” come about through the pursuit of
people’s  self-interest  in  economic  affairs.  Because  most  people  do  not  possess  this
insight and humbling knowledge, Hayek literally argues that democratic politics must
therefore be “dethroned” (Hayek 2013, 481-5). This is supposed to occur by creating a
body  of  universal  rules  that  primarily  protects  individual  negative  freedom  from
arbitrary  interference  and  coercion,  which  is  nothing  other  than  the  Hobbesian
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protection of individual private property rights and the enforcement of contracts (ibid.,
447). Furthermore, the democratic state should include both a Legislative Assembly and
a Governmental Assembly that is elected by the entire population every couple of years.
The Legislative Assembly consists of adults of a “relatively mature age for fairly long
periods” (ibid., 448), more specifically between 45 and 60 years old and for a period of
15  years.  This  long period should keep members  independent  from the “fluctuating
wishes of  the electorate” and from political  parties “committed to support  particular
interests and particular programmes of actions” (ibid.). In contrast to the Governmental
Assembly, the Legislative Assembly is only elected by people of the age of 45 once in
their lifetime who then choose someone of their generation whom they can “trust to
uphold  justice  impartially”  and  to  possess  qualities  such  as  “probity,  wisdom  and
judgment” (ibid.). This political body would revise and sanction all laws, including those
concerning taxation and regulations for safety,  health and environmental  matters.  In
other  words,  members  would  ultimately  possess  the  power  to  create  an  “adequate
framework for a functioning competitive market” (ibid., 450). To ensure that these laws
are  compatible  with  the  constitution,  Hayek  also  suggests  that  there  should  be  a
constitutional court that oversees the work of these two assemblies. The judges of this
court are, in turn, appointed by the Legislative Assembly and would often include former
members of this assembly. 
As becomes clear, Hayek’s concept of a “democratic” state is not very democratic. The
problem of conflicting interests is solved by a council of the wise who should be – in
contrast to the other self-interested citizens – highly impartial. This group supposedly
possesses the insight into the true nature of a free market society while simultaneously
limiting citizens from democratically co-determining their laws and social arrangements
in ways that  might  interfere  with the price  mechanism,  market competition and the
distribution of resources and wealth that results thereof. In other words, while Hayek
understands the open and competitive market as an evolutionary process of discovery
and adaptation dependent on the decentralized decision-making of individual  agents,
the legal framework of it remains abstract and immutable. While the interactions in the
market  should occur  spontaneously,  its  laws are  enforced and protected in  a  rather
unspontaneous and calculated manner by supposedly wise and objective humans. Put
somewhat crudely,  it  appears that Hayek is defending a social  order that is ruled by
technocratic  economic  experts  or  platonic  economist  kings.  According  to  this
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interpretation, I believe it to be adequate to argue that Hayek’s concept of society based
on an international, open and competitive market comes close to what Hermann Heller
called “authoritarian liberalism” already in 1933 (Heller 2015[1933]). Furthermore, this
interpretation of Hayek would allow us to agree with historian Philip Mirowsky who
argues that although many economists and economic agents often argue for a minimalist
state, they are in fact not against the state but merely want to take over the driver’s seat
in government (Mirowski 2014).
It must be acknowledged, however, that such an anti-democratic political model could
easily be put off as a somewhat embarrassing blunder and obscure thought experiment
of an elderly economist. Furthermore, it can be expected that most economists would
reject such a political model, because it not only denies fundamental political freedoms,
but it is also highly improbable to find these wise and impartial people. For this reason,
it is often argued that open and competitive markets must be coupled with the periodic
open and competitive elections of government officials  (North et al. 2009).  Here, we
appear to have returned to Fukuyama’s notion of the liberal democracy or democratic
capitalism.  I  would  like  to  show,  however,  that  even  with  the  existence  of  periodic
elections, open and competitive markets nevertheless severely limit peoples’ rights and
capabilities to democratically alter their social arrangements. Wolfgang Streeck lucidly
describes  this  problem  in  his  book  Buying  Time  (2013).  Here,  he  explains  that
democratic citizens (what he calls a  Staatsvolk) are bound to a national territory and
have specific rights and obligations, including the equal right to vote and the ability to
express  one’s  opinion  freely.  In  contrast,  the  people  of  the  market  (Marktvolk)  are
generally understood as internationally mobile investors and creditors, who possess the
right to demand profits. Importantly, while the first group is more or less geographically
bound, the second can move easily and more or less freely from one country to the next.
Because  the  wellbeing  of  economies,  societies  and  states  are  largely  dependent  on
private  investors,  the  Marktvolk becomes  a  second  and,  in  some  cases,  even  more
important  constituency.  Here,  elections  are  complemented with  continuous auctions,
public  opinion  with  the  rate  of  return  on  investment,  and  political  loyalty  with  the
“trust” of investors in market stability  (Streeck 2013,  117-132).  When the  Staatsvolk
attempts to raise taxes in order to decrease socio-economic inequalities or to implement
environmental regulations in order to limit pollution, the Marktvolk often withdraws its
investments  due to  its  dissatisfaction with  the  potential  decrease  in  profits.  In  turn,
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these “investment  strikes”  (ibid.,  50,  118-119)  lead to  unemployment  and  economic
crises,  thereby  punishing  the  people  for  attempting  to  alter  their  polit-economic
institutions and, ultimately, constraining democratic choices. In Streeck’s words, 
“The  limitation  of  national  sovereignty  by  ‘market  forces’  amounts  to  a
limitation of the freedom of the Staatsvolk to make democratic decisions and a
corresponding  empowerment  of  the  Marktvolk,  which  becomes  increasingly
essential  for  financing  government  decisions.  Democracy  at  national  level
presupposes nation-state sovereignty, but this is less and less available to […]
states because of their dependence on financial markets“ (Streeck 2013, 126;
transl. P. Camiller).
Here, we are again reminded of the “countervailing power of private capital” (Held 1987,
160).  Yet  this  time  the  economic  power  is  not  used  to  limit  the  power  of  absolute
sovereigns and warring feudal lords, as was the case with Montesquieu and Adam Smith,
but instead to undermine the democratic powers of a nation state. This is what Joshua
Cohen succinctly calls the “structural constraints argument”. As Cohen explains, 
“According  to  the  structural  constraints  argument,  the  private  control  of
investment  importantly  limits  the  democratic  character  of  the  state  by
subordinating  the  decisions  and  actions  of  the  democratic  state  to  the
investment  decisions  of  capitalists.  Political  decisions  are  structurally
constrained because the fate of parties and governments depends on the health
of  the  economy,  the  health  of  the  economy  on  investment  decisions  by
capitalists,  and  investment  decisions  by  capitalists  on  their  expectations  of
profits. While groups other than capitalists also control strategic resources, and
can use that  control  to  constrain  decision-making,  the  structural  constraints
argument  holds  that  the  power  of  capitalists  and  the  fact  that  everyone's
welfare  depends  on  their  decisions  singles  them  out  for  special  attention”
(Cohen 1989, 28).
This problem of structural constraints can, on the one hand, be understood as a tension
between  national  democracies  and  an  international  open  market  economy  (Streeck
1998, Rodrik 2012). On the other hand, it also must be understood as a fundamental
tension between the realms of  society that  are  considered to  be  private  and public.
Within the classical  Hobbesian state-market dichotomy, the maintenance of one’s life
and  livelihood  is  largely  considered  to  be  a  private  affair  that  occurs  within  the
supposedly neutral framework of the state – and is therefore subjugated to the arbitrary
decisions and powers of the Marktvolk. 
For  this  reason,  I  would  agree  with  the  political  scientist  Charles  E.  Lindblom  who
provocatively argues in his article  The Market as Prison from 1982 that the open and
competitive market can be interpreted as a type of political prison that does not entirely
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stop,  but  substantially  represses  institutional  change  (Lindblom  1982,  326).  As  he
explicates,
“Many kinds of market reform automatically trigger punishments in the form of
unemployment or a sluggish market economy. […] Punishment is not [however;
LP]  dependent  on  conspiracy  or  intention  to  punish.  If,  anticipating  new
regulations,  a businessman decides not to go through with a planned output
expansion, he has in effect punished us without the intention of doing so. Simply
minding  one’s  own  business  is  the  formula  for  an  extraordinary  system  for
repressing  change.  […]  That  result,  then,  is  why  the  market  might  be
characterized as a prison. For a broad category of political/economic affairs, it
imprisons  policy  making,  and  imprisons  our  attempts  to  improve  our
institutions. It greatly cripples our attempts to improve the social world […]”
(ibid., 325-329). 
As  we see,  even without  Hayek’s  impartial  economic  rulers,  once the  institutions  of
individual private property and the open and competitive market are in place, the actual
possibilities of people to democratically alter these central institutions remain severely
limited. In this sense, we might even say that Heller’s authoritarian liberalism does not
even require Hayek’s economist kings, but rather functions through the institutions of
the open and competitive market.  Here,  it  doesn’t  matter who is in the drivers seat,
because whoever it  is  must acquiesce to the demands of the market.  Thus,  it  can be
concluded that both the supposedly neutral legal framework of the state and the self-
regulating, open and competitive market undermine our concept of democracy, in which
people possess the rights and capabilities to co-determine their social conditions.
This being said, this rather negative portrayal of the market as a political prison should
not deny the positive aspects of capitalist markets. It cannot be denied that open and
competitive markets have expanded the realm of individual freedom and increased the
number of goods that a large portion of the world’s population can enjoy today. In this
sense,  we  must  agree  with  Fukuyama  that  democratic  capitalism  is  a  good  thing.
Nonetheless,  as  I  have  shown,  the  institutions  of  the  open  and  competitive  market
inherently limit the democratic freedom that people can realize.  This  might not be a
problem  if  everyone  was  satisfied  with  life  within  the  framework  of  an  open  and
competitive market. But as Adam Smith and Hayek already acknowledged, this is not the
case. Furthermore and as we will discuss in more detail later, social arrangements that
prioritize  individual  freedom based  on the  negative  rights  of  private  property  bring
about serious social, economic, and ecological problems that often cannot be politically
solved due to the structural constraints of capitalist markets. For this reason, it might be
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necessary to develop the understanding for other social  arrangements that are more
conducive to our more demanding understanding of democracy and thereby provide
people with the capabilities to institutionally adapt and collectively solve threatening
problems.  As  already  mentioned,  one  alternative  to  democratic  capitalism  that  is
increasingly being discussed is that of the commons. For this reason, let us now turn to
this discourse on the commons and analyze whether it provides us with a normatively
sound and feasible alternative “beyond markets and states”. In order to do this, I will
firstly  examine why commons are  often assumed to  fail  and then,  in  a  second step,
examine  how a  sustainable  and  democratic  governance  of  commons  is  nevertheless
possible. 
3. Garret Hardin’s Tragedy of the Unregulated Commons
Before we can scrutinize whether the commons provide us with a reasonable alternative
to the social institutions that underlie democratic capitalism, we must firstly analyze the
widely  assumed  downfall  of  commons,  as  expressed  in  Garrett  Hardin’s  influential
article  The Tragedy of the Commons from 1968. Generally put, although the concept of
the commons can be traced back much further, Hardin’s article has greatly increased the
interest in the topic and framed the heated debate that has lasted until today.10 For this
reason I will, in this short chapter, firstly analyze Hardin’s argument why commons are
necessarily overused. In a second step, I will discuss his suggestions of how to overcome
this tragedy. In a nutshell, I will demonstrate that Hardin’s theory is not a critique of the
commons  per  se,  but  rather  of  unregulated  commons,  which  bring  about  open  and
competitive social arrangements.   
3.1. The Tragedy: Maximization Strategies and the Double C-Double P
Game 
To  begin  with,  it  is  noteworthy  to  mention  that  Garrett  Hardin’s  theory  implicitly
repeats the basic arguments of Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population from 1798.
10  According  to  Elinor  Ostrom:  “Hardin's  article  is  one  of  the  most  cited
publications of recent times as well as among the most influential for ecologists and environmental policy
researchers. Almost all textbooks on environmental policy cite Hardin's article and discuss the problem
that Hardin so graphically identified” (Ostrom 2008b). 
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Accordingly,  Hardin  opens  his  theory  of  “The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  with  two
general  yet  conflicting  assumptions.  His  first  premise  is  based  on  the  laws  of
conservation and postulates that resources on earth are scarce. His second premise is
based on biologists’ observations that all living organisms have an inherent tendency to
perpetually increase their population size to secure their survival (Hardin 1968, 1243).
Understood mathematically,  this  existential  drive  leads  to  the  exponential  growth of
populations. In nature, however, this tendency is kept in check by limited resources and
other scarcity-related mechanisms such as hunger, disease, predators and, ultimately,
death.  In comparison to  other  animals,  humans are reflexive  beings  that  must  make
choices  between  the  forms  of  their  consumption,  or  rather  between  the  amount  of
resources  they utilize  per  person and  their  population  size.  For  this  reason,  Hardin
dismisses the utilitarian principle of “the greatest good for the greatest number” and
declares that we must choose between maximizing population and maximizing goods –
or that we find a middle way between these extremes. With this reasoning, Hardin sets
the stage for his critique of “laissez-faire” policies in reproduction and, more generally,
for commons. 
Hardin  explains  this  conflict  between  limited  ecological  resources  and  both
demographic and economic growth with the metaphor of a pasture commons. Here, a
pasture  is  held  in  common and  is  “open to  all”  (Hardin  1968,  1244)  to  be  used by
herders for the grazing of their privately-owned cattle. Hardin borrows this “heuristic
image” (Hardin 1977a, 68) from William Foster Lloyd’s pamphlet  Two Lectures on the
Checks of Population that was first published in 1833 and utilizes it as a model to portray
and  understand  the  relationship  between humans  and  their  environment.  For  us  to
comprehend the underlying problem, Hardin’s two premises must now be reformulated.
Firstly, the scarcity of resources implies that the carrying capacity of a common pasture
is limited. Hardin therefore defines the carrying capacity of a resource as “the maximum
number of animals that can be sustained by this food source year after year, without a
diminution of the quality of the pasture”  (Hardin 1993, 207; emphasis i.o.). The second
premise that postulates the supposed natural exponential growth in population sizes of
all  living  creatures  must  be  translated  into  the  size  of  the  herds  that  are  bred  and
controlled  by  the  herders.  While  this  second  premise  originally  assumed  an  innate
biological drive to increase one’s own population size, we must now ask ourselves why
herders desire and choose to increase the number of their cattle. 
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Hardin  answers  this  question  within  a  general  framework  of  methodological
individualism  and  in  both  biological  and  utilitarian  terms.  Although  not  explicitly
formulated by Hardin, his biological reasoning provides us with a Social Darwinist and
“existential” understanding of the tragedy of the commons. In contrast to other animals,
with  humans,  an  innate  drive  to  survive  can  manifest  itself  either  in  the  increasing
number of human offspring produced or in the amount of resources accumulated for
future production and consumption. When population sizes and consumption levels are
far  below  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  resource,  abundance  prevails  and  the  use  of
commons provides no serious problems. In Hardin’s words: “So long as there is a great
sufficiency  of  pastureland,  commonized  real  estate  is  efficient:  no  fences  need  be
maintained  and  there  is  little  call  for  human supervision”  (Hardin  1993,  216).  This
implies  that  although  the  carrying  capacity  creates  a  limitation  to  economic  and
demographic  growth,  if  human  existence  remains  largely below  these  boundaries,
people  could  nevertheless  theoretically  experience  a  certain  sufficiency  or  even
abundance. Yet,  due to the supposedly natural urge to survive through the growth in
population  size  or  wealth  accumulation,  resources  become  scarcer.  This  increase  in
scarcity,  however,  ironically  leads  to  a  greater  existential  threat  and  an  intensified
attempt to secure one’s survival through more growth and accumulation.    
Although  the  foundation  of  Hardin’s  argumentation  is  based  on  this  “biological”
reasoning,  he  resorts  to  utilitarian  terms  and  rational  choice  theory  to  explain  the
tragedy of the commons. Accordingly, Hardin declares that “[a]s a rational being, each
herdsman seeks to maximize his gain” (Hardin 1968, 1244). Along this line of thought,
he assumes that each herder calculates the utility of increasing the number of animals in
their herd and that they realize that one additional animal increases the individual’s
utility (meat, milk etc.) by +1 while the negative effects of overgrazing are distributed
among all herders, creating a fraction of -1 utility for themselves. In other words, the
responsibilities  for  losses  do  not  correlate  with  the  gains  of  one’s  actions.  For  this
reason, Hardin calls this situation the “Double C-Double P Game”,  in which costs are
communized  and  profits  are  privatized  (Hardin  1993,  237).  By  assuming that  other
humans are also rational beings and that they will act accordingly, each herder realizes
that resources will predictably become scarce and that they must act in this manner so
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as not  to  be  a  “sucker.”  Hardin  explains  this  dynamic  and  the  problematic  outcome
thereof in this central passage: 
 “Adding  together  the  component  partial  utilities,  the  rational  herdsman
concludes  that  the  only  sensible  course  for  him  to  pursue  is  to  add  another
animal to his herd. And another; and another…. But this is the conclusion reached
by every each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all
men  rush,  each  pursuing  his  own  best  interest  in  a  society  that  believes  the
freedom of the commons.  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (ibid., 1244;
emphasis added).
The tragedy of the commons can thus be understood as a “race to the bottom” in which
each farmer attempts to gain as much as possible from the common pasture before its
resources are completely depleted. While individuals strive to survive in the short term,
then,  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  perpetual  reproduction  of  the  group  are
undermined and destroyed in the long run. In other words, the tragedy of the commons
portrays a type of Hobbesian state of nature in which subjective rationality ultimately
leads to a social and objective irrationality. Due to the assumed functioning of human
nature in  such a  social  setting,  Hardin declares  that  this  destructive  dynamic in  the
tragedy of the commons is “inevitable” (ibid.). 
3.2. Social Institutions Against Tragedy: Privatism or Socialism
Yet,  in  spite  of  this  supposed  inevitability,  Hardin  argues  that  the  situation  can  be
changed. In this sense, Hardin sees the problem not in a supposed egotistical human
nature or in a lack of individual morality but in the institutional organization of society
and of its  resources (Hardin 1993,  218).  As Hardin admitted in  an article  published
thirty years later, the actual problem of the commons is not the commons per se, but
rather that they are unmanaged and open to all (Hardin 1998). Particularly, the problem
of the tragedy of the commons is that the use of its resources is institutionally structured
in  an  open  and  highly  competitive  manner.  In  this  sense,  the  tragedy  of  a  pasture
commons is not limited to an agricultural society but can be understood as metaphor for
the general problem of open and competitive social arrangements in which profits can
be  privatized  and  costs  can  be  spread  onto  the  rest  of  society  (Hardin  1979).
Interestingly, Hardin also sees this problem in Adam Smith’s “laissez-faire” policies of
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unregulated free enterprise and its adverse effects on pollution11 (ibid.,  Hardin 1968,
1244,  Hardin  1993,  223)  and  the  supposedly  Marxist  principle  of  the  open-access
principle “to each according to his needs”  (Hardin 1977b). According to Hardin, both
cases create social arrangements in which rights and responsibilities do not correlate
and therefore ultimately lead to over-use and destruction. However, I would add here
that the negative externalities of these open and competitive social arrangements also
include  social  inequalities  and  other  related  social  problems such as  unemployment
economic  crises  and  the  like.  The  ability  of  all  agents  to  appropriate  an  unlimited
amount of resources implies that certain (stronger) parties can inevitably accumulate
more,  ultimately  leading  to  the  limitation  of  access  to  these  resources  for  others.12
Hardin argues that this lack of regulation opens the possibility for a small minority to
free-ride and “bleed the jointly owned resource dry,” which,  in turn, forces others to
“follow their lead” (Hardin 1979). According to Hardin, this problem cannot be resolved
through  a  plea  for  more  moral  behavior  because  “a  system  that  depends  only  on
conscience rewards the conscienceless”  (Hardin 1972, 129). Or, specifically, an open-
access system penalizes the prudent and rewards the reckless and more powerful. 
Hardin’s answer to this problem is,  at least at first glance,  relatively simple: “mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected” (Hardin 1968,
1247). In order to break this tragic vicious circle, everyone must agree to be forced to
follow rules and regulations – without exception.  Only through a social  contract that
limits everyone’s individual freedom can the freedom of everyone be secured in the long
run. Here, we are reminded of Hobbes. But what is an institutional arrangement based
on  mutually  agreed-upon coercion  supposed  to  look  like?  Hardin’s  response  to  this
question  is,  again,  quite  straightforward:  “privatism”  or  “socialism”  must  replace  all
forms of unmanaged “commonism” (Hardin 1978, 315, Hardin 1979, Hardin 1993, 218-
9). “Privatism” occurs, according to Hardin, when both the land and animals are owned
by  the  same  individual.  Responsibilities  and  gains,  resources  and  harvests  correlate
fully.  This  property  regime,  however,  becomes  problematic  when  ownership  is
separated from occupancy and operation, which can lead to new problems of over-use
11  In  relation  to  the  problem of  externalities  and  pollution,  Hardin  writes  that
“[W]e are locked into a system of ‘fouling our nest,’ so long as we behave only as independent, rational,
free-enterprisers” (Hardin 1968:1245). For further thoughts on the problem of laissez-faire policies and
externalities, see also Hardin 1993, p. 240.  
12  We  will  return  to  the  social  effects  of  this  mechanism in  more  detail  when
analyzing what I call the tragedy of the market.
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and exploitation. While “socialism” is similar to “privatism” in that responsibilities and
gains correspond, it must be understood as a regulated common because it is collectively
owned, managed and harvested. However, this property regime is problematic because
larger groups often require appointed managers who administer and enforce rules. This
delegation of power leads to the fundamental problem of Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?
Or in English: Who will watch the watchmen themselves?13 Due to the problems of both
property regimes, Hardin argues that neither form is clearly better than the other. It is
important to Hardin that the tragedy of unmanaged commons is avoided through either
regime or – as is most often the case – through a mixture of the two, depending on the
different empirical conditions. 
Despite this openness towards both political  systems and property regimes,  Hardin’s
position must nevertheless be interpreted as Neo-Hobbesian  (Ophuls 1977, 148). The
reason for this is that in both cases of privatization and socialization, Hardin argues that
freedom must be limited by coercion implemented from “without”: 
“The  persistent  dream  of  freedom  is  the  suicidal  dream  of  a  state  in  which
individual conscience is the only coercive force. But in truth, when we are dealing
with  real  human  beings  rather  than  paragons,  if  ruin  is  to  be  avoided  in  a
crowded  world,  people  must  be  responsive  to  a  coercive  force  outside  their
individual psyches, a ‘Leviathan,’ to use Hobbes’ term. […] In a crowded world, this
is the closest we can get to freedom” (Hardin 1978, 314; emphasis added).   
He states that because it cannot be assumed that all humans are virtuous, freedom – and
humans’ biological survival,  for that matter – can only be protected through coercive
laws  that  precisely  limit  this  freedom.  And  these  limiting  rules  must  ultimately  be
implemented from without, from outside the affected individual’s psyche and thus from
outside the affected group. 
In  summary,  it  can  be  claimed  that  Hardin’s  thesis  has  brought  about  three  rather
significant fallacies. Firstly, it is often mistakenly assumed that commons inherently will
be  overused,  while  Hardin  actually  argues  that  the  unmanaged commons  leads  to
tragedy. Here, I would agree with Hardin. Secondly, it is often mistakenly believed that
the destruction of common resources can only be averted if privatized or socialized. In
this case, socialization is often interpreted as nationalization through the state. It can
13  The  literal  translation  refers  to  guards  and  not  watchmen,  but  the  problem
remains the same: The social control of those who must create and enforce rules.   
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generally be said that this dualism has reinforced the often held assumption popular
during and since the cold-war that the only options people have to organize society are
either according to the principles of the market or to those of the nation-state. This is
problematic, however, because it simply brings us back to the market-state dichotomy
that we had hoped to escape in democratic capitalism. Lastly, Hardin assumes that while
people are theoretically able to democratically agree on laws to limit their freedom and
destruction of the planet, the implementation of these laws must, however, come from
an external leviathan sovereign. If these options are truly the only possibilities available,
three questions remain: Firstly, how are people able to enter a contract that might be
rational for society in the long run, while being harmful or irrational for the individual in
the short run? Secondly, are private property and state ownership truly the only forms
of  resource management  available  to  humans? And thirdly,  where will  this  virtuous,
absolute leviathan that can administer and enforce laws “from the outside” come from?
Considering these problems that remain unsolved in Hardin’s work, it appears necessary
to explore Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s research on the sustainable and democratic self-
governance of commons, which provides us with theoretical and empirical answers to
these diverse questions. 
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4. Overcoming the Tragedy with the Ostroms
After having analyzed the social structure and logic of the tragedy of the unmanaged
commons, we must now examine how to avert this supposedly inevitable catastrophe.
An important characteristic of this answer is that it aims to provide us with a different
conception of social  arrangements that  overcome or dissolve the traditional  market-
state  dichotomy  of  democratic  capitalism,  which  inherently  limits  democratic
potentialities to adapt social institutions and solve social problems. In order to do this,
we will turn to the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom on the sustainable and democratic
governance of the commons. The exploration of their work will be structured as follows.
Firstly, I will analyze what Elinor Ostrom understands as “grim” social dilemmas that
underlie not only the tragedy of the commons but almost all forms of collective action. In
a second step, I will consider their arguments against a centralized and hierarchical state
or “monocentric order” as a possible answer to these social dilemmas. In a third step, I
will critically reflect the diverse problems or tragedies that result from privatization and
the  market.  After  having  discussed  the  limitations  of  both  monocentric  orders  and
markets, I will then turn to the Ostroms’ work on how collective action can be cultivated
and  realized  in  order  to  overcome  social  dilemmas.  A  central  feature  of  this  is  the
development of reciprocity, trust and reputation through communication of the affected
agents.  The  stabilization  of  this  collective  action  requires,  in  turn,  the  democratic
definition of rules for the use of common pool resources and the mutual monitoring
thereof. I will then discuss these ideas with reference to Elinor Ostrom’s eight design
principles for the sustainable self-governance of commons. In a final step, I will explore
how these insights from microsituational settings can be scaled up into what Elinor and
Vincent Ostrom call a polycentric system of democratic governance. Last but not least, I
will critically reflect the limits and blind spots of their work.   
Before delving into this investigation, I would like to shortly explain why I largely focus
on the work of Elinor Ostrom and only marginally on that of Vincent Ostrom. The reason
for  this  is  rather  simple:  Elinor  Ostrom’s  extensive  empirical  and  theoretical  work
provides us with an amazing array of examples of common pool resources and public
services,  including  fisheries,  forests,  pastures,  irrigation  systems,  water  basins  and
police security.  Throughout her life,  Elinor Ostrom searched to define the contingent
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conditions of possibility for overcoming the tragedy of the commons – or put differently,
the  conditions  of  possibility  for  human cooperation,  democratic  self-governance  and
ecological sustainability. And it is for this work that she then received the Nobel Prize in
Economics  in  2009.  In  contrast,  while  Vincent  Ostrom  also  used  the  tragedy  of  the
commons as a starting point  for the development of  his  ideas,  his  focus was less on
commons and more on the political theory of a polycentric or federal model of the state
that was based on many of Elinor Ostrom’s more empirical  insights.  For this reason,
while I will focus on Elinor Ostrom’s work, I also will integrate Vincent’s arguments and
ideas in order to complement those of Elinor.14  
4.1. Collective Action and “Grim” Social Dilemmas
In  the  theories  of  Elinor  and Vincent  Ostrom,  the  notion  of  democracy is  of  central
importance as a means to overcome the tragedy of the commons. While much literature
on democracy focuses on issues such as voting behavior, party politics, parliamentary
institutions and the state, Elinor Ostrom approached the problem of democracy from a
micro-situational perspective of game theory, social dilemmas and collective action. In
her Presidential Address of the American Political Science Association in 1997, Elinor
explains the importance of collective action theory for political science – and for almost
all human interactions:  
“The theory of collective action is the central subject of political science. It is the
core  of  the  justification  of  the  state.  Collective  action  problems  pervade
international relations, face legislators when devising public budgets, permeate
pubic bureaucracies, and are at the core of explanations of voting, interest group
formation, and citizen control of governments in a democracy” (E. Ostrom 1998,
1; emphasis i.o.).
According to Ostrom, collective  action dilemmas are present  in  “all  major economic,
political, and social projects requiring individuals to associate in allocation activities” (E.
Ostrom 2003, 21). For this reason, it has been her lifelong aim to  develop intellectual
tools to understand “the capabilities and limitations of self-governing institutions for
regulating many types of resources” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 2).
14  In order to deal with the rather awkward and cumbersome repetition of the
names Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom, I will sometimes also refer to the two authors simply as Vincent
and Elinor. 
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In this sense, Elinor Ostrom understood the “tragedy of the commons” as a collective
action or social dilemma, which, in turn, can also be understood as a prisoner’s dilemma
between two people (E. Ostrom 2008, 2-5). According to Ostrom, a social dilemma refers
to  diverse  situations  in  which  “individuals  make  independent  choices  in  an
interdependent  situation”  (E.  Ostrom  1998,  3).  Such  dilemmas  occur  “whenever
individuals  in  interdependent  situations  face  choices  in  which  the  maximization  of
short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible
alternatives” (ibid., 1). As already seen in the analysis of Hardin’s model, these dilemmas
would theoretically generate defect strategies that would ultimately lead to suboptimal
outcomes  (resource  depletion,  inequalities  etc.)  which  are  defined  in  economic
literature  on  game  theory  as  Pareto-inferior  Nash-equilibria  or,  in  more  colloquial
terminology,  as  a  “tragedy”.  In  general  terms,  Ostrom argues  that  these  models  boil
down to the “free rider problem”, which she defines as such: 
“Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide,
each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on
[or take advantage of; LP] the efforts of others. If all participants choose to free-
ride, the collective benefit will not be produced” (E. Ostrom 2008, 6).  
The reason for the general fascination with these models is that their structures create a
situation in  which the best  individual  strategies ironically  lead to a  suboptimal  joint
outcome. For this reason, Elinor Ostrom writes, “The paradox that individually rational
strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to challenge a fundamental faith
that rational human beings can achieve rational results” (E. Ostrom 1986, 4). It must be
noted that this insight is quite striking because it  contradicts,  first and foremost,  the
previously mentioned assumption in economics that individual subjective interests lead
to  positive  social  outcomes.  This  is  the  basic  principle  of  the  invisible  hand  that
underlies belief in the self-regulation of the market.15 Furthermore, these dilemmas also
suggest,  more  generally,  that  cooperation  is  impossible  or,  rather,  irrational  for
15  It could be argued that the two models (the “invisible hand” and the “tragedy of
the commons”) cannot be compared because one model is based on private property regimes and the
other on common property  regimes.  In  economic theory,  the  answer to the problem of  over-use and
tragedy is therefore privatization.  We will discuss the limits and problems of privatization in more detail
later. For the time being, however, it is important to note that privatization cannot overcome the problem
of tragedy because people are intersubjective beings that share a common reality and therefore also share
certain goods that cannot be privatized. One example of this shared reality is, for example the shared legal
structure of the market itself.  To illustrate the relationship between the market and the commons, we
could thus say that the commons provides the stage or background setting for the market. While the self-
regulation of the market might function on the stage, I argue that it inherently will lead to the destruction
of the stage. 
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supposedly rational agents within specific social arrangements. Although Ostrom agrees
with Hardin that “from within the game, participants are trapped in an eternal struggle
of tragic proportions” (ibid., 6), she questions whether such a situation truly represents
the full diversity of social interactions and institutions. 
Elinor Ostrom thus does not only criticize the simple model based on this “grim trap”
but  also  the  policy  prescriptions  that  display  an  equally  “grim  character”  that  has
resulted from such models (E. Ostrom 2008, 8). Her main critique aims at the simple
dualism  presented  and  discussed  as  alternatives  to  the  tragedy:  Centralized  state
authority  versus  privatization  and  the  market.  Before  analyzing  the  Ostroms’  own
alternative to the tragedy, I would like to analyze their interpretations and critiques of
the centralized state and the market in more detail in order to clarify the limitations of
these two models as answers to the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Let us
therefore  begin  with  the  centralized  state,  which  Vincent  Ostrom has  coined  as  the
“monocentric order”. 
4.2. The Tragedy of Monocentric Orders
According to Vincent Ostrom, a monocentric order is realized according to a theory of
sovereignty  where  there  is  only  one  single  center  of  ultimate  authority.  This  is  the
Hobbesian model of the Leviathan that Hardin propagated. The assumption underlying
this  idea is  that  to  overcome perpetual  war  or  the  destructive  competition between
private, egotistical individuals, a single center of authority must create a single system of
law for all. In order to be able to do this, the center of authority must be “the source of
law, […] above the law, [and] cannot be held accountable to law” (V. Ostrom 2011b, 352-
3). Furthermore, this law is enforced by the same, single source of authority (ibid., 353-
4).  The  conflicting  violence  between  factions  is  therefore  resolved  by  creating  a
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the organization of a society” (ibid.,
353; emphasis omitted). The monopoly of the use of force in society transforms all these
quarrelling  individuals  and  groups  into  a  unified  organization  called  “the  state.”
Abstractly  speaking,  oneness  is  to  supersede,  contain  and  structure  the  many.  The
function of such a monocentric order is to “dominate […] all patterns of organization
that are subject to law” (ibid.) so as to limit and enable individual freedom. 
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With reference to Max Weber, Vincent Ostrom further argues that a monocentric order
is not only characterized by a single center of supreme authority, but that it is closely
associated with and dependent on hierarchical command structures that are realized in
a  bureaucratic  form  of  organization.  In  general  terms,  the  command  structure  in
monocentric,  hierarchical organizations is justified based on an increase in efficiency,
rationality and objectivity. The hierarchical command structure and the monopoly of the
use  of  force  in  society  enables  monocentric  orders  to  impose  effective  sanctions  to
prevent free-riding and to collect levies for protecting and developing both common-
pool resources and public goods (V. Ostrom 1974, 58-9). This ability to enforce rules and
collect  taxes  provides  an  efficient  answer  to  the  relatively  high  deliberation  and
transaction  costs  created  when  pooling  resources  by  creating  contracts  between  all
individuals.  Furthermore,  the  management  of  a  resource  through  one  organization
enables externalities to be internalized (ibid.,  63).16 Thus,  monocentric bureaucracies
are considered to increase the efficiency and rationality in the organization of human
affairs.
In relation to the efficient implementation of impartial and uniform laws, Elinor Ostrom
emphasizes, however, that uniform rules are problematic when dealing with commons,
because common pool resources are often very diverse. If uniform rules are applied to
diverse contexts, the problem is that either false incentives are created or people do not
take the rules seriously and thus end up pursuing short-term maximization strategies
nevertheless (E. Ostrom 2008a, 11). This problem is sometimes accentuated when states
nationalize resources that were held in common by local communities yet are unable to
monitor and enforce a regulation thereof, ultimately transforming a common-property
resource into an unregulated open-access resource (ibid., 23, E. Ostrom 1999a, 495).  
Vincent Ostrom’s rather fundamental critique of monocentric orders is not, however,
based  on  common-pool  resources,  but  rather  on  the  widespread  and  well-known
critique of bureaucratic systems in welfare states, made especially popular by the work
of Ludwig von Mises, Gordon Tullock and, more generally, public choice theory. Here, it
is argued that individuals working in large bureaucracies are – like all humans – self-
16  It is important to note that this economic rationale of vertical integration drives
both public agencies and private firms to become centralized, hierarchical organizations, as Robert Coase
argued in his article The Nature of the Firm (Coase 1937, 390-1, V. Ostrom 1974, 59). This insight radically
contrasts the common interpretation of bureaucracy as a form of organization only found in governments
and public administration. 
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interested, which ultimately leads to corruption and to a loss of control of executives
over the organization. Elinor Ostrom also points to the paradox that it is assumed that
the  Leviathan  will  be  a  wise  and  ecological  ruler  while  the  individuals  using  the
resources are short-sighted, ecologically ignorant egoists  (E. Ostrom 1986, 8). Second,
she argues that state bureaucracies are not exposed to competition and are therefore
prone to being inefficient and unresponsive to the diverse and changing demands of
citizens  and  consumers.  Continuing  this  critique,  Vincent  Ostrom  argues  that
monocentric, hierarchical bureaucracies enable a monopoly over the legal instruments
of coercion and thus provide “unique opportunities for a few to exploit the many”  (V.
Ostrom 1993, 59), opening the door to oppression and tyranny. Vincent finalizes this
critique of monocentric,  bureaucratic orders by concluding – again with reference to
Max Weber – that such organizations can become self-perpetuating organizations that
reduce all individuals – rulers and ruled – to subservient cogs in an “iron cage” (Weber
2001,  123,  Ostrom 2011b).  This  leads us to a supposed “paradox of bureaucracy” in
which  collective  attempts  to  enable  individual  positive  freedom  –  through  welfare
services, for example – will  be undermined by an unresponsive and possibly corrupt
paternalism of governmental officials (V. Ostrom 2011b, 355-6).17 Furthermore, through
its  individualistic  conception  of  rights,  a  monocentric  bureaucratic  (welfare)  state
supports  the  atomization  of  individuals  and,  thereby,  undercuts  the  desire  and
capacities of individuals to collectively care for common goods (Allen and Ostrom 2008,
148). According to Vincent Ostrom, the monocentric order thus appears to reproduce
the tragedy of the commons through its monopoly of the use of force and its corrupt and
exploitive bureaucratic administration.  
17  The assumption that a monocentric bureaucracy is a threat to individual positive
freedom  is  famously  formulated  in  Tocqueville’s  understanding  of  “democratic  despotism”  where  he
writes: “That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. […]The will of man is not shattered,
but softened, bent,  and guided; men are seldom forced to act,  but they are constantly restrained from
acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses,
enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of
timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shephard”  (de Tocqueville 2004, 861-2).
Although the state that  Tocqueville  is  describing is  not the same as  the one Vincent  Ostrom lives  in,
Vincent nevertheless repeats this argument throughout his work (e.g. V. Ostrom 1997, 278). In a different
form, Claus Offe also presents a similar argument in his essay Contradictions of the Welfare State (1985) in
which he explains that the socialist Left also believe that the welfare state undermines individual self-
determination: “[T]he welfare state can be looked upon as an exchange transaction in which material
benefits for the needy are traded for their submissive recognition of the ‘moral order’ of the society which
generates such needs. One important pre-condition for obtaining services of the welfare state is the ability
of  the individual  to  comply with the routines and requirements of  welfare  bureaucracies  and service
organizations, an ability which, needless to say, often is inversely correlated to need itself”  (Offe 1985,
156).
53
Before  discussing  the  Ostroms’  answer  to  the  problems  of  monocentric  orders,  this
somewhat crude and problematic depiction of monocentric orders should be critically
relfected.  Firstly,  it  must  be  emphasized that  the  notion of  a  monopoly  on coercion
appears, at least to me, to be an important means in overcoming conflicts. Monocentric
orders provides a means to define rules that limit  free-riding,  enforce sanctions and
redistribute  scarce  resources.  Ultimately,  these  are  similar  mechanisms  that  Elinor
Ostrom describes in her eight design principles for sustainably self-governing commons.
Here,  the monopoly of force can be understood as a pooling of coercive powers in a
certain institutional arrangement. However, the difference to commons is simply that
the state is a much larger institution with longer chains of trust and accountability than
the social arrangements that Elinor analyzed. The mere fact that monocentric can be
used as a means of tyranny and oppression should not, however, imply that we must
entirely reject the concept of a monocentric order. This would be like throwing out the
baby with the bath water. We have already confronted this problem in Hardin’s critique
of commons, which turned out be a critique of unregulated commons. Thus, the question
is how the monocentric power of the sovereign can be controlled and how the monopoly
on the use of force can be made legitimate and just. Furthermore, the question arises of
how bureaucratic administrations should be designed to make them more responsive,
effective  and  accountable.  We  will  return  to  these  questions  in  more  depth  while
discussing polycentric orders and the relation between the state and commons. Before
that,  however,  let  us  turn  to  the  other  answer  to  the  tragedy  of  the  commons:
Privatization and the market.
4.3. The Tragedy of Privatization and the Market
Due  to  this  widespread  critique  of  the  state,  it  has  often  been  propagated  that
privatization is a better answer to the tragedy of the commons (Demsetz 1967).  As we
have  already  touched  upon  in  our  discussion  of  Garrett  Hardin’s  work,  the  main
arguments for privatization are the internalization of costs and thus the correlation of
costs and benefits. And as Adam Smith and other economists have argued, competitive
market  arrangements,  in  turn,  provide  us  with  more  responsive  and  efficient  social
institutions. 
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Interestingly, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom do not discuss privatization or the market very
much. While Vincent is fierce in his critique of the state, he remains rather silent on the
problems  of  the  market.  In  fact,  while  he  speaks  of  a  “moral  economy”,  he
simultaneously defends the open and competitive market using arguments similar to
those that we have previously discussed (V. Ostrom 2011a, 191, V. Ostrom 1991, 229-
231, V. Ostrom 1997, 107). 18  In contrast, Elinor sparingly mentions the problems of an
open and competitive market. To be fair, we can generally assume that this has to do
with the historical context of the Cold War they lived and wrote in.19 Nevertheless, they
do provide us  with some rare  insights  on the problem of  privatization and markets
within their empirical and theoretical framework. The reason why I insist on a critique
of privatization and markets here is that we must understand why privatization and
markets are problematic in more detail in order to justify our defense and development
of commons. Conversely, if privatization and markets work well, there is no reason to
change their institutional arrangements. As Elinor Ostrom says herself, “If it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” (Ostrom 2008a, 211).
4.3.1. Different Types of Goods (Part I)
Before turning to privatization and the market, it is important to note that Elinor and
Vincent Ostrom do not deal with these issues in detail because they often simply assume
a somewhat clear categorization of goods as already developed and discussed in the
public choice theory (Buchanan 1965). In distinguishing between goods, they emphasize
18  It must be noted that Vincent Ostrom does not like to use the term capitalism. He
explains in an interview: “Probably the best way to characterize our approach would be to start with one
of our most influential themes: the idea that broad concepts such as ‘markets’ and ‘states,’ or ‘socialism’
and ‘capitalism,’ do not take us very far in thinking about patterns of order in human society. For example,
when  some  ‘market’  economists  speak  of  ‘capitalism,’  they  fail  to  distinguish  between  an  open,
competitive market economy and a state-dominated mercantile economy. In this, they follow Marx. He
argued  that  ‘capitalism’  has  a  competitive  dynamic  that  leads  to  market  domination  by  a  few  large
monopoly  or  monopoly-like  enterprises.  But  what  Marx  called  ‘capitalism,’  Adam  Smith  called
‘mercantilism.’ Similarly, many authors who write about ‘capitalism’ fail to recognize the complexity of
capitalist institutions. They overlook the rich structures of communal and public enterprises in societies
with open and highly competitive market economies. Instead, we should expect to find some combination
of market and non-market structures in every society, and we should recognize the complex configuration
of  institutions behind labels  such as  ‘capitalism’”  (V.  Ostrom in  Aligica  and Boettke 2009,  142).  It  is,
however,  quite  peculiar  and  problematic  in  Vincent’s  work  that  while  he  demands  an  exact  and
differentiated analysis of the institutions of markets, he never – at least to my knowledge – provides such
a differentiated analysis  himself.  I  do,  in fact,  hope to develop such a differentiated understanding of
markets in this book.
19  In an interview, Elinor Ostrom was once asked “Do you take issue with those
who call your theories ‘implicitly socialistic’?”, Her answer to this question was: “Yes. I don’t think they are
supporting socialism as a top-down theory. A lot of socialist governments are very much top down and I
think my theory does challenge that any top-down government, whether on the right or the left, is unlikely
to be able to solve many of the problems of resource sustainability in the world” (E. Ostrom in Klein et al.
2013, 541).
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two essential characteristics: Exclusion and rivalry or joint-ness of use. The divisibility
of goods creates the possibility of excluding others from its use, ultimately enabling a
specific  good or service  to be privatized and traded as a  commodity on the market.
Access to such a good is only allowed when the terms and conditions of the vendor are
met (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999, 76). In other words, access to these goods depends on a
person’s purchasing power or, in more plain language, on how much money a person
has. In the case of goods that cannot be divided up or where this is more difficult with
things such as the ocean or peace and security, exclusion can generally not be realized.
Here,  “anyone can derive  benefits  from the good so long as nature  or  the efforts  of
others supply it” (ibid.). Joint-ness of use, on the other hand, implies that more than one
person can consume a good simultaneously. Typical examples of such a good are a movie
theater or a lighthouse. Goods that generally do not enable joint consumption are, for
example, an apple or a fish. These goods are considered rival. If one person eats the fish,
another person cannot eat it. Such goods are subtractive and therefore considered to be
scarce and rival. These distinguishing characteristics of exclusion and joint-ness of use
have led the Ostroms and other intellectuals of the public choice theory to differentiate
between individual private goods, collective private goods or club goods, common pool
resources and public goods. The following table portrays the four types of goods:
Rival Non-rival/Joint Use
Exclusion Feasible Private  Goods:  Bread,  shoes,
automobiles, haircuts, books, etc.
Toll  Goods: Theaters,  night  clubs,
telephone  service,  toll  roads,  cable
TV, electric power, library, etc.
Exclusion
difficult/infeasible
Common-Pool Resources:
Water  pumped  from  a  ground-
water  basin,  fish  taken  from  an
ocean,  crude  oil  extracted  from
an oil pool
Public Goods: Peace and security of a
community,  national  defense,
mosquito  abatement,  air  pollution
control,  fire  protection,  streets,
weather forecasts, public TV, etc.
   Table 1: Types of goods (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999, 78)
Here, it is important to note that common pool resources are similar to public goods
because it is somewhat difficult (i.e. costly) in both cases to exclude others from their
use. Yet, in contrast to public goods, common pool resources can provide individuals
with goods that can be consumed individually (e.g. a fish from an ocean).20 In a similar
20  In order to explain the concept of common pool resources in a bit more detail, I
quote a longer passage by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom here:  “In the case of  a  common-pool  resource,
exclusion may be infeasible in the sense that many users cannot be denied access. But, use by any one user
precludes use of some fixed quantity of a good by other users. Each pumper in a groundwater basin, for
example, makes a use of water that is alternative to its use by each other pumper. Each fish or ton of fish
taken by any one fisherman prevents any other fisherman from taking those same fish. Yet no basis exists
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manner,  individual  private goods can be distinguished from collective  private or toll
goods in that both types of goods enable exclusion while the former good is a rival good
and the latter is at least principally non-rival. 
Although this  schematic  categorization of  goods is  helpful  in  differentiating between
types of goods, Vincent Ostrom emphasizes that it is somewhat problematic in a few
respects. Firstly, few if any goods perfectly fit this categorization except for a few trivial
and ideal cases such as gravity (V. Ostrom 1975, 847). In a similar sense, the possibility
of joint consumption depends on the precise conditions of use. A public highway can, for
example, become rival and a public “bad” when over-used. Additionally, the schematic
representation of goods fails to recognize that the differences between goods lie on a
continuum. And lastly, the relationships between diverse types of goods are neglected
(i.e. the relationship between automobiles and the public highway). Vincent therefore
explains  that  “[w]ithin  this  continuum,  the  production  or  consumption  of  goods  or
services may involve  spillover effects or  externalities”  (V. Ostrom 2011a, 190; empasis
i.o.).  In  other  words,  the  use  of  one  type  of  good  will  most  likely  have  positive  or
negative effects on other goods due to their interdependence (e.g. the positive effects of
education  on  a  broader  population  and  the  negative  effects  of  pollution  on  water
quality). The interrelatedness of different types of goods therefore demands different
access  and  utilization  rules  depending  on  the  positive  and  negative  effects  of  these
goods. Also, these access and utilization rules are not merely given but highly contested. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that this framework simply assumes that specific types of
goods inherently or “naturally” possess certain characteristics,  which,  in turn,  makes
them more adequate to be dealt with as private, club, common or public goods. But as
Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess argue,  “Common pool resources may be owned by
national, regional, or local governments; by communal groups; by private individuals or
corporations; or used as open access resources by whomever can gain access” (Ostrom
and Hess 2007, 9). Ostrom and Hess emphasize, therefore, that “there is no automatic
association of common-pool resources with common property regimes –  or, with any
other particular type of property regime” (ibid., 10; emphasis i.o.). In other words, it can
be assumed, at least theoretically, that all goods could be privatized if purchasing power
for excluding fishermen from access to fish in an ocean. Once appropriated from a natural supply, water
can be dealt with as a toll good to be supplied to those who have access to a distribution system; similarly,
once taken from the ocean, fish can be dealt with as a private good” (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999, 78). 
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and the demand of a good increases while new technologies would decrease the costs of
exclusion (Engel 2002, 52, Euler 2018). Just as it might have been absurd to imagine that
water would be bottled and consumed by the masses a few centuries ago, it could be just
as possible that fresh air will be bottled and sold one day. We can thus conclude with
Tyler Cowen that the “costliness of exclusion is not a function of the nature of the good
[itself]”  (Cowen  1985,  61).  Or,  in  more  general  terms,  “nearly  every  good  can  be
classified  as  either  public  or  private  depending  upon  the  institutional  framework
surrounding the good and the conditions of the good’s production” (ibid., 53). For this
reason, it is necessary to investigate whether the Ostroms provide us with arguments for
or against organizing specific resources in private or common property arrangements. 
4.3.2. Market Failure and Privatization
It is important to emphasize that both Elinor and Vincent do not understand the tragedy
of  the  commons  to  be  the  result  of  a  common pool  resource itself  or  of  a  common
property regime, but rather, they understand tragedy to be the consequence of specific
institutional arrangements that enable people to act in a specific manner in relation to
specific goods. In this sense, the unhindered individualistic freedom that Garrett Hardin
describes in his model is not to be understood as a type of freedom in a state of nature,
but  rather  as  freedom  that  has  been  created  through  a  public  good  of  the  legal
framework  (V. Ostrom 1993, 62,  V. Ostrom 1999b, 62). More specifically, it is a legal
framework  that  protects  specific  property  and  contract  rights  from  arbitrary
interference and that allows the unimpeded and unlimited accumulation of resources. In
Elinor’s words, “The Hobbesian state of nature is logically equivalent to a situation in
which rules exist permitting anyone to take any and all desired actions, regardless of the
effects  on  others”  (E.  Ostrom  2008a,  140).  According  to  Vincent,  this  type  of
individualistic freedom and choice is not simply a characteristic of open-access common
pool  resources,  but  also  a  characteristic  of  the  market  (V.  Ostrom  1974,  56).
Furthermore,  it  is  this  individualistic  choice  that  leads  to  aforementioned  spillover
effects and externality problems. Vincent explains:  
 “When individuals  act  with  the  legal  independence characteristic  of  decision
making in market structures in a situation dominated by externalities, common-
pool resources, or public goods, we can conclude that  institutional weakness or
institutional  failure will  occur.  The magnitude  of  the  weakness  or  failure  will
depend upon the importance of  the  externality,  or  the degree of  indivisibility
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occurring  in  the  common  property  or  public  good”  (V.  Ostrom  2011a,  193;
emphasis i.o.).  
Here,  tragedy arises when individual  freedom in the market affects  other goods and
third parties in the form of negative externalities, free-riding or unlimited appropriation
of common pool resources or public goods. Vincent refers to this problem as a form of
“institutional  weakness  or  failure”  that  could  be  interpreted  as  what  is  generally
understood to  be  market  failure.  Elinor  Ostrom,  in  turn,  defines  market  failure  in  a
similar yet slightly different manner: 
“Market  failure  means  that  the  incentives  facing  individuals  in  a  situation,
where the rules are those of a competitive market but the goods do not have the
characteristics  of  ‘private  goods,’  are  insufficient  to  motivate  individuals  to
produce,  allocate,  and consume these  goods  at  an  optimal  level”  (E.  Ostrom
2005a, 23). 
Although the acknowledgement of the problem of market failure is quite widespread, it
should  not  be  interpreted  as  a  critique  of  privatization  and  markets  but  rather,  as
Vincent does here, as the “failure” of certain goods to be divided up and privatized. As
Elizabeth Anderson remarks correctly, “The theory of market failure is not a theory of
what is wrong with markets, but of what goes wrong when markets are not available: it
is a theory of what goes wrong when goods are not commodified” (Anderson 1993, 192).
The point is  that  the problem of externalities is often understood as an institutional
weakness of common pool resources and public goods – and not as a problem of private
goods and markets. This is a very prevalent argument that is especially brought up in
relation to environmental problems such as pollution.21 For example,  Arrow and Hahn
argue in their book  General Competitive Analysis (Arrow and Hahn 1971, 186) that a
“competitive equilibrium” in allocation – and thus where no market failure – exists when
everything is  clearly  defined  and  delineated  as  privatized  commodities.22 This
21  Here is merely one example: “There is good reason, however, to believe that a
genuinely free market economy would actually minimise negative externalities. A free market is not a
free-for-all,  but a system of private property rights enforced by law. Negative externalities without the
possibility of amelioration can only arise where private property rights do not (or cannot) exist. […] While
there may be some externalities that cannot be made good via the enforcement of private property rights
(principally  because private  property rights  cannot be created or enforced),  the  presence of  negative
externalities should properly lead to an investigation to see how private property rights can be further
extended, rather than an abandonment of the free market system” (Meadowcraft 2004).
22  Arrow and Hahn write: “The implications of these conclusions […] suggest that
under  appropriate  hypotheses,  especially  convexity  and  the  presence  of  all  markets  (absence  of
externalities), competitive equilibrium is very sturdy. There is no strong incentive for subgroups to try to
coalesce and to achieve more than they could in the competitive equilibrium; for any such attempt would
be  unstable.  This  is  contrary  to  the  view  sometimes  expressed  that  competitive  equilibrium  has  an
inherent instability in that it would pay, for example, the owners of some one commodity to form a cartel
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assumption is far-reaching and would imply the commodification of all things including
not only common-pool resources such as air, water, forests, pastures and ecosystems,
but also “things” like love, sex, taking care of one’s own children and, theoretically, also
law, police protection and the state. 
To be clear,  it  would be completely wrong to  argue that  Elinor  and Vincent Ostrom
defend  this  position.  They  worked  throughout  their  lives  to  develop  a  better
understanding  of  how  commons  and  common  property  arrangements  can  be
democratically  governed.  But  the  question  arises  whether  the  Ostroms  provide
arguments  against  this  demand  to  privatize  all  of  life.  Generally,  their  only  reasons
against  privatization  are  the  ones  that  result  from  their  previously  mentioned
categorization of  goods.  In  her  book  Governing  the  Commons  originally  published  in
1990, Elinor shortly discusses privatization. Here, she basically argues that privatization
is  undesirable  because it  increases  the  costs  of  property  protection,  monitoring  and
sanctioning (E. Ostrom 2008a, 12). She writes, “[T]he setup costs for a new market or a
new insurance  scheme  would  be substantial  and  will  not  be  needed  so  long  as  the
herders  share  fodder  and  risk  by  jointly  sharing  a  larger  grazing  area”  (ibid.,  13).
According  to  Elinor,  an  increase  in  costs  makes  it  unlikely  that  shared  land  will  be
privatized.  Furthermore,  common  pool  resources  such  as  pastures  are  supposedly
somewhat difficult to (fairly) parcel up because of the highly unequal structure of the
landscape. According to Ostrom, this would make privatization undesirable. In the case
of fisheries, Elinor also argues that the unstable movement of fish make it “likely” that
fisheries would “be owned in common rather than individually” (ibid.,  13).  However,
these  arguments  against  privatization  are  simply  based on  monetary  utility  and the
functional  description  of  goods.  As  we  can  see,  we  may  search  in  vain  for  robust
normative arguments against privatization in the work of the Ostroms. 
In this sense, a more fundamental question that arises now is not only if privatization is
possible (i.e. costly), but whether it is desirable. What is neglected is the simple insight
that privatization and commodification fundamentally transform people’s relationships
with each other and the world (e.g. paid sex versus unpaid sex between people), but that
they also exclude people from vital resources for their life and liberty (i.e. water, land,
housing etc.).  For example, by enabling someone to appropriate and accumulate land
and exploit their monopoly power” (Arrow and Hahn 1971, 186; emphasis added). 
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without limit, other people will be excluded from the possibility to access land. I believe
this to be the main, simple and general argument against privatization. The position that
I defend in this work and that I  will  elaborate on in more detail  later is that people
require  access  to  common  resources  as  a  prerequisite  for  life  and  liberty.  While
individual private property might be necessary for the fulfillment of certain personal
needs,  an access to democratically  managed common property provides people with
greater  individual  freedom  in  joint  activities  while  simultaneously  minimizing  their
ecological  impact.  Put  somewhat  differently,  commons  thus  increase  our  autonomy,
which  we  defined  as  the  ability  to  co-determine  our  social  conditions,  and
simultaneously provide us with a democratic means to create abundance through the
fairer distribution of goods in a world of limited resources. In turn, I believe this to be
the main argument  for a  commons-based society.  Elinor  and Vincent  Ostrom’s work
strikingly  lacks  such  a  critique  of  privatization  and  a  clear  normative  defense  of
commons. As previously mentioned, it would be false to argue that Elinor or Vincent
Ostrom defend privatization; but with his scant and somewhat misleading critique of
market failure, the door is left wide open to privatization.23 As we can see, this is a large
and serious gap in Elinor and Vincent’s work on commons. In order to be fair, we could
say that as political scientists,  it was not their job to provide a normative defense of
commons – they simply provided the examples that commons can be democratically and
sustainably managed. 
4.3.3. The Tragedy of the Market
That  being  said,  Elinor  Ostrom  actually  does  provide  another  rather  slender  but
insightful critique of markets that will help us in our general analysis of the relationships
between markets, democracy and commons. 
In Governing the Commons, Elinor does, in fact, note that privatization will transform the
relationship that one has with nature. After privatization, she explains, “each herder will
be playing a game against nature in a smaller terrain, rather than a game against another
player in a larger terrain”  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 12; emphasis i.o.). She then declares that
the reason for this “game against nature” is a “result of [one’s; LP] own profit incentive”
23  For a (neo)liberal market-oriented (re)interpretation of Elinor Ostrom’s work
see,  for  example,  Mark  Pennington’s  Elinor  Ostrom,  common-pool  resources  and  the  classical  liberal
tradition (2012).
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(ibid., 13). Here, we are confronted with a certain contradiction in property theory. On
the one hand, it  is  often assumed that privatization leads to a more responsible and
sustainable management of a specific resource due to the correlation between costs and
benefits. On the other hand, it is also assumed that people will use their resources more
usefully or, rather, more productively and profitably. We will discuss this argument in
further detail when we discuss John Locke’s legitimization of private property. For now,
however,  it  is  interesting to note that Elinor appears to claim that sustainability and
profit contradict each other and that the problems of overuse and degradation remain
present even if the specific resource is privately owned.
On the one hand, we might think that this overuse occurs because people are inherently
greedy and short-sighted. This would support the thesis that if people are able to pursue
their  egotistical  interests,  they  will  then  seek  profits  and  exploit  the  resources  that
sustain  their  own  existence.  If  this  were  the  case,  we  could  justify  a  power  “from
without”  that  protects  people  from  their  own  destructive  drives.  As  we  will  see,
however, this is not the case that Elinor is defending. On the other hand, it could just as
easily be assumed that people manage privately owned resources sustainably in their
own  long-term  self-interests.  This  could  occur  when  people  are  relatively  informed
about the effects of their actions. Why, then, would people nevertheless overuse their
privately-owned  resources?  The  reason  becomes  more  apparent  when  we  perceive
individuals in their broader social context. In her article  Toward a Behavioral Theory
Linking  Trust,  Reciprocity,  and  Reputation (2003),  Elinor  explains  that  when
privatization is coupled with open and competitive markets, tragedy is simply repeated
at a higher level. She explains: “In highly structured and competitive environments such
as an open market [...]  entrepreneurs have  no alternative other than to seek profits.
Those who do not pick maximization strategies […] are eliminated by the selective forces
of the market” (E. Ostrom 2003, 25: emphasis added). Similarly to Hardin’s portrayal of
the  tragedy of  unregulated commons,  she argues  that  the  open-market  arrangement
transforms individuals into “determinate, calculating machine[s]” (ibid.) that are caught
up in a single-exit or straitjacket situation (ibid.). In order to survive, private property in
open  competitive  markets  thus  force  people  to  increasingly  extract  and  accumulate
resources – irrespective whether these resources are owned privately or collectively.
Aside from these and other fleeting references to the  problems of “rent seeking”  (E.
Ostrom  and  Hess  2007,  5),  “roving  bandits”  (E.  Ostrom  2007,  12) or  even  “robber
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barons”  (V.  Ostrom 2008c,  244),  I  am not  aware of  any other  critical  reflections  on
privatization and markets in the work of Elinor or Vincent Ostrom. 
Before continuing,  I  think it  is  important to pause for  a  moment  and reflect  on this
insight of Elinor’s in order to develop my own more elaborate critique of markets here.
As we see, competitive and maximizing arrangements as described by Elinor are very
similar to those described by Adam Smith in which markets discipline people to increase
the “wealth of nations”. Firstly, it must be noted that unregulated commons enables the
unlimited appropriation and accumulation of resources. Yet, in contrast to Adam Smith’s
positive portrayal of wealth generation,  we are reminded again that the discipline of
open  and  competitive  markets  greatly  limits  and  undermines  the  individual  and
collective freedom to alter one’s  social  arrangements.  Furthermore,  in discussing the
tragedy  of  unregulated  commons,  we  have  ironically  discovered  that  open  and
competitive markets function according to the same paradoxical logic as unregulated,
open-access commons: One’s existence is secured through the necessity to appropriate
more and more resource units from a specific resource system, irrespective whether the
resource  system  is  held  in  common  or  treated  as  individual  private  property.  Both
arrangements function according to the logic of “survival through accumulation”. While
Adam Smith positively describes this process as an increase in economic growth and
individual monetary wealth, the perspective of commons conceptualizes the same social
arrangement as a tragedy that depletes and overuses people’s common resources. 
Yet, in contrast to Elinor, I would argue that privatization does not replace the “game
against another player” with a “game against nature” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 12). Instead,
antagonistic and competitive relationships exist in both social arrangements. The reason
for  this  is  that  both  the  unregulated  commons  and  the  open market  are  structured
according to the prisoner’s dilemma or what is also known in economic terminology as
the isolation paradox  (Sen 1984,  123-4,  Elson 1988,  13-20).  In  both,  there exists  an
institutional setting in which individuals must act ex post without prior communication
and knowledge of the intentions and actions of the other person. This is what Frank
Night and other economists call “uncertainty” in market situations  (Knight 1921). The
problem, however, goes beyond the difficulty of merely dealing with unforeseen events
such as rainfall or strong wind. As we know, the uncertainty of the prisoner’s dilemma
leads to maximization strategies and the depletion of resources – irrespective whether
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these are held in common or owned privately. Hence, the privatization of all goods and
resources  will  not  be  able  to  overcome  ecological  problems,  because  competitive
markets also force one to extract more and more resources from one’s own individual
private property, ultimately depleting these resources too. A pertinent example of this is
burnout, which can be interpreted as a type of depletion of one’s resources in oneself in
order to keep up with the other market participants  (Rosa 2010). As we see, survival
through  perpetual  accumulation  in  a  world  of  finite  resources  is  not  only  logically
impossible, but also socio-ecologically self-destructive. 
Interestingly, this dynamic not only undermines the resources that are privatized and
transformed into profit but also destabilizes the market itself.  Due to the diversity of
people’s capabilities and their unequal starting positions, accumulation processes are
also  highly  unequal.  Simply  put,  people  with  better  starting  positions  can,  in  turn,
accumulate even more at a greater rate. This cumulative advantage is often understood
as the Matthew principle.24 This implies that the ensuing race to the bottom – or to the
top, depending on one’s perspective – increases scarcity even more for those who have
less. Obviously, this dynamic accentuates the divergence between the haves and have-
nots. Then, those without purchasing power become limited in their possibilities to buy
products that are being sold on the market. This is, however, not only problematic for
their own access to resources, but also for those producing the goods, for if the products
are  not  bought,  wages  cannot  be  paid  and  people  loose  jobs.  The  socio-economic
inequality that results from such a divergence thus leads to what is generally known as
an economic  crisis  due  to  a  demand  deficit  (Keynes)  and  overaccumulation  (Marx).
According to this rather simple logic, open and competitive markets lead to economic
instability and the devastation of livelihoods. Put somewhat differently, we could even
say that the dynamic of the open and competitive market undermines the commons of
the market economy. 
Both the ecological devastation and the economic instability would not necessarily be a
problem, if people could solve these problems that result from the open and competitive
market. But as we already know, the open and competitive market creates “structural
constraints” (Cohen 1989, 28) or a “straitjacket situation” (E. Ostrom 2003, 25), which
24  As Streeck quotes in his book Buying Time: “For to all those who have, more will
be given, and they will have in abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be
taken away” (Matt. 25,29 in Streeck 2013, 94; transl. by P. Camiller).
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impedes people from altering their social institutions. We already have discussed this in
relation  to  the  tension  between  the  Staatsvolk and  the  Marktvolk.  This  problem  is,
however, augmented with the maximization dynamic of the competitive market. If one
producer increases its rate of production, all must follow suit in order to maintain their
competitive edge. Thus, in order to survive on the market, agents must not only increase
the  amount of  appropriation and output,  but  also  the  rate thereof.  This  is  normally
understood as efficiency gains through rationalization processes and is one of the main
justifications of a competitive market economy. The sociologist Hartmut Rosa describes
this  process  as  one  of  perpetual  social  acceleration,  that  might  increase  economic
output,  yet  does  not  necessarily  increase one’s  freedom and wellbeing  (Rosa 2013).
Importantly, this increased socio-economic acceleration also conflicts with the processes
of democratic deliberation and governance. As he explains, 
“[T]he central specifically temporal difficulty of democratic politics proves to be
the  fact  that  a  participatory  and  deliberative  will  formation  that  includes  a
broad democratic public is capable of being accelerated only to a very limited
extent and under specific social conditions. The aggregation and articulation of
collective interests and their implementation in democratic decision making has
been and remains time intensive.  For this  reason democratic  politics is  very
much  exposed  to  the  danger  of  desynchronization  in  the  face  of  more
acceleratable social and economic developments” (Rosa 2013, 254).
We can thus understand this desynchronization as a falling apart of the high speed of
socio-economic  processes  and  the  time  necessary  for  democratic  practices.  This
incongruence  leads  to  a  time  lag  of  political  action  behind  economic  developments.
Importantly, this implies that “politics loses its role as an influential actor that shapes
the playing field itself and takes on the status of a predominantly reactive fellow player
of the game” (ibid., 264; emphasis i.o.). Here, democratic politics is again dethroned, yet
not by economist kings or a Marktvolk, but rather by the maximization dynamics of the
market itself. Similar to the previously discussed structural constraints, this necessity to
perpetually accelerate can thus also be understood as “objective forces” (ibid., 269) that
limit political deliberation and action. Again we are confronted with a mechanism of the
open and competitive market that thwarts people from collectively solving the problems
that the market institutions themselves bring about. 
As we see, the isolation paradox that underlies open and competitive markets brings
about diverse problems and mechanisms that limit democratic change and institutional
problem solving. As Amartya Sen explains: “The market mechanism on its own confines
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its attention only to issues of congruence, leaving the interest conflicts [and problems;
LP] unaddressed” (Sen 1984, 95). 25 Along those lines, I would argue that by neglecting
or  suppressing  conflicts  through  individual  private  property,  market  exchange,
competition and the belief in perpetual accumulation and economic growth, conflicts
and tragedies will inevitably erupt elsewhere. As we have just discussed, these tragedies
can  be  economic  degradation,  pollution  and  climate  change,  local  and  global  social
inequalities and economic crises. Here, I would agree with James Tully who understands
these injustices with what he calls the Medea Hypothesis, “that is, like Medea killing her
own children, humanity’s current way of life is bringing about the destruction of the life
conditions of future generations” (Tully 2013a, 3). On top of this, the democratic deficit
resulting from a state-market dichotomy hinders people from instituionally dealing with
these antagonistic interests and grave socio-ecological problems. In turn, this is what
Tully  coins  “the  tragedy  of  privatization”  and  what  I  would  also  understand  as  the
tragedy of open and competitive markets (Tully 2013b, 227, 2014, 86). The underlying
prisoner’s dilemma of both the unregulated commons and the open and competitive
market  underlines  Charles Lindbloms’  notion of  the market as a  prison,  in  which in
which each person is “locked into” (Hardin 1968, 1244, Lindblom 1982).  Paraphrasing
Hardin, we may conclude that in an open and competitive market, each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his wealth without limit – in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best
interest  in  a  society  that  believes  in  the  freedom  of  the  self-regulating  market.
Unhindered individual freedom in an open and competitive market brings ruin to all.
Returning to Elinor Ostrom, we therefore might conclude that although she recognized
the underlying straitjacket maximization logic of the open and competitive market, it
appears that she did not follow through with a reflection on the consequences thereof. 
25  Hayek admits that markets do not actually deal with these conflicting values, but
that they instead only provide a method for agreeing on the means to obtain diverse and conflicting ends.
Hayek writes “Among the members of a Great Society who mostly do not know each other, there will exist
no agreement on the relative importance of their respective ends. There would exist not harmony but open
conflict  of  interests if  agreement  were  necessary  as  to  which  particular  interests  should  be  given
preference over others. What makes agreement and peace in such a society possible is that the individuals
are not required to agree on ends but only on means which are capable of serving a great variety of
purposes and which each hopes will assist him in the pursuit of his own purposes.” (Hayek 2013, 171-2;
emphasis  added).  Although  it  might  appear  that  people  would  not  agree  on  final  ends  in  an  open,
competitive market, I would argue that the final notion that people in capitalist societies must (tacitly)
agree on is perpetual and exponential economic growth as a means to deal with the fact that they do not
agree on other final notions. Ignoring planetary boundaries, endless growth provides the hope that one
day all people will able to realize their desired ends. Instead of dealing with conflicting values, people have
in an open and competitive market thus agreed on economic growth as a social end in itself. 
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In order to avoid being misunderstood, I would again like to mention that this rather
harsh critique of markets is not a critique of markets per se, but rather of open or rather
unregulated, competitive market arrangements. Nevertheless, some may say that this is
a highly exaggerated and negative portrayal of markets.  To a certain extent,  I  would
agree with that critique.  Fortunately,  not all  markets function in this  manner,  as the
regulations  of  labor  markets  and  subsidies  for  farming  in  France  and  Switzerland
respectively prove. It could even be said that the markets of all goods and services are
regulated in some form or another. In this sense, open and competitive markets have
been  portrayed  in  an  abstract  and  idealized  manner.  Nevertheless,  the  mechanisms
behind existing “imperfect” markets still often function according to the dynamics that
were  just  described.  Furthermore,  the  problem  that  many  people  –  especially  in
northern Western countries and especially people in upper social strata – are faced with
is that the world does not appear to be as bad as I have just described it to be. Under this
assumption,  we could begin a  discussion about  whether  the  glass is  half  full  or  half
empty. That, however, would be missing the point. The problem is that many of these
issues discussed are not perceived directly but usually occur somewhere else, be that in
poor neighborhoods that one does not live or in the global South that is hit harder than
the North by austerity policies and climate change. More to the point, the positive and
negative effects of these maximization strategies are distributed unevenly and unequally
throughout a society and between societies. Thus, while some of us may not experience
these problems in our day-to-day life,  I would nevertheless affirm that the structural
logic that lies behind these diverse socio-economic, ecological and political problems is
largely  due  to  the  institutional  arrangements  based  on  privatization  and  open  and
competitive markets. 
That being said, I believe that we can now return to the work of the Ostroms and see if
we find some answers to the tragedies of both the hierarchical monocentric order and
privatization. 
4.4. Overcoming Tragedy through Collective Action 
In order to conceptualize alternative forms of societal organization, Elinor Ostrom turns
to the analysis and reflection of a central assumption of both Garret Hardin’s thesis and
economic theory in general:  That  humans are rational,  egotistical  utility  maximizers.
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Although  she  questions  the  universality  of  complete  rationality  and  rational  choice
theory, Ostrom insists that she does not present a new, alternative model, but that she
merely formulates diverse attributes of human behavior that should be included in the
consideration of future efforts to formalize specific models of agency (Ostrom 2003, 54,
62). 
4.4.1. A Behaviorist Theory of Bounded Rationality and Norm-Oriented Agents
As mentioned above, the tragedy of the commons is based on the prisoner’s dilemma, in
which agents are conceptualized according to a utilitarian model of complete rationality.
The assumptions for such games are that  (1)  all  participants have knowledge of the
structure and possible outcomes, (2) the strategies are decided upon independently, and
(3) there is no external authority to enforce agreements (ibid.,  23).  Elinor lists some
reasons for the peculiarity of this model: “no communication among the participants, no
previous ties among them, no anticipation of future actions, and no capacity to promise,
threaten, cajole, or retaliate” (E. Ostrom 1986, 10). Most importantly, the “only ‘choice’
available  to  rational  human  beings  [in  this  situation  is;  LP]  a  ‘choice’  within the
constraints of an externally imposed structure” (ibid., 11, emphasis i.o.). Because people
can supposedly only choose within these specific institutional arrangements, individuals
are encouraged or forced to act as if they were “naturally” egotistical utility maximizers.
It  is  in  this  sense  that  Elinor  denaturalizes  both  unregulated,  open-access  common
property  regimes  and,  in  passing,  the  open  competitive  market.  In  contrast,  she
understands both the models of the completely rational agent and of the paradigm of the
prisoner’s dilemma situation to merely be “one model within a family of models […]
[that exits; LP] in highly structured physical and institutional settings” (ibid., 25).   
Elinor  Ostrom is  able  to  relativize  and reformulate  the  currently  dominant  rational-
choice theory due to her extensive analysis of vast amounts of empirical research both in
the laboratory and in the field. Without going into too much detail about the laboratory
experiments,  it  can generally  be  said  that  much evidence contradicts  the  theoretical
predictions  of  dilemmas and Nash-equilibria  (E.  Ostrom 2003,  24,  27-37).  The most
important findings made in the laboratory are (1) the initially high yet suboptimal levels
of cooperation in most social dilemma games, (2) the positive effect of communication
on cooperation and (3) the willingness to invest in solving second-order dilemmas or,
rather, in changing the structure of the game itself in order to improve joint benefits
68
(ibid.). Despite these results, Ostrom remarks that diverse contextual variables (such as
length  of  game,  communication  and  sanctioning  possibilities  etc.)  produce  stark
variations in levels of cooperation, which remains as the “really big puzzle in the social
sciences” (ibid., 39). In this sense, it could be said that the variance in laboratory settings
and  game  outcomes  has  led  Elinor  Ostrom  to  broaden  the  scope  of  classical
methodological  individualism  by  emphasizing  the  importance  of  the  context  for
individual agency and collective action.26  
It is this variety in the empirical results that has enabled Ostrom to attempt to formulate
a  behavioral  theory  of  bounded  rationality  that  brings  together  the  constraints  of
specific  contexts  and the cognitive  limitations  of  agents.  In comparison to  the “thin”
theory  of  complete  rationality  in  which  humans  are  “self-interested,  short-term
maximizers”  (E.  Ostrom  1998,  2),  Ostrom  develops  a  broader,  “second-generation”
(ibid., 9) model of bounded or incomplete rationality. 
“I  assume  that  [humans;  LP]  seek  to  improve  values  of  importance  to  them
(including what happens to other individuals who are of concern to them); select
actions within interdependent situations in which what they do is affected by
their expectations of what others will do; use information about the situation and
about the characteristics of others to make decisions; and try to do as well as they
can given the constraints they face. In addition, I assume that in the course of
their lifetimes individuals learn heuristics, strategies, norms, rules, and how to
craft rules” (E. Ostrom 2003, 39-40).
Remaining within a general utilitarian framework, Elinor Ostrom appears to understand
human rationality as a means to an end, as an instrument to attain certain preferences
(E. Ostrom 1998, 9). In contrast to a classical rationalist model, however, Ostrom does
not  assume the (short-term) maximization of  interests  but  hypothesizes  that  people
merely desire to improve the things they value.  This teleological  movement could be
understood as a form of meliorism which is common in pragmatist thought  (Koopman
2006). Although Ostrom’s use of the term “value” is under-defined here, considering her
critique of a purely economic or monetary understanding of value, it is plausible that her
26  Ostrom writes: “The models of social dilemmas used in laboratory experiments
appear to be quite robust. Researchers are able to create and replicate situations in which there is no
cooperation, very high levels of cooperation, or moderate levels of cooperation. The amount of control
that can be exercised indicates that the experimental models of dilemma situations are quite good.  The
model of the individual actor used to explain outcomes appears to be the source of the problem” (E. Ostrom
2003, 39; emphasis added).
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– and Vincent’s – understanding of value is plural, conflicting and contingent (Dietz et al.
2003, 1909, V. Ostrom 1984). 
This  model  of  bounded  rationality  importantly  emphasizes  that  the  definition  and
pursuit of these values is embedded in and constrained through the general material and
social  context.  Having  been  influenced  by  Herbert  Simon,  Elinor  understands  the
rationality  of  an  agent  to  be  limited  by  available  resources  (such  as  time  and
information) that enable people to attain specific ends (Wall 2014, 41-3). Furthermore,
she argues that diverse empirical examples demonstrate that humans learn and utilize
diverse  heuristics,  norms and rules  to  simplify  this  cognitive  process  of  information
analysis,  evaluation and transmission.  According to Elinor,  instrumental heuristics  or
“rules  of  thumb”  are  created  and  refined  by  individuals  in  repetitive  situations  to
optimize  outcomes.  Norms  are,  however,  used  as  positive  and  negative  “internal
valuations […] that an individual attaches to a particular type of action” (E. Ostrom 2003,
40).  Norms  are  generally  learned  through  socialization  and  are  affected  by  diverse
situational variables (ibid., 49). Ostrom understands these internal values as a scale or
“delta parameter” (ibid.) that can weigh diverging and conflicting external end values
against each other. Although norms are often associated with positive values such as
sharing  and caring,  Ostrom conceptualizes  the  term more neutrally  as  an  individual
orientation system or societal  “focal  points” (ibid.,  40)  that are created through past
experiences and the expected actions of others. She explains, 
“After experiencing repeated benefits from other people’s cooperative actions, an
individual may resolve always to initiate cooperation in the future. Alternatively,
after many experiences of being the ‘sucker’ in such situations, an individual may
resolve  never  to initiate  unilateral  cooperation and to  punish noncooperators
whenever feasible” (ibid., 40-41).
As Elinor emphasizes, norms, preferences and values can be changed throughout one’s
life  in  order  to  react  to  specific  experiences  (E.  Ostrom 1998,  9).  In  comparison to
unconscious heuristics and internalized tacit  norms, rules tend to be self-consciously
developed “shared understandings  that  certain actions  in  particular  situations  must,
must not, or may be undertaken” (ibid., 10). It is in this sense that Ostrom understands
rationality as being bound, where the choices of means and ends that an agent makes
are rarely based on complete knowledge and abstract, absolute principles. Instead, they
are constrained by the limited resources available and strongly influenced by implicit
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and explicit orientation systems created through human interactions. By including both
situational  constraints  and  societal  norms  and  rules,  Elinor  Ostrom  fundamentally
transforms  the  concept  of  methodological  individualism  into  a  non-essentialist  and
contingent27 model  of  human  agency  that  is  embedded  in  a  social  reality  of
“communicative action” (Habermas 1981). 
4.4.2. The Importance of Reciprocity, Trust and Reputations
Despite this important revision of the theory of human agency, its implications for the
overcoming of social dilemmas must be discussed now. To understand the possibilities
of creating social  conditions for overcoming social  dilemmas, Elinor Ostrom turns to
norms of cooperation and reciprocity. According to Ostrom, “Reciprocity is viewed by
sociologists, social psychologists, and philosophers as one of the basic norms taught in
all  societies”  (E.  Ostrom  2003,  42).  From  an  evolutionary  perspective,  reciprocity
enhances  one’s  “fitness”  by  promoting  better  outcomes  and  has  been  utilized  as  a
strategy to overcome social dilemmas long before mutual obligations could be enforced
by external authorities (E. Ostrom 1998, 10). For this reason, it could even be said that
reciprocity has the tendency to be people’s  dominant norm or default  position.  This
hypothesis  is  supported  by  numerous  laboratory  experiments  in  which  people  use
reciprocity  norms  in  one-shot,  no-communication  games  and  other  short-term
experimental  environments  (E.  Ostrom 2003,  47-9).28 Despite  this  general  tendency,
Ostrom emphasizes that reciprocity is not biologically inherited. Instead,
“[i]ndividuals inherit a capacity to learn and value algorithms that enhance their
capacity  to  increase  their  own  long-term  benefits  when  confronting  multiple
social-dilemma situations with others who have learned and value similar norms,
even  though  each  situation  involves  different  people,  payoffs,  and  levels  of
uncertainty” (ibid., 44).
We will discuss the question of reciprocity and human nature in more detail later, but
for  the  time  being,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  because  reciprocity  is  learnt
27  The contingency of human agency basically implies that the actions of human
beings  are  neither  completely  predetermined  because  chance,  spontaneity  and  imagination  open  the
possibilities of change, nor are they completely free, because actions are always dependent on specific
conditions.
28  A famous laboratory game that demonstrates this tendency to use reciprocity is
the ultimatum game (E. Ostrom 2003, 47-9). In reference to other experiments, Ostrom writes:  “[T]he
evidence from experiments shows that a substantial  proportion of the population drawn on by social
science  experiments (primarily college students in major universities in the United States, Europe, and
Japan)  –  ranging  from  50  to  60  percent  –  do  have  sufficient  trust  that  others  are  reciprocators  to
cooperate with them even in one-shot, no-communication experiments” (ibid., 49).
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through processes of  socialization,  individuals  can develop diverse strategies to deal
with  different  social  dilemmas.  While  some  people  learn  strategies  of  reciprocity  to
overcome these problems in a variety of situations, others learn norms of behavior that
are less “nice” (ibid.). This can include either individual or group egotistical behavior. In
this sense, reciprocity norms can also have a dark side. In reference to this problematic
finding, Ostrom argues: 
“Tight  circles  of  individuals  who  trust  one  another  [and  cooperate;  LP]  may
discriminate against others of a different color, religion, or ethnicity to keep them
from access to productive opportunities. The focus on the return of favors for
favors can also be the foundation of corrupt practices whereby those in official
positions do favors for wealthy friends who then return the favors with various
forms of financial enrichments” (ibid.: 45). 
For this reason, reciprocity norms and practices that are inclusive and that support basic
moral standards must be differentiated from those that are highly exclusive, restrictive
and repressive (ibid.). 
According to Elinor Ostrom, central endogenous variables in human interactions that
enable  and strengthen reciprocal  interactions  are  those  of  trust  and  reputation.  She
defines trust as “the expectation of one person about the actions of others that affects
the first person’s choice, when an action must be taken before the actions of the others
are  known”  (E.  Ostrom 1998,  12).  The  existing  level  of  trust  is  therefore  central  in
determining the first action in a social dilemma because it “affects whether an individual
is willing to initiate cooperation in the expectation that it will be reciprocated” (ibid.).
The hope or expectation that one’s cooperation will be returned is not based on naïve
altruism but rather on one’s own previous experiences and social norms, on the one
hand, and on the reputation of the other person, on the other. Reputations are, in turn,
important for trust and reciprocity because they give information about an individual’s
history of overcoming social dilemmas. Or, in other words, reputations tell other people
whether someone has been “keeping promises and performing actions with short-term
costs  but  long-term benefits”  (E.  Ostrom 2003,  43).  This,  in  turn,  enables  people  to
“estimate of the risk of extending trust [to the other person; LP], given the structure of
the  particular  situation”  (ibid.,  49).  A  good  reputation  makes  a  person trustworthy,
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implicating that one can expect that they will reciprocate cooperative behavior in the
future. 
For this reason, Elinor Ostrom places the relationship between reciprocity,  trust and
reputation at the center of her understanding of how bounded rational agents overcome
social dilemmas: “[A]t the core of a behavioral explanation are the links between the
trust  that  an  individual  has  in  others,  the  investment  others  make  in  trustworthy
reputations, and the probability of using reciprocity norms” (E. Ostrom 2003, 49-50). If
cultivated, trust, reputations and reciprocity are “valuable assets” (E. Ostrom 1998, 12)
that  can  create  a  “mutually  reinforcing  core”  (E.  Ostrom  2003,  50)  and  transform
Hardin’s  negative  vicious  cycle  of  tragedy  into  a  virtuous  cycle  of  improved  joint
outcomes,  ultimately increasing one’s evolutionary (ibid.,  E.  Ostrom 1998,  12).  These
insights  into  the  mechanisms of  reciprocity,  trust  and reputation to overcome social
dilemmas are fundamental in Elinor Ostrom’s theoretical development of an alternative
to market or state policy prescriptions that are grounded in micro-situational everyday
experiences. 
4.5. Self-Governing Commons with the Aid of Eight Design Principles
Despite  these  positive  impacts  on  peoples’  capabilities  to  cooperate  and  trust  one
another,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  Elinor  Ostrom’s  research  also  reveals  the
contingency and fragility of these norms and behavioral patterns. For this reason, she
shifts her focus from such endogenous variables to exogenous, contextual variables in
order to understand how social conditions can strengthen these norms and enhance the
possibilities  of  overcoming  social  dilemmas.  By  analyzing  the  effect  of  institutional
structures on human interactions, it can be said that first-order dilemmas of reciprocity,
trust  and reputation are  then transformed into  second-  and third-order  public  good
dilemmas  of  institutional  supply,  credible  commitment  and  mutual  monitoring  (E.
Ostrom  2008a,  41-5).  Similarly  to  her  findings  on  trust  and  reciprocity,  while  the
classical theory of fully rational agents predicts that rule making will not occur because
everyone will  default to free-riding,29 Ostrom’s meta-analysis of numerous laboratory
29  On the problem of second-level dilemmas, Ostrom writes, “Spending time and
effort designing rules creates a public good for all involved and is thus a second-level dilemma no more
likely to be solved than the original dilemma. This is the foundation for the repeated recommendation that
rules must be imposed by external authorities who are also responsible for monitoring and enforcing
these rules” (E. Ostrom 1999a, 506).
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and field experiments has discovered that people are actually often willing to invest time
and energy into changing rules and institutions to improve joint outcomes. 
Before  analyzing  and  discussing  these  exogenous  factors  in  detail,  it  should  be
mentioned that  one specific  variable can be considered fundamental  for  overcoming
social dilemmas on all levels of interactions: The possibility of communicating with one
another. Although no single variable automatically produces reciprocity norms, face-to-
face communication is central for cultivating cooperation and creating institutions. In
contrast to the situations of non-communication in Hardin’s unregulated commons and
the prisoners’ dilemma, Elinor Ostrom explains:  
“With a chance to see and talk with others repeatedly, a participant can assess
whether he or she trusts others sufficiently to try to reach a simple contingent
agreement regarding the level of joint effort and its allocation. Communication
thus allows individuals to increase (or decrease) their trust in the reliability of
others” (E. Ostrom 2003, 51).
Face-to-face communication not only enables people to access more information about
other participants, but it also enables people to make promises and create agreements in
relation to future actions. Furthermore, communication can reinforce prior normative
values and facilitate the development of a group identity, which also generally increases
mutual  trust  (ibid.,  33).  Thus,  the  possibility  of  face-to-face  communication  must  be
understood  as  a  key  variable  in  dealing  with  social  dilemmas  on  different  but
interrelated levels of action. 
Despite  this  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  communication  for  creating  robust30
institutions, communication per se does not solve the problems of supply, commitment
and monitoring. In order to understand how these difficulties can be dealt with through
communication and rule creation,  we must now turn to Elinor Ostrom’s eight design
principles  for  long-enduring  institution.31Beginning  with  the  importance  of
30  The term robust is introduced here because it is a central term for the type of
institutions Ostrom intends to help develop. She explains what is normally meant by robust: “[Kenneth]
Shepsle considered a system to be robust if it was long-lasting and the operational rules had been devised
and modified over time according to a set of collective-choice rules (which themselves might be modified
more slowly over time within a set of  constitutional-choice rules,  which were modified,  if  at  all,  very
unfrequently). The contemporary use of the term robustness in regard to complex systems focuses on
adaptability to disturbances: ‘the maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations
in the behaviour of its component parts or its environment’ (Carlson and Doyle)” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 258).  
31  I will not discuss the eight design principles in the order that Ostrom presents
them in, but rather in a sequence that suits the logic of my argumentation.  
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communication in dealing with multi-level social dilemmas, it makes sense to begin with
Ostrom’s  seventh  principle:  “minimal  recognition  of  rights  to  organize”  (E.  Ostrom
2008a, 90). According to Elinor, this entails “[t]he rights of users to devise their own
institutions  [that;  LP]  are  not  challenged  by  external  governmental  authorities”  (E.
Ostrom 2005a,  259). It  is  implicit  in this principle that users have “long-term tenure
rights to the resource” (ibid.).32 These simple yet fundamental principles provide people
not  only  with  the  rights  to  access  and  use  the  resource,  but  also  to  define  the
institutional  framework  that  regulates  it.  This  enables  people  to  have  a  long-term
interest  in  the  maintenance  of  the  resource  and  allows  communication  and  self-
organizing to take place at all. 
With this ability to communicate and self-organize, people are also able to define clear
boundaries for those with rights to access and utilize the resource (design principle 1).33
This is an important step that transforms open, unregulated commons threatened by
overuse into closed and regulated commons (E. Ostrom 2008a, 90-1). This set of rules
occurs on the constitutional-choice level and determines “the specific rules to be used in
crafting the set of collective-choice rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules”
(ibid.,  52). Then, “collective-choice arrangements” and the policy rules of “how a CPR
[common  pool  resource;  LP]  should  be  managed”  (ibid.)  must  be  defined  (design
principle  3).  People  are then able to create operational  rules  that  regulate the  daily
utilization of the resource according to local  conditions and the different inputs and
needs of the people involved (design principle 2). According to Ostrom, it is especially
important  here  to  note  a  “proportional  equivalence  between benefits  and  costs”  (E.
Ostrom  2005a,  262).  This  supposedly  implies:  “When  the  rules  related  to  the
distribution  of  benefits  are  made  broadly  consistent  with  the  distribution  of  costs,
participants  are  more  willing  to  pitch  in  to  keep  a  resource  well  maintained  and
sustainable” (ibid., 263). In simpler terms, fair rules are important to maintain levels of
32  This  aspect  of  the  seventh  design  principle  was  not  included  in  her  book
Governing  the  Commons first  published  in  1990  but  was  added  in  her  later  book  Understanding
Institutional Diversity published in 2005.. 
33  The  definition  of  clear  boundaries  of  a  common  pool  resource  is  necessary,
according  to  Elinor  Ostrom,  when  the  resource  units  consumed  are  rival  or  subtractive  goods.  In
comparison to non-rival or non-subtractible goods such as information that can be organized as open-
access regimes, the scarcity and subtractibility of goods makes it necessary to regulate the appropriation
and consumption thereof. According to Ostrom, this is the central distinction between common property
and open-access regimes (E. Ostrom 2008a, 91-2, E. Ostrom 2010a, 642, 644).
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trust  and  reciprocity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  uphold  stable  institutions  and  the
sustainable use of resources, on the other hand. 
Although the constitutional-, collective- and operational-choice levels of rules and rule-
making are analytically differentiated here, Ostrom notes that self-organizing and self-
governing people in field settings “go back and forth across levels as a key strategy for
solving problems” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 54). In relation to all three levels of rule-making, it
can generally be said that when most of the individuals who are affected by a resource
unit are able to continually configure and modify their own rules, these rules are then
more likely to better suit local environmental conditions and the affected individuals’
needs. Furthermore, such participation not only limits elites from creating policies that
only benefit themselves, but it also empowers individuals to co-produce rules and public
goods that are more likely to be considered fair,  adhered to and fostered (E. Ostrom
2005a, 263).  
After discussing the general design principles for the supply of institutions,  we must
now turn our attention to the problem of the adherence to these rules. Although the
creation  of  fair  and  suitable  institutions  by  those  affected  strongly  increases  the
commitment to adhering to the rules, the fragility of reciprocity and trust implies that
shared norms are not sufficient for maintaining cooperation and higher joint outcomes.
To strengthen one’s trust that one is not being taken advantage of, rule infraction and
free-riding  must  be  additionally  controlled  and  limited  through  certain  forms  of
monitoring,  sanctioning  and  other  conflict-resolving  mechanisms.  While  Hardin  and
many others believe that only external coercion can solve the problem of rule violation,
Elinor believes this solution to be a sleight of hand because it does not address the costs
and motivations of the external enforcer  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 44, 96). Although external
enforcers can, in certain cases, be useful and necessary, she argues that in order to solve
the commitment problem, affected individuals  have to “motivate  themselves (or their
agents) to monitor activities and be willing to impose sanctions” (ibid.; emphasis added).
The commitment problem thus boils down to the willingness of affected individuals to
adhere to collectively self-determined rules – and to the assurance that others will also
act accordingly. For this reason, the commitment problem is inherently interwoven with
the monitoring problem. 
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Monitoring  generally  implies  that  resource  conditions  and  harvesting  activities  are
visible  and  checked  on.  Ostrom’s  research  on  long-enduring  resource  regimes  has
shown that monitoring works well if the monitors are appropriators themselves or are
elected  by  and  accountable  towards  appropriators  (design  principle  4)  (E.  Ostrom
2005a, 265). In some cases, mutual monitoring simply occurs as a “natural by-product of
using the commons”  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 96). In cases where local monitors are elected,
these officials are, in turn, often also monitored by the appropriators who are usually
those  who  initially  elected  their  officials.  The  redundancy  in  this  system  of  mutual
monitoring is a central strategy to minimize the “quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” problem
that  Hardin  formulated  for  what  he  understood  as  “socialism.”  Furthermore,  the
attractiveness of formal and informal mutual monitoring by appropriators is increased–
besides gains in status, prestige and other small material rewards from sanctioning – by
the  access  to  valuable  information  of  the  resource  and  compliance  rates  for  future
strategic  decisions  (ibid.,  97).  Although  mutual  monitoring  can  easily  be  considered
highly  inefficient  because  of  its  redundancy,  research  shows  that  it  is  actually  an
effective and low-cost mechanism to strengthen mutual trust and maintain higher joint
outcomes. 
For monitoring to have any effect on trust and compliance, however, it must be coupled
with different mechanisms of sanctioning (E.  Ostrom 2005a,  266-7).  Sanctioning can
either occur by the appropriators themselves or by officials accountable towards the
appropriators – or by both (E. Ostrom 2008a, 90). Contrary to general assumptions that
trust  and  compliance  are  maintained  through  harsh punishments  of  rule  violation,34
Ostrom’s research demonstrates that graduated sanctions are both less costly and more
effective than initial  major fines (design principle 5) (ibid.,  98).  She writes that  “[i]n
many self-organized systems, the first sanction imposed by a local monitor is so low as
to have  no impact on the expected benefit-cost ratio of breaking local rules (given the
substantial temptations frequently involved)” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 266; emphasis i.o.). In
many cases, the initial sanction that is “imposed” is when the monitor merely informs
both the community and the person that they were caught violating the rules (ibid.).
34  In the literature on game theory, the most frequently discussed punishment is
the grim trigger. Here, “a participant, once he or she has detected any level of cheating, plays the Nash
equilibrium strategy forever” (E. Ostrom 2003, 52). The problem with the grim trigger, however, is that it
“immediately could lead to the rapid unravelling of the agreement and the loss of substantial benefits over
time” (ibid., 53). Although it is often assumed that the grim trigger is normally used in social interactions
as an ultimate threat to secure rule conformity,  research on game theory provides a different picture:
“Few subjects use grim triggers, however, in experimental contexts” (ibid., 52). 
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These  low-cost  sanctions  have  an  impact  because  they  are  a  subtle  form  of  public
shaming  and  damage  the  reputation  and  trustworthiness  of  the  individual.  This
threatens the individual’s social status and evolutionary “fitness” because other people
could possibly – in a “tit-for-tat” or “measured reaction” (E. Ostrom 2003, 42, 52-3) –
stop  cooperating  with  this  person,  which,  in  turn,  produces  an  incentive  to  quickly
return  to  a  more  cooperative  strategy.35 Ostrom  explains,  however,  that  the  more
serious problem of repeated rule infractions is often dealt with by escalating sanctions
because it “enables such a regime to warn members that if they do not conform, they will
have to pay ever higher sanctions and may eventually be forced to leave the community”
(E. Ostrom 2005a, 267). 
With  reference  to  Margaret  Levi,  Ostrom  explains  that  monitoring  and  escalating
punishment  strategies  create  a  regime  of  “quasi-voluntary  compliance”.  Here,
cooperation is initially voluntary because if non-cooperation arises, it will be subject to
coercion  (E.  Ostrom  2008a,  94-5).  More  importantly,  it  must  be  noted  that  these
strategies generally maintain or increase levels of quasi-voluntary compliance and trust
among appropriators so that – contrary to Hardin’s assumption – one-hundred-percent
compliance is not necessary. In relation to endogenous factors, Ostrom writes: 
“If only a small deviation occurs, the cooperation of most participants is already
generating  positive  returns.  By  keeping  one’s  own  reaction  close  to  the
agreement,  one  keeps  up one’s  own  reputation  for  cooperation  and makes  it
easier  to  restore  full  conformance  because  cooperation  levels  are  higher”  (E.
Ostrom 2003, 53)
For this reason, contingent self-commitment36 does not trigger a relentless process of
over-use and free-riding when others break with the agreement (E. Ostrom 2008a, 97-
8).  In  turn,  the  exogenous  variables  of  local  mutual  monitoring  and  graduated
sanctioning can assure appropriators of the fact that the conformance of others to the
35  Elinor Ostrom explains that the most common – or most famous – reaction to
non-cooperation is the tit-for-tat reciprocal strategy. This mechanism can be defined as “reciprocate first,
and then do whatever the others did the last round” (E. Ostrom 2003, 42). It appears that this tactic is also
utilized  in  most  field  experiments  to  punish  the  rule  violator  for  a  specific  negative  action.  Yet,  in
comparison to the unforgiving  grim-trigger strategy,  the offender receives the chance to change their
strategy and return to cooperation and higher joint outcomes without further sanctions.  
36  Ostrom explains that contingent self-commitment implies the following type of
pledge:  “I  commit  myself  to  follow  the  set  of  rules  we  have  devised  in  all  instances  except  dire
emergencies if  the rest  of  those affected make a similar commitment and act  accordingly”  (E.  Ostrom
2008a, 99-100). In this context, contingent means that the individual will adhere to the rules as long as
(most) others also do. This type of contingent self-commitment resembles the tit-for-tat strategy of norm
reciprocity. 
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rules is being controlled. This can then increase levels of trust and enables appropriators
to  “continue  their  own  cooperation  without  constant  fear  that  others  are  taking
advantage of them” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 265). Furthermore, it must also be emphasized
that, in comparison to external surveillance and coercion, quasi-voluntary compliance
through mutual  monitoring  and graduated sanctioning  can effectively  increase  trust,
reciprocity and commitment at extremely low costs. 
To  strengthen  this  reinforcing  relationship  between  rule  creation,  contingent
commitment and mutual monitoring, Ostrom also mentions the importance of conflict-
resolution  mechanisms  for  this  process  (design  principle  6).  Conflict-resolution
mechanisms  impliy  that  “[a]ppropriators  and  their  officials  [should;  LP]  have  rapid
access  to low-cost  local  arenas to resolve conflicts  among appropriators  or between
appropriators and officials”  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 90). The reason why such mechanisms
are helpful is because – unlike physical constraints – “rules […] have to be understood in
order to be effective” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 267). In other words, even when appropriators
have defined the rules themselves, the interpretation and administration of social rules
is always ambiguous and can therefore easily lead to conflicts  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 100).
Due to this inherent ambiguity, there must be local arenas and simple mechanisms that
enable people to discuss and resolve the precise definitions of rule violation in diverse
cases (ibid.). Although Ostrom emphasizes the importance of local and sometimes quite
informal techniques to deal with conflict, she stresses the necessity of well-developed
court  mechanisms  above  the  level  of  the  local  resource.  Such  arenas  at  higher
institutional  levels  are,  for example,  especially important in  reducing the problem of
elite  capture.  Even  though  such  arenas  do  not  guarantee  cooperation  and  the
maintenance of robust institutions, Ostrom considers it unlikely that robust institutions
can exist over long periods of time without such institutional arrangements (ibid., 101).
Generally, it can be said that this ability to deliberate on and deal with these conflicts in
a simple and uncostly manner can increase the levels of rule adherence and trust within
a specific community (E. Ostrom 2005a, 268). 
Aside from these seven design principles, Elinor Ostrom adds a final eighth principle to
the list: Nested enterprises. This principle is of importance for common pool resources
that are either relatively large or parts of larger resource systems. We will discuss this
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eighth  design  principle  in  the  next  section  in  relation  to  Ostrom’s  more  general
understanding of polycentric governance systems.  
4.6. Institutional Diversity and Polycentricity
The  previously  discussed  design  principles  are  explications  of  the  exogenous,
institutional variables that can strengthen the endogenous variables of reciprocity, trust
and reputation in order to overcome social dilemmas.  It was shown that first-, second-
and third-order social  dilemmas can be solved in  a  mutually  reinforcing manner (E.
Ostrom 2005a, 267, E. Ostrom 2008a, 100). We will now turn to the broader and more
general  implications  of  these  results  for  the  understanding  of  institutional  design,
democratic theory and ecological sustainability. 
Firstly,  the  results  of  Elinor  Ostrom’s  extensive  meta-analysis  of  diverse  common
property resources has shown that it is possible for individuals and communities who
are confronted with social dilemmas to change the very institutional structure that they
are facing and limit or even eliminate overuse and freeriding. This finding is extremely
significant  because  it  demonstrates  that  people  can  solve  diverse  “tragedies  of  the
commons”  without  resorting  to  the  classical  –  and  sometimes  quite  problematic  –
models of privatization or centralized state coercion. Formulated more fundamentally,
“What the research on social dilemmas demonstrates is a world of possibility rather that
one of necessity” (E. Ostrom 2003, 62). For this reason, Elinor Ostrom explains that not
commoners but rather academics appear to be trapped in tragedy: “Instead of the users
of a commons being inexorably trapped in a tragedy, it is the scholars who have allowed
their  assumptions  to  trap  them  into  a  presumption  that  short-run  tendencies  will
necessarily prevail in the long run” (E. Ostrom 1986, 26). Despite this positive finding,
her research has also shown that people do not always choose a higher joint outcome
whenever possible. As many other examples of depleted common pool resources that
Ostrom  discusses  show,  “[e]stablishing  a  possibility is  not  the  same  as  establishing
necessity”  (E.  Ostrom  1986,  25;  emphasis  i.o.).  This  generally  implies  that  trust,
reciprocity  and  collective  action  are  extremely  delicate  matters  and  require  diverse
institutional structures that are adapted to diverse social and material conditions. 
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Aside  from formulating  this  new perspective  for  solving  commons  dilemmas,  Elinor
Ostrom’s work has also challenged the classical dualistic concept of founding a social
contract  and  subsequent  institutional  change.  An  important  insight  that  Ostrom
provides with her empirical analysis of diverse field cases is that there is no “state of
nature” without any institutional structure. Specifically, “[t]he Hobbesian state of nature
is logically equivalent to a situation in which rules exist permitting anyone to take any
and all desired actions, regardless of the effects on others” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 140). This
implies  that  human  interaction  is  always  embedded  in  institutions37 and  that  no
fundamental difference exists between an “original” social contract and the change of
institutions38: “Once one assumes that all recurring situations are characterized by a set
of status quo rules, then it is possible to broaden the concept of institutional supply to
include both what  can be called the  ‘origin’  of  new institutions  and the  changing  of
existing  institutions”  (ibid.,  140).  Contrary  to  most  contractarian  philosophers  who
categorically  distinguish  between a  state  of  nature  and  civilized  society,  firstly,  this
conceptualization  of  human interactions  and  institutions  enables  Ostrom,  as  already
mentioned, to understand humans as egotistical utility maximizers that are a product of
specific  institutional  arrangements.  Secondly,  she  formulates  one  single  theory  of
institutional  origin  and  reform  for  operational-,  collective-  or  constitutional-choice
levels of decision making, in which change is a continual “sequential and incremental
process” (ibid., 141). 
A  third  important  implication  of  her  work  is  that  she  places  the  micro-situational
institutions  governing  smaller-scale  common pool  resources  in  a  broader  context  of
nested and multi-leveled polycentric  institutions.  In relation to her understanding of
institutional  change on different levels  of  choice within institutions,  Ostrom explains
that accumulated social and “institutional capital”39 can then be utilized for governance
37  Elinor Ostrom defines institutions in the following manner: “‘Institutions’ can be
defined as the sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some
arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures
must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to
individuals dependent on their actions. All rules contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some
action or outcome” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 51).
38  Elinor  Ostrom  defines  institutional  change  as  such:  “A  change  in  any  rule
affecting the set of participants, the set of strategies available to participants, the control they have over
outcomes, the information they have, or the payoffs is an institutional change” (E. Ostrom 2008a, 140).
39  Although  Elinor  Ostrom  has  never  precisely  defined  the  term  “institutional
capital,” she has used it numerous times in her writing. Generally, it appears to imply the functioning of
institutions  that  has  evolved  and  developed  through  the  adaptation  of  the  system  to  solve  certain
problems –  whether  biophysical  or  social.  Institutional  capital  also implies  the developed  habits  and
acquired knowledge of the people who build and maintain their own institutional systems. Ostrom writes:
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on higher levels of scale:  “Success in starting small-scale initial institutions enables a
group of individuals to build on the social capital [of trust, reputation and reciprocity;
LP] thus created to solve larger problems with larger and more complex institutional
arrangements” (ibid., 190). In an article for the United Nations Rio+20 summit that she
wrote shortly before her death in 2012, she explains the general importance of locally-
governed institutions in a polycentric system for environmental sustainability: 
“No one knows for sure what will work, so it is important to build a system that
can evolve and adapt rapidly. Decades of research demonstrate that a variety of
overlapping policies at city, subnational, national, and international levels is more
likely  to  succeed  than  are  single,  overarching  binding  agreements.  Such  an
evolutionary  approach  to  policy  provides  essential  safety  nets  should  one  or
more policies fail. […] Sustainability at local and national levels must add up to
global sustainability. This idea must form the bedrock of national economies and
constitute the fabric of our societies. The goal now must be to build sustainability
into the DNA of our globally interconnected society” (E. Ostrom 2012)
While we have mentioned previously that Elinor Ostrom emphasized that one single
model  does  not  fit  all  situations,  she  clearly  advocates  a  specific  direction  in  which
political development should move: The strengthening of bottom-up initiatives and self-
transformative processes to deal with global issues of sustainability. 
Although  the  advantages  of  decentralized,  participatory  governance  in  polycentric
systems have already been mentioned, I would like to shortly summarize them. Firstly,
local and disaggregated knowledge of both the existing social values and norms and of
the  biophysical  system  and  its  changes  can  be  used  to  create  better  rules  that  are
adapted to local conditions. Second, the creation of suitable and legitimate rules that
foster  trust  and  reciprocity  increases  rule  conformity  and  decreases  the  costs  of
monitoring and sanctioning.  And third,  the existence of parallel  autonomous systems
reduces the probability of immense failure spanning larger regions (E. Ostrom 2005a,
281-2). Even though it is often believed that institutions that are “complex, redundant,
“Current theories of collective action do not stress the process of accretion of institutional capital. Thus,
one problem in using them [traditional theories of collective acion; LP] as foundations for policy analysis
is  that  they do not  focus  on the incremental  self-transformations  that  frequently  are  involved  in  the
process  of  supplying  institutions.  Learning  is  an  incremental,  self-transforming  process”  (E.  Ostrom
2008a, 190). Elsewhere, she explains: “Applying models out of range can produce more harm than good.
Public policies based on the notion that all CPR appropriators are helpless and must have rules imposed
on  them  can  destroy  institutional  capital  that  has  been  accumulated  during  years  of  experience  in
particular locations, as illustrated by the Nova Scotia fishery cases” (ibid., 184). 
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and nested in many layers”  (Dietz et al. 2003, 1910) are inefficient, Ostrom’s research
shows that such decentralized and participatory forms of governance can,  in fact,  be
quite effective in dealing with social  dilemmas and tragedies – and therefore also in
increasing joint benefits.
For those reasons, both Elinor and Vincent Ostrom argue that commons-like institutions
should be integrated in the management and provision of public goods.  This  is what
they call  “co-production”  (E.  Ostrom 1996,  Parks  et  al.  1981).  Elinor  Ostrom’s  basic
definition of co-production is “the process through which inputs used to produce a good
or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’  the same organization” (E.
Ostrom 1996, 1073). In comparison to the more widespread public choice theory, the
Ostroms did not, however, limit their understanding of co-production to public-private
partnerships in which public goods are outsourced to private corporations. Instead, they
argue that co-production should “cross the great divide” (ibid.) between the state and
economy and integrate civil society. The aim of this is to create decision-making arenas
that  unite  the  possibly  conflicting  interests  of  producers,  consumers  and  regulators.
Although not explicitly stated, it can be assumed that participation in the production and
governance  of  such  goods  and  services  depends  on  one’s  affectedness.  While  the
importance of a clearly-defined demos is understood as the first design principle of long-
enduring, self-governing institutions for common resources, the fundamental problem of
how  to  measure  this  affectedness  and  of  who  shall  decide  who  is  affected  and  can
participate is, unfortunately, not dealt with in their work. Nevertheless, by “unlocking
public  entrepreneurship  and  public  economies”  (E.  Ostrom  2005b),  it  is  hoped  that
consumers will transform into active citizens. Instead of isolating the public from the
private, the Ostroms argue that bureaucratic state administration must be democratized
(V. Ostrom 1974, 111). 
However, because decentralized decision-making does have its own weaknesses, Elinor
and  Vincent  Ostrom argue  that  these  institutions  must  be  located  within  the  larger
institutional context of a complex polycentric system. The importance of higher-scale
institutions becomes apparent when the limits of community governance are discussed.
In  short,  these  include:  (1)  The  lack of  organization by some appropriators,  (2)  the
failure  of  some  self-organizing  efforts,  (3)  local  tyrannies  and  elite  capture,  (4)
stagnation  or  the  lack  of  institutional  innovation,  (5)  illegitimate  discrimination  and
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exclusion,  (6) the  limited access to  scientific  information,  (7) serious  conflict  among
appropriators and between common pool resource systems, and, most importantly, (8)
the inability of small-scale institutions to deal with larger-scale common pool resources
(E. Ostrom 2005a, 282). 
Due to these limitations, Ostrom strongly emphasizes that local self-governed resources
must be built into – or nested in – a larger multileveled polycentric governance system.
Ostrom explains  what  she understands as  the  concept  of  polycentricity  in  her  book
Understanding Institutional Diversity:   
“By polycentric I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one
but  multiple  governing  authorities  at  different  scales.  Each  unit  exercises
considerable independence to make and enforce rules  within a circumscribed
domain of authority for a specified geographical area. In a polycentric system,
some  units  are  general-purpose  governments  while  others  may  be  highly
specialized. Self-organized resource governance systems in such a system may be
special districts, private associations, or parts of the local government. These are
nested in several levels of general-purpose governments that also provide civil
equity, as well as criminal courts” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 283)
The advantage of such a polycentric system is that while users have the authority to
define some of the local rules, serious problems such as local tyrannies, corruption and
inappropriate discrimination can, in turn, be addressed. According to Elinor, polycentric
systems  enable  to  deal  with  such  problems  through  “larger  general-purpose
governmental units who are responsible for protecting the rights of all citizens and for
the oversight of appropriate exercises of authorities within smaller units of government”
(ibid.).  Another  advantage  of  such  nested  enterprises  is  that  interaction  and  the
exchange of information over what has worked and what has not can also take place.
Finally, and most importantly, a polycentric system strengthens institutional robustness
and evolutionary fitness in that if small systems fail, larger systems can pitch in and help,
and  if  larger  systems  are  instable  or  break  down,  the  smaller  systems  can  possibly
survive and support the reconfiguration of the larger institutions (ibid.).
That being said, Elinor Ostrom acknowledges that polycentric systems are not easy to
deal  with  –  neither  for  affected  participants  themselves  nor  for  social  scientists.  A
central  problem  which  she  recognizes  is  the  serious  potential  of  conflict  between
84
diverse units “at multiple levels due to their interdependence” (ibid., 286). While such
conflict can lead to serious violence, the conflict can also generate more information for
participants to solve the specific problems that are being fought over. For scholars, on
the other hand,  polycentric  systems often look “terribly messy and [are; LP] hard to
understand”  (ibid.).  For  this  reason,  Elinor  advises  scientists  to  resist  their  “love  of
tidiness” (ibid.) and to “develop better theories of complex adaptive systems focused on
overcoming  social  dilemmas”  (ibid.).  In  relation  to  these  numerous  and  diverse
difficulties  in  dealing  with  decentralized,  participatory  governance  in  polycentric
systems,  Elinor  Ostrom  recognizes  that  “[c]oping  with  potential  tragedies  of  the
commons is never easy and never finished” (ibid.). 
4.7. Interim Conclusion
Without repeating the previously presented results of our discussion of the Ostroms’
work, I will  now turn to a few concluding reflections on Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s
work  that  will  influence  our  discussion  of  the  relationships  between  democracy,
markets and commons. 
In general terms, the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom has shown that the tragedy of
unregulated  commons  and  what  I  have  then  defined  as  the  tragedy  of  open  and
competitive commons can be overcome. As Elinor has demonstrated,  these problems
could be overcome by cultivating communication, reciprocity and trust on the one hand
and  by  developing  rules  and  regulations  against  overuse  that  are,  in  turn,  upheld
through mutual monitoring and graduated sanctioning on the other hand. It is important
to note that their findings also emphasize that the people affected by a specific resource
system should be included in the co-determination of its rules and regulations in order
to provide an institutional  framework that  is  adapted to fit  the  specific  cultural  and
ecological  context.  Such forms of  democratic  self-governance are  also  understood as
strategies in dealing with limitations in the provision of public goods by the state. The
Ostroms  called  this  type  of  democratic  collaboration  with  the  government  co-
production, which must be understood as an alternative to the otherwise widespread
notion of public-private partnerships. We might call this alternative type of organization
a public-civil  society or possibly even a public-commons partnership.  Yet,  due to the
weaknesses of small-scale democratic self-governance of economic goods and activities,
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they argued that these units  should be embedded in a multi-layered and polycentric
system of overlapping and democratically governed units. 
Despite these improvements in our understanding of how to deal with the problem of
tragedy and the manner in which democratic forms of governance can be developed, the
Ostroms’ work is nevertheless somewhat limited in three respects. Firstly and as already
discussed, their work lacks both a critique of privatization and of open and competitive
markets.  For this  reason,  I  would argue that  while  Hardin’s  thesis  was disproven in
certain cases, it is important to note that the perpetually occurring tragedy of open and
competitive  markets  and  the  power  asymmetries  that  result  thereof  were  almost
entirely  ignored  by  them  (Mattei  2013a,  20).  Secondly,  Elinor  Ostrom’s  somewhat
positivistic  description  of  successful  and  unsuccessful  commons  importantly  lacks
explicit  normative arguments  why  societies  should  develop  democratic  common
property arrangements (Levine 2011, 11-13). Elinor accentuates this problem when she
emphasizes that there exist no single best social arrangements and that commons are no
panacea  (E.  Ostrom  2010b,  2005a,  258).40 This  is  understandable  considering  the
problems of top-down blueprint thinking and policy implementations that the Ostroms
discuss.  Nevertheless,  the lack of explicit  normative  arguments is  highly problematic
because  it  provides  little  counterweight  to  widespread  and  rather  well  articulated
arguments for individual private property and open and competitive markets – despite
the existing negative effects that result therefrom. Thirdly, their rather narrow focus on
common pool resources rather than common property arrangements accentuates this
problem. This leads to the false impression that commons are specific things (pastures,
forests  etc.)  and not social  arrangements that  can be utilized for the organization of
more or less all resources and goods. Due to this rather limited definition of commons
and their lack of explicit  normative arguments for commons arrangements,  it  can be
expected that commons might simply remain charming niches in the threatening stormy
sees of the existing market society.
In  order  to  deal  with these  problems,  I  believe  it  necessary to  develop a  normative
justification of commons in the name of ecological sustainability and human freedom. I
40  In an interview with Elinor Ostrom by Fran Korten in Yes! Magazine after she
won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009, she was asked what her advice to someone
with much influence on natural resources policy would be. Her answer was: “No panaceas!”  (E. Ostrom
2010b). In her book Understanding Institutional Diversity she writes, “As social scientists, we have to use
one of our favorite slogans […] – it depends!” (E. Ostrom 2005a, 258).   
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will  do this  in relation to the institutions of  property,  the state and the market.  But
before that, I will, however, firstly develop an ecological understanding of democracy
and the commons that prioritizes the shared, common reality of humans and the non-
human  world  and  their  co-creation  thereof.  Let  us  therefore  now  turn  to  a  more
ecological approach to the commons.  
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5. An Ecological Understanding of the Commons 
In this chapter I would like to turn to a category that is of central importance to our
discussion  of  the  commons,  but  is  almost  entirely  neglected  in  the  work  of  Elinor
Ostroms: Nature. For Elinor, it appears as though nature is somewhat reduced to passive
resources in the “drama of the commons”  (Ostrom et al. 2002). Nature is the stage on
which  the  human  theater  takes  place.  Here,  the  relationship  between  humans  and
nature  is  implicitly  instrumental.  Although  such  an  interpretation  of  nature  might
appear to be sufficient in order to deal with environmental problems and “planetary
boundaries”  (Steffen  et  al.  2015),  I  would  argue  that  its  underlying  Society-Nature
dualism  is  both  conceptually  false  and  problematic.  The  dualism  is  false,  because
humans and human society are always a part of nature: There is no outside of nature.
The dualism is problematic, because the external environment is primarily understood
as  a  limit  to  one’s  individual  freedom –  and  not  as  an  interdependent  precondition
thereof.  Furthermore,  this  instrumental  and antagonistic  relationship  also  leaves  the
door open for a hierarchical and exploitative relationship of man over nature. It would
be absolutely wrong to say that Elinor Ostrom intended to do this, but I believe that her
analysis does not critically reflect  their  understanding of nature and the Malthusian-
Hardian  “stage”  that  she  found  herself  on.  Despite  her  insightful  solutions  to  the
problems of tragedy, the unregulated commons remains the overarching and ahistorical
model of man in nature. In order to overcome this framework, it is therefore necessary
to  reflect  and  develop  a  more  adequate  understanding  of  nature  for  a  free  and
sustainable society. Or in the words of Robyn Eckersly, I aim to shift our understanding
of  the  “environmental  problem”  from  a  “crisis  of  survival”  to  an  “opportunity  for
emancipation” (Eckersley 1992, 11-21).
In this chapter, I will therefore proceed as follows. Firstly, I will discuss the relationship
between  nature,  language  and  social  arrangements  and  argue  that  humans’  social
practices and institutions are always interrelated with the their conceptions of nature.
Secondly, I will then attempt to develop a more timely understanding of nature that is
more conducive to the principles of freedom and ecological sustainability. Here, I will
develop a notion of nature based on new insights in diverse fields of thought, in which
organisms perpetually self-organize and dynamically adapt together with their changing
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environments. With reference to the work of Andreas Weber, I will understand nature as
web of life that is constituted of interdependent organisms and ecosystems. Thirdly, I
will  discuss  the  importance  of  this  ecological  interdependence  for  humans,  which
constitutes a shared, common reality as the backbone of their individual freedom. Next, I
will flesh out an ecological understanding of democracy with reference to the principles
of care and the civic tradition of democracy. Finally and with reference to the work of
Ugo Mattei and Fritjof Capra, I will then develop an ecological concept of the commons,
which  goes  beyond  common  pool  resources  and  emphasizes  the  civic  practices  of
commoning in, with and through nature. 
5.1. Nature, Language and Social Relations
Before we begin our discussion of our specific understanding of nature, I would like to
explain why our understanding of nature is of such great importance for our discussion
of commons. A more reflected analysis of nature aims not only to determine where the
“safe operating space” within planetary boundaries lie (Rockström et al. 2009). Instead, I
will argue a society’s understanding of its natural world is central to the way humans
interact with it and with each other. 
As just mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the premise of this examination is
that  humans  and  society  are  always  a  part  of  nature.  This  apparently  naïve  claim
receives  a  little  more depth if  understood in  the  light  of  Marx and Engels’s  German
Ideology, in which they write,
“The  first  premise of  all  human history  is,  of  course,  the  existence of  living
human  individuals.  Thus  the  first  fact  to  be  established  is  the  physical
organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of
nature. […] All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their
modification in the  course  of  history  through the action of  men”  (Marx and
Engels 1998, 37).
By  understanding  humans  and  human  history  as  embedded  in  nature,  we  must
conversely also understand our ideas of nature as a specific result of our social relations.
Or again in the well-known words of Marx and Engels: “The ruling ideas are nothing
more  than  the  ideal  expression  of  the  dominant  material  relations,  the  dominant
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material  relations grasped as ideas” (ibid.,  67).41 This classical  “materialist” notion of
ideas implies that the prevalent ideas of society and nature are largely historical results
of  contingent  power  relationships  and  a  legitimation  thereof.  In  this  manner,  social
institutions are naturalized and our conceptions of nature reflect the dominant form of
social  organization.  In  turn,  the  symbolic  ordering  of  these  representations  also
constitute and reproduce the organization of nature. 
In  contrast  to  a  crude  deterministic  interpretation  of  Marx’s  base-superstructure
relationship between social relations and ideas, I contend that our ideas (of nature) are
not only a result of the social relations but can also transform them. Marx admits this
himself  in his  discussion of the labor process,  through which ideas are brought  into
reality (Marx 1982a, 284).42 Elsewhere, he also claims that ideas can be used for political
collective  action  when they influence  a  wider  population:  “[T]heory,  too,  becomes a
material force once it seizes the masses” (Marx 1982b, 137). I do not want to pursue a
detailed discussion of Marx’s  theory of historical  materialism and social  praxis  here.
Nevertheless, this very short discussion of Marx aims to underline the embeddedness of
language in both the physical nature and social arrangements thereof. Furthermore, it
emphasizes  that  ideas  can,  in  turn,  be  utilized  to  transform  social  action  and  the
organization of the material world. It is in this sense that language and concepts are of
utmost  importance  in  the  reproduction  and  transformation  of  what  we  generally
understand as “life”. 
In  a  somewhat  similar  manner,  Vincent  Ostrom  discusses  this  relationship  between
language,  reality and social  relations in his  book  The Meaning of Democracy and the
Vulnerabilities of Democracies (1997). Here he writes,
“The  meaning  associated  with  the  triangulation  of  images  [mental  states],
events and relations [the objects and states of the world referred to] and words
or  symbols  [names  assigned  to  events  and  relations]  involves  a  shared
community  of  understanding  among  language  users.  Tacit  levels  of
understanding go beyond the mere use of words and of definitions stated in a
41  The rather well-known saying of this is: “It is not consciousness that determines
life, but life that determines consciousness” (Marx and Engels 1998, 42).
42  “At the end of every labour process, a result emerges which had
already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects
a change of  form in the materials of nature;  he also realizes [verwirklicht]  his own purpose in those
materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity
of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it.  This subordination is no mere momentary act”  (Marx
1982a, 284).  
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more  profuse  use  of  words,  as  in  dictionaries.  In  a  sense,  an  ‘organic’  tie
pervades  intelligible  communication  by  reference  to  the  tacit  common
understandings that are fashioned by communities of language users. […]  The
essential  link  is  language.  Language  associates  thoughts,  ideas,  and
knowledgeable  articulations  of  skill  in  actions  to  what  gets  done  –  ideas  to
deeds.” (V. Ostrom 1997, 130)
With Vincent Ostrom, it could thus be said that language holds the relationship between
ideas,  things  and  social  relations  together.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  merely  social
relations that determine one’s ideas and the distribution of power within society, but it
is also language, which constitutes these specific arrangements. Societies use language
and  ideas  in  specific  ways  that  are,  however,  not  always  fully  conscious  to  the
individuals  using  them.  This  tacit  common understanding can possibly be  compared
with  Marx’s  notion  of  consciousness  that  is  organically  and  often  unconsciously
determined  by social  arrangements  (Marx  and  Engels  1998,  42).  These  tacit  “ruling
ideas” (ibid., 67) bring about specific patterns of action and, in turn, what Ostrom calls
with reference to Searle “institutional facts” (V. Ostrom 1997, 128). For Vincent Ostrom,
an institutional  fact  is  the  “social  reality  that  is  itself  an  artifactual  construction  by
relying on norms and rule-ordered relationships” (ibid.). He utilizes the term artifactual
to connote that  social  reality  is  constructed by humans and their  (tacit)  concepts of
society. 
For this reason, Elinor Ostrom also maintains in her book Governing the Commons that
we must critically  reflect  our “metaphorical  use of  models” due to their  influence of
policy prescription and collective action  (E. Ostrom 2008a, 8).  With Elinor Ostrom we
could therefore say that the reformulation of metaphors, concepts and ideas provides us
with new “heuristics, strategies, norms […] [or] rules of thumb” (E. Ostrom 2003, 40).
These “focal points” (ibid., 41) help us (re-)orient ourselves in our interactions with the
world. Thus, the reflection of our use of language and concepts, in turn, opens up choices
in the way we organize society and can “increasingly transform the material conditions
of their environment” (V. Ostrom 1997, 128). Within this framework, language and ideas
are  thus understood as  key determinants in  the  reproduction and transformation of
social order and material reality.  Put somewhat differently, we can therefore maintain
that concepts do not only provide us with abstract ideas that help us understand an
objectively given reality,  but  also co-constitute the symbolic-material  order of  things
(Castoriadis 1987, Latour 1993, Foucault 2002).
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Along these lines, it can therefore be argued that our (tacit) common understanding of
nature holds an important position in this process of reproduction and transformation.
The reason for this is that our knowledge and concepts of nature are both a result of
material conditions and social relations, on the one hand, and a constituting force of the
political  organization of the environment,  on the other.  As Jason W. Moore generally
puts it in his book Capitalism in the Web of Life: 
“Modernity's  structures  of  knowledge,  its  dominant  relations  of  power,
re/production, and wealth, its patterns of environment-making: these form an
organic  whole.  Power,  production,  and  perception  entwine;  they  cannot  be
disentangled because they are unified, albeit unevenly and in evolving fashion”
(Moore 2015, 3). 
Although Moore speaks of  modernity here,  the point  can be applied to all  of human
history: “humans make environments and environments make humans” (ibd.). Society
and nature or “human history” and “natural evolution” are intertwined and co-produce
each  other  both  symbolically  and  materially.  Jason  Moore  calls  this  the  “double
internality” of the society-nature relationship (ibid., 5). The reason why our knowledge
and concepts of nature are of such great importance is therefore because they provide
the material or, rather, organic backdrop of reality that structure our possibilities of how
to act and arrange society. In his article The Nature of Environment (1993) David Harvey
therefore argues,
“If all socio-political projects are ecological projects and  vice versa, then some
conception of 'nature' and of 'environment' is omnipresent in everything we say
and do.  If,  furthermore,  concepts,  discourses and theories can operate,  when
internalised in socio-ecological practices and actions,  as 'material forces' that
shape  history,  then  the  present  battles  being  waged  over  the  concepts  of
'nature'  and  of  'environment'  are  of  immense  importance.  All  critical
examinations of the relation to nature are simultaneously critical examinations
of society” (Harvey 1993, 39).
Due  to  the  inherent  interrelation  of  language,  nature  and  social  relations,  I  would
therefore  contend  that  the  different  ecological,  economic  and  political  crises  that
contemporary  societies  are  facing  today  are  also  a  result  of  specific conceptions  of
nature.  In order to deal  with these problems,  we therefore also have to rethink our
central concepts that constitute this relationship, such as the mind-body, subject-object,
individual-society and human-nature dichotomies (Dewey 1930, Latour 2013). As I will
show, this shift should move us beyond a reductionist, mechanistic and deterministic to
a more systemic and adaptive understanding of nature and society. Or more specifically,
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it is a shift from a dualistic and anthropocentric to an interrelated and ecocentric model,
in which humans are conceived as interdependent, creative components of the natural
world (Dewey 1929, Eckersley 1992, Stengers 2010/2011).
Before continuing, it is of utmost importance to stress that this does not imply that we
can simply create another reality by describing it differently. That would be solipsistic
and naïve, especially considering the interests of those who are not interested in such
social  change.  Nevertheless,  the  aim  is  to  develop  a  new  “shared  common
understanding”  of  nature  that  will  influence  people’s  patterns  of  (inter)actions  and
possibly become a “material force” of social change towards a more democratic society.
In order to see how this might be done, let us therefore now turn to some preliminary
reflections on this new concept of nature. 
5.2. Preliminary Reflections on the Concepts of Nature
In order to develop a different interpretation of nature that is conducive to commons, I
would like to focus on two pieces of writing: The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System
in  Tune  with  Nature  and  Community (2015)  by  Fritjof  Capra  and  Ugo  Mattei  and
Enlivenment: Towards a fundamental shift in the concepts of nature, culture and politics
(2013)  by  Andreas  Weber.  As  Capra  and  Mattei  emphasize,  their  critique  revolves
around the rise of a rationalist and mechanistic understanding of the world through the
Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment constituted by scholars like Galileo, Descartes,
Hobbes, Newton and Locke. For Weber, the problem is not only in this reductionism, but
also  in  the  determinism  interpretations  of  competition  and  natural  selection.  These
interpretations  of  reality,  in  turn,  provide  us  with  a  biological  “metaphysics  of  our
culture”  (Weber  2013,  23) and  the  cornerstones  of  how  human  society  can,  and
therefore should, be organized. 
A key moment for both authors in the development of their worldviews is Descartes’
differentiation between res cogitans and res extensa through which the subjective human
spirit is separated from – and placed above – objective, material reality. While the realm
of  life  and  freedom  is  limited  to  the  spirit,  the  material  world  is  understood  as  a
mechanistic  machine that  is  determined by universal  and natural  laws.  According to
Capra and Mattei, this conception of natural laws was then adopted by legal scholars to
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create an objective legal framework based on private ownership and state sovereignty,
generally understood as “legal absolutism” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 6). Despite advances
in  evolutionary theory,  Weber  argues,  in  turn,  that  Malthusian  and  Social  Darwinist
“laws  of  nature”  created  an  understanding  of  economy  in  which  subjectivity  and
freedom were ultimately negated  (Weber 2013, 23).43 The biologist Richard Dawkins,
for example, expresses this worldview most clearly in his book The Selfish Gene, as he
writes: “We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the
selfish molecules known as genes”  (Dawkins 2006, xxi). Due to the law-like nature of
social reality, Weber goes so far as to say that the “deep metaphysics of our age, is a
science of the non-living” (Weber 2013, 23). Although many intellectuals and scientists
would not go so far as to deny the freedom of the individual, it is important to note that
the  belief  that  people  exist  in  inherently  antagonistic  and  therefore  competitive
relationships is deeply rooted in Western thought, including that of Hobbes, Kant and
Freud. In simple terms, the antagonistic competition between atomistic individuals is
assumed  to  be  a  universal  law  of  nature.  This  is  what  Andreas  Weber  and  others
understand as bio-economics: The biological foundations of the open and competitive
market (Arnhart 2015). Generally, the universalization of the principles of machine-like
mechanisms of antagonistic competition has become an (often implicit) metaphysical
framework within which Western society has interpreted and organized its social and
natural world during the last few centuries. Additionally, as we have already discussed,
it  is  this  universalist  institutional  framework  that  has  largely  brought  about  the
contemporary and interrelated ecological, socio-economic and political crises.
That  being  said,  Capra,  Mattei  and  Weber  maintain  that  a  paradigm  shift  in  our
fundamental understanding of the world is necessary to deal with these crises. Andreas
Weber  propagates  a  paradigm  shift  from  that  of  the  Enlightenment  to  one  of
“Enlivenment”. With reference to romantic and critical responses to the rationalism of
the Enlightenment, Weber argues, however, that rationality should not be abandoned,
but  should instead be  linked with subjectivity  and sentience that  exists  in  all  living
beings. For this to occur, he explains,
43  Weber explains: “The [economic; LP] process is subject-less and self-organized
in the sense that eternal, external laws (that of selection and that of economic survival) punish or reward
the behavior of atomistic black boxes called ‘Homo economicus’ – economic man – or in a more modern
telling, the selfish gene’” (Weber 2013, 23).
94
“It is necessary to explore a new narrative for what life is, for what life is to be
alive, for what living systems do, and what their goals are. We need to explore
how values are created by the realization of  the living,  and how we, as living
beings in a living biosphere, can adapt the production needed for livelihoods to
that reality, the only reality we have” (Weber 2013, 21).
Here, the individual or res cogitans is not understood as a separate entity from material
reality  but  as a  creative  force  within the  process  of  the living world.  For Capra and
Mattei, this implies a shift from thinking of a “mechanism of law” toward an “ecology of
law” which,  in turn,  is  inherently associated with the concept of  the commons.  They
explain,
“In the strict scientific sense, ecology is the science of relationships between the
members of an ecological community and their environment. In this sense, then,
the ecology of law refers to a legal order that is consistent with and honors the
basic principles of ecology.  The ecology of law implies a process of transforming
legal  institutions  from  being  machines  of  extraction,  rooted  in  the  mechanistic
functioning  of  private  property  and  state  authority,  into  institutions  based  on
ecological communities. The ecology of law seeks a quality of economic life aimed
at  nurturing  and  preserving  nature  in  the  interest  of  future  generations  and
overall human survival. The law should mimic the natural strategies of long-term
ecological  survival,  including  the  reduction of  waste  and consumption.  […]  In
other  words,  an  ecological  vision  of  law  does  not  reduce  law  to  a
professionalized, preexisting, objective framework ‘out there,’ separate from the
behavior it regulates and tries to determine. Instead, law is always a process of
‘commoning,’ a  long-term  collective  action  in  which  communities,  sharing  a
common purpose and culture,  institutionalize  their  collective  will  to  maintain
order and stability in the pursuit of social reproduction. Thus the commons – an
open network of relationships – rather than the individual, is the building block
of the ecology of law and what we call an ecological order”  (Capra and Mattei
2015, 14-15; emphasis added). 
In other words, the basic idea here is to overcome the dualism of laws and individuals by
contextualizing  our  understanding  of  law  historically,  socially  and  ecologically.  This
would  enable  us  to  understand  law  as  a  second-order  commons  that  is  created  by
humans  and  that  should  thus  perpetually  be  reformed  and  adapted  by  those
communities  affected  by  these  laws.  The  general  point  to  be  made  here  is  that  by
widening our understanding of “nature”, we further increase the possibilities of ways in
which we can organize social arrangements. Again, this is not to say that we can then
realize  any forms of social  organization,  irrespective  of  the  existing condition,  but  it
95
implies instead that we can learn from our “first nature” so we can attempt to bring
social arrangements into existence that are more or less well-adapted – and that can
continuously  adapt  –  to  existing  ecological  conditions.  This  type  of  learning  is  what
Capra  and  Mattei  call  eco-literacy  and  eco-design  (Capra  and  Mattei  2015,  174-9).
Interpreted in a less dualistic and more poetic manner according to Weber, it does not
imply that we “copy nature’s objects, but rather [that we] follow [and participate in; LP]
its […] process of creative unfolding” (Weber 2015).
Before I continue, I would like to clarify a criticism that might arise here, being that this
approach  is  nothing  but  a  naturalistic  fallacy.  Here,  it  could  be  argued  that  I  –  and
authors like Capra, Mattei and Weber – wish to transfer principles that we perceive in
nature  (“facts”)  into  human  society  and  assume  that  the  “is”  should  determine  the
“ought”. In essence, we are simply repeating the same mistake that Social Darwinists
have made. This is also the argument that I have used against limiting our understanding
of democracy to a representative democracy, merely because it is supposed to be the
most prevalent form of democracy in the world. Here however, I would argue that the
analysis  of  nature  does  not  necessarily  provide  humans  with  fixed  forms  and
parameters of organization to be transposed onto human society. Instead, our concept of
nature can define the processes of human existence and freedom. In this sense, I would
agree with Andreas Weber who maintains that  
“Only if [an] organism is conceived of as a deterministic system are we trapped in
the  danger  of  the  naturalistic  fallacy,  imposing  value  from  the  outside  on
something which is neutral. Living beings, however, exist according to embodied
values. Their nature is to live according to values. The ontology proposed here is
non-deterministic because of biological reasons” (Weber 2016, 39).
The point being made here is that this new interpretation of nature does not understand
its functioning as something bound by strict laws. This would be a naturalistic fallacy
because we define how we should act and organize society according to certain rules
that supposedly exist in independence of humans. Instead, by understanding nature –
and  our  interpretation  thereof  –  as  a  creative  process,  we  open up  possibilities  for
human action through a process of socio-ecological  co-creation  (Dewey 1929,  Latour
2004, Whitehead 1971). This comes close to what Elinor Ostrom described as the shift
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from necessity to a world of possibilities (E. Ostrom 2003, 62), yet merely from a bio-
ecological  perspective.  As  we  have  seen  with  the  competitive  market,  there  are
institutions that support this process of adaptation and others that impede it. As I will
show, the notion of the commons supports this type of adaptation because they enable
societies  to  perpetually  alter  their  institutions  according  to  diverse  and  changing
conditions, needs and desires. 
This notion, however, leads us to the problem that “nature” is a highly contested concept
and  that  no  one  true  understanding  of  nature  has  ever  existed  in  human  history.44
Although it is true that interpretations of nature have varied throughout human history,
I would argue that a purely discursive interpretation of nature is flawed. This would lead
us into a solipsistic position in which we deny an “external” material reality and living
world  that  resists  the  human  desire  to  arbitrarily  shape  and  form  it.  I  believe  this
position to be flawed because knowing and learning must itself be understood as an
embodied and creative process in the world. Nevertheless, symbolic descriptions of the
material world will never be grounded on one ultimate truth but will change and adapt
with  new empirical  insights  and  scientific  hypotheses.  With  each  description  of  our
natural world, we also implicitly bring a certain symbolic arrangement of reality about.
This is most clear in reference to our understanding of human “nature” and the self-
fulfilling prophecies of the homo oeconomicus (Kapeller 2008, 34-40) in which we create
social  arrangements for  the pursuit  of  individual  self-interest  (e.g.  individual  private
property and open and competitive markets) and then feel confirmed that people are
inherently  egotistical.  As  empirical  studies  have  shown,  people  also  act  accordingly
when social situations are simply named differently (Liberman et al. 2004).45 That being
44  In reference to the contested question whether nature pursues a teleological
purpose,  Andreas  Weber  and  Francisco  Varela,  for  example,  explain  how  the  interpretation  of  this
problem has changed throughout Western history: “The Greeks experienced nature as an ever-present
horizon,  most  clearly  set  in  Aristotle’s  dictum:  the  final  cause  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  the
mechanical cause. But in medieval times the idea of finality radically shifted to divine will and design, the
source of all meaning and purpose. The enlightenment opposed to that the even more radical position of
human mind as the measure of things, where nature is only seen as mere object for the human subject.
Recent times have shifted to post-modern views on nature as a purely historical locus, contingent and
relative”(Weber and Varela 2002, 98).
45  Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels and Lee Ross, for example, discovered that
people act differently in similar social settings, depending on how these arrangements are named. They
performed two experiments, one with American college students and the other with Israeli  pilots and
their instructors. Each group played either an N-move Prisoner’s Dilemma game called “the Community
Game”  or  “the  Wallstreet  Game”,  each  respectively  connoting  more  cooperative  or  more  competitive
norms. The rules of the two games were, however identical. Interestingly, the results of the experiment
demonstrate  that the levels  of  cooperation and defection varied depending on the label of  the game.
Liberman et al.  conclude, “When told they were playing the Bursa [Wallstreet;  LP] Game, participants
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said, (human) nature is neither simply given nor entirely neutral but always implicitly
conveys certain values of society. In this sense, our question about nature turns into a
more normative question: What society do we want to live in and how can it be realized
given the knowledge of the conditions of our existence? This implies a shift from the
merely empirical to the normative, but without completely disregarding the former. Or,
more precisely, it attempts to integrate the normative in the empirical because life itself
– and therefore science as well – is not a distinct and objective entity separated from the
symbolic, but also always a creative expression of the meaning we give ourselves and
the world (Weber 2016, 9, 12-13). I would argue that it is this understanding of nature
that would ultimately be more conducive to commons. 
5.3. Autopoiesis and the Interdependent Co-Creation of Reality
As mentioned  previously,  the  understanding of  the  natural  world  as  a  machine  was
developed  during  the  Early  Modernity  by  numerous  thinkers,  most  notably  René
Descartes (1596-1650) and Isaac Newton (1642-1726). Here, René Descartes’ dualism
of  mind  and  matter  or  res  cogitans and  res  extensa is  of  central  importance.  This
Cartesian dualism assumes that the realm of freedom is limited to the mind while the
sphere of material reality remains unfree and determined  (Des Chene 2001). With the
aid of Isaac Netwon’s mathematical understanding of the natural laws that underlie all of
material reality, the entire universe was ultimately conceived as a clock-like machine,
determined by its laws (Dolnick 2011). In this dualistic worldview, the mind receives the
semi-divine position of a director who is not tainted by the laws of nature and can, or
rather should, control the machine. For individuals, this implies the mastery of the spirit
over the desires of the body; for society, it means the rule of those with insight into the
underlying laws of nature and society over the ignorant and passionate masses; and for
individuals’ relationship to nature, it implies the imperative to subdue (and exploit) the
natural world according to one’s supposedly higher needs and desires. The claim I am
making  here  is  that  to  realize  a  democratic  and  sustainable  society,  we  need  to
overcome this problematic dualism.
expected  defection  to  be  the  most  likely  response;  when  told  they  were  playing  the  Kommuna
[Community;  LP] Game,  they expected cooperation to be the most likely response.  […] [T]he effect  of
expectations regarding other’s choices on own choices depended on the name of the game, and thus on the
way the participants construed the game. The result of these tendencies over successive rounds, in which
defection begot defection and cooperation was sustained only when it was mutual, was inevitable; that is,
first-round responses tended to dictate  later-round responses,  and as a consequence,  overall  rates of
cooperation—especially  mutual  cooperation— were  significantly  higher  in  the  Community/Kommuna
Game than in the Wall Street/Bursa Game” (Liberman et al. 2004, 1182).
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For this reason, let us now turn to a new understanding of the natural world that has
been  in  development  by  different  philosophers  and  biologists  at  least  since  the
beginning of the 20th century. These intellectuals include, for example: the pragmatists
Charles  Peirce  (1839-1914)  and  George  Herbert  Mead  (1863-1931),  the
neurophysiologist  Warren  S.  McCulloch  (1898-1969),  the  social  scientist  Gregory
Bateson (1904-1980), the chemist Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003) and the biosemioticists
Thure von Uexküll  (1908-2004),  Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001)  and Jesper  Hoffmeyer
(1942*).  This  new understanding  of  nature  became  more popular  during  the  1970s
through  the  work  of  Chilean  biologists  Humberto  Maturana  (1928*)  and  Francisco
Varela  (1946-2001)  and  since  then through the  works  of  Fritjof  Capra  (1939*)  and
Stuart  Kauffman (1939*).  The development of  this  new paradigm in biology is  often
compared to  the shift  in  physics from Newtonian mechanics  to quantum mechanics,
Einstein’s general theory of relativity and thermodynamics in which the subject and the
object are no longer understood as independent entities  (Weber 2014, 18, Capra and
Mattei 2015, 42). 
On a similar line of thought, most noted authors, and most prominently Maturana and
Varela, argue that the understanding of life must also include an understanding of how
human  knowledge  of  life  (cognition)  biologically  arises  (Maturana  and  Varela  1980,
1987). Although not stated in these terms, Maturana and Varela initially take two steps
simultaneously to understand this problem: One is in line with the phenomenological
tradition of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, acknowledging that the mind as embodied and part
of the natural, material world  (Merleau-Ponty 2001); the other step is made with the
semiotics  of  Charles  Peirce  and  other  linguists,  acknowledging  that  all  forms  of
knowledge are socially constructed signs that not only interpret but also constitute or
shape reality (Hoffmeyer 2008, 32). Here, knowledge of the world is neither regarded as
a form of  representation or correspondence of  signs  and their  objects  (signifier  and
signified),  nor  as  a  subjective,  biological  Idealism  (Hampe  2007,  112) in  which  the
subject  merely  projects  their  ideas  and concepts  onto reality  or  the  “thing-in-itself”.
Instead, the process of knowing is best understood in the terms of Charles Peirce as a
relational and interwoven process of differentiation, interpretation and co-creation of
the  world  through  signs.  This  implies  that  a  “thing-in-itself”  does  not  exist
independently  but  is  created through its  symbolic  and material  relations  with other
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entities  (Hoffmeyer 2008,  33).  For Peirce,  this process of interpretation consists of a
dynamic,  triadic relationship between a sign,  an object  and an interpretant  (Kilstrup
2015). This semiotic understanding thus demonstrates the two-sided character of the
same reality: The social constitution of the self and the material interconnectedness of
the  subjective  with  its  objective  surroundings.  Or,  more  precisely,  humans  are
understood as biological beings that socially conceive and construct themselves through
their  symbolic  self-referential  differentiation  from  and  interpretation  of  their
environment. Therefore, the dualism that is often assumed in Western thought does not
exist  “in  reality”  but  is  created  through  a  process  of  embodied  cognition  based  on
symbolic signs that delineate the separation between mind and matter, individual and
society and, finally, between culture and nature. 
The generality of Peirce’s semiotics, in turn, lay the foundations we need to broaden the
concept of embodied cognition to all living beings. Similarly to humans, all organisms
actively constitute themselves as a differentiated unity, interpret the information from
their environment through chemical or, in Peirce’s terms, indexical and iconic signs and
act  accordingly  in  order  to  survive.  Many philosophers  and biologists  recognize  this
sensory cognition in all other forms of life (Bak 1997, Kelso 1995, Goodwin 2001, Narby
2006).  This  process  of  sensory  cognition  is  understood  as  the  self-organization  or
dynamic self-reproduction of organisms or,  in  the words of Maturana and Varela,  as
autopoiesis.  Here,  the  process  of  self-organization must  be understood as  a  material
process of self-reproduction through internal signaling. Weber and Varela explain in a
co-authored article  Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autpoietic foundations of
biological individuality (2002) that autopoiesis is 
“a  circular  process  of  self-production  where  the  cellular  metabolism  and  the
surface membrane it produces are the key terms. Thus an autopoietic system –
the  minimal  living  organization  –  is  one  that  continuously  produces  the
components that specify it, while at the same time realizing it (the system) as a
concrete  unity  in space and time,  which makes the network of  production of
components possible” (Weber and Varela 2002, 115).
In general terms,  autopoiesis or self-organization must therefore be understood as a
departure from a linear and mechanic conceptualization of life in which natural laws and
genes determine the actions of organisms. Instead, through signaling, internal feedback
100
loops  provide  a  “nonlinear  interconnectedness  of  the  system’s  components”  (Capra
1996, 85) which can be understood as a network. As Fritjof Capra explains in his book
The Web of Life: 
“Since  all  components  of  an  autopoietic  network  are  produced  by  other
components  in the network,  the entire system is  organizationally  closed,  even
though  it  is  open with  regard  to  the  flow  of  energy  and  matter.  This
organizational closure implies that a living system is self-organizing in the sense
that  its  order  and  behaviour  are  not  imposed  by  the  environment  but  are
established by the system itself. In other words,  living systems are autonomous.
This  does  not  mean  that  they  are  isolated  from  their  environment.  On  the
contrary,  they interact with the environment through a continual  exchange of
energy and matter. But this interaction does not determine their organization –
they are self-organizing” (Capra 1996, 167-8; emphasis added)
Both the partial independence from their environment and the internal feedback loops
enable organisms to create “new structures and new modes of behaviour in the self-
organizing process”  (Capra 1996,  85).  In the jargon of biosemiotics,  this  is  generally
understood  as  semiotic  freedom  (Hoffmeyer  1993,  52-67) and  is  more  generally
understood as adaptation in the Darwinian theory of evolution. Yet, while adaptation in
non-human  beings  is  normally  understood  as  a  random  and  intergenerational
phenomenon, it is argued in this line of thought that change can occur in a non-random
manner within the lifetime of an organism (Strohman 1997, 195). Or, in simpler terms:
“Creatures change their forms without changing their genes” (Strohman 1997, 198).46 
In contrast to the widespread differentiation in Western philosophy between material
reality as the realm of unfreedom and that of the human mind as the realm of freedom,
here, all living beings are understood to possess minimal intelligence, subjective agency
46  In more technical language, this can be understood as a shift in biology from
genetic  determinism  to  epigenetic  open-feedback  networks.  In  the  paradigm  of  genetic  determinism,
evolution occurs through random reconfiguration of genetic information. In contrast to this,  Strohman
argues in his article on the “coming Kuhnian revolution in biology” of 1997: “Epigenetic networks have
been  described  as  cellular  neural  networks  and,  given  their  great  complexity  and  openness to
environmental  signals,  most probably use a (nonlinear)  logic and set  of  rules quite different from the
comparatively linear rules needed for completing the genetic sequence of events. This comparison also
emphasizes  feedback  from  epigenetic  networks  to  the  genome;  feedback  that  includes  changing  the
patterns of gene expression. This change in pattern of gene is accomplished by enzymatic changes in
chromosome structure and by ‘marking’ sections of DNA chemically without changing the genetic code in
any way. What is changed is the accessibility of genes to expression pathways. But the decisions to mark or
not to mark are in the epigenetic [open feedback networks; LP] and not the genetic pathway. The details of
epigenetic biology […] are well known and thoroughly covered in the literature”(Strohman 1997, 197).
The  important  point  here is  that  these changes are  non-random,  altered morphology,  “which  is  then
subsequently filtered by natural selection” (Strohman 1997, 197; emphasis added). 
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and autonomy. This subjective agency is grounded in the assumption that all organisms
strive to maintain themselves. This energy directed towards self-preservation implies
that  not  only  do  all  organisms  have  interests  and  values  (e.g.  staying  alive  and
reproducing  the  species),  but  they  also  have  a  minimal  sense  of  self  (e.g.  the
maintenance of one’s own life) (Weber and Varela 2002, 116-119). This is not to say that
organisms are self-conscious, but rather that they are sentient beings with a minimal,
embodied sense of self. The foundation of an organism’s autonomy therefore does not lie
in self-reflexive thought, but in sentience, which enables organisms to give meaning to
the world through their embodied and intentional interpretation thereof (Weber 2016,
Narby 2006, Hoffmeyer 1993, Kauffman 1993). For biosemioticist Jesper Hoffmeyer, this
process of embodied cognition is inherently linked to the capability of living beings to
anticipate  the  future.  To  explain  this  issue  with  some  simple  examples,  I  quote
Hoffmeyer in full here:  
“Quite generally, living systems have evolved a capacity for making anticipations:
they must decide when to grow and when to withhold growth, when to move,
when to hide, when to sing, and so on, and this way of adjusting the behaviour
depends on a capacity to predict the future at least to some limited extent. For
instance: is it likely the sun will shine or not, is it likely that little flies will pass by
if I make my web here, will the predator be fooled away from the nest if I pretend
to have a  broken wing etc.  Of  course,  in  most  cases it  will  be  the  instinctual
system of the animal rather than the brain that makes this kind of prediction, but
the  logic  is  the  same:  the  animal  profits  from  its  ability  (whether  acquired
through phylogeny or through ontogeny) to identify trustworthy regularities in
the surroundings.  And most  –  if  not  all  –  trustworthy regularities  are  indeed
relations.  For  instance,  the  relation  between  length  of  daylight  and  the
approaching springtime that tells the beech when to burst into leafs; or the play
of sun and shadows which tells the spider where to construct its web; or the
relation between clumsy movements and an easy catch that tells the predator
which individual prey animal to select,  and thus tells the bird how to fool  the
predator away from its nest” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 34-5).  
Considering  these  basic  interpretative  interactions  of  all  living  beings  with  their
environment, organisms should then not be understood as “genetic machines” but as
“materially  embodied  [cognitive;  LP]  processes  that  bring  themselves  forth”  (Weber
2013,  30).  Or,  to put it  somewhat tautologically:  Self-organization implies that  living
organisms are alive.
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The implications of this are twofold. Firstly, not all cognitive processes in living beings
are self-conscious but are, rather, based on a type of sensory and sentient cognition. For
humans, this is obvious when we consider that most of our actions are not performed
entirely consciously but rather through a tacit knowledge of the body (i.e. habits). This
was demonstrated most clearly by the famous Libet experiment in 1979 in which a hand
movement  was  initiated  through  a  reaction  of  the  nervous  system  while  the  self-
conscious decision to act in this manner followed shortly afterwards (Libet 1999). While
this experiment has often been interpreted as proof for the non-existence of human free
will – or the free will as a type of  ex post veto possibility –, this new interpretation of
self-organization through sensory cognition would, however, imply that autonomy does
not merely lie in the self-conscious determination of the body, but more fundamentally
in  the  embodied,  sentient  cognition  of  the  body  itself  (Libet  1985).  In  other  words,
humans’ relationship with the world is thus, in its most fundamental form, not one based
on knowledge and rationality, but is instead physical and emotional – or, in the words of
sociologist Hartmut Rosa, a relationship of resonance (Rosa 2016). 
Secondly,  this  understanding  of  nature  provides  a  more  general,  non-dualistic
understanding of reality. Here, the mind is not understood as a distinct thing in itself, but
as  a  process  that  arises  out  of  relationships.  By  conceiving  cognition  as  sentient
consciousness, “mind” arises through a process of sensory interactions of the organism’s
components  and  in  its  interaction  with  the  environment.  The  mind  –  and  all  other
“things”, for that matter – are therefore constituted as separate and independent entities
through  their  linguistic  and  symbolic  categorization  in  the  interactive  process
communication and reflection. In this sense, it must also be noted that the environment
or nature does not merely exist as a thing in itself, but as relationships between different
organisms that  give each other meaning and bring each other about.  The pragmatist
philosopher George Herbert Mead expresses this idea quite well in his book Mind, Self
and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist:
“It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  state  just  what  we  mean  by  dividing  up  a  certain
situation between the organism and its  environment.  Certain objects  come to
exist for us because of the character of the organism. Take the case of food. If an
animal that can digest  grass,  such as an ox,  comes into the world,  then grass
becomes food. That object did not exist before, that is, grass as food. The advent
of the ox brings in a new object. In that sense, organisms are responsible for the
appearance of whole sets of objects that did not exist before. The distribution of
meaning to the organism and the environment has its expression in the organism
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as well as in the thing, and that expression is not a matter of psychical or mental
conditions. There is an expression of the reaction of the organized response of
the organism to the environment, and that reaction is not simply a determination
of  the  organism  by  the  environment,  since  the  organism  determines  the
environment  as  fully  as  the  environment  determines  the  organs.  The  organic
reaction is responsible for the appearance of a whole set of objects which did not
exist before. […] The organism, then, is in a sense responsible for its environment.
And since organism and environment  determine each other  and are mutually
dependent for their existence, it follows that the life-process, to be adequately
understood,  must be considered in terms of their interrelations.”  (Mead 1967,
129-30)47
Here, individual entities such as the ox and the grass are neither fully independent nor
completely dependent on each other, but rather exist in interdependent relationships in
which they enable each other to be brought forth. This insight repeats the previously
discussed notion that  living  creatures  are  not  determined by natural  laws and their
environment.  Instead,  living  beings  are  integrated  in  a  process  of  relational  and
interdependent co-creation of nature and meaning. This is a basic insight of a systemic
understanding of nature that can then be applied to “higher” or more complex forms of
socio-ecological organization. 
5.4. Ecosystems, Abundance and Natural Commons 
In order to apply the notions of autopoiesis and interdependent co-creation to humans,
we  need  to  scale  up  our  understanding of  these  concepts  from single  organisms  to
populations, entire ecosystems and the “web of life” in general.  Although Maturana and
Varela  originally  only  developed  the  concept  of  autopoiesis  as  a  function  of  cellular
networks and other “minimal autopoietic systems”48 (Capra and Luisi 2014, 306), there
have been attempts to transfer this understanding of life to more complex organisms
and living systems including the social domain. Here, it might be helpful to elaborate on
the basic concepts of organism and living systems. As Fritjof Capra and Pier Luigi Luisi
explain in their book The Systems View of Life: 
47  It  can  be  noted  that  while  George  Herbert  Mead  discusses  the  agency  and
meaning of animals, he nevertheless denies them a “self” which, however, is to be distinguished from our
notion of subjectivity based on sentient cognition. Mead explains that “We can distinguish very definitely
between the self and the body. The body can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without
there being a self involved in the experience. The self has the characteristic that it is an object to itself, and
that characteristic distinguishes it from other objects and from the body” (Mead 1967, 136). It is therefore
self-reflexive consciousness that creates the self as an object.
48  According to Capra and Luisi, minimal autopoietic systems include “simple cells,
computer simulations, and the autopoietic chemical structures, or ‘minimal cells’, created recently in the
laboratory” (Capra and Luisi 2014, 306). 
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“All living systems are networks of smaller components, and the web of life as a
whole is a multilayered structure of living systems nesting within other living
systems – networks within networks.  Organisms are aggregates of autonomous
but closely  coupled cells;  populations are  networks of  autonomous organisms
belonging to a single species; and ecosystems are webs of organisms, both single-
celled and multicellular, belonging to many different species.”  (Capra and Luisi
2014, 306; emphasis added)
In other words, we can differentiate between three types of multicellular living systems:
Individual  organisms,  populations  and  societies  and  ecosystems.  Because  all  living
systems are ultimately made up of cells,  I would agree with Capra and Luisi that “all
living  systems,  ultimately,  are  autopoietic”  (Capra  and  Luisi  2014,  306).  The
understanding of populations as self-organizing basically revolves around the idea that
populations  can  reproduce  themselves  by  continuously  adjusting  to  and  co-creating
their eco-system. Here, the survival of individual organisms and specific populations is
embedded  within  a  broader  ecological  setting  in  which  individual  entities  play  a
possibly  minor  yet  significant  role  in  the  reproduction  of  entire  ecosystems.  This
systemic approach to  understanding  life  provides  us  with  a  better  understanding  of
interdependencies in nature and requires us to revise many basic concepts that we have
adopted  from  biology  and  applied  to  economics  and  politics.  Furthermore,  this
understanding of living systems provides us with a concept of “natural commons” and a
commons-based  eco-law  as  Andreas  Weber,  Fritjof  Capra  and  Ugo  Mattei  have
developed. 
In order to understand this transformation in conceptual frameworks, let us begin with
one  of  the  most  fundamental  assumptions  in  Malthusian  and  Neo-Darwinist
interpretations  of  nature  and economics:  The competition of  individuals  over  scarce
resources  for  their  survival.  This  assumption can  be  understood  as  one  of  the  core
elements  of  “bioeconomic  metaphysics”  and  lays  the  foundation  for  one  of  the  core
functions  of  markets:  The  efficient  allocation  of  scarce  resources  through  market
competition  (Robbins 1932). This basic concept of scarcity and the competition over
these resources has been popularized by the idiom “there is no such thing as a free
lunch” by Robert Heinlein  (1966), Milton Friedman  (1975) and many others.49 As we
49  In the OnlineLibrary of Economics and Liberty (econlib.org), economist David R.
Henderson explains, for example, that he begins every class with the “Ten Pillars of Economic Wisdom”,
the first of which is “There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch” (TANSTAAFL). He then supposedly tells
students that  “[e]conomic resources are scarce, and, therefore, if we get more of one, there has to be less
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have already seen in our discussion of the open and competitive free market, according
to this logic, one’s existence is secured through accumulation which, ironically, increases
scarcity through the depletion of resources needed by oneself and other beings.  This
antagonistic competition is not only conceived as a struggle between individuals but also
as a struggle between entire populations or “nations” – and against one’s environment.
Not only do people strive to accumulate more and more resources, but they also strive to
incessantly  increase  the  size  of  their  population  to  preserve  the  existence  of  their
exclusive gene pool. As we have already discussed, the underlying assumption here is
that  all  living  creatures  are  biological  consumption  machines  determined  by  their
egotistical genes. Here, the only strategy of survival is perpetual growth. It is interesting
to note that not only is freedom undermined by the biologically determined egotistical
drive  to  perpetually  grow,  but  also  by  the  decrease  in  people’s  chances  of  survival
because of the destruction of their ecosystem. If growth were the only genetic program
of life, it can be assumed that living creatures would have wiped themselves out long ago
simply by devouring each other and their environments. 
However,  while  this  notion might  be  biological,  it  is  based on the logic  of  atomistic
entities and therefore neglects the more recent insights of an interrelated and systemic
understanding of biology that we have previously discussed. The notion disregards the
interactive communication that occurs within an individual organism and the processes
of interdependent co-creation between organisms and their ecosystems. In this sense, it
neglects the capabilities of individuals and populations to adjust their patterns of actions
not only to secure their own existence, but also to maintain the metabolic reproduction
of the entire ecosystem. This is not to say that individual organisms or populations must
have knowledge of the entire ecosystem that they exist in, but it is to be assumed that
they can adjust their long-term consumption and reproductive patters in accordance to
signals  that  they  receive  from  the  ecosystem  in  order  to  secure  their  long-term
existence. Obviously, this can include destructive strategies of parasitic growth but must
also include strategies of symbiogenesis and mutual symbiosis which are based on the
basic fact that the long-term existence of one being depends on the long-term existence
of other beings. This is clearest considering the example of the bacteria in one’s bowels
that I provide food for and that, in turn, enable me to digest my food; or the trees that
of another. What are economic resources? It's a little circular: economic resources are defined as scarce
resources. […]There are a few non-scarce goods, which economists call ‘free goods’” (Henderson 2014).
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provide oxygen for animals to breathe; or the rabbits that provide food for foxes. This is
what  George  Herbert  Meade  meant  when  he  spoke  of  organisms’  reciprocal
responsibility for the conditions of each other’s existence. 
To develop a better understanding of these other strategies of interdependent survival
in network systems, we must integrate the other central premise of the Neo-Darwinist
narrative: Scarcity. While I would agree that resources on planet earth are limited, this
does not mean that resources must also be scarce. The objective limit of resources is
best understood with the law of conservation that basically states that the total quantity
of  energy (including  mass)  remains  constant  over  time  in  a  closed  physical  system.
Energy can therefore not be created ex nihilo but can only change its form (Hosch 2017).
In contrast to this objective limit, scarcity is a phenomenon based on social organization
and perception. As Hardin himself acknowledged, scarcity only occurs when the demand
of  some  good  exceeds  the  existence  or  reproduction  thereof.  According  to  Hardin,
scarcity  is  therefore  increased through population growth and  the possibility  of  the
unlimited  accumulation  of  resources.  Ironically,  however,  by  perceiving  existing
resources to be scarce, accumulation strategies are pursued to secure one’s existence,
ultimately increasing the scarcity for others – and, in the long term, also for oneself, due
to the  depletion  of  the  resource.  Again,  we observe  the  creation  of  reality  from the
categories that we perceive and thus understand nature. We will discuss the creation of
scarcity in more detail later, but as we see, the central question that we must answer is
therefore  one  of  how  to  transform  limited  resources  into  relative  abundance  and
freedom. As I will argue later, that implies the transformation of our social arrangements
from  those  based  on  negative  rights,  individual  private  property  and  open  and
competitive markets to interdependent rights and commons property arrangements. In
order to do this, however, we must shift our understanding of planetary limits from one
based on scarcity to one based on sufficiency and abundance. 
To manage this,  it  would seem helpful to return to the work of Andreas Weber who
develops a notion of abundance in nature in relation to what he calls “natural commons”
or, more specifically, the process of “natural commoning”. In Weber’s words,  
“Nature, understood as a creative process of interacting, embodied subjects, can
serve as a model for an economic concept of the commons. Basic structures and
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principles  of  ‘natural  commoning’  –  self-organizing,  dynamic,  creative  –  have
been the basis of biospheric evolution” (Weber 2013, 37). 
In contrast to the scarcity narrative, Andreas Weber argues that the concept of commons
is  based on the assumption of a  general  and relative abundance in  nature.  This  is  a
central point that Weber emphasizes: 
“Resources in nature are not scarce. Where they become so, they do not lead to a
creative diversification, but to an impoverishment of diversity and freedom. The
basic energetic resource of nature, sunlight, exists in abundance. A second crucial
resource – the number of ecological relationships and new niches – has no upper
limit. A high number of species and a variety of relations among them do not lead
to sharper competition and dominance of a ‘fitter’ species, but rather to richer
permutations of relationships among species and thus to an increase in freedom,
which is at the same time also an increase of mutual dependencies. […] In old
ecosystems where solar energy is constant,  as in tropical rainforests and high
oceans,  this brings forth more niches and thus a greater overall  diversity. The
result is an increase of symbioses and reduced competition. Scarcity of resources,
experienced as the temporal lack of specific nutrients, leads to less diversity and
the  dominance  of  few species,  as  for  example  in temperate  coastal  mudflats”
(Weber 2013, 27).
In contrast to the scarcity narrative, the source of all  of life originates from an over-
abundant  resource  that  literally  falls  from  heaven  like  manna:  Sunlight.  As  is  well-
known,  sunlight  is  the key  source of  energy for  life  on  earth that  enables  plants  to
synthesize  carbon  dioxide  from  the  air  and  water  and  minerals  from  the  soil.  This
process of photosynthesis, in turn, “nourishes almost all of the living world directly or
indirectly” (Campbell and Reece 2002, 176). In this sense, sunlight can be understood as
a central source of energy that is provided to all living beings as an abundant gift.  
Aside from sunlight, Weber also mentions another resource that exists in abundance in
nature:  “the openly available source code of  genetic  information”  (Weber 2013,  39).
Here,  genetic  code  is  not  understood  as  an  exclusive  good  that  is  protected  and
reproduced “privately” by competing individual species. Instead, it is a good that is open
to all and shared by many. Here, genetic data is understood as an open-source commons.
Similar ideas have been developed in Stuart Kauffman’s concept of a biological “order
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for  free”  (Kauffman  1995,  71-92) and  Marcello  Barbieri’s  notions  of  “code  biology”
(2015) and “evolution by genomic flux”50 (Barbieri 2003, 58). In Weber’s words: 
“DNA has been able to branch into so many species only  because all  sorts  of
organisms could use its code, tinker with it and derive combinations that were
meaningful and useful to them. This is also the way Homo sapiens came about
[…].  Some 20 percent of our genome alone consists of former viral genes that
have been creatively recycled” (Weber 2013, 39).
According  to  Weber  and  other  authors,  it  is  not  the  selfish  gene  that  dominates  in
nature,  but  the  existential  desire  to  share,  copy and  diversify  genetic  information –
within and beyond one’s own species. In contrast to the survival of the fittest, Maturana
and Varela understand this notion of evolution in  The Tree of Life as “structural drift”,
which  merely  appears  a  posteriori to  the  observer  as  being  “selected”  by  the
environment  (Maturana  and  Varela  1987,  102-3).51  Here,  evolution  should  be
understood not as a process of selection in which individual genetic codes optimize and
assert  themselves  against  others,  but  rather  as  a  process  of  “free”  exchange  and
recombination of genetic information. Survival is thus not secured through protection
and  domination,  but  rather  through  (unconscious)  collective  participation  in  the
50  Marcello Barbieri explains: “Other phenomena – such as  unequal crossing-over,
DNA slippage and  gene conversion –  proved that the genome is actually a turbulent superstructure in
which  genes  are  in  a  continuous  state  of  flux.  The  Mendelian  behaviour  of  genes  is  only  a  crude
approximation of the truth, good enough for many practical purposes but not for a real-life understanding
of the  fluid genome.  This brings us back to the possibility of a third exception to the Hardy–Weinberg
theorem, i.e. to the possible existence of a third mechanism of evolution based on non-Mendelian heredity.
And since the new mechanism would be a direct result of gene turbulence, a good name for it could be
evolution by genomic flux” (Barbieri 2003, 58).
51  As Varela and Maturana write: “In fact, we have no unified picture of how the
evolution  of  living  beings  occurs  in  all  its  aspects.  There  are  many schools  of  thought  that  seriously
question understanding evolution by natural selection; this view has prevailed in biology for more than
sixty years. Whatever new ideas have been bruited about in terms of evolutive mechanisms, however,
those ideas cannot discount the phenomenon of evolution. But these will free us form the popular view of
evolution  as  a  process  in  which  there  is  an  environmental  world  to  which  living  beings  adapt
progressively, optimizing their use of it. What we propose here is that evolution occurs as a phenomenon
of  structural  drift  under  ongoing  phylogenic  selection.  In  that  phenomenon  there  is  no  progress  or
optimization of the use of the environment, but only conservation of adaptation and autopoiesis. It is a
process in which organism and environment remain in a continuous structural coupling” (Maturana and
Varela 1987, 115). Or, in more poetical and anthropomorphic terminology: “Evolution is somewhat like a
sculptor with wanderlust: he goes through the world collecting a thread here, a hunk of tin there, a piece
of wood here, and he combines them in a way that their structure and circumstances allow, with no reason
other  than  that  he is  able  to  combine them.  And so,  as  he  wanders  about,  intricate  forms  are  being
produced; and they are composed of harmoniously interconnected parts that are a product not of design
but of natural drift. Thus, too, with no law other than the conservation of an identity and the capacity to
reproduce, we all have emerged. It is what interconnected us to all things in what is fundamental to us: to
the five-petal rose, to the shrimp in the bay, or to the executive in New York city” (Maturana and Varela
1987, 117)
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adaptive diversity of life forms. In this sense, aside from sunlight and the genetic code,
diversity itself must also be considered as another vital and abundant resource for life
that provides ever more possibilities for other beings to secure their interdependent
existence. 
To understand this notion of diversity as a means for survival, we must turn to another
basic  concept  in  this  theory:  That  it  is  not  competition,  but  rather  “gift-giving”  and
mutually interdependent “networking” that underlies the life cycles of ecosystems. In
this sense, Andreas Weber argues that nature’s resources exist in relative abundance
and  that  they  are  also  provided  to  other  living  beings  as  gifts.  The  most  obvious
examples of resources being provided as gifts are those previously mentioned: Sunlight,
air, water, soil, genetic information and biological diversity. Here, it could be argued that
the  energy  of  these  resources  is  given  to  plants  “for  free”  or  as  a  gift  which  then
transform and conserve the energy through photosynthesis, which then, in turn, can be
consumed by other beings. Andreas Weber describes this process, 
“As there is no property in nature – there is no waste. All waste products literally
are food for some other member of the ecological community.  At death every
individual offers itself as a gift to be feasted upon by others, in the same way it
received the  gift  of  sunlight  to  sustain  its  existence.  There  remains  a  largely
unexplored connection between giving and taking in ecosystems in which ‘loss’ is
the precondition for generativity” (Weber 2013, 39).
The fact that there is no property in nature is obvious because plants and animals do not
exist in symbolic legal arrangements.52 Nevertheless, this is not to say that there should
not be any property arrangements in society. Instead, the point that Weber is making is
that the transfer of energy from one organism to another depends neither on trade nor
on competition, but is simply passed on as a gift to other living beings. Put in a larger
ecological context, the concept of gift-giving can thus be illustrated with the food cycle in
which energy is passed on from one organism to another in a more or less reciprocal
manner. Fritjof Capra portrays the food cycle in his book The Web of Life in the following
manner: 
52  In this sense – and in relation to the abundance and accessibility of resources
such  as  sunlight  and  genetic  code  –  Weber  writes,  “Nothing  in  nature  can  be  exclusively  owned  or
controlled; everything is open source” (Weber 2013, 39).
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Figure 1: A cyclical portrayal of a food web (Capra 1996, 179)
This understanding should be contrasted with the linear and hierarchical understanding
of  food  chains  as  it  is  often  portrayed  in  schoolbooks  such  as,  for  example,  in  the
classical textbook Biology: A Global Approach (Campbell et al. 2015) by Neil Campbell et
al.:  
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Figure 2: Hierarchical portrayal of a food web (Campbell et al. 2015, 1290)
As we see here, the food web is portrayed in a fairly linear and hierarchical manner. It is
interesting to note that  Campbell  et  al.  mention the decomposers that transform the
energy of carnivores and omnivores into energy for plants in the caption, but that they
do not include them in the figure. For this reason, the food chain with humans at the top
of the hierarchy (fig.  3) remains hierarchical and incomplete.  It  could be argued that
these  two  depictions  of  how  energy  is  distributed  in  the  ecosystem  tacitly  convey
notions of how nature is structured: Linearly, hierarchically and anthropocentrically or
cyclically, reciprocally and eco-centrically.  
This interpretation of nature does not imply that life is always harmonious and benign.
Such an interpretation would obviously be an all-too idealistic understanding of nature.
However, as Darwin himself acknowledged later in life  (Darwin 2009, 70-106) and as
Pjotr  Kropotkin  also  argued  over  100  years  ago,  survival  is  not  merely  based  on
competition and warfare but also on interdependencies,  reciprocity and “mutual aid”
(Kropotkin 1998). The main point of this new interpretation of nature is that animals
and  populations  are  not  conceived  in  isolation  from  other  organisms  and  their
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environment, but rather in mutual interdependencies. This shifts our understanding of
evolution from one focused on competition to one based on communication in web-like
networks. The existence of a specific population is thus not conceptualized in a dualistic
logic  of  “us  versus  them” but  as  a  dynamic  and  sometimes  stressful  relationship  of
interdependency. It can therefore be argued here that life only comes into being through
the existence of the other – through its dependency on the ecosystem that it lives in. This
implies a biological primacy of reciprocal “birth-giving”,  understood as a “natural gift
economy” and a “natural commons” over the Darwinian focus on struggle, competition
and “nature red in tooth and claw.” According to Weber, 
“From the standpoint of enlivenment nature is a commons economy consisting of
subjects  that  are  continuously  mediating  relationships  among  each  other  –
relationships that have a material side, but also always embody meaning, a sense
of living and the notion of belonging to a place” (Weber 2013, 36). 
Here, the natural common of the gift is not a specific property arrangement, but it should
be understood as a mode of existence and, more importantly, as the precondition for
one’s existence – including one’s ability to compete with other beings. In this sense, the
existence of “the other” is the precondition of an organism’s own existence. As Weber
explains: 
“The  biosphere  consists  of  a  material  and  meaningful  interrelation  of  selves.
Embodied selves come into being only through others: the biosphere critically
depends on cooperation and ‘interbeing’ – the idea that a self is not possible in
isolation and frenetic struggle of all against all,  but is from the very beginning
dependent  on  the  ‘other’  –  in  the  form  of  food,  shelter,  mates  and  parents,
communication partners.  Self is only self-through-other.  In human development
this  is  very  clear,  as  the  infant  must  be  seen  and  positively  valued  by  its
caretakers to be able to grow a healthy self.” (Weber 2013, 32; emphasis added)
Again,  this  interdependency  of  life  does  not  imply  that  nature  is  one  harmonious
symphony but that the dynamic processes of mutual adaptation and evolution result
from  this  interdependency.  In  this  sense,  Weber  speaks  of  the  biosphere  being
“paradoxically cooperative” in that symbiotic relationships emerge out of “antagonistic,
incompatible processes: matter/form, genetic code/soma, individual ego/other” (Weber
2013,  32;  emphasis  omitted).53 Weber  emphasizes  that  this  paradoxical  unity  forces
53  The dynamic unity of these fundamental paradoxes of life can be compared to
the wave-particle paradox in quantum physics. 
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entities to form precarious and provisional solutions to their way of life. Here, existence
comes into being through “transitory negotiations of several incompatible layers of life”
(Weber 2013, 32).
This implies that nature does not exist in a stable equilibrium but rather in a dynamic
process of balancing diverse desires and needs between different organisms within an
ecosystem. This does not imply that all organisms exist in a struggle of “all against all” in
which one species or population will “win.” Instead, this concept implies that ecosystems
have  functional  “dissipative  structures”  (Capra 1996,  168-9) or  “balancing  levels”  in
which the change of one factor of the ecosystem inherently brings about other changes
in it. Andreas Weber writes, 
 “All systems have a ‘balance level’ of health. If disruptions or damage force the
individual,  community  or  species  to  experience  too  much  stress,  then  the
resilience of the whole will weaken. The ‘balance level’ is not a fixed threshold,
but  more  of  a  zone  for  absorbing  what  Varela  and  Maturana  call  ‘disruptive
perturbation.’ Stress that exceeds the structural resilience of the system means
that the system cannot produce a ‘surplus of meaning’ – i.e., it cannot provide its
gifts on other parts of the ecosystem. The degree of tolerable stress can be very
difficult to observe and even more difficult to predict. A second important point is
that  the  existence  of  a  ‘balance  level’  does  not  mean  static  equilibrium  or
‘homeostasis’;  it  is  a  dynamic negotiation among the system’s  elements about
exactly how far it can stretch to accommodate the stress. Tolerable stress, which
includes minor and major catastrophes, can actually be a stimulation as long as it
remains within ecotone levels (an ecotone is the patchy fringe between two or
more specific areas).  Beyond that,  disruptions can become devastating for the
whole, eventually destroying it. On the larger system level, this destruction will
lead to  a  new equilibrium,  but  not  with  the same players as  before.”  (Weber
2013, 38-9).
Here,  the  dynamic  balance  that  an  ecosystem  maintains  can  be  interpreted  as  an
inherent  principle  of  networked  self-organization.  Using  the  concepts  of  relative
abundance and mutual interdependency in ecosystems, Weber then also reminds us that
an ecosystem never grows in a material sense. Thus, Weber concludes that “nature is
running a steady-state economy – that is, an economy where all relevant factors remain
constant in relation with one another”  (Weber 2013, 27). This notion of the metabolic
reproduction of the ecosystem in a dynamic yet steady state economy will be relevant
for our later discussion of a commons-based economy. For now, however, let us turn to
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the  implications  of  these  insights  for  human freedom and  democracy  based  on  this
ecological and systemic understanding of reality. 
5.5. Empathy, Cooperation and Common(s) Reality 
In  this  discussion  of  self-organizing  organisms,  populations  and  ecosystems,  it  is
important to note that the degree of autonomy of organisms and networks varies greatly
depending on the complexity of the specific multicellular living system. Here, the main
difference between human and the more-than-human living systems is that humans and
their social  systems possess the ability not merely of  interpreting their environment
through indexical and iconic signs, but also of interpreting through symbolic signs.54 This
capability does not merely enable humans to give things “names”, but also enables self-
reflection in which the “process of naming is itself nameable”  (Bateson 1979, 185). In
turn, these self-reflective capabilities provide greater “semiotic freedom” (Hoffmeyer)
for human beings. In the words of George Herbert Mead: 
“Mind arises in the social process only when that process as a whole enters into,
or is present in, the experience of any one of the given individuals involved in
that process. When this occurs the individual becomes self-conscious and has a
mind; he becomes aware of his relations to that process as a whole, and to the
other individuals participating in it with him. […] It is by means of reflexiveness –
the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself – that the whole
social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it;
it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other
toward himself,  that  the individual is  able  consciously  to adjust  himself  to that
process, and to modify the resultant of that process in any given social act in terms
of his adjustment to it” (Mead 1967, 134; emphasis added). 
As Mead emphasizes, the ability to reflect on the process of thought and action is not
something  divine  or  transcendental  but  emerges  from  the  processes  of  the  central
nervous  system.  Furthermore,  this  ability  provides  humans  with  a  greater  range  of
freedom than other living beings. For Mead, the seemingly simple ability to stop and
reflect  on  one’s  cognitive  processes  (i.e.  thinking)  opens  a  space  in  one’s  mind  for
altering  the  interrelations  of  symbolic  signs  and intended action.  Or,  in  Mead’s  own
words, “When [one; LP] stops, mind, we say, is freed” (Mead 1967, 122).
54  Despite this very general and far-reaching statement, there are experiments that
demonstrate that animals use basic abstract  concepts.  One such experiment shows how ducklings can
differentiate between “same or different” (Martinho III and Kacelnik 2016). 
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Nevertheless, Mead never tires to emphasize that this process of reflection is not merely
an individual activity, but also an inherently social one. In other words, language and,
therefore,  mind only occur through the interaction both with one’s environment and
with other humans. Self-consciousness and the self is therefore not atomistic and self-
dependent, but created through the material and social world that it is embedded in.
Mead explains, 
“What goes to make up the organized self  is  the organization of  the attitudes
which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to
a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his
own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality,
and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish
he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. Such, in a certain
sense, is the structure of a man’s personality. […] The  structure, then, on which
the self is built is this response which is common to all, for one has to be a member
of a community to be a self” (Mead 1967, 162; emphasis added).
Biologically, this primordial cooperative sociability is explained by the development of
mirror  neurons  and  humans’  deeply  ingrained  empathetic  sensibility.55 In  a  general
sense,  mirror  neurons  enable  the  mind  to  grasp  another  mind  “as  if”  the  emotions,
thoughts and behavior of the other were one’s own (Damasio 2003, 115). According to
Rizzalotti and Sinigaglia, however, this process should not be understood as reflexive
but  instead  as  immediate  and  empathic:  “The  instantaneous  understanding  of  the
emotions  of  others,  rendered  possible  by  the  emotional  mirror  neuron  system,  is  a
necessary condition for the empathy which lies at the root of most of our more complex
inter-individual  relationships”  (Rizzolatti  and Sinigaglia  2008,  190-1).   Mirroring the
other in a direct,  first  person and pre-reflexive manner enables people to empathize
with other humans – and other living, sentient beings. This basic insight that humans are
not  simply  reflexive  and  rational  but  also  inherently  social  and  empathic  beings
corresponds with much recent research in other scientific fields  (de Waal 1996, 2009,
Fehr and Schmidt 2006, Kolm and Ythier 2006, Tomasello 2009, Rifkin 2009, Bowles
55  Mirror neurons were discovered in the early 1990s in Parma, Italy, by a team of
scientists  led  by  Giacomo  Rizzalotti,  who  were  analyzing  the  brains  of  macaque  monkeys  and  their
cognitive abilities to plan movements. Here, they discovered neurons in the F5 region of the frontal cortex
that were not only fired before the monkey had grabbed a peanut, but also when a researcher took some
peanuts. Soon afterwards, they studied human brains and found a similar reaction: Neuronal activity was
detected in an individual when they saw other humans act without acting themselves (Rifkin 2009, 82).
From the point of these insights, a burst of research was initiated that supported an embodied and social
theory of mind in which not reason, but emotions – and, more specifically, empathy and cooperation –
stand at the center of human existence.
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and Gintis 2011, Baron-Cohen 2011, Batson 2011, Jensen et al. 2014, Rosa 2016, 246).56
The  important  point  here,  however,  is  that  mirror  neurons  enable  a  pre-reflexive,
empathic  and  primary  sociality  that  promotes  the  development  of  self-reflexive
individuality in and with others. In this sense, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia write that
“The clarification of  the  nature and reach of  the  mirror  neuron systems then
provided  us  with  a  base  from  which  to  investigate  the  cerebral  processes
responsible for the vast range of behaviour that characterizes our daily existence,
and  from which  we weave  the  web  of  our  social  and  interindividual  relations”
(Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, 192-3; emphasis added).
This understanding of mind emphasizes the ecological principle of interdependence and
co-originality of the self and the other, which, in this case, must also be interpreted as
the individual and society. 
In a general sense, we could therefore say that mirror neurons bridge minds and weave
them into a network of “common mind[s]” (Pettit 1993). They provide humans with an
elementary  and  underlying  shared  experience  and  a  shared  reality.  Here,  we  are
reminded  of  Elinor  Ostrom’s  “interdependent  situations”  (E.  Ostrom  1998,  1)  that
constitute most of people’s existence. As Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia explain: 
“The mirror neuron system and the selectivity of the responses of the neurons
that compose it, produce a shared space of action, within which each act and chain
of  acts,  whether  ours  or  'theirs',  are  immediately  registered  and  understood
without the need of any explicit or deliberate ‘cognitive operation’”  (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia 2008, 131; emphasis i.o).
Mirror  neurons  generally  enable  individuals  to  develop  a  shared  language,  shared
thoughts  and  shared,  collective  actions  through  the  imitation  of  the  other.  Michael
56  Randall Collins, for example, confirms this insight in his book Violence: A Micro-
sociological Theory (2008): „[H]umans have evolved to have particularly high sensitivities to the micro-
interactional signals given off by other humans. Humans are hard-wired to get caught in a mutual focus of
intersubjective attention, and to resonate emotions from one body to another in common rhythms. This is
an evolved biological propensity; humans get situationally caught up in the momentary nuances of each
other’s nervous and endocrinological systems in a way that makes them prone to create interaction rituals
and thus to keep up face-to-face solidarity. I am making more than the banal point that humans have
evolved with large brains and a capacity for learning culture. We have evolved to be hyper-attuned to each
other emotionally, and hence to be especially susceptible to the dynamics of interactional situations. The
evolution of human egotism, then, is far from primary; it emerges only in special circumstances, for the
most part rather late in human history“ (Collins 2008, 26-7).
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Bratman echoes  this  insight  in  his  notion  of  shared  intentions,  which  “consists  in  a
public, interlocking web of appropriate intentions of the individuals” (Bratman 1999, 9).
Or, as Mead explains, “[T]he beginnings of the process of communication [is found; LP]
in the co-operative process, whether of reproduction, caring for the young, or fighting”
(Mead  1967,  234).  It  can  thus  be  said  that  cooperation  lies  at  the  beginning  of  all
individual  development  and  is  most  clearly  symbolized  by  parents  caring  for  their
children. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that this cooperation can be conflictual or
competitive. Or, conversely, the basis of a competitive or conflictual relationship implies
that two parties share a  common  reality – and that they are a result thereof. For if a
reality was not primarily interdependent and shared, conflict could not even arise. 
In another sense, we could possibly say that one’s mind does not exist “in one’s head”,
but rather “out there” in one’s interactions with society and in the world. In the words of
Mead,  this  is  the  “generalized  other”  that  is  incorporated  and  reproduced  through
mirror neurons and role-playing games (Mead 1967, 152-64). For this reason, we could
not only argue that language, but also mind, thoughts and “reality” should be understood
as an “irreducibly social good” (Taylor 1995) that people co-create and inherently share.
However, this shared mind-language-reality is not merely limited to the social sphere
but includes material reality as well. In this sense, Meade argues that “[c]onsciousness as
stuff,  as  experience,  from  the  standpoint  of  behavioristic  or  dynamic  psychology,  is
simply  the environment of  the  human individual  or  social  group”  (Mead  1967,  111;
emphasis added). Subjective mind is therefore always objectified in its existing social
and natural conditions. 
What was previously understood as the nature commons now flows over into a type of
social  commons  that  lays  the  foundation  of  both  our  social  realities  and  our
individualities. In his article Reality as Commons, Weber explains: 
“The commons of reality is a matrix of relationships through which aliveness is
unfolding in ecosystems and history. It conveys the aliveness of biological and
human communities from a perspective of metabolic dependency, exchanges of
gifts,  and  the  entanglement  of  actors  within  their  vectors  of  activity.  Living
participants  bring  each  other  into  being  by  establishing  relationships
(metabolism, predator/prey relationships,  social ties),  thus producing not only
their  environments  but  their  very identities.  Thus,  the commons describes an
ontology of relations that is at the same time existential, economic and ecological.
It emphasizes a process of transformation and identity formation that arises out
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of a mutuality that is not only material, but also experienced [and symbolic; LP]”
(Weber 2015).
From this perspective, all our interactions constitute our shared, common reality. The
fabric  of  our  very  existence  could  thus  be  understood  as  a  commons  –  a  reality
commons. This reality commons would obviously include conscious acts of sharing, but
also  walls,  conflicts  and  war.  Although  these  latter  examples  might  be  attempts  to
exclude,  subdue or even eliminate  the other,  they would nevertheless constitute the
common reality that people inherently co-inhabit and co-create – whether they like it or
not. In this sense, it could even be said that this reality commons is the bedrock and
horizon of the interdependent existence of humans and the more-than-human world.
While this concept of reality commons might appear to be too general and vague, it is
clear that we must not confuse this notion of commons with Elinor Ostrom’s notion of
common pool resources or common property arrangements. Instead, this understanding
of commons goes beyond them and should, rather, be understood as a “way of entering
into  relationships  with  the  world,  both  materially  and  conceptually”  (Weber  2015).
Moreover, this understanding provides us with the adequate concepts to demand that
people  should  have  the  right  and  possibility  to  co-determine  their  shared  common
reality or their reality commons. 
5.6. Ecological Freedom and Care
As  we  see,  this  notion  of  a  shared  reality  commons  based  on  interdependent  self-
organization  in  ecosystems  forces  us  to  reformulate  our  original  understanding  of
autonomy and democratic freedom with ideas discussed with David Held. David Held’s
principle of autonomy was based on the individual’s capability and right to change its
conditions of living. Although this is an advance to other notions of freedom in that it
conceptualizes democracy as a form of living, it nevertheless understands autonomy as
“the supreme value and derives universal environmental rights, duties and institutions
from it” (Tully 2008a, 74). From our ecological understanding of reality, it is important
to embed this principle of autonomy in the basic principles of ecology. Fritjof Capra, for
examples,  defines  these  principles  as  “interdependence,  recycling,  partnership,
flexibility, diversity, and, as a consequence of all of those, sustainability”  (Capra 1996,
119
304).  In  its  most  simple  sense,  this  ecological  reinterpretation  of  Held’s  autonomy
principle provides us with a concept of an ecological, democratic freedom based on the
self-organization of organisms within an ecological network of interdependencies.  
Similarly,  Andreas Weber understands autonomy as biologically  embodied,  which be
conceived as “freedom-in-and-through-relation” (Weber 2013, 40). For interdependent
ecological networks or “natural commons”, this connotes that
 “a  multitude  of  different  individuals  and  diverse  species  stand  in  various
relationships  to  one  another  –  competition  and  cooperation,  partnership  and
predatory hostility,  productivity and destruction.  All  those relations,  however,
follow one higher principle: Only behaviour that allows for the productivity of the
whole ecosystem over the long term and that does not interrupt its capacities of
self-production, will survive and expand” (Weber 2013, 37).
Thus, the relations of the individual with the entire ecosystem becomes central to our
understanding of ecological freedom. Therefore, the important point is not simply the
maximization  of  individuals’  autonomy,  but  rather  the  co-determination  and
reproduction  of  the  systemic  socio-ecological  conditions  that  enable  individuals’
freedom. 
Here, we could mistakenly interpret individual freedom in an organic metaphor as the
subjugation of the individual to the whole. This is a classical critique that states that
holistic and organicistic concepts of life inherently lead to totalitarianism, as was the
case  with  National  Socialism  (Harrington  1996).  The  understanding  of  ecological
relationships defended here,  however, fundamentally contradicts this totalitarian and
hierarchical  interpretation of social  organicism.  Totalitarian metaphors of  an organic
society have often been based on notions of Social Darwinism which, in turn, legitimated
a hierarchical interpretation of nature and a society divided into charismatic leaders and
sheepish  followers.  Only  by  suppressing  one’s  individuality  can  the  existence  of  the
whole  be  secured.  Contrary  to  this  interpretation,  the  notion  of  interdependent
ecological systems that has been developed here implies that self-organizing organisms
and  biological  diversity  are  necessary  for  the  functioning  of  the  whole  ecological
network. Or, in the words of Weber, “The individual can only exist if the whole exists and
the whole can only exist if individuals are allowed to exist” (Weber 2013, 32). Although
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this definition goes in the right direction, I consider the notion of being “allowed to exist”
to be somewhat problematic. Individual existence could be reduced to life in a prison
cell or in Disneyland. The fundamental point in this ecological and systemic notion of
freedom is that the  thriving of individuals depends on a “healthy” society and on the
premise that the flourishing of society depends on a healthy individual. We cannot have
one without the other: The whole and its parts are interdependent and co-create each
other. For this to happen, it is necessary to see both “the forest and the trees”  (Moran
and Ostrom 2005) in their interwoven relationships with one another. It is this systemic
understanding that must complement and transform David Held’s notion of individual
autonomy and democracy to make it more ecologically sound and open to a more far-
reaching notion of commons. 
First and foremost, this implies that the networked structures of living systems are not
hierarchical.  In  simple  terms,  all  organisms –  including  all  people  –  are  assumed  to
possess the ability to self-organize and it  is  assumed that all  parts  contribute to the
interdependent  process  of  the  co-creation  of  the  whole.  The  biological  and  physical
realm of human reproduction and production is no longer conceptualized as the realm
of  necessity  and  unfreedom.  Nevertheless,  while  humans  possess  the  capability  to
reflect, reason and self-organize, they are dependent on the self-organization and well-
being of other organisms, populations and their ecosystem at large. Therefore, humans
are merely understood as one component in a larger, complex ecosystem. According to
Weber, this concept of ecological freedom is what underlies the commons: 
“The  basic  idea  of  the  commons  is  therefore  grounded  on  an  intricate
understanding of freedom and its relationship to the whole: the individual enjoys
many  options  of  self-realisation  but  the  only  viable  ones  depend  upon  the
flourishing  of  the  life/social  systems  to  which  she  belongs.  To  organise  a
community  between  humans  and/or  non-human  agents  according  to  the
principles of the commons means to increase individual freedom by enlarging the
community’s  freedom.  Both  expand  together  –  and  mutually  through  one
another” (Weber 2013, 40). 
Again, this is not to say that the relationship between the individual parts and the whole
are  harmonious.  That  would  be  a  naïve  and  all-too  optimistic  interpretation  of  this
mutual  interdependency.  Freedom  should  therefore  be  interpreted  as  a  process  of
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continual communication and negotiation both with the necessities of material existence
and between the individual parts and the whole. Thus, we could conclude that freedom
is not only an in-and-through-relation, but, more precisely, individual freedom must be
understood as being with, through and against the other. 
In  order to understand what  this  means,  let  us  quickly summarize  each term: With,
through and against.  “Freedom with” signifies people’s  inherent common reality that
they share and therefore co-determine – irrespective whether they have the political or
legal right to co-determination. It emphasizes the co-origination of self and other and
one’s dependency on the other. However, this dependency is positively connoted here
because it is only with the other that one can realize common ends and satisfy common
needs.  Moreover,  this  relation  highlights  the  intrinsic  value  of  social  interactions,
collective action and convivial modes of being. In this sense, the principle underlying
“freedom  with”  can  be  understood  as  the  Kantian  categorical  imperative  that  all
(rational)  beings  must  each be considered as  an  end  in  themselves  (Kant  2002,  45;
4:429), whereby we would replace the term rational with the term sentient, extending
its  sphere  of  relevance  to  all  living  beings  and  thereby  possibly  also  ecosystems  in
general.  In  contrast,  “Freedom  through”  denotes  the  utilitarian  and  instrumental
character of relationships, in which people can use one another and their environment.
We use people and things to realize certain ends that are either held in common or not.
Both freedom “with” and “through” resemble a collective notion of positive freedom,
understood as the ability to act collectively, and social freedom, understood as the ability
to  co-determine  one’s  conditions  of  existence.  Finally,  “freedom against”  emphasizes
that people have conflicting values and ends and therefore need to negotiate how these
conflicts can co-exist without negating one another.  While “freedom against” appears
similar to negative freedom or “freedom from”, the latter is, in fact, a means to solve the
conflict by excluding or – in its extreme case – negating the other. Instead, “freedom
against”  implies  that  conflicting  interests  and  ends  must  be  dealt  with  not  through
exclusion but, rather, through negotiation. This is not to say that all conflicting ends have
a  right  to  be  realized,  but  rather  that  it  must  be  negotiated  which  ends  fulfill  the
reproduction of the whole and the flourishing of its parts better. In this sense, “with,
through and against the other” are the fundamental criteria of ecological interdependent
freedom. Lastly, it should be noted that these three notions must always be recognized
simultaneously.  While  it  is  possible  that  one  aspect  is  emphasized  in  certain
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relationships, other aspects are accentuated in other relationships. One of these aspects
cannot not be annulled from the definition of ecological freedom. As becomes clear, the
negation of “with” would imply a purely instrumental and conflictual relationship with
others. This comes close to the notion of negative freedom in which one’s atomistic and
supposedly independent subjective rationality is defined as the cornerstone of society.
The denial  of either “through” or “against” would,  in turn,  lead to the subjugation of
one’s individuality to the whole and thus negate one’s individual freedom. As we see,
this notion of freedom aims at maintaining a dynamic tension between the parts and the
whole while not falling into the traps of focusing on merely one aspect of its tripartite
definition. 
In  this  sense,  I  would  say  that  ecological  freedom  emphasizes  individuality  without
being either totalitarian or atomistic and solipsist. Ecological freedom emphasizes the
importance of other living beings as a precondition for one’s own material existence and
actual  freedom.  Thus,  ecological  freedom  is  always  both  embedded  and  embodied
freedom. As Andreas Weber elaborates,
“The enlivened idea of freedom does not do away with the classical-humanistic
[and liberal-negative; LP] account[s] of autonomy (as strictly biologistic accounts
do), but rather it limits its absoluteness to an ‘embodied relativity’. There is no
such thing as individual freedom detached from the living world, and any attempt
to claim it inevitably will violate the necessities of embodied life, of an organic
being’s living needs. So from an Enlivenment viewpoint [ecological; LP] freedom
(as enframed in constraint) is a natural process.” (Weber 2013, 40). 
Here,  freedom  with,  through  and  against  is  simply  interpreted  as  a  process  of
communication with one’s ecosystem instead of merely with one’s fellow human beings.
This generally implies that people recognize that other organisms have an intrinsic right
to exist and are the basis for our existence and the reproduction of the entire ecosystem
which we co-inhabit  (freedom with).  Importantly,  this  would imply  that  we provide
organisms, animals and ecosystems with legal rights that recognize this right to life and
liberty of more-than-human life. Our notion of ecological freedom would, however, also
imply that we can use these organisms and ecosystems to satisfy our needs (freedom
through) while not negating the needs of the other (again, freedom with). Finally, this
notion can suggest that we must somehow negotiate over conflicting ends and see to
what  extent  these  conflicting  ends  support  the  reproduction  of  the  whole  and  the
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flourishing of each individual part.  How can this negotiation process between human
and  non-human  organisms  take  place?  On  the  one  hand,  this  notion  of  ecological
freedom should provide people with a point of normative orientation in their everyday
interactions with the-more-than-human world. On the other hand, it should also provide
people with the ability to file a suit in the name of the more-than-human world when the
rights of certain organisms or ecosystems would be violated. Here, I must admit that it
still  remains  unclear  to  me  how  the  more-than-human  world  can  be  increasingly
integrated into the legal framework not merely as an object, but also as participants in
the democratic processes of law and policy making.  One possibility would be to develop
special  methods  of  representation  through  the  integration  of  scientists,
environmentalists  and  the  people  who  are  directly  working  in  and  with  specific
ecosystems (farmers, fisher, forest rangers etc.), as developed by Bruno Latour in his
notion of the “Parliament of Things”  (Latour 1993,  2004). Despite the importance of
these questions, we must discuss these ideas in more depth elsewhere.  
This shift in understanding from an individualistic and anthropocentric understanding
of freedom to a social and ecological notion forces us to rethink our basic ethical relation
to other humans and to the more-than-human world. In general terms, the relationship
to other humans and the more-than-human world should be interpreted as a resonant
relationship  of  communication  and  negotiation.  Furthermore,  by  recognizing  the
inherent interdependency of living systems, ecological freedom is neither based on the
negative notion of non-interference nor on a utilitarian ethic of maximization for the
greatest  number.  I  would also argue that  ecological  freedom goes beyond Honneth’s
previously discussed concept of social freedom that is based on (the struggle for) mutual
recognition between humans. Instead, I would argue that ecological freedom is based on
a care ethic – towards one’s fellow human beings and the more-than-human world. In
this sense, I would use Joan Tronto’s classical definition of care that she developed in her
book  Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (1993). According to
Tronto, care is  
“everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and
our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining
web” (Tronto 1993, 103).
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Although  care  is  often  associated  with  the  relationship  between  parents  or,  more
specifically, mothers and their children, I would agree with Tronto that care is a more
general principle that defines not merely ethics, but also rights and obligations. In this
sense, it is important to emphasize that the care ethic implied here is not hierarchical
and paternalistic but based on the recognition of others’ equal capabilities and rights to
self-organize. Ecological freedom based on a care ethic thus emphasizes the equal rights
of all living beings to individual and interdependent action and the obligation to ensure
the autonomy of all other living beings by caring for them. Caring does not, however,
imply harmony and altruism (Tronto 2013, 32), but instead the negotiation of diverging
interests and values with a basic interest for the other. This can also mean that there is
oppositional  conflict  precisely  because  one  cares  for  certain  goods.  Grounding  our
notion of freedom on an ethic of care implies that we break with the implicit “ethic” of
self-interest in negative freedom. We would therefore shift our focus from the right of
non-interference and the unlimited accumulation of wealth to the care for reproduction
and flourishing  of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  whole.  By  placing  a  care  ethic  at  the
foundation of our notion of freedom, I believe that we would ultimately be bringing life
and freedom into alignment. 
Here, someone might ask if we truly need a specific ethos for a specific legal framework.
Simply put, my short answer to this is yes. The reason for this is that social institutions
can only be maintained if they are also morally justified. Moral justification implies not
only the approval of the existence of certain institutions (e.g. individual private property
in land), but also patterns of both individual and collective action. With Hegel, I would
argue that social institutions are not merely created through reason and contracts, but
are brought about through ingrained patterns of action and habit which are,  in turn,
structured  according  to  normative  values  of  right  and  wrong.  This  is  what  Hegel
generally refers to as “Sittlichkeit”.  We may found new institutions,  but if  we do not
uphold  them  through  ethical  conviction  and  repeated  actions,  they  will  most  likely
disappear again. In this sense, we could also say that (democratic) institutions of society
are no better than the people that live in that specific society. From this perspective, it is
our norms, our ethics and our corresponding actions that must bring about the social
institutions we want. 
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On a more general level, by placing care at the center of our relationship to ourselves,
other humans and the more-than-human world, we transform fundamental notions of
politics,  law and property.  In general  terms,  this  shifts  our understanding of politics
from struggle and conflict to one of mutual, reciprocal care. Furthermore, it shifts our
focus from rights to responsibilities. According to Joan Tronto, this is a central aspect of
a “caring democracy”, as she explains:  
“Most importantly, rather than being a set of principles from which one deduces
proper action, a feminist democratic ethic of care begins by envisioning a series
of  caring  practices,  nested  within  one  another.  The  broadest  of  these  nested
practices  are  those  that  pertain  to  society  as  a  whole  […].  The  goal  of  such
practices is to ensure that all of the members of the society can live as well as
possible by making the society as democratic as possible. This is the essence of
‘caring with.’ While living in a democratic manner is not the only goal of care, or
of human life, in a democratic society it is the goal of democratic caring practices.
Thus,  democratic  politics  should  center  upon assigning responsibilities  for care,
and  for  ensuring  that  democratic  citizens  are  as  capable  as  possible  of
participating  in  this  assignment  of  responsibilities.  The  task  of  a  democratic
politics is to affix responsibility, and as we come to recognize the centrality of
care for living a decent human life, then the task of democratic politics needs to
be  much  more  fully  focused  upon  care  responsibilities:  their  nature,  their
allocation, and their fulfilment” (Tronto 2013, 30; empasis i.o.).
By interpreting freedom and democracy in this manner, we could say that democracies
that  clearly  separate  the  private  from  the  public  and  that  are  coupled  with  self-
regulating markets limit the possibilities for individuals to care for the socio-ecological
problems  that  determine  their  common  reality.  As  we  have  already  seen,  the  self-
limitation of politics to the realm of the state has created a democratic deficit that can
also  be  interpreted  as  a  structural  caring  deficit  in  modern  societies.  These  legal
institutions stop people from taking responsibility and caring for social and ecological
problems because the root of these problems is ultimately situated in the private realm
which  is  largely  shielded  from  democratic  interference  –  be  that  by  the  state,  civil
society  or  communities.  Furthermore,  the  existing  politics  of  care  imply  that  the
responsibilities of care are unequally distributed: While some people are overburdened
with classical “private” and often unpaid care work (e.g. childrearing, caring for the sick
and elderly, social work etc.), few people have the somewhat limited possibility to care
for common affairs (e.g. politicians, environmentalists) and others are largely freed from
care work (e.g. people pursuing accumulative “economic” activities). Here, while some
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people have a “free pass” to accumulate and extract wealth, the rest of society must do
the care work to keep the socio-ecological organism alive. As we see, legal arrangements
define  and  distribute  care  work  and  the  according  responsibilities  within  society
(Tronto 2013, 32-3). In this sense, it is not simply of central importance in an ecological
notion of freedom to define and demand rights for humans and the more-than-human
world  (e.g.  the  right  to  clean  water,  to  education  etc.),  but  also  to  demand  a  fair
distribution  of  caring  possibilities  and  obligations  that  enables  the  reproduction  of
freedom for all (Held 1995, 203). We will discuss later how this care ethic can transform
our  notion  of  property  rights  and  labor.  Before  turning  to  property  arrangements,
however, I would like to further develop an understanding of democracy that is based on
our notion of ecological freedom. To do this, we will now develop Fritjof’s and Capra’s
notion  of  eco-law  with  reference  to  James  Tully’s  work  on  the  “civic  tradition”  of
democracy  which  provides  us  with  an  important  stepping-stone  for  an  ecological
democratic theory of the commons.  
5.7. The Civic Tradition of Ecological Democracy and Commoning
In his book On Global Citizenship (2014), James Tully differentiates between the civil and
civic traditions of democracy. Similarly to Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei, he recognizes
that  the civil  tradition is  problematic because it  limits  people in their capabilities to
change their legal frameworks to adequately deal with and care for social and ecological
problems. To understand the civic tradition of democracy fully, it might, therefore, be
helpful to shortly discuss what Tully understands as the civil tradition of democracy. 
5.7.1. The Civil Tradition of Democracy
According to James Tully,  the civil  tradition is  based on a dualistic  understanding of
society that differentiates between individuals and their representatives (demos) on the
one  hand  and  between  citizens  and  their  legal  framework  understood  as  the
constitutional rule of law (nomos) on the other (Tully 2014, 11). This understanding is
similar  to  our  understanding  of  protective,  legal  (minimal)  and  formal,  positive
(medium-range) democracy. Here, the “constitutional rule of law is the first condition of
citizenship”, which is “defined as a status (state or condition)” (Tully 2014, 11). Rights
and obligations are granted to the individual by the hierarchical authority of the state.
Society is divided into state-individual, state-market or state-civil society dichotomies
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that  are  found  in  the  writings  of  Hobbes,  Locke  and  Kant.  Tully  lists  four  tiers  of
citizenship rights and duties within this civil tradition: (1) Civil liberties, understood as
private autonomy or, with reference to Benjamin Constant, the liberty of moderns; (2)
representative government and the liberty of ancients, understood as the possibility to
participate  in  public  autonomy;  (3)  social  and  economic  rights,  understood  as
substantive  yet  rather  weak rights to  education,  housing and health;  and finally,  (4)
modern minority rights (Tully 2014, 12-17). As Tully emphasizes, the “modern liberty to
participate in the private economic sphere and not to be interfered within it; the right to
own property and enter into contracts” (Tully 2014, 13) lies at the center of the first tier
civil  liberties.  In  this  sense,  the  state  exists  primarily  to  pacify  our  supposedly
antagonistic and conflicting, egotistical interests. Again, we confront the state-individual
dichotomy which must also be interpreted as a dichotomy of subjective, egotistical or, in
Christian terminology, “fallen” individuals and objective, robust and “universal” laws. Or,
in Kantian terms, it is a rational and universal legal order that can be realized even by a
“nation of devils” (Kant 2006, 90).57 As becomes clear, this concept of civil liberty turns
the  social  and  ecological  ontology developed  in  this  paper  on  its  head  by assuming
independent  and  conflicting  individuals  as  primary,  the  interference  of  others  as
cumbersome  and  participation  in  social  activities  and  common  affairs  as  voluntary.
Here,  democracy  and  processes  of  democratization  are  “equated  with  tier-one  civil
liberties  (neoliberal  marketization)  and  a  short  list  of  democratic  rights  (primary
elections)” (Tully 2014, 29). In this dualistic model, self-organization is not understood
as an activity of democratic self-governance but rather as a “spontaneous” function of
57  In  the words  of  Immanuel  Kant:   “Establishing  a  state,  as  difficult  as  it  may
sound, is a problem that can be solved even for a nation of devils (if only they possess understanding). The
problem is as follows: ‘To form a group of rational beings, which, as a group, require universal laws for
their preservation, of which each member is, however, secretly inclined to make an exception of himself,
and to organize them and arrange a constitution for them in such a way that, although they strive against
each other in their private intentions, the latter check each other in such a way that the result in their
public conduct is just as if they had no such evil intentions.’ It must be possible to solve such a problem.
For it is not precisely how to attain the moral improvement of the human being that we must know, but
rather only how to use the mechanism of nature on human beings in order to direct the conflict between
their hostile intentions in a people in such a way that they compel each other to submit themselves to
coercive laws and thereby bring about the condition of peace in which laws are in force. In the case of
actually existing, however imperfectly organized states one can also observe this, in that in their external
conduct they already closely approximate what the idea of right prescribes, although an inner morality is
certainly not the cause of this conduct (and it should not be expected that a good state constitution would
arise from an inner morality,  but rather conversely that the good moral education of a people would
follow the former).  Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature, in the form of selfish inclinations,
which by their nature oppose one another even externally, as a means to make room for reason’s own end,
legal regulation, and to thereby promote and secure, insofar as it is within the power of the state to do so,
both internal and external peace.—This is the essence of the matter: Nature wills irresistibly that right
ultimately attains supreme authority”(Kant 2006, 90-91).
128
the self-regulating market as described by Hayek. As we have discussed previously in
reference  to  the  self-regulation  of  the  market,  the  primacy  of  individual  negative
freedom and market competition lays heavy constraints on democratic  freedom. The
problem is that the civil tradition does not recognize the ecological, democratic freedom
that would enable all people to participate in this process of multilayered, institutional
self-organization and adaptation. Tully discusses this problem: 
“The civil  tradition makes a fundamental  distinction between the institutional
rule of law and the citizen activities that take place within the boundaries of these
institutional  settings.  The  institutionalized  rule  of  law  exhibits  a  systemic  or
functional quality of formality and independence from the agents who are subject
to it and act within its boundaries. This picture is encapsulated in the mantra,
‘rule of law not of men’. The features of institutionalization and rationalization
that  establish the  independence of  the  rule  of  law from  the  rule  of  men and
women consist in the definite rules, procedures and training of the institutional
offices, the hierarchical, command–obedience relationships among the members,
the specialized division of labour, the separation of knowledge from use, reflexive
monitoring and the systematic application of coercion to align behaviour with
rules.  That  is,  it  is  the  non-democratic  and  procedural  character  of  the
relationships  within an institution that give it  its  formality and independence
from the informal rule of men. The language of governance is replaced by that of
administration,  management,  control,  discipline,  procedure,  direction  and
monitoring. […] The roles of humans seem to disappear” (Tully 2014, 55; emphasis
added).
Here, we are reminded of Vincent Ostrom’s critique of the monocentric order. Yet, in
contrast to Vincent, Tully sees similar problems in representative democracies based on
the civil tradition that uphold an abstract, formal and independent rule of law.  Aside
from  a  hierarchical  and  technocratic  character  of  these  social  arrangements,  it  is
important to note Tully’s conclusion that “humans seem to disappear”. I find this point
to be central because it is precisely in the name of individual negative freedom that the
civil tradition is often so fiercely defended. Yet, from Tully’s perspective, the universal
and abstract rules of property that intend to defend individual freedom simultaneously
suggest the disappearance thereof. How can this be? Similarly to Hayek’s understanding
of a dethroned democracy, political issues are delegated to experts who uphold the rule
of law and implement adequate policies to maintain the functioning of the social body.
As Capra and Mattei note, “Since its foundation by Hugo Grotius, international law has
remained  based  on  individualized  Cartesian  building  blocks  –  legal  persons  in
competition with each other within a mechanistic,  depoliticized vision of law” (Capra
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and  Mattei  2015,  117-118).  Similarly  to  Hermann  Heller’s  notion  of  authoritarian
liberalism, Capra and Mattei describe this institutional arrangement as a type of legal
absolutism. The individual is subjugated to the forces of the self-regulating open and
competitive market and is not a participant in the democratic self-organization of its
common, institutional and economic reality. The active and conscious participation in
and care for the self-organization of society is severed. Due to this democratic deficit, we
can interpret the civil tradition to be politically disempowering. Furthermore, the apathy
that results therefrom can turn into both hate towards established elites and hope for
strong (authoritarian) leaders who will “set things straight”. The tragic irony, however,
is  that  these  new  charismatic  leaders  are,  themselves,  subject  to  the  structural
constraints of the market and must often adhere to the “objective” market forces under a
new political banner.  
5.7.2. The Civic Tradition of Democracy
In contrast to this civil model, James Tully then develops an alternative understanding of
citizenship that overcomes these dualistic problems and that can be interpreted as a
democratic  theory  of  our  ecological  concept  of  freedom.  Tully  calls  this  form  of
citizenship  “civic”,  in  which  the  liberty  of  ancients  is  prioritized  over  the  liberty  of
moderns. According to Tully, a fundamental difference between these two traditions is
that while civil citizenship defines “a status within an institutional framework backed up
by world-historical processes and universal norms, the diverse [civic; LP] tradition looks
on citizenship as  negotiated practices,  as praxis – as actors and activities in contexts”
(Tully  2014,  35).  As  we see,  the civic  tradition of  democracy is  very similar  to  Axel
Honneth’s notion of social freedom. Similarly to our social and ecological interpretation
of the subject, Tully also assumes an embodied individual that brings about institutions
through its interactive relationships with others: 
 
“The  diverse  [civic;  LP]  tradition  reverses  this  modernist,  institutional
orientation and takes the orientation of citizens in civic activities in the habitats
they  are  enacted  and carried  on.  Institutionalization  is  seen  and  analysed  as
coming  into  being  in  unpredictable  and  open-ended  ways  out  of,  and  in
interaction with, the praxis of citizens – sometimes furthering, strengthening and
formalizing  these  activities  while  at  other  times  dispossessing,  channelling,
dominating, cancelling, downsizing, constraining and limiting” (Tully 2014, 35-6).
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Here, citizenship is not granted and guaranteed by states but, instead, brought about by
collective action and social freedom. In contrast to first and second-tier freedoms in the
civil tradition, 
“[t]he crucial kind of freedom is thus neither the freedom from relationships of
interdependency  (negative  freedom) nor  the  freedom  of  acting  in  conformity
with  allegedly  ideal  and  universal  legal  relationships  that  ‘we’  impose  on
ourselves (positive freedom). It is the proto-civic and civic freedom of negotiating
and democratizing in/over the always less-than-ideal relationships in which we
live and breathe and become who we are. The only guarantee of freedom and
democracy  is,  not  surprisingly,  the  daily  cooperative  practices  of  democratic
freedom in webs of relationships and on the fields of possibilities they disclose”
(Tully 2014, 52-3).
As  we  see,  civic  freedom is  thus  neither  merely  understood  as  negative  or  positive
freedom but as action in, with and against others. Furthermore, political participation is
not simply an opportunity, but rather an act of being free. Tully explains, 
“The civic citizen manifests the freedom of participation. The free citizen is free in
engaging in civic activities and, eo ipso, making these activities free. Civic freedom
is not an opportunity but a manifestation; neither freedom from nor freedom to
(which are often absent or suppressed), but freedoms of and in participation, and
with fellow citizens. The civic citizen is not the citizen of an institution (a nation
state or international law) but the free citizen of the ‘free city’: that is, any kind of
civic world or democratic ‘sphere’ that comes into being and is reciprocally held
aloft by the civic freedom of its citizens, from the smallest deme or commune to
glocal federations” (Tully 2014, 39; emphasis i.o.).  
Translated back into our terminology, civic activities are a manifestation of ecological
freedom  with,  through  and  against  the  other.  In  this  sense,  Tully’s  civic  theory  of
democracy  must  be  understood  as  inherently  participatory.  We  must,  however,  be
precise  in  defining  participation.  Firstly,  participation is  neither  to  be  limited to  the
realm  of  the  state  nor  to  be  understood  as  something  extraordinary,  as  if  political
engagement  occurs  after  work  and  in  our  free  time.  Instead,  participation  must  be
understood as basic and constitutive of our interactions. All activities are manifestations
of participation in life,  and it thus depends on everyday patterns of action that bring
about  different  relationships  and  institutions.  Or  in  other  words:  We  cannot  not
participate in life and politics; the apolitical citizen is also inherently political. Political
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participation in everyday life can thus be more or less free. And by consciously acting in
a self-organized manner, we make ourselves even freer. 
Second, and as mentioned previously, participation is not something granted, but rather
something realized through (collective) action and thus literally “en-acted”. Participation
is thus not to be limited to actions  within existing institutions (e.g. voting). Here, Tully
defines four general types of civic activities, depending on the precise field of action one
finds oneself in: (1) The range of activities available in and recognized by an existing
government; (2) a certain range or “Spielraum” of “playing the civic game differently”;
(3) the negotiation of governance relationships themselves; and (4) confrontation with
the unjustified structural limits  of the specific  field  (Tully 2014,  48-9).  In this  sense,
Tully  understands  the  processes  of  civic  action  as  the  participation  in  and
transformation of existing relationships and institutions. As Tully explains, 
“The  civic  tradition  simply  does  not  have  this  disenfranchising  disjuncture
problem.  By  starting  from  the  premise  that  any  community  subject  to  and
affected by a relationship of governance that harms a public good is for that very
reason a citizenry with the civic right to hold the responsible party accountable
through civic negotiations, it links democratic organization, networkization and
civicized institutionalization directly to the specific power relationship at issue
and at the most effective sites” (Tully 2014, 82).
The right to participate in the democratic co-determination of one’s common reality is
therefore not something that is provided for by institutions, but instead something that
is acted upon when people feel negatively affected by existing circumstances. Through
this collective action, they, in turn, alter and co-determine the social arrangements in
which they live. In this sense, Tully concludes that “to civicize governance relationships
is – eo ipso – to ‘democratize’ them” (Tully 2014, 49; emphasis added).
With this differentiation of the fields of action, we can ask ourselves to what extent this
civic tradition of democracy is to be equated with direct democracy. Firstly, it must be
clarified that this model of democratic law-making is not to be confused with a Marxist
model of direct democracy in which there is no separation of powers (Held 1987, 116).
Although separation of powers is rarely discussed in Tully’s civic model of democracy,
he does emphasize that the existence of institutionalized procedures is of fundamental
importance for the existence, stability and reproduction of democracies. Tully explains:
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“This is not to deny the importance of institutionalized procedures. It is rather to
observe that the way a person ‘grasps’ a procedural rule is not itself a procedure
but a negotiated practice. […] Both our understanding of the rule and the actual
rule itself are immanent in the negotiated practices that cannot be circumscribed.
The living rule of law is the pattern of interplay and interaction of the negotiated
practices.  This is the immanent or manifestation thesis of the civic rule of law.
The unfolding of the rule of law, no matter how institutionalized and rationalized,
is internally related to the indeterminate negotiated practices of the law. In a
word, civic citizens are ‘constructivists’” (Tully 2014, 56-7; emphasis added).
The point Tully is making here is that the separation of powers and the enforcement of
procedures is not something that societies can simply rely on,  because they,  too,  are
created through practice and subject to conflicting interpretations and negotiations. 
According  to  this  interpretation,  I  would  argue  that  Tully’s  understanding  of  an
institution  is  very  similar  to  George  Herbert  Mead’s  which  he  defines  in  his  social
behaviorist  terminology  as  “developments  within,  or  particular  and  formalized
manifestations of, the social life-process at its human evolutionary level”  (Mead 1967,
262). This interpretation of social arrangements supports the idea that the cultivation of
a  specific  ethic  manifests  itself  in  specific  social  patterns  of  actions  (e.g.  utility
maximization or an ecological care ethic). In turn, the negotiated conflict over patterns
of  action  and  social  arrangements  can  support  or  impede  the  realization  of  certain
notions of justice that are consolidated in existing institutions. As we can see, this notion
clearly contradicts the aforementioned Kantian notion of legal institutions which should
be  constructed  for  a  “nation  of  devils”.  A  few  examples  might  illustrate  this:  If,  for
example, a large majority of a people believes slavery to be legitimate, it is difficult if not
impossible to legally abolish slavery. If a people desires to eat large amounts of cheap
meat,  it  is  probably  very  difficult  to  prohibit  intensive  factory  farming.  If  a  large
percentage of a people demands the unlimited freedom to accumulate wealth, then it
will be impossible to limit accumulation. If a society believes that competition brings out
the best in us, it is highly improbable that one will be able to create a legal structure that
fosters  cooperation.  It  is  irrelevant  here,  however,  whether  the  majority  of  society
actually owns slaves or has the ability to accumulate large amounts of wealth. It might
be the case that only a small minority actually participates in such practices. But if the
belief  that  these  practices  are  morally  legitimate  and  ethically  commendable  is
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widespread, it will nevertheless be accepted that only a few people in the population are
lucky enough to pursue these activities. 
Conversely, however, this does not imply that an altruistic morality of all individuals is
necessary to create just and democratic institutions. Rules are precisely created for the
limitation of actions of  individuals  that  conflict  with existing laws.  If  everyone acted
altruistically, rules would not be necessary; if no one abided to the law, specific laws
could not be enforced and would most likely not exist in the first place. Civic activities
thus create  institutions,  which,  in  turn,  determine the  structure of  social  patterns of
action and the possibilities of future civic activities. As becomes clear, this concept of
civic  action  echoes  the  principles  of  co-creation  previously  discussed  in  our  non-
dualistic, ecological understanding of humans and nature. Here, humans are responsible
for the co-creation of their material and social reality. Or, in the words of Harry Boyte,
Elinor Ostrom and et al.: “A citizen is the co-creator of the worlds to which she or he
belongs”  (Boyte  et  al.  2014,  207).  This  is  what  Tully  means  by  an  “immanent  or
manifestation thesis” and the constructivism of the civic rule of law (Tully 2014, 57).
5.7.3. Eco-law, Commons and Commoning
Interestingly,  Tully’s  notion of  the  civic  activity  of  law-making is  very close  to  what
Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei describe as an ecological paradigm of law and commons.
For them, a shift to an ecological understanding of law can only be realized through a
“culture  and  genuine  civic  engagement”  that  “overcomes  both  hierarchy  and
competition as ‘correct’ narratives of the legal order” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 134). In
other  words,  an  ecological  conception  of  law  must  overcome  state-market  or  state-
individual  dualisms  and  be  based  on  another  conception  of  nature:  The  networked
system.  Similar  to  Tully’s  understanding  of  civic  democratic  rule  as  a  “network  of
relationships of negotiated practices” (Tully 2014, 56), Capra and Mattei also argue that
an ecological understanding of law “seeks to capture the complex relationships among
the parts and the whole – between individual entitlements, duties, rights, power, and the
law – by  using  the  metaphor  of  the  network and  of  the  open community  sharing  a
purpose” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 134).  All three authors argue that law is not to be
understood  as  a  neutral  and  objective  science  that  is  merely  constructed  and
implemented by experts and specialists, but should, instead, be understood as a craft or
practical  art  (Tully  2014,  56) and  the  “nonprofessional exercise  in  the  sharing  of
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collective meaning”  (Capra and Mattei  2015,  135;  emphasis  added).  That  being said,
Capra and Mattei go so far as to argue that in an ecological order, “the community [or
network; LP], not the individual or the state, is sovereign” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 140).
According to them, however, this does not imply that the state should whither away, but,
instead, that local and global communities and networks should possess the power to
perpetually change and adapt their legal structures according to changing circumstances
and needs. In this sense, Capra and Mattei write, 
“Likewise, the new ecolegal order must allow collective agency to emerge […],
reclaiming  the  law  as  a  collective  tool  of  political  transformation.  Such
participatory decision making, both political and economic, is a crucial aspect of
the need to put the legal system at the center of, not the individual physical or
legal person, but the ‘whole’ – communities, networks, qualitative dimensions of
relationships,  with  direct  access  to  and  stewardship  of  knowledge,  law,  and
resources” (ibid., 164).
The state and its monopoly of power to enforce laws does not disappear, therefore, but
is “reclaimed” and democratized through civic activities. 
While Capra and Mattei place the term of community at the center of their theory, the
concept  of  community  is  not  to  be  limited  to  a  local  geographical  unit.  Due  to  this
misunderstanding,  Elinor Ostrom’s cases have often been criticized for requiring too
high levels of homogeneity and for therefore being very limited in their scale. In contrast
to  a  close-knit  notion,  the  concept  of  community  developed  here  should  rather  be
understood as networks of people pursuing common (or conflicting) interests on local,
regional or global levels. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that all communities are
situated in local contexts – and in nature (Capra and Mattei 2015, 164). The concept of a
networked community thus rejects the nature-culture divide and always understands
itself as a form of collective action within specific socially co-constructed landscapes and
environments.  This  contextualization,  however,  does  not  impede  people  from
connecting with others on the other side of the world. The main point is the pursuit of
similar  goals  and  the  exchange  of  information  and  resources,  be  that  local  farmers
developing an international seed bank or the international effort to protect local water
resources  from  privatization.  For  this  reason,  James  Tully  calls  this  local-global
networking  “‘glocalization’  and  the  networkers  ‘glocal  citizens’  because  they  are
grounded in and hyperextend the civic features of local citizenship”  (Tully 2014, 73).
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The “glocal” community is thus not simply to be understood as a “higher” cosmopolitan
order but as a network of people that are engaged in concrete practices and conflicts
that take place on the ground of and within specific social systems (Tully 2008b, 84). If
higher levels of coordination and regulation are realized, then it most likely will be in the
form of democratic network governance by those most affected people. These networks
would then be the  arenas  of  negotiation and would provide the  “foundations for  an
international legal order based on independent, legally organized commons” (Capra and
Mattei 2015, 144).58 
That being said, Capra and Mattei acknowledge that communities can either be “giving,
hospitable,  and open to guests” or can be “selfish,  closed and bigoted” (ibid.,  164).59
However,  the  recognition  of  the  interdependence  of  living  beings  underlying  this
ecological legal paradigm should – at least theoretically – provide a basis for a care ethic
which cultivate such inclusive values. In this sense, Capra and Mattei argue that such
ecological  communities  are  “never  closed”  (ibid.,  164).  With  reference  to  the  self-
organizing principles of organisms, they also state that communities “depend on energy
and  nutrients  from  their  environment,  and  on  occasional  disturbances  for  their
evolution” (ibid., 164). The question whether such communities are inherently open or
closed is a highly complex and often ethically delicate issue. With reference to limited,
rival goods, I would argue with Elinor Ostrom that complete openness is problematic if
people aim to effectively deal with free-riding and the overuse of resources. This could
be  understood  as  an  inherent  inner  and  outer  boundary  of  commons,  and  it
distinguishes  an  open-access  common  with  a  rigid  and  unregulated  institutional
framework  from  democratically  regulated  commons  arrangements.  Here,  I  would
maintain  that  resources  should  remain  closed  to  people  pursuing  maximization  and
privatization strategies.  This  would then,  for example,  place the rights of  indigenous
people to resources over those of colonists and corporations  (Weis 2015). Conversely
58  For a more detailed discussion of  how such a legal  framework for commons
would look like, see Weston and Bollier’s  Green Governance: Ecological Survival, Human Rights, and the
Law of the Commons (2013).
59  Jeremy  Waldron,  for  example,  argues  similarly  in  his  article  Community  and
Property – For Those Who Have Neither (2009): “Although ‘community’ can sound like a warm, inclusive
word,  real-world  communities  (be  they  nations,  municipalities,  neighborhoods,  or  clusters  of
condominiums) characteristically define themselves by reference to an array of excluded "others" and
erect fences and patrol borders to keep these others out” (Waldron 2009, 189).  Although I would agree
with Waldron that real-world communities are often exclusionary, I would contest that they always are or
that the principle of exclusion is an inherent principle thereof. The arrangement of a community depends
on  a  shared  ethic,  whether  inclusionary  or  exclusionary,  and,  in  more  formal  cases,  on  a  specific
constitution that structures its openness and closed-ness.
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and in line with Elinor Ostrom’s 3rd design principle60, I would, however, also argue that
the inclusion of “others” is based on the general right of affected people to access vital
resources and to co-determine the institutions that govern these resources. Aside from
local  residents,  this  could  or  rather  should  also  include,  for  example,  refugees,
immigrants, transients or homeless people who are in need of aid for their survival and
are dependent on hospitality (Waldron 2009).61 
While the principle of affectedness is one way to determine the inclusion into a specific
networked  community,  another  –  and  possibly  more  straightforward  –  means  of
community formation is the pursuit of common interests and common goods. For Tully,
this provides a people with both a common purpose for their civic activities and an ethos
of caring. In Tully’s words:
“A civic  activity also has another important  aspect,  the telos or good towards
which the activity is oriented and which the activity upholds and manifests. It
gives the activity its civic character or ethos. A civic telos is thus a ‘civic good’.
Modern citizenship is ‘egocentric’, oriented towards the protection of the liberty
of  individuals  to  be  free  from  interference  and  to  be  free  to  exercise  their
autonomy in the private sphere (tier-one rights) or in the official public sphere
(tier-two  rights).  In  contrast,  diverse  citizenship  in  both  citizen  and
governance/citizen  relationships  is  ecocentric  and  human-centric  (or
relationship-centric in both cases). Civic activities are oriented towards  caring
for the public or ‘civic goods’ of the correlative ‘city’: namely, the community and
its members bound together by citizen/governance and citizen relationships in
interdependency  relationships  with  nonhuman  animals  and  the  environment
they bear as inhabitants of the natural habitat” (Tully 2014, 64).
While  Tully  speaks  of  civic  common  goods,  Capra  and  Mattei  explicitly  speak  of
commons. Nevertheless,  by placing common purposes and commons at the center of
their theories of civic democracy and eco-law, the authors break with the tradition of
“deontological  liberalism”  (Sandel  1986) as  propagated by Immanuel  Kant  and  John
Rawls  (Rawls 1988). According to Michael Sandel, deontological liberalism assumes a
plurality of conflicting individual conceptions of the good and therefore places the right
60  Elinor  Ostrom  defines  the  third  design  principle  in  her  book  Governing  the
Commons in the following manner: “3. Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules” (Ostrom 2008a, 90).
61  This is ,  for example,  in contrast  to “expats”,  who are not in such a destitute
situation. Obviously, “affectedness”, “vital resources” and thus inclusion are highly contested concepts and
can therefore not be determined in abstraction or in advance, but are defined in the practices of civic
collective action and negotiation.
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(the law) over the good (a specific notion of the good life).62 While Kant argues that the
right should be attained through the use of one’s transcendental reasoning and finally
through  contract,  Rawls  maintains  that  the  right  can  be  defined  in  the  thought
experiment of the veil  of ignorance and in an overlapping consensus. Instead, in this
civic tradition and eco-legal paradigm, the civic good is understood as an inherent part
of all institutions and communities. Justice is brought about not merely through reason
and contract, but, first and foremost, through pre-contractual collective practices. 
According  to  Tully,  these  common  goods  are  “multiplex”  and  “subject  to  ongoing
democratic  negotiation”  (Tully  2014,  64).  For  him,  they  include  diverse  democratic
goods such as civicizing relationships, character development and conviviality and more
substantive goods such as “caring for the environment, economic self-reliance, mutual
aid, fair trade, equality among citizens and so on” (Tully 2014, 64).  While Tully’s list of
these goods remains somewhat general and vague, Capra and Mattei step back and claim
that  law itself  must  be understood as a common (Capra and Mattei  2015,  160)  that
results  from collective  action  or  “commoning”.  They explain  that  “[L]aw is  always a
process of ‘commoning,’ a long-term collective action in which communities, sharing a
common purpose and culture, institutionalize their collective will to maintain order and
stability in the pursuit of social reproduction” (ibid., 14). Here, the civizicing activities as
described by Tully can be equated with what Capra and Mattei refer to as commoning.
According to Capra and Mattei, the “fundamental organizational principle of commoning
everywhere  is  that  of  caring,  duty,  reciprocity,  and  participation”  (ibid.,  156).
Commoning thus implies the process of collectively bringing about common goods in a
manner that ensures the future reproduction of the good. This is ensured through the
inclusion  of  those  affected  people  in  both  the  definition  and  adaptation  of  its
institutional framework on the one hand and in the fair use and enjoyment of its benefits
on the other. 
62  Sandel explains, “society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his
own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that
do  not  themselves  presuppose  any particular  conception  of  the  good;  what  justifies  these  regulative
principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or otherwise promote the good, but rather
that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and independent of it”
(Sandel 1986, 1).
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So, what precisely are commons, based on this notion of civic collective action? It should
be clear that this dynamic and process-oriented interpretation of commons goes beyond
the definition of commons as presented by the Ostroms and other political economists. If
we look back, commons are limited to common-pool resources which describe goods
that are rival and where the exclusion of others is difficult (i.e. costly) in the classical,
politico-economic  definition.  As  we  have  already  argued,  these  resources  could,
however,  be  organized  as  national,  private  or  common  property  –  each  with  their
diverse  institutional  arrangements.  An  important  insight  we  derived  from  that
discussion was the fact that something that is held in common cannot be derived from
the  objective  descriptive  characteristics  of  an  entity.  Instead,  the  question  whether
something should be held in common or not is therefore not merely a question of an
entity’s  characteristics  but  depends  on  the  social  institutions  that  constitute  it.  The
characteristics of a good are, first and foremost, a question of whether people want to
hold a specific good in common. In this sense, commons can be understood as a triadic
relationship between resources, communities and norms/rules (Helfrich et al. 2010, 10).
Nevertheless, this shift from the objective description of a good to social relationships
and institutions remains dualistic and neglects the dynamic process of co-creation of
reality through commoning. The existence of a common is thus not merely a descriptive
or normative  question, but, more importantly, a question of social  practice. Capra and
Mattei therefore emphasize that the activity of making something a common good can
therefore not be separated from specific resources and goods (Capra and Mattei 2015,
153). Or, as historian Peter Linebaugh explains in this often-quoted citation:  
“To speak of the commons as if it were a [pre-existing; LP] natural resource is
misleading at best and dangerous at worst – the commons is an activity and, if
anything, it expresses relationships in society that are inseparable from relations
to nature. It might be better to keep the word as a verb, an activity, rather than as
a noun, a substantive” (Linebaugh 2008, 255).
We must thus conclude that our previous question is somewhat misleading. We cannot
simply say what commons  are. That would assume that commons are objective things
that  exist  independently  from  people.  Such  an  understanding  of  commons  would
substantivize the concept and neglect both the normative and performative characters
of  commoning  as  a  “vital  determinant”  of  commons  (Euler  2018).  In  this  sense,
commons scholar and activist  Silke Helfrich states that  “common goods don’t  simply
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exist – they are created” (Helfrich 2012a).  Hence, commons cannot be limited to what is
traditionally  known  as  common  pool  resources,  but  must  be  understood  as  a  civic
activity  of  self-organizing or commoning that  both brings  common goods about  and
democratizes their  institutional  frameworks.  Commoning thus  recognizes our shared
reality as a common and enables people to care for their own well-being and the well-
being of others according to the ecological principles of freedom. 
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6. Towards a Commons Theory of Property
After having laid the foundations for an ecological understanding of freedom and some
preliminary remarks on a more profound notion of commons, I believe it is necessary to
turn to a  central  question that  has  not  yet  been discussed in  this  investigation:  The
question of what a commons theory of property could look like. Generally put, this is of
central importance because it would enable us to develop an understanding of property
rights  that  is  not  based  on  exclusion,  dominion  and  scarcity,  but  rather  on  access,
democratic guardianship and relative, convivial abundance.   
In order to develop such a theory, I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will critically reflect
the normative language of goods with reference to categorization of goods in the work of
the Ostroms.  In a second step, I will present a general argument for common property
arrangements,  based  on  the  acknowledgement  of  common  needs  and  the
interdependent and conflictual  satisfaction of  these needs in  shared resources.  After
these  two  introductory  sections,  I  will  turn  to  John Locke’s  famous  labor  theory  of
private property and critically reinterpret it from a commons perspective. Here, I will
argue that we must shift our justification of property in three respects: firstly, we must
replace  property  arrangements  based  on  (self-)ownership  with  those  structured
according to guardianship. Secondly, I argue that the negative rights of non-interference
must be substituted with the notion of non-domination.  Lastly,  I  demonstrate that  a
commons theory of property must be based not the special rights of individual labor but
more importantly on the general rights of interdependet needs. With this groundwork, I
will  then  critically  discuss  John  Rawls’  influential  theory  of  a  property-owning
democracy. Here, I will argue that Rawls’ notion of predistribution provides us with a
better understanding of positive access rights to resources, but must shift its focus from
productive capital to the caring for material resources held in common. In a final step, I
will  shift  my  focus  from  so-called  productive  resources  to  consumption  goods  and
maintain  that  certain  consumptive  goods  also  should  be  organized  in  the  form  of
common  property.  Here,  I  will  show  that  shared  consumptive  goods  both  decrease
detrimental ecological impacts and simultaneously expand the access to goods for more
people. Ultimately, this implies an increase in individual freedom, relative abundance
and convivial modes of living. 
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6.1. The Normative Language of Goods 
In order to explore and develop a commons theory of property, I would like to push the
previous argument on commoning a bit further by focusing on the civic activity of self-
organization from a linguistic perspective. As we have already discussed in relation to
our understanding of nature, the way we describe and categorize things constitutes or
co-creates reality. In this sense, language is never neutral and should therefore also be
understood as a political act. This implies that the praxeological turn in understanding
commons,  in  the  form  of  commoning,  must  also  be  understood  as  a  linguistic  turn,
whereby speaking constitutes  merely  one form of  social  praxis  (Austin 2009,  Searle
2005).  With  reference  to  our  discussion  of  commons,  this  implies  that  the  way  we
describe goods also frames their constitution and normative desirability in the symbolic
order  of  things.  In  our  analysis  of  the  Ostroms’  work,  we  have  already  seen  how
common-pool resources are defined according to their relatively high costs of exclusion.
In  our  following  discussion  on  nature  and  ecological  freedom,  we  concluded  that
commons are never simply given, but are always created through civic activities of self-
organization  or  commoning.  I  would  now  like  to  return  to  and  critically  reflect  the
classical  political  and  economic  categorization  of  goods  according  to  the  terms
“exclusion”, “subtraction” and “rivalry” more thoroughly.
Although Elinor and Vincent Ostrom also used the term “joint-use” (Ostrom and Ostrom
1977), it can generally be said that the mainstream political and economic discourse on
goods and property revolves around the categories of exclusion, subtraction and rivalry.
Interestingly,  all  three  terms  have  a  certain  negative  connotation  that  assume  and
emphasize the conflictual reality of goods, implying that one person’s enjoyment of a
good is often interrupted or threatened by other people. This negative connotation, in
turn,  provides  a  more  general  normative  and  political  framework  of  goods:  Where
exclusion “unfortunately” is not possible, people must either arduously organize these
goods  in  complex  common  property  arrangements,  or  –  and  even  worse  –  let  the
centralized state manage them. Thus, implicit in this categorization is the assumption
that we would actually prefer to possess these goods privately and enjoy them without
being  bothered  by  other  people.  Or  put  somewhat  more  radically,  the  underlying
principle of this categorization is – in the words of Sartre – that “hell is other people”
(Sartre 1989, 45). 
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This is not to say that everyone with private property hates his or her neighbors, but
rather  that  a  deep  fear  of  other  people  is  an  axiomatic  basis  of  individual  private
property and our understanding of goods in general. As we see, by framing goods in this
manner, humans are assumed to exist in inherently antagonistic relationships.  Yet in
this  case,  the  fact  that  humans are  each other’s  enemies  lies  not  merely in  people’s
“nature” but is also reproduced in the way we perceive goods. By framing goods in this
manner, the antagonistic relation between people is naturalized – and the supposedly
best answer to this problem is, obviously, the exclusion of others through negative rights
and  individual  private  property.  By  shutting  the  other  out  –  and  oneself  in  –,  the
individual  is,  thus,  apparently  freed  from  unwanted  interferences,  burdensome
responsibilities and conflict. Only from this “original position” of negative freedom based
on a supposed material independence can positive freedom be attained by then entering
into  relationships  according  to  the  needs  and  desires  that  spring  entirely  from  the
independent  self.  As  we  can  see,  this  deeply  rooted  understanding  of  independent
antagonistic individuals and highly contested goods goes against our understanding of
ecological  freedom which is  based on the mutual  interdependence of  self-organizing
living beings that inherently share a common reality. Thus, in order to create a system of
democratic eco-law based on commons, we must also reformulate our categorization of
goods,  which,  in  turn,  should  transform  our  normative  framework  of  social
arrangements. 
For this reason, I would argue that we must shift our focus when discussing goods from
exclusion to inclusion, from subtraction to sustainability or addition and, finally, from
rivalry  to  (negotiated)  cooperation.  If  we change the  categorization of  goods in  this
manner,  the  normative  question  that  implicitly  underlies  the  social  organization  of
goods  is  then  no  longer  how  to  limit  the  consumption  of  goods  through  exclusion.
Instead, the normative question regarding a good would be: Which goods produce better
joint outcomes when shared,  and can they be sustainably reproduced or,  if  possible,
increased  in  number  through  (negotiated)  cooperation?  It  can  be  assumed  that  the
categorization of goods in this manner would flip the supposed tragedy of the commons
on its head by defining not the (unregulated) commons, but privatization as the problem
at hand. In turn, this might provide us with a normative linguistic framework that would
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value inclusive, sustainable and additive forms of social arrangements over those based
on unlimited individual appropriation.  
We must ask ourselves, however, if this replacement of categories is merely a sleight of
hand that ignores the “actual” characteristics of goods. In order to answer this question,
let us turn to some examples in order to illustrate what I am implying here. As we have
already  discussed,  the  question  of  exclusion  is  not  dependent  on  the  ontological
characteristics  of  a  good,  but  rather on the economic,  technological  and institutional
context that makes exclusion possible or not. Thus, the ability to exclude people from a
good  is  not  inscribed  in  the  good  itself,  but  is  determined  by social  conditions  and
norms. With subtraction and rivalry, the issue appears a little less straightforward. The
standard argument assumes that a good is rival or non-rival depending on whether its
future use is decreased when utilized or consumed. The classical examples here are food
and information. If I eat an apple, the other person cannot eat the same apple because it
is gone. If I use a piece of information (e.g. a recipe, a book from a library or an article
from a newspaper or in the Internet), the quality of the good is not diminished and thus
can  be  used  by  another  person.  In  more  abstract  terms,  while  food  is  normally
understood as subtractive and thus rival and scarce, information is generally understood
as  non-subtractive  and  therefore  non-rival.  Due  to  this  categorization,  food  is  then
classified as a private good and information as a public good, or it is assumed, at least,
that these goods should be classified in this manner (e.g. Stiglitz 1999).
As was the case with excludability in relation to common-pool resources, we can also
think  of  other  ways  of  perceiving  and  organizing  such  goods.  With  reference  to
information, diverse examples quickly come to mind where information is not always
structured as an open-access public good. For example, scientific information that was,
at least in many cases, paid for with public funds is often stored in expensive, private
academic journals. We will discuss this problem in relation to the education commons in
the  next  chapter.  Printed  newspaper  articles  can  also  often  only  be  accessed  if  the
newspaper is paid for and therefore privately appropriated. By socially organizing this
information as private goods, it is made scarce and rival, despite its supposed inherently
non-rival character. 
However, the case with apples is a little more complicated. It is true, obviously, that my
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consumption of an apple would prevent another person from consuming it. In this sense
it could be argued that apples are subtractive and rival goods. But to then assume, as
John Locke did  (Locke 2008,  II,  5,  §26), that the apple  must be a private good is not
necessarily given. We will  return to Locke later,  but his  focus on subtraction merely
emphasizes one way of using a specific good. There are, for instance, other ways of using
an apple that enable or even increase the usability for others: This is the case if I merely
take a photo of it (neutral use) or share it with someone else (inclusive, non-additive
use) or use its seeds to plant apple trees (inclusive,  sustainable/additive use)  (Euler
unpublished). These three uses demonstrate how an apple can be used in non-exclusive
and non-subtractive ways that support interdependent relationships of inclusion and
cooperation. Furthermore, by focusing on the individual subtraction of an apple through
consumption, two central questions are ignored: (a) Whether other people have access
to other apples and (b) how the apples came into existence in the first place.  If,  for
example, there are piles of fresh and juicy apples for a group of people to eat, the fact
that I consume one or even a few apples does not make apples per se scarce and rival.
Alternatively, if apple trees were cultivated by a group of people who then divided them
up fairly63  between themselves year after year, the quantity of apples might be limited,
but  not  necessarily  rival  and  scarce.  In  this  case  we might  even consider  a  relative
abundance of apples to exist because the group is satisfied with the number of apples
available to it and the consumption of apples by another person does not threaten its
access  to  apples  due  to  the  acknowledged  limitation  of  everyone’s  appropriation.
Philosopher Jeff Noonan discusses this notion of relative abundance in relation to the
conflict  of  use  and  appropriation  rights  between  Native  and  white  fishers  in  New
Brunswick, Canada:  
“Conflict [over the lobster fishery; LP] is only likely to be resolved if both sides to
the dispute interpret ‘abundance’ in such a way that they can agree that there is
enough  of  the  resource  to  share  without  any  group  feeling  deprived.  This
conclusion  cannot  be  reached  if  either  side  looks  at  the  logic  of  resource
appropriation  as  governed  by  the  value  of  profit  maximization,  since  by
definition the growth of profit has no ‘natural’ limit and anyone driven by that
value will see any restriction upon that logic as a personal or group deprivation”
(Noonan 2004, 191-2). 
63  The fair distribution of these goods must not imply that they are distributed
equally, but rather, as for example, according to effort,  need or other values that the people define as
important.
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Here,  we  are  reminded  of  Elinor  Ostrom’s  work  on  the  democratic  governance  of
commons  in  which  it  is  stated  that  the  limitation  of  appropriation  can  enable  the
sustainable  use  and  reproduction  of  resources  over  long  periods  of  time.  This  also
requires, in turn, a shift from the profit motive and unlimited wants to a mindset based
on  needs  satisfaction  and  sufficiency  or,  put  more  succinctly,  from  having  to  being
(Fromm 1997). Considered in this manner, relative abundance and non-rivalry would be
possible for subtractive goods under the condition of a materially limited reality (Sahlins
1972, 1-39, G.A. Cohen 1995, 128). In this sense, we can agree with Hardin that scarcity
and rivalry arises through an unregulated, unlimited and, thus, unfair increase of use of
a certain good. Consequently, scarcity is not an intrinsic condition of nature and rivalry
is not an inherent characteristic of subtractive goods, but rather depends on the way we
perceive and thereby institutionally structure them. 
In order to understand this important insight, we will avoid confusion by differentiating
between goods, their production and their institutional arrangements. In the case of the
apple, we have the apple, the apple tree and many other factors that are necessary for
the growth of the apple, such as a plot of land, air and water. With the findings of Elinor
Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, we can therefore differentiate between the flow of resources
(e.g. apples) and the resource unit (e.g. the apple tree, the orchard and the ecosystem)
(Ostrom and Hess 2007, 10). Along those same lines, we can also differentiate between
goods used for production (e.g. the apple tree, fishery, machines, capital) and goods used
for consumption (the apple, fish, pasta, clothes or wages) (Held 1995, 263). In general,
we could therefore say that while the consumption of a good (e.g. chewing and digesting
an apple) is often individual (i.e. private), neither the (re)production, the appropriation
nor the allocation of that good must necessarily be organized privately. The question
that then arises is that of which type of social organization in which goods are more
conducive  to  the  values  of  inclusion,  sustainability  and  addition.  Because  it  can  be
assumed  that  a  fair  distribution  of  goods  could  create  a  sustainable  and  relative
abundance  of  limited  goods,  it  would  be  of  utmost  importance  that  the  individuals
dependent on specific resources have the possibility to negotiate and co-determine the
social arrangement thereof (Knight and Johnson 2007). In line with the insights gained
from the Ostroms’ work, we may thus conclude that democratic negotiated cooperation
and  self-organization  are  the  key  counterparts  to  scarcity,  rivalry  and,  ultimately,
tragedy.  And  because  the  ability  to  co-determine  the  institutional  framework would
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imply  access,  inclusion  and  democratic  participation  rights,  it  can  be  argued  that  a
property regime based on commons, understood as diverse forms of common property
arrangements, could possibly fulfill this purpose best. 
6.2. Common Needs, Common Resources and Common Property
Similarly,  Capra  and  Mattei  argue  in  favor  of  a  shift  in  our  legal  framework  from
extractive to more sustainable and “generative” property rights based on commons and
commoning (Capra and Mattei 2015, 145-6, Kelly 2012). In a nutshell, they contend that
for most of human history resources were held in common and only in recent history of
humankind has a legal system based on abstract and universal private property rights
emerged  that  enables  the  unlimited  accumulation  of  capital  through  private
appropriation.  Although this  legal  transformation has provided a  part  of  the  world’s
population  with  increased  living  standards  and  technological  advances,  it  has  also
brought  with  it  diverse  and  grave  ecological,  social  and  political  problems.  For  this
reason, Capra and Mattei write that “[h]armonizing human laws with the principles of
ecology requires,  at  a  minimum, the  development  of  a  healthy and legally  protected
commons sector and associated institutions” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 152). In order to
do this, they argue that it is necessary to transform existing forms of property that are
structured  around  the  individual  to  one  that  is  structured  around  interdependent
situations and the shared reality of the community. In the words of Capra and Mattei:
“A radical revision of property and of its relationship with state sovereignty is
thus necessary if we wish to transform capital back into commons and build an
ecological  order.  Such  an  alternative  begins  with  the  understanding  that  a
community  lives  and  unfolds  in  a  common  space  where  the  actions  of  one
member affect the well-being of all others. Such a space is the venue of life and
death for a community and it must serve the interest of every one of its members,
regenerating life in it” (ibid., 139).
This  shared,  common reality  thus  provides  the  backdrop for  the  understanding that
humans – and most, if not all, living beings – possess common needs and desires, such as
the desire to be loved and respected, the need to eat,  the desire to live well and the
desire to develop one’s capabilities and to co-determine (i.e. self-organize) one’s reality.
Obviously,  this is no exhaustive list  of  human needs,  but it  does assume that certain
needs and desires are common to all sentient beings. This is not to say, however, that the
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specific form of need satisfaction is the same for all beings, but that it varies according to
species, culture and technological development. On the other hand, instead of assuming
conflicting interests and goals as the axiomatic foundation of social arrangements, the
ecological  approach  to  property  therefore  emphasizes  interdependencies  and  the
similarity of fundamental needs and desires. From this perspective, it can be argued that
primary similarity of needs that then leads to conflicts  of  interest.  Jeff  Noonan aptly
expresses this idea: 
“Beneath differences in the content of cultures, there is, I will argue, a shared –
indeed universal  –  human need for  a  ‘social  habitat,’  that  is,  a  resource  base
through the use of which goods are produced that in turn sustain the practical
and symbolic particularities of the culture. […] The uniqueness of a culture is a
content that is produced by universal forms of human activity. The evidence for
the position is provided precisely by the struggles between different [individuals
and; LP] cultures for the  same resources. If cultures were radically distinct and
discrete wholes they would never come into conflict because there would be no
common needs between them, and there would therefore be nothing to struggle
about” (Noonan 2004, 186; emphasis i.o.). 
As  we  can  see,  beneath  the  conflicts  between  people  lies  not  completely  diverging
interests, but rather common needs that are, in turn, co-dependent on the use of shared
resources.  However,  because  all  living  beings  exist  in  webs  of  interdependent
relationships, the satisfaction of one’s needs is highly affected by the manner in which
other  people  satisfy  their  needs.  Due  to  these  existential  interdependencies,  it  is
consequently necessary to hold those resources for the satisfaction of such common
needs in common. 
Conversely, behind this reasoning lies the assumption that, if individuals can privately
appropriate these vital resources, then the ability of others to satisfy their basic needs
will be limited. Shortly put, their abilities to survive, self-organize and flourish will be
undermined. Here, it is noteworthy to point out that the word “private” etymologically
comes from the Latin word privare, to deprive, bereave or rob (Onions 1966, 711, Glare
2012, 1607-8). This root meaning of the word private thus supports the interpretation
that  private  individual  property  is  something  that  is  taken  from  the  shared  reality
commons. The individual appropriation of vital resources thus implies that the possible
use  of  these  resources  by  other  people  is  severed  –  and,  simultaneously,  the
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responsibility  and  obligations  towards  other  beings  is  dissolved.64 Private  property
therefore turns the relationship of duties on its head: The responsibility does not lie
with the owner and towards the community, but rather in the duty of those excluded
from the resource to respect the rights of the owner. In the words of Jeremy Waldron: 
“Material  resources are crucial  to  our  survival  and elementary aspects  of  our
wellbeing. In the circumstances of moderate scarcity [and thus possible relative
abundance; LP] that we must assume, it is perfectly possible that the uses that are
blocked by the duties correlative to property rights are uses that relate to human
need, not just covetous desire” (Waldron 2009, 165). 
Despite the existence of common needs in a shared reality commons, private property in
material resources thus enables people to exclude others from its use, ultimately placing
the burden of duty on the community to respect the ownership rights of the individual –
and  not  on  the  individual  to  care  for  the  wellbeing  of  the  community.  With  this
inversion,  the  notion  of  care  and  responsibility,  as  was  previously  elaborated,  is
individualized, implying that each individual is responsible for the satisfaction of his or
her own needs. Although we cannot deny the importance of individual responsibility for
one’s  own  wellbeing,  this  entirely  individualized  notion  of  care  based  on  private
property brings about an atomistic  and competitive arrangement that  reminds us of
Hardin’s  tragedy of  the  unmanaged commons.  Tragedy results  because no  one feels
responsible for the needs satisfaction of each member of the community nor that they
are institutionally capable of caring for the shared, common resources.
64  Although some might argue that private property is entrenched with duties of
owners towards society (e.g.  I  cannot drive  my car on the sidewalk or faster than 120 km/h on the
highway), I would agree with Jeremy Waldron that we must understand these restrictions not as duties
but rather as “general  background constraints”.  He writes,  “[T]he rule  that knives are not to be used
murderously nor cars driven at a certain speed are not to be seen as property rules. They are part of the
general  background constraints on action which place limits on what anyone can do with any object
whether it is his property – or something he has some sort of entitlement to use – or not. Once we have
settled what the background rules of action are, we can then turn to the property rules. If a particular
action, say, riding bicycles, is permitted by law, it does not follow that the law permits me to ride any
bicycle I please. The specific function of property rules is to determine, once we have established that
bicycles may be ridden, who is entitled to ride which bicycle and when”  (Waldron 1988, 32-33). Aside
from these background constraints, the institution of private property requires that individuals fulfill one
central duty regarding others: The respect of other people’s private property and, in turn, the fulfillment
of contracts. This reciprocity might be understood as a form of mutual obligation and, thus, care. Yet due
to the central principle of exclusion from and non-interference in private property, it ultimately and, at
least in principle, liberates the individual of further obligations in relation to the needs satisfaction and
wellbeing of other beings. I believe this to be one of Robert Nozick’s central arguments in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia (1999).
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A widespread argument against this rather critical interpretation of individual private
property is that ownership is not a unified concept, but rather consists of a “bundle of
rights” (Grey 1980, Glackin 2014). This bundles-theory interpretation of property must
be  understood  as  a  critique  of  the  standard  interpretation  of  William  Blackstone’s
(1723-1780)  famous  definition  in  which  private  property  is  “that  sole  and  despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”  (Blackstone 2016,
1).65 Contrary  to  this  Blackstonian  notion  of  private  property  as  “individualistic,
exclusive and absolute dominion” (Schorr 2009, 104), the bundles of rights theories, as,
for example, presented by Wesley N. Hohfeld  (1913) and A.M. Honoré  (Honoré 2015),
define ownership rights as a collection of diverse and independent rights (Penner 1996,
Glackin  2014,  3).  Importantly,  and  as  Shane  N.  Glackin  states,  “[t]he  bundle  theory
regards  these  individual  and  separable  rights,  or  ‘sticks,’  as  having  no  substantive,
essential connection to each other” (ibid., 4). In this sense, the notion of private property
is not constituted by any intrinsic characteristics of the relationship between individuals
and things, but rather through contingent combinations of the relevant “sticks” between
people. This basically implies that prevalent notions of private property are not based
on  transcendental  or  natural  laws,  but  that  they  are  historical  products  of  existing
societies. At this point it must be admitted that a deconstruction of individual private
property  into  its  diverse  components  is  remarkably  helpful  to  “demystify”  (ibid.,  3)
widespread notions of  property and understand the complex relationships of access,
management,  use,  exclusion  and  alienation  of  resources.  Elinor  Ostrom  and  Edella
Schlager, for example, use the bundle-of-rights theory in order to analyze the diverse
arrangements  in  “common-property  resources”  (Schlager  and  Ostrom  1992).  This
strategy can open the field to a less ideologically charged debate over the pros and cons
of diverse property arrangements, whether individual, common or public. 
Nevertheless, I would argue with Henry E. Smith that the bundle theory is problematic
because it can cover up normative questions of property arrangements by focusing on
the how instead of on the why (Smith 2011, 281). Furthermore, the analytic “realism” of
the bundle-of-right theories conceals the fact that individual private property does have
a  dominant,  central  meaning  in  modern  Western  societies  that  is  employed  either
65  As recent work has shown, however, even Blackstone himself did not support
this rather monolithic notion of individual private property (Schorr 2009).
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simply as a cognitive shortcut in order to simplify complex legal relationships or, and
more importantly, as a normative justification of existing social arrangements. As has
already been mentioned  previously  and in  line  with  the  arguments  of  Henry Smith,
Jeremy Waldron and Richard Epstein, a central function of individual private property is
defined  as  exclusion  or  non-interference.66 Although  Jeremy  Waldron  also  defines
exclusion  as  the  “key  to  private  property”  (Waldron  2009,  164),  he  elaborates  “in
Hohfeldian terms” on a few other important aspects of private ownership: 
“To justify private property is  to  justify  conferring,  recognizing,  and enforcing
certain  individual  rights  over  material  resources.  An  individual  X’s  rights  of
ownership in relation to some land, Lx, usually are comprised of such elements as
(R1) the right to use Lx, (R2) the right to exclude others from the use of Lx, and
(R3) the power to transfer some or all of these rights to others by way of gift, sale,
lease or bequest” (ibid.). 
 
Here, we see two additional key aspects of individual private property that result from
exclusion:  The  right  to  use  and  to  alienate  (i.e.  trade)  resources.  Implicit  in  this
definition is also the right to accumulate, underuse or destroy resources. The exclusion
of the other provides the owner with the freedom to do what they please with a good
within  certain  “general  background  constraints”  (Waldron 1988,  32).67  Along  these
lines, in his book The Right to Private Property (1988), Jeremy Waldron further defines
ownership as 
 “the abstract idea of an object being correlated with the name of some individual,
in relation to a rule which says that society will uphold that individual's decision
as final  when there is any dispute  about how the object  should be used.  The
owner of an object is the person who has been put in that privileged position”
(Waldron 1988, 47).  
66  Henry Smith writes, for example, “The architecture of property emerges from
solving  the  problem  of  serving  use-interests  in  a  roughly  cost-effective  way.  […]  At  the  core  of  this
architecture is exclusion because it is a default, a convenient starting point” (Smith 2011, 282) In Richard
Epstein’s book  Design for Liberty (2011),  he writes,  “The choice of a  sound property ‘baseline’  in the
original position is not random. […] The central proposition is this: the only set of substantive rules that
achieves that goal is one that requires all persons to forbear from interfering with the property rights of
any other person, where ‘interfering’ is narrowly defined to involve taking, using, handlung, or breaking
the property of another” (Epstein 2011a, 74).
67  For an elaboration on the notion of these “general background constraints”, see
footnote 64.
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As  we  see,  individual  private  property  implies  the  right  to  exclude  others  from the
determination of how resources will be used and allocated. Here, the individual owner
has the right to determine the access and use of material resources for the satisfaction of
shared individual needs. Thus, a central aspect of individual private property over goods
is to place the owner’s decision-making power and needs satisfaction over that of other
members of the community. 
As  has  already  been  mentioned  with  reference  to  the  tragedy  of  privatization,  the
emphasis on exclusion and non-interference in individual private property rights makes
it difficult to alter property arrangements in order to align them with the shared yet
conflicting needs of other human and non-human beings. Thus, I would agree with Capra
and Mattei that only by holding these vital resources in common can the use of these
resources be negotiated over and, hopefully, the needs of all be satisfied. Put in these
terms,  the  central  justification  of  commons  must  be  understood  as  an  ecological
(re)interpretation  of  the  basic  right  to  life  and liberty  or,  in  our  terminology,  to  an
interdependent,  sustainable,  self-organized  and  flourishing  existence  (Alexander  and
Penalver 2009). According to Capra and Mattei, it is this ecological reasoning that has
brought commons into existence throughout human history: 
“Ancient  institutions  of  the  commons  that  provide  communities  with  water,
wood, agricultural products, education, and housing construction are still alive in
ecological niches in Europe and are still very important in much of Africa, South
Asia, and Latin America. […] Even today, when a common need emerges, people
tend  to  organize  in  common  to  run  recuperated  spaces,  factories,  theaters,
gardens,  farmers  markets,  or  institutions  such  as  Time  Banks.  […]  These
emerging alternatives, based on the recognition of common needs,  material or
spiritual, make us understand that the resources necessary to satisfy a need must
themselves be understood as a common and governed according to the principles of
solidarity necessary for all to satisfy their needs and for the community to prosper”
(Capra and Mattei 2015, 142-4; emphasis added).
Simply  put,  by  recognizing  that  humans  share  both  a  common reality  and  common
needs, they therefore should recognize that the resources that enable everyone to satisfy
these desires also be held in common. In the words of Capra and Mattei, a legal order
that is based on generative ownership therefore “serves the needs of life by having the
tendencies to be socially just and ecologically sustainable built into the very fabric of its
organizational structures” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 146). 
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The ideal type of commons can thus generally be defined as goods created, reproduced
and held in common by a group of people, a network or a community that is dependent
on and affected by a specific  material  or immaterial  resource.  This  definition closely
resembles the notion of common property as defined by Jeremy Waldron: 
“In  a  system  of  common  property,  rules  governing  access  to  and  control  of
material resources are organized on the basis that each resource is in principle
available for the use of every member alike. In principle, the needs and wants of
every person are considered, and when allocation decisions are made they are
made on a basis that is in some sense fair to all” (Waldron 1988, 41).
In  contrast  to  individual  private  property,  which defines  exclusion as  its  structuring
principle,  common property arrangements emphasize access and inclusion.  Although
commons  often  have  –  or  even  require  –  boundaries,  they  can  nevertheless  be
considered inclusive because they enable those in need and those affected to define and
adapt  the  institutional  framework  thereof.  In  this  sense,  commons  are  based  on
democratic network governance systems that ensure the inclusion and participation of
the affected people. Simultaneously, commons demand that the users are responsible for
the  sustainable  reproduction  of  the  specific  resource.  Commons  are  thus  structured
according to  the individual  satisfaction of  common yet  conflicting needs and desires
through  the  sustainable  and  interdependent  co-(re)production  of  these  goods.  It  is
important to underline here that commons must not necessarily assume an extremely
high level of harmony or unity, but instead provide people with the ability to collectively
solve  conflicts  and  shared  practical  problems  through  democratic  negotiated
cooperation. This aspect of common property arrangements emphasizes the “freedom-
against”  characteristic  of  ecological  freedom.  In  this  sense,  common  property
arrangements support and enable democratic problem solving – not merely in political,
but also in economic and social areas of life. Last but not least, the (re)production and
maintenance  of  commons  is  not  merely  a  means  to  an  end  (freedom  through,  e.g.
individual needs satisfaction), but must itself be understood as an end in itself (freedom
with).  This  is best  understood through the concept of  conviviality,  in which people’s
satisfaction of needs occurs not in isolation, but in acting with others. 
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6.3. Reinterpreting John Locke’s Theory of Property from a Commons
Perspective
In  order  to  fully  understand  this  central  argument  in  favor  of  the  justification  of
resources held in common for individual  need satisfaction,  it  might be  helpful  if  we
compare  it  to  John Locke’s  (1632-1704)  justification  of  the  private  appropriation  of
resources  in  his  Second Treatise  of  Government (1689).  The reason why I  choose to
reinterpret Locke’s labor theory of property is that its importance for our contemporary
understanding of  individual  private property and our social  arrangements cannot be
underestimated. It lies at the heart of the concept of a self-regulating market, Robert
Nozick’s libertarianism and, also, Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons. I will thus
present a short sketch of Locke’s argument and then revise his theory according to our
understanding of ecological freedom and the commons.  This will revolve around three
conceptual  and  normative  shifts:  from  (self-)ownership  to  guardianship,  form  non-
interference  to  non-domination and,  finally,  from individual  labor  to  interdependent
need satisfaction.  
6.3.1. Locke’s Justification of Individual Private Property
Framed in the Christian theology of his time, Locke believed, quoting Timothy (6:12),
that “God has given us all things richly” (§31; emphasis omitted).  More precisely, God
“has  given  the  Earth  to  the  Children  of  Men,  given  to  Mankind  in  common”  (§25;
emphasis  omitted).  According  to  these  notions,  the  abundant  natural  resources
originally belonged to everyone and thus to no one. This is what Simmons and Waldron
call  a  “negative  community”  (Simmons  1992,  238,  Waldron  1988,  153).   Locke
understands this type of social arrangement as a commons (§28), which reminds us of
Garrett Hardin’s notion of an open-access and unregulated commons. Furthermore, in
this supposed state of nature, all humans are “equal and independent” (§6) and each has
the right to or, rather, the freedom of self-preservation (§17, 19). Yet, in order to survive,
humans are required to labor, may this be through hunting and gathering or, as God
supposedly preferred, through “subduing or cultivating the Earth, and having Dominion”
(§35). According to Locke, this, however, puts humans in a problematic situation: How
can humans appropriate and consume goods that belong to everyone? (§25-6) In order
to solve this problem, Locke argues that one’s self, including one’s body and the labor of
one’s body, must originally be understood as one’s individual private property (§27).
From this premise of self-ownership, he argues that individuals then have the right to
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transform the resources originally held in common into private property through the
“mixing” of their labor with the common resources (§27), be it through picking an apple,
killing a deer or cultivating wheat. In Locke’s words: “So that God, by commanding to
[labor  and;  LP]  subdue,  gave  Authority  so  far  to  appropriate.  And  the  Condition  of
Human Life,  which requires Labour and Materials to work on,  necessarily introduces
private  Possessions”  (§35;  emphasis  i.o.).  According  to  Locke,  only  the  private
appropriation of  goods through labor can secure the  survival  and liberty of  humans
(§26).  Although Locke understands property  as  a  means  to  life  and liberty,  he  then
collapses the three values under the term of property (§123),  ultimately defining the
protection of property as the “chief end” of society and government (§124).  
It must be noted, however, that in his labor theory of property Locke does not clearly
differentiate between the right to the fruits of one’s labor (e.g. the apple, the deer or the
wheat) and the resources that brought this fruit forth (e.g. the apple tree, the land on
which the wheat is grown and, possibly, the whole deer or, possibly, the territory where
the deer live). In Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess’s terminology, this implies the right
not only over the  resource unit,  but  also  over the  resource system itself,  which can
otherwise also be understood as the means of subsistence (e.g. water, land, tools etc.)
and the means of production (e.g. machines and factories). This ambiguity implies that
the labor theory of property can easily support the right not only to the outcome of the
labor  process,  but  also  to  the  resource  system  involved  in  the  labor  process  itself.
Nevertheless, Locke limits the right to appropriating these common resources by two
provisos: (a) If the resources are not left to spoil (§31) and (b) if there remains “enough
and as good” for others (§33). While the “spoilage limitation” (Macpherson 2011, 204-
11) aims at limiting the under-use of goods, the “sufficiency limitation” (ibid., 211-14)
should provide all humans with the access to sufficient natural resources in order to be
able to secure their existence. 
Locke describes, however, how these limitations were annulled with the “invention” of
money (§36). Because it is possible to hoard money without it spoiling, Locke contends
that the first proviso is no longer applicable and people may accumulate it without limit
(§50). The fact that money can buy large amounts of natural resources is, according to
Locke, no longer a problem because the owner will not leave the land to spoil, but will
use this land productively in order to increase profits (§48, 50). As Adam Smith argued
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almost 100 years later, the use of resources for profit is not interpreted as extraction
and depletion, but rather as an increase in the wealth of mankind and the conveniences
of life (§37). In contrast to Hardin’s tragedy of the open access commons, according to
Locke, the private appropriation of common resources supposedly increases the value of
the resources involved (§40, 43, 45). 
Interestingly,  the  second  sufficiency  limitation  also  becomes  invalid  with  the
introduction of money.  Here,  Locke provides two reasons for the annihilation of the
right to access resources in order to secure one’s existence. Firstly, the introduction of
money is  based on a “tacit  and voluntary consent” (§50),  which then legitimates the
inequality that results through the private accumulation of wealth. Secondly, although
Locke admits that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few creates scarcity for
those without property (§45), he nevertheless believes this to occur “without injury to
any one” (§50). On the one hand, this is due to the increases in productivity that result
from the unbound profit incentive. These increases in productivity supposedly create an
abundance of conveniences for the wider population and therefore compensate for the
scarcity that was brought about through privatization (§41).  On the other hand, it  is
implicitly assumed that the individual without access to the means of subsistence in the
form of natural resources still  possesses their own body and can therefore sell their
labor power in exchange for a  wage (§28).  Now, it  is  no longer the direct  access to
natural resources that secures one’s existence, but instead the access to money through
wage labor, which in turn enables the laborer to survive by buying food and a place to
live on the market.  As becomes apparent, the original, equal right to self-preservation
and liberty through the access to resources held in common is thus transformed into the
protection of the existing and unequal distribution of property on the one hand, and the
necessity of  the  property-less  to gain access to wage labor  relationships in  order  to
secure their life on the other hand. This  is the basic argument of John Locke’s labor
theory of private property. 
Although this story may initially appear rather straightforward and convincing,  there
are numerous premises in Locke’s theory of property that are highly problematic.  To
name just a few: The existence of the independent individual in a state of nature; the
open-access  commons  (res/terra  nullius)  as  a  state  of  nature;  the  concept  of  self-
ownership; the suspension of the provisos through the introduction of money and wage
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labor; and the necessity to declare something as one’s own private property in order to
use  or  consume  it.  We  will  deal  with  these  issues  one  at  a  time  by  arguing  that  a
commons theory of  property  requires  a  shift  from (self-)ownership to  guardianship,
from non-interference to non-domination and, finally, from labor to needs. 
6.3.2. From (Self-)Ownership to Guardianship
As our discussion of nature has demonstrated, all living organisms, including humans,
are self-organizing yet always exist in webs of interdependent relationships.  For this
reason, the original state of nature is not to be understood as one where individuals
roamed around alone,  but where people – as they still  do today – lived and worked
together in groups – in, with and against other humans and the more-than-human world.
As most historical and ethnological research shows, resources were never conceived as
res nullius, but were always embedded in diverse informal and formal rules of rights and
obligation. Often enough, so-called “primitive” economies were based on communalistic
economies with central  resources held in common  (Weston and Bollier  2013,  133-5,
Diamond  2007,  131-3).68 As  was  the  case  with  Thomas  Hobbes,  the  concept  of  the
independent individual and the common world as res nullius is thus a historical and legal
construct of Locke’s day projected back onto nature. 
This raises a few questions: Would the concept of interdependent living beings shed a
different light on the notion of (self-)ownership? If ownership is founded on “labor” can I
truly be considered to be my own property? Would I not, in fact, be the property of the
people who raised me and the environment that provided me with sunlight,  air  and
things to eat? As we see, although human beings have a sense of self and the power to
self-organize,  this does not mean that one’s existence has been brought forth merely
through one’s  self  and through one’s  own labor.  With reference to Andreas Weber’s
68  The anthropologist Stanley Diamond, for example, explains: “Primitive societies
rest on a communalistic economic base. This is not to say that everything in such societies is owned in
common, which is clearly not the case, but rather that those material means essential to the survival of the
individual  or  the  group  are  either  actively  held  in  common  or,  what  is  equivalent,  constitute  readily
accessible economic goods. […] Exceptions to this communal condition dissolve under close scrutiny. For
example, it is claimed that members of Hottentot joint families ‘own’ particular cows in the family heard,
but we find that they cannot privately dispose of  them. It  is  similarly assumed that individuals ‘own’
particular watering places, but we discover that access is never denied to other people in need of it. On the
other hand, true private property does exist among primitives, in the form of tools made by the individual,
breechclouts, back scratchers and similar ‘extensions of the personality.’ However, private property of this
type does not constitute primitive capitalism; this does not exist, at least among primitives. The private
property that can be identified is  either not essential  for  group survival,  is  readily duplicated by any
individual in the society and therefore need not be owned communally, or is of so personal a nature that it
cannot be owned communally.” (Diamond 2007, 131)  
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concept of the gift economy of the open-source “natural commons”, I would therefore
argue that the self should also be understood as a gift – not necessarily from God, but
from  the  infinitely  complex  processes  of  co-creation  that  result  from  the  mutually
interdependent relationships of the web of life. Or, phrased somewhat differently, the
individual should thus be conceived as a product of nature and society – and an active
and  semi-autonomous  agent  therein.  Here,  the  focus  is  shifted  from  the  supposedly
independent “Man” who forms the world to the world that brings each individual being
about.  Here,  the  individual  does  not  determine,  but  takes  part  in  this  process  of
interdependent co-creation. Such an understanding of the self-world relationship may
sound somewhat peculiar in the ears of people brought up and trained in the Western
mode of thinking based on methodological individualism. Despite the danger of ethno-
romanticism here (Latour 2004, 42-49), I believe that it can be argued that such a notion
is  far  more  prevalent  in  the  Buddhist  notion  of  dependent  co-arising  (Macy  1979,
Garfield 1994, Loy 1997) and in diverse indigenous traditions  (de Sousa Santos 2008,
2016). A famous portrayal of this notion has been expressed in the phrase attributed to
Chief Seattle, in which he apparently stated that “the earth does not belong to man, man
belongs to the earth.”69 This understanding is also echoed in Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic,
in  which  he  writes:  “In  short,  a  land  ethic  changes  the  role  of  Homo  sapiens from
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for
his fellow-members, and also respect for the [socio-ecological; LP] community as such”
(Leopold 1987, 204).
A central  implication of this  understanding of the self  as  a  member in a  network of
reciprocal gift giving is that it ultimately transforms a central category of property rights
from ownership to guardianship. The resources that one uses, be it the land, the water
or one’s own body, are not something that one owns, but rather a gift of nature and of
society.  Although  the  notion  of  the  gift  and  guardianship  is  often  associated  with
“archaic”  societies  (Mauss  2002),  it  is  also  marginally  discussed  in  contemporary
69  As is generally well known, the authenticity of this phrase and of Chief Seattle’s
speech is contested. Although the speech was supposedly held in 1854 or 1855, it was only published by
Dr. Henry A. Smith in the Seattle Sunday Star on October 29, 1887. Since then, numerous versions of the
speech have been published (Low 1995, Krupat 2011, Rothenberg 1999). Importantly, the cited famous
phrase is actually not part of the original speech published in 1887, but appears in later versions thereof.
Despite  this  historical  inaccuracy,  I  nevertheless  believe  it  justified  to  refer  to  this  quote,  because  it
reflects the notion of another type relationship with world – irrespective whether it was expressed by
Chief Seattle or someone else. 
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debates  on property  arrangements.  Karl  Marx,  for  example,  refers  to  the  concept  of
stewardship in this somewhat well-known passage in volume three of Capital: 
“From the standpoint of a higher socioeconomic formation, the private property
of particular individuals in the earth will  appear just as absurd as the private
property  of  one  man  in  other  men.  Even  an  entire  society,  a  nation,  or  all
simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the earth.
They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an
improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias [Good heads of
the household]” (Marx 1991, 911)
Although Marx equates ownership and property here, the gist of his critique goes in a
similar  direction  as  the  argument  we  have  been  developing:  That  humans  are  not
owners of the earth, but that they have received this earth and their selves from others
and therefore have a duty to care for their own well-being and that of their society and
ecosystem for the benefit of future generations. In contrast to Marx’s statement in this
passage, I would argue that it is not property per se but specific property arrangements
based on the notion of exclusive, individual private ownership that are problematic. In
this  sense,  commons  can  –  or  should  –  be  understood  as  an  institutional  property
arrangement in which not only exclusion is replaced by inclusion, but ownership is also
replaced by guardianship. 
While this may appear to be a rather simple task, it would in fact require us to revise not
only our understanding of ownership over things, but also our deeply rooted notion of
self-ownership.  According  to  Locke,  it  is  the  notion  of  self-ownership  that  provides
individuals with the right to exclusive ownership of the world.  At this point I  would
agree with G.A. Cohen and Michael Sandel that the concept of self-ownership is in itself
highly  problematic because it  lays  the  foundation for  an individualistic  and absolute
understanding of property rights. With reference to Nozick’s interpretation of Locke’s
concept of self-ownership, G.A Cohen brings the problem to the point when he explains
that the “polemically crucial right of self-ownership is the right not to (be forced to)
supply product or service to anyone” (G.A. Cohen 1995, 215). Similar to the abstract and
absolute right of ownership over things, the right to self-ownership implies that each
person has “no non-contractual enforceable obligations to anyone else with respect to
the use of your powers” (ibid., 240). In turn, the premise of self-ownership enables the
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rejection of all claims of the community on the fruits of the other person’s labor. For this
reason,  Cohen  understands  self-ownership  to  be  a  central  pillar  for  open  and
competitive  markets  in which  each individual  is  free  to own,  alienate,  exchange and
accumulate goods without limitations and obligations to other individuals. Along these
lines, I would therefore also argue that the affirmation of self-ownership and the right to
the fruits of one’s labor ultimately denies other people and society in general the right to
a share of these fruits. Along with Cohen, I would therefore conclude that the answer to
this grave problem is the “rejection of the thesis of self-ownership” itself (ibid.,  230).
However,  while  Cohen  then  vaguely  propagates  the  “affirmation  of  non-contractual
obligations  to  serve  other  people”  (ibid.),  I  would  argue  that  we  must  develop  the
previously discussed care ethic into somewhat more robust property arrangements that
enable the co-determination of socio-ecological rights and duties. 
For this reason, I would turn to Michael Sandel who, to my knowledge, is one of the few
contemporary  Western  philosophers  who  has  not  only  criticized  the  notion  of  self-
ownership  but  has  also  developed  an  alternative  notion  of  property  based  on
guardianship. In his book  Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1986), Sandel discusses
Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) and the general notion of self-ownership. Here, Sandel
agrees with Rawls that we should understand the self as made up of a purely contingent
and arbitrary distribution or, in our terminology, gift of our natural endowments. For
this reason, Sandel argues that we should not interpret our relationship to these gifts as
something that we own. Instead, he argues, 
“To be sure,  the  various natural  assets  with which I  am born may be said to
‘belong’ to me in the weak, contingent sense that they reside accidentally within
me, but this sense of ownership or possession cannot establish that I have any
special rights with respect to these assets or any privileged claim to the fruits of
their exercise. In this attenuated sense of possession, I am not really the owner
but  merely  the  guardian  or  repository  of  the  assorted  assets  and  attributes
located ‘here’” (Sandel 1986, 82).
The  fact  that  a  person  is  born  with  –  or  without  –  certain  arbitrary  qualities  and
capabilities implies that this person then has no justification to consider their self and
the  fruits  of  their  labor  as  their  own.  But  how,  then,  are  we  to  conceptualize  the
relationship  to  our  selves  and  the  world?  For  this  reason,  Sandel  differentiates  the
concepts of the owner, the guardian and the repository. According to Sandel, ownership
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in its strongest version implies “that I have absolute, unqualified, exclusive rights with
respect to my endowments” (ibid., 96). In its more moderate version, he states that “I
have  certain  privileged  claims  with  respect  to  them,  a  bundle  of  rights,  while  not
unlimited, at least more extensive with respect to my assets than any bundle of rights
anyone else may have with respect to them” (ibid.). In contrast, the repository of assets
assumes  the  complete  arbitrariness  of  the  relationship  between  the  self  and  one’s
natural  endowments  and provides  little  basis  for the recognition of the subject.  The
notion  of  guardianship,  however,  assumes  a  relationship  between  one’s  self  and  its
endowments and assets, yet embeds it in an intersubjective, communitarian framework: 
“To say that I am the guardian of the endowments I bear is to imply that they are
owned by some other subject, on whose behalf, or in whose name, or by whose
grace I cultivate and exercise them. This is a notion of possession reminiscent of
the early Christian notion of  property,  in which man had what he had as the
guardian of assets belonging truly to God, and it is a notion that fits with various
communitarian notions of property as well” (ibid., 97).
The basic reason why Sandel defends such a notion of property rights is that we are able
to understand property as a social phenomenon that has been created not only for the
satisfaction of one’s individual needs and desires, but also for the needs and desires of
the community and society in general. In general,  I would agree with Sandel that the
notion of guardianship enables us to conceptualize a form of property that breaks with
the classical concept of independence, absolute sovereignty and dominion. Yet, instead
of  falling  back  into  hierarchical  dependencies  characteristic  of  the  feudal  system,  a
democratic notion of guardianship embeds resources into a contextual framework of
property  based  on  interdependencies,  mutual  care  and  co-determination.  And  in
contrast  to  both  the  Christian  and  communitarian  interpretation  of  guardianship,  I
would understand the stewardship not toward God and not only toward one’s fellow
human  beings,  but  equally  to  all  living  and  non-living  beings  –  as  a  type  of  socio-
ecological stewardship. Thus, by defining an individual’s relationship to its self and to
the world as a form of guardianship within this ecological web, I would argue that we
have laid the cornerstone of the “structural [eco-]communality of the commons” (Meretz
2012) for  property  arrangements  that  include  those  without  a  voice:  The  wider
community or society “in general”, nature and future generations. For this reason, it is
this principle of stewardship that the scientists Will Steffen et al. propagate as a crucial
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means to solve the serious threats that humanity faces in the epoch of the Anthropocene
(Steffen et al. 2011).
6.3.3. From Non-Interference to Non-Domination 
Although this argument might sound reasonable, it  may be feared that the shift from
ownership  to  guardianship  will  open  the  door  to  the  arbitrary  oppression  of  the
individual by the community. In order to deal with this legitimate critique and potential
danger,  I  will  argue  in  the  following  section  that  not  guardianship,  but  rather  non-
interference leads to new forms of domination and, thus,  arbitrary interference. This
insight brings us to the conclusion that a revision of Locke’s theory of property from a
commons  perspective  also  requires  a  shift  in  focus  from  non-interference  to  non-
domination. 
Put  in  a  historical  perspective,  John Locke’s  concept of  natural  property rights were
developed as a critique of the existing feudal social order and the absolute powers of the
monarchy over property rights. With the rise of the bourgeoisie, this feudal property
regime  was  problematic,  because  it  not  only  prevented  the  individual  from
appropriating more property, but also because the absolute monarch ultimately had the
power to arbitrarily confiscate the property of his subjects. Locke’s theory of property
was therefore a means to deal with both of these problems: On the one hand, it justified
an  original  appropriation  of  property  through  labor  and  an  unlimited  accumulation
through  contracts  (i.e.  money);  on  the  other  hand,  it  protected  individual  private
property from the powers of the state. By grounding these basic property rights in God,
nature and reason – all of which were understood to be one and the same (Laslett 2008,
94-6) –,  Locke  provided  a  new  theological  interpretation  of  the  divine  property
arrangements  that  lies  prior  to  existing  social  institutions.  This  is  what  is  generally
understood  as  natural  law.  Thus,  individual  private  ownership  became  a  means  to
hinder arbitrary political powers from interfering with a person’s freedom to act. For
this  reason,  non-interference  as  become  a  cornerstone  for  most  other  notions  of
freedom. 
Considering  the  power  asymmetries  of  the  feudal  social  order,  the  right  to  non-
interference is in itself a legitimate claim. However, since Locke’s times, the freedom of
individual ownership has augmented to such an extent that it has shifted the balance of
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power  from  the  absolute  monarch  to  wealthy  individuals  and  large  multinational
corporations whose existence often lies beyond the grasp of nation states and social
control. In this sense, the relationship between sovereignty and private power has been
reversed (Bailey and Mattei 2013, 973-4). And while state sovereignty has partially been
democratized since Locke’s times, property arrangements have remained – often in the
name of individual negative freedom and constitutional democracy (e.g. Epstein 2011b)
– largely immune to the processes of democratization.70 With James Tully we can say
that this is a result of the prioritization of individual negative rights over democratic
rights of co-determination. It therefore appears as though Locke’s property rights that
were originally developed as a critique of  the power of  the monarchy have,  in turn,
enabled new power asymmetries to develop.71 
In his  Second Treatise on Government, Locke already recognized that private property
and the introduction of money lead to inequalities. According to Locke, however, people
must accept these asymmetries due to their “tacit and voluntary consent” to this social
arrangement and the supposed fact that monetary wealth “may be hoarded up without
injury  to any one” (§50;  emphasis added).  As we see,  the accumulation of wealth by
some individuals has, according to Locke, no negative effects or “externalities” on those
with less property or no direct access to the means of subsistence. As has already been
discussed,  Locke’s  answer  to  this  problem  of  scarcity-through-privatization  is  the
possibility to “freely” exchange one’s labor for wages and the increases in productivity
that result from private ownership. The person without direct access to the means of
subsistence  can  sell  his  or  her  labor  power  to  someone  who  owns  resources.
Furthermore  and  as  Adam  Smith  later  argued,  the  unfettered  profit  motive,  market
competition and the increased productivity that results results from privatization, will
supposedly benefit property-less individuals in providing them with jobs and cheaper
goods.  In  this  sense,  John  Locke  and  Adam  Smith  assume  that  the  scarcity-induced
conflicts  can  be  solved  through  increased  productivity.  Today,  this  is  generally
70  It  must be noted here,  however,  that nationalization cannot be equated with
democratization. A well-known (failed) example of the democratization of private property is the Meidner
Plan in Sweden  (Blackburn 2007, Pontusson 1992). This is not to say that diverse small scale cases do
exist  in  which  resources  have  been  socialized  and  democratized,  such  as  reclaiming  water  rights  in
Cochobamba, Bolivia, and Italy (Assies 2003, Mattei 2013b) and recuperation of companies by workers in
Latin America and Europe (Azzellini 2016).
71  Saki  Bailey  and  Ugo  Mattei  describe  this  as  a  “return  to  a  sort  of  neo-
medievalism, where state sovereignty is weak and constitutional law is reduced to a Leviathan that uses
an iron fist with the weak – the people – and the velvet glove with the strong – corporate powers” (Bailey
and Mattei 2013, 973).
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understood as economic growth and the “trickle down” effect – and is still a widespread
recipe for socio-economic inequalities. Before continuing, it is important to note that this
dualistic depiction of reality divided between the haves and the have-nots might appear
as highly simplified, especially considering the effects of economic growth over history.
While there have been great increases in the absolute amount of wealth since the times
of John Locke and Adam Smith  (Maddison 2007,  Acemoglu and Robinson 2012),  the
asymmetrical  relation  between those  with  and  those  without  property  still  remains
large and socially relevant (Piketty 2014, Oxfam 2017). 
But  do  these  inequalities  and  power  asymmetries  resulting  from  the  private
appropriation of the original commons truly have no negative effects on other people?
And are all people still equally free if no one is interfered with by the arbitrary power of
the state? The important point to make here is that, in contrast to Locke’s assumption,
the unlimited accumulation of resources by some individuals might expand their sphere
of non-interference, but this accumulation also limits and therefore interferes with the
freedom of others. Jeremy Waldron lucidly explains this problem in his book The Right to
Private Property (1988):  
“If private property serves negative liberty, it does so because owning something
just is a matter of being free to use it and of its being the case that one is not to be
opposed in that use by the interference of others.  But then the distribution of
property has a direct impact on the distribution of negative liberty. A person who
owns nothing in a society (where everything is privately owned) is not at liberty,
in a negative sense, to make use of anything – indeed for everything that he might
use, someone else has a right that he should refrain from using it, and it is a right
which they are entitled to enforce. If it is true that all (or most) human actions
require a material  component  over and above the use of  one's  own body – a
location, for example, or an implement – then the unfreedom in a negative sense
of the propertyless man is more or less comprehensive. There is literally nothing
or next to nothing that he is free to do. This point is mitigated by the existence of
some common property even in the most comprehensively capitalist societies:
tramps have the streets to walk on and the bridges to sleep under. But that is all
they have and all they can do, without falling foul of the prohibitions enforced by
the  property  system  of  the  society  in  which  they  have  to  make  a  life  for
themselves” (Waldron 1988, 410-11; emphasis i.o.).
As we can see,  the  unlimited appropriation of  resources by some individuals  makes
these  resources  scarce  and  ultimately  undermines  the  freedom  of  others,  thereby
substantially  interfering  with  the  freedom  of  others.  While  it  is  often  assumed  that
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negative freedom is to free the individual from undesired and involuntary obligations, as
has already been discussed, it nevertheless “generates a duty […] on everyone to refrain
from using it  without my permission” (ibid.,  109).  People without property are thus
placed  under  the  duty  to  recognize  the  property  rights  of  the  other  –  even  if  they
themselves  are  property-less  and  require  these  resources  to  survive.  Similarly,  G.A.
Cohen vividly illustrates this relationship between one’s duty to respect the property of
others and the interference with the freedom of those without property: 
“The banal truth is that,  if  the state prevents me from doing something that I
want to do, then it places a restriction on my freedom. Suppose, then, that I want
to perform an action which involves a legally prohibited use of your property. I
want, let us say, to pitch a tent in your large back garden, perhaps just in order to
annoy you, or perhaps for the more substantial reason that I have nowhere to live
and no land of my own, but I have got hold of a tent, legitimately or otherwise. If I
now try to do this thing that I  want to do,  the chances are that the state will
intervene on your behalf. If it does, I shall suffer a constraint on my freedom. The
same goes, of course, for all unpermitted uses of a piece of private property by
those who do not own it, and there are always those who do not own it, since
'private  ownership by  one  person presupposes  non-ownership on the  part  of
other persons' (Marx 1991, 948)” (G.A. Cohen 1995, 55-6).
The general point that Waldron and G.A. Cohen are making is that no neutral or positive
sum  property  arrangements  exist,  due  to  the  interdependence  of  individuals  on
resources that people need for their life and liberty. The accumulation of some resources
inherently leads to scarcity for others. While the concept of non-interference might have
made sense in its historical setting against the powers of an absolute monarch, the un-
interfered-with  and  thus  unlimited  appropriation  of  resources  can  substantially
undermine the life  and freedom of others.  As becomes clear,  the interdependence of
living  beings  implies  that  the  existence  and  freedom  of  one  being  is  inherently
intertwined  with  the  existence  and  freedom  of  another  being  and  therefore  always
“interferes” with others – whether we like it or not. 
As previously mentioned,  John Locke’s  answer to the problem of  exclusion from the
direct  access  to  resources  is  wage  labor.  But  is  there  not  a  fundamental  difference
between the direct access to resources and the pursuit of wage labor? On the one hand,
it could be argued that there is no difference between working on the original commons
and  wage  labor  because  both  are  a  means  to  secure  one’s  existence  through  labor.
Whether I cultivate my vegetables or earn a wage to buy vegetables makes no significant
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difference. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the two are significantly
different. The difference between the two is rather simple: When people do not have
direct access to the means of subsistence or production, they have no other choice than
to enter wage labor relationships. They either go hungry or perform work for another –
that is,  if  they can find a job.72 In this sense,  we may speak of a socially determined
existential necessity that forces people without access to the means of subsistence to
enter wage labor relationships. Although the coercion is not exerted by individuals but
through society’s property arrangements, the force is neither less real nor natural nor
entirely  accidental.73 We  can  therefore  say  that  property  arrangements  that  do  not
provide people with the direct access to the means of subsistence and production deny
those people the right to life and liberty. 
Because this  structural  coercion is non-accidental,  the inability to directly access the
means of subsistence also means that an individual’s ability to survive and freedom to
choose how they will survive is interfered with in an  arbitrary manner. While Philipp
Pettit  presents  us  with  a  less  profound  critique  of  wage  labor  relationships  (Pettit
2006),74 I would nevertheless use his notion of domination as arbitrary interference in
72  Starting one’s own business is rather unlikely for most people without property,
understood either as means of subsistence (land), means of production (machines) or accumulated wealth
(capital),  because  in  order  to  start  a  business,  resources  are  required.  The  ability  to  borrow  money
(credit) to start a business could possibly be an option, but also requires an “accumulation” of either social
or symbolic capital (e.g. knowing the right people, having the right education, a good reputation or social
status) that is not always given. This is not to say that starting a business for people without property is
entirely impossible, but it is nevertheless rather unlikely. 
73  While  people  like  Townsend  and  Malthus  aimed  at  naturalizing  social
arrangements that cause scarcity and poverty (Polanyi 2001, 116-21),  Friedrich von Hayek argues that
such  occurrences  cannot  be  considered  unjust  because  they  arise  accidentally  from  the  unintended
interaction of individual agents. Hayek writes: “Though we are in this case [of injustice; LP] less ready to
admit it, our complaints about the outcome of the market [a property regime based on individual private
property; LP] as unjust do not really assert that somebody has been unjust; and there is no answer to the
question of who has been unjust. Society has simply become the new deity to which we complain and
clamour for redress if it does not fulfill l the expectations it has created. […] For in such a system in which
each is allowed to use his knowledge for his own purposes the concept of ‘social justice’ is necessarily
empty and meaningless, because in it nobody’s will can determine the relative incomes of the different
people, or prevent that they be partly dependent on accident. ‘Social justice’ can be given a meaning only
in a directed or ‘command’ economy (such as an army) in which the individuals are ordered what to do;
and any particular conception of ‘social justice’ could be realized only in such a centrally directed system“
(Hayek 2013, 233). In contrast to this view, I argue that social arrangements can be considered unjust
because they are always created by individuals with a specific purpose. The history of individual private
property shows that it has always aimed at excluding other people from its use – and forcing people into
wage-labor relationships (Neeson 1996, 27-34, Castel 2003). This coercion was therefore, in the eyes of
some, not unintended. Yet even if this structural coercion was not intended, this should in no way deny
people the right to criticize and counteract the negative effects that result therefrom. 
74  In  Freedom in the market  (2006), Philipp Pettit argues with reference to Adam
Smith that wage labor can – in an ideal or well-functioning labor market – provide people with the ability
to escape domination. Most importantly,  this occurs  through the possibility of exiting relationships of
domination  (Adam  Smith  refers  here  to  master-servant  relationships  characteristic  of  the  feudal
166
order  to  comprehend  its  diverse  problems.  With  Philipp  Pettit,  we  could  say  that
arbitrary interference occurs when one person can arbitrarily interfere with the choices
and  plans  of  another  person.  Here,  the  action  of  one  person is  “chosen  or  rejected
without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected“ (Pettit 1997, 55). In
this sense, one person’s exclusion from the means of subsistence or production makes
them dependent on the arbitrary will of the proprietor and his or her desire to employ
them. As Jeremy Waldron explains: 
“Appropriation […] wreaks a drastic change in the position of non-appropriators.
From being  tenants-in-common of  God's  largesse,  they  are  now placed in the
position  of  moral  [and  economic;  LP]  dependence,  for  everything  but  bare
survival, on the say-so of individual property-owners.” (Waldron 1988, 175-6)
Put  in  a  historical  perspective,  this  is  what  Karl  Marx  calls  “so-called  primitive
accumulation” and what is more generally understood as the enclosure, privatization or
dispossession  of  commons  that  began  in  the  12th century,  if  not  earlier,  and  has
continued  until  today  (Marx  1982a,  Part  8,  Linebaugh  2008,  Federici  2009,  Neeson
1996, Zückert 2003, Harvey 2004, Boyle 2003). Although this process of enclosure might
have freed peasants from the feudal relationships of serfdom, it also “freed” peasants
apprenticeship system (Smith 1994, 117, 136-42)) and entering more favorable ones (Pettit 2006, 142-4).
In Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), Pettit discusses, however, the problem of
domination in  what  socialists  have otherwise called  “wage  slavery”  during the rise  of  capitalism and
argues that his theory of non-domination supports this critique of wage slavery  (Pettit 1997, 141-2). In
this  sense,  Pettit  criticizes  property  arrangements  that  lead  to  asymmetrical  power  relations  and
domination,  which  in  turn  legitimize  state  regulation  and  a  fairer  distribution  of  property:  “The
distribution of property may tend toward inegalitarian extremes, and it may be necessary to regulate
against the effects of those extremes on people’s overall enjoyment of freedom as non-domination” (Pettit
2006, 147). Despite this conclusion, he argues that the domination or, rather, arbitrary interference must
be  “more  or  less  intentional  in  character”  (Pettit  1997,  52).  For  this  reason,  he  limits  the  notion  of
domination in property arrangements to particular relationships and intentional actions. In  Freedom in
the market he writes, “The property regime can have the aspect of an environment akin to the natural
environment. Like the natural environment, it will certainly affect the range or the ease with which people
enjoy their status as undominated agents, and it may warrant complaint on that account, but  it will not
itself  be  a  source  of  domination.  It  will  not  be  a  source  of  domination  so far  as  it  is  the  cumulative,
unintended effect of people’s mutual adjustments, where that history of adjustment may or may not have
begun in government  initiatives”  (Pettit  2006,  139;  emphasis added).  As we can see,  this is  a  similar
argument  as  presented by Friedrich Hayek (see fn.  73)  because Pettit  brackets  out  the “unintended”
domination that arises from the social structure or property arrangements themselves. As I have already
argued  there,  it  is  highly  questionable  whether  the  domination  that  arises  out  of  such  property
arrangements is entirely unintended, because the legal framework has been intentionally implemented
and maintained  (Gourevitch  2013,  606).  And even if  these effects  of  a  specific property  regime were
unintended, I would agree with Alex Gourevitch that a republican theory of non-domination must include
not only intentional domination in a particular employer-employee relationship, but also the structural
domination that arises in wage labor relationships out of asymmetrical property arrangements (ibid., 598-
601).
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from their means of subsistence – ultimately making them vulnerable to the arbitrary
interference of proprietors. 
In contrast to our previously developed notion of socio-ecological interdependence, the
economic  dependence  on  wage  labor  is  therefore  problematic  because  of  the
asymmetrical power relationship between the employer and the employee. The subject
without property is therefore placed in a situation of vulnerability and powerlessness
vis-à-vis  the  proprietor/employer.  In  turn,  this  relationship  leaves  the  door  open to
domination. Here, we can also refer to Pettit’s notion of domination, which he defines as
such: 
“Both  [the employee and the employer;  LP]  will  share an awareness  that  the
powerless can do nothing except by the leave of the powerful: that the powerless
are  at  the  mercy  of  the  powerful  and  not  on  equal  terms.  The  master-slave
scenario will  materialize,  and the asymmetry between the two sides will  be a
communicative as well as an objective reality” (Pettit 1997, 61).
The fact that wage labor relationships have been entered by contract does not, however,
alter the existence of this power asymmetry (ibid., 62). Although the ability to exit wage
labor relationships slightly increases one’s freedom, it does not protect or immunize the
property-less from future relationships of domination. In turn, within the hierarchical
wage relationship, domination is often experienced as a necessity to fulfill certain tasks
that are determined by the employer, thereby denying the employee his or her freedom
to self-organize and co-determine their activities with others. As a result, we find two
potential types of domination in wage labor: One in the asymmetrical distribution of
access  to  productive  resources  and  the  other  in  hierarchical  employee-employer
relationships (Gourevitch 2013, 598). 
This  is  not  to  say  that  all  wage  relationships  are  experienced  as  hierarchical  and
oppressive. Contemporary forms of wage labor relationships in a modern knowledge-
based economy, for example, often support individual creativity, self-management and
team collaboration.  Yet despite these gains in the individual freedom for employees, the
range  of  freedom  is  often  limited  by  the  demands  of  the  employer  to  increase
productivity and outputs (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Furthermore, the relationship
of domination remains because it is not necessary that the person in power (e.g. the
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employer) actively interferes with the freedom of the property-less (e.g. the employee).
Instead, we can argue with Pettit that “[w]hat constitutes domination is the fact that in
some respect the power-bearer has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, even if they are
never going to do so“ (Pettit 1997, 63; emphasis added). The mere capacity of property
owners  and employers  to  deny an individual  their  wage labor  and thus  a  means to
survival on the one hand, and the mere capacity to subjugate the employee to the will of
the employer within a wage labor relationship on the other hand, provides the basis for
domination, even if it is not actively exercised. In this sense, we can argue with Pettit
that  the  property-less  “are  in  a  position  where  fear  [of  unemployment;  LP]  and
deference [to the employer; LP] will be the normal order of the day, not the frankness
that  goes  with  intersubjective  equality”  (ibid.  64;  emphasis  added).  By  creating
asymmetrical positions of power and domination, property arrangements that enable
the unlimited private accumulation of resources can therefore arbitrarily interfere with
and undermine the equal right of all people to life and liberty. Ironically, the arbitrary
interference caused by asymmetrical property relationships as described above reminds
us of the domination of the sovereign, which Locke originally aimed to limit and avert.
The  arbitrary  interference  and  domination  that  arises  from negative  freedom rights
ultimately undermine not only the equal negative freedom rights of the property-less,
but  also  the  principle  of  self-organization  that  underlies  our  notion  of  ecological
democracy. In order to grasp and deal with the problem of negative freedom, I argue
with  Philipp  Pettit  that  we  must  shift  our  focus  from  non-interference  to  non-
domination,  thereby  proving  to  each  member  of  a  community  the  protection  from
arbitrary interference and, in turn, the possibility of participating in the activities of co-
determination of their activities. 
Following this line of thought, one answer to the problem of domination is limiting the
accumulation  of  resources  by  individuals  and  corporations.  With  reference  to  the
concept of guardianship previously discussed, this should not merely be framed as a cap
on  wealth,  but  rather  as  basic  responsibilities  towards  other  individuals,  affected
communities and the environment that are inscribed in property relations themselves.
Succinctly put, the limiting of accumulation reciprocally enables the freedom of others.
In  John Rawls’  Theory  of  Justice this  is  classically  defined  as  the  maximin  principle:
socioeconomic  inequalities  must  be  limited  in  order  to  maximally  benefit  the  least
advantaged (Rawls 1999). With a more socio-ecological focus, Capra and Mattei briefly
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discuss the implications of such a limitation of accumulation in their discussion of eco
law. In relation to corporations they suggest: 
 “Ecolaw  will  not  consider  corporations,  which  are  the  current  face  of
accumulated  capital,  as  people,  because  unlike  every  other  creature  they  are
immortal. In the United States, for example, the idea that economic interests can
be incorporated no matter what their purpose is quite recent and dates back to
the late nineteenth century. Before then the legal benefits of incorporation were
granted only for specific purposes and were limited in time. Once the purpose of
a corporation had been achieved,  such as when the Charles  River Bridge was
completed,  the  corporation  would  dissolve,  as  naturally  as  individuals  die.  In
ecolaw, the benefits of incorporations are restricted, with conditions to care for
the environment and respect communities” (Capra and Mattei 2015, 185-6), 185-
6).
In this sense, the purpose, activities and existence of corporations will always be bound
to their meaning and value for the affected people and environment. In turn, this socio-
ecological  embedding should limit  corporations’  ability  to dominate  others.  This  can
theoretically  imply  either  the  limitation  of  resource  extraction  from socio-ecological
systems  or  the  redistribution  of  wealth  back  to  those  affected  by  an  economic
enterprise. 
Despite the importance of limiting accumulation and, thus, limiting power asymmetries,
the  notion  of  non-domination  also  requires  people  to  be  protected  from  potential
domination. Based on our argument, this would require people not to be forced to enter
into  asymmetrical  wage  labor  relationships  due  to  existential  necessity.  Within  the
republican  tradition,  this  has  often  been understood  as  the  freedom from economic
dependencies.  For  this  reason,  thinkers  such  as  James  Harrington,  Jean-Jacques
Rousseau  and  Thomas  Jefferson  argued  that  freedom  and  democracy  can  only  be
realized  through  the  widespread  distribution  of  property  in  resources  and,  more
specifically, in land (Jackson 2012, 34-5). Generally put, all three propagated an agrarian
republicanism that was assumed to secure the independence of individuals through a
broad distribution of land and, thus, the direct access to their means of subsistence. Such
a property arrangement would protect individuals from economic dependencies and, in
turn, produce independent, responsible, diligent and austere citizens. With the rise of
the open access market and commercial society the focus slowly shifted from land to the
access to public goods such as universal education, healthcare and old age pensions. This
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age-old argument that property in resources is a necessary precondition for a life and
liberty has more recently taken on different forms as for example: John Rawls’ concept
of  a  property-owning  democracy  (Rawls  2001),  Bruce  Ackerman  and  Anne  Alstott’s
notion  of  The  Stakeholder  Society  (Ackerman  and  Alstott  1999),  the  idea  of  the
unconditional basic income, which is, for example, strongly advocated by Philippe Van
Parijs  (Van  Parijs  2003,  Widerquist  2013,  Pettit  2007).  At  the  center  of  all  these
concepts  is  the  basic  idea  that  property  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  life  and
independence,  generally  understood as  the  freedom from arbitrary  interference and
domination. 
We will discuss Rawls’ notion of property-owning democracy shortly, but for the time
being, it is crucial to note the importance of commons for the freedom from arbitrary
interference and domination. Similar to the previously mentioned concepts, commons
have historically provided people with direct access to their means of subsistence and
therefore  “offered  some  independence  of  wages  and  markets”  (Neeson  1996,  12).
Similarly, Stuart White argues, 
“In the same way that the historic enclosure of the commons helped to create a
proletariat,  reliant  on wage-labour,  the emergence of  the commons today can
conceivably help limit this  reliance.  To the extent that capital-  and commons-
based predistribution reduce  reliance  on  wage-labour,  they  thereby also  help
reduce the risk of domination from this source. They will tend to make workers
less desperate to find jobs and so help protect them against situations where,
because  of  the  urgent  need  for  a  job,  they  are  vulnerable  to  domination  by
employers” (White unpublished, 10).
The direct access to resources in the form of commons can therefore limit the arbitrary
interference  that  arises  through  asymmetrical  distribution  of  individual  private
property and the dependency on hierarchical wage labor. Furthermore, by defining non-
domination  as  a  central  pillar  of  property  arrangements,  “no  single  individual  can
arbitrarily make the decisions affecting each other” (Gourevitch 2013, 609). In turn, this
enables  Pettit’s  “intersubjective  equality”  (Pettit  1997,  64)  to  come  about,  in  which
people  can  organize  economic  activities,  including  wage  labor  relationships,  in  a
moredemocratic manner. The important point, however, is that the notion of commons
developed here emphasizes non-dominated socio-ecological  interdependence and not
economic  independence.  Put  in  this  light,  the  advantage  of  commons  over  more
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individualistic property arrangements, such as Rawls’ property-owning democracy or a
basic income, is that the interdependencies are inscribed in the property arrangements
themselves.  While  criticizing  dependencies  that  result  from  asymmetrical  power
relations, a commons theory of property would not fall into the illusions of individual
independence, as many republican theories do, but would instead critically reflect how
interdependencies can be organized in a manner that hinders arbitrary interference and
domination  on  the  one  hand,  and  enables  negotiated  self-organization  of  economic
activities on the other. The fundamental question is not, therefore, whether interference
exists  or  not,  but  rather  how commons  arrangements  can  be  organized  in  order  to
distribute  freedoms  and  duties  in  a  manner  that  supports  the  interdependent  and
sustainable self-organization of all living beings. 
6.3.4. From Individual Labor to Interdependent Needs
Up until  now, we have reinterpreted John Locke’s theory of property by shifting our
understanding of property from ownership to guardianship and from non-interference
to  non-domination.  The  justification  of  these  shifts  was  largely  based  on  the  socio-
ecological interdependencies of living beings and the problems of arbitrary interference
and  domination  that  arose  out  of  a  purely  negative  definition  of  freedom.  The
connection of interdependencies and non-domination led me, in turn, to the justification
of a commons property arrangement. Now, however, a central question relevant to the
reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of property arises: How should the appropriation of
resources  from  commons  be  legitimized?  According  to  John  Locke,  the  ability  to
individually appropriate resources held in common is based on what is often defined as
the labor theory of property. By working on the resource, I have a right to declare it as
mine. In turn, Locke also declares that a thing must be one’s individual private property
in  order  to  use  or  consume  it.  In  order  to  critically  reinterpret  these  widespread
justifications of individual private property, let us begin with Locke’s labor theory of
property  and,  more  precisely,  Carol  Gould’s  critique  thereof  in  her  book  Rethinking
Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (1990). 
Similarly to my defense of an ecological  and interdependent interpretation of reality,
Gould argues that in order overcome the problems of domination and exploitation we
must base our property arrangements not on an individualistic, but on a social ontology.
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As a critique of Locke’s individual labor theory of property, she argues that most forms
of production occur not individually but through social cooperation and collaboration.
Conceptualizing labor activities in this manner, she thus maintains that the labor theory
of  property  “gives  rise  to  a  different  conception  of  property  right,  namely,  social
property”  (Gould  1990,  177).  Yet,  in  order  to  protect  a  minimal  realm  of  negative
freedom and non-interference for the individual, Gould distinguishes between personal
and social property. In this postulate, Gould differentiates between personal property
that  is  “required  for  the  individual’s  own subsistence  and  self-development”  (Gould
1990, 180) and social property, which is “required by individuals in common in order to
realize  their  joint  purposes”  (Gould  1990,  180).  Furthermore,  she  develops  two
fundamental  rights of  social  property.  Firstly,  the  “right  of  all  of  those engaged in  a
common activity  to control  the products of  that  activity,  or  to enjoy in  common the
benefits  of  their  labor”,  which  provides  the  “condition  for  the  development  of  the
sociality  of  individuals  as  individuals-in-relations”  (Gould  1990,  183).  Secondly,  she
argues in favor of the “equal right to control the conditions of social  activity” (ibid.),
which sounds very similar to our definition of democratic freedom. But Gould says that
this implies not only the “right to participate in decisions concerning the uses of the
conditions or means of social production in which one is engaged” but also “the right to
participate in decisions concerning the purposes and plans of the activity” (Gould 1990,
183-4).  Simply put,  the right to co-determination is based on ones participation in a
joint,  social  activity.  I  would  therefore  agree  with  Gould  that  such  a  social  right  to
democratic  co-determination  and  the  individual  right  to  the  fruits  of  one’s  social
activities  provides  an  important  cornerstone  for  a  more  social  and  democratic
interpretation of Locke’s labor theory of property. It provides a radical shift from the
right of the individual proprietor to exclude others to the right of others to be included
in  the  common  use  and  benefits  of  the  specific  resources.  Furthermore,  her
understanding  of  “labor”  is  broad  enough  to  include  not  only  people  in  wage-labor
relationships,  but  also people who participate in  unpaid social  activities.  Finally,  her
notion  of  social  property  is  not  conceptualized  as  state  property  but  rather  as  “the
property of the associated individuals engaged in a given common activity, whether in
an industry or a social organization” (Gould 1990, 189). 
On a similar note, this principle is also expressed by the legal scholar Burns H. Weston
and  commons  intellectual  David  Bollier  in  their  book  Green  Governance:  Ecological
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Survival,  Human  Rights,  and  the  Law  of  the  Commons (2013).  In  relation  to  the
“principles of internal [commons; LP] governance” (275) they write that “[c]ommoners
shall have collective control over the surplus value they create through the collective
management  of  their  shared wealth and resources”  (Weston and Bollier  2013,  277).
While Gould emphasizes the recognition of the individual equal right to positive freedom
in relation to others,  we would interpret  this  from our commons perspective  as the
equal right to individual and interdependent self-organization. Despite these gains in a
social and democratic reinterpretation of Locke, I would nevertheless argue that a labor
theory of property is not adequate for a commons theory of property because, firstly, it
remains  rather  exclusive  and,  secondly,  falsely  prioritizes  labor  activities  over  the
general right to existence through primal needs satisfaction. 
In order to understand these limitations,  let  us begin with the basic argument for a
(social) labor theory of property. Since we have already discussed the problems of a
labor theory of property in relation to the notion of ownership, we will now focus on the
more general problem of grounding a theory of property on labor. Put in more general
terms, it must be admitted that a labor theory of property does has an intuitive appeal: If
I (or we) change an object that is not owned by anyone, I (or we) should have the right
to declare that thing as mine (or ours). With Gould, we could say that if a group of people
kills a mammoth, then the group would have the right to the mammoth meat. Or, with a
more contemporary example, if a group of people build cars in a factory then they have a
right  to  co-determine  how  the  activities  are  organized  and  how  the  profits  of  the
company  are  distributed  between  the  employees.  Although  Gould  argues  that  her
concept of social property refers to the broad notion of “social activity” (Gould 1990,
183) and is thus not limited to wage-labor relationships, the principle of a labor theory
of property inherently limits the questions of co-determination to those performing the
specific labor activities. The other people, who are not engaged in these activities but are
nevertheless  largely  affected  by  them,  are  thus  excluded  from  the  rights  to  co-
determination.  Thus,  by  focusing  on  labor  activities,  people  outside  of  the  hunting,
farming or industrial activities (in both cases often women and the wider community)
are excluded from the decisions of how activities are organized and, more importantly,
what is then done with the fruits of labor generated by this activity. According to the
principle of non-interference, it would be assumed that people outside of these activities
should have no say in the co-determination of these affairs. Considering, however, the
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division of labor in society and the interdependent self-organization of living beings (i.e.
the dependence of the person pursuing wage-labor, the person at home taking care of
the  children and the  household  and  the  city  taking  care  of  the  education,  pollution,
unemployment etc.),  it  becomes less clear why people at home or in the community
should be completely excluded from the important decisions that are made in businesses
that largely affect and determine their lives. 
In order to understand this problem better, let us turn to an example that lies closer to
home:  The ability  to democratically  participate  in  political  affairs.  In  contrast  to  the
fundamental  right  to  democratic  co-determination  of  one’s  interdependent  life
conditions,  the  argument  for  political  participation  based  on  negative  liberty  and
individual private property, as presented by John Locke, is grounded on the right to non-
interference by the state authority. People are allowed to vote in matters of the state
because they are subjugated to the state monopoly on the use of force. Furthermore,
people (are coerced to) pay taxes for the state to provide certain public goods such as
law and order, roads or education. For this reason, because these people are subdued by
force to be a member of this specific association and are also required to pool private
resources through taxation, they ultimately should also have a say in how the state is
organized or, as is most often the case, they should be able to elect who shall rule and
determine the organization of the state and its activities. So, the main justification of the
democratic right to participate in public affairs of the state is the fact that citizens are
involuntarily  and  highly  affected  by  the  state’s  overarching  authority.  Political
participation  is  therefore  a  means  to  limit  arbitrary  interference  of  the  state  (i.e.
domination) and to collectively define its legitimate forms of interference (e.g. taxation).
In more general terms, participation is a means to legitimize the basic rules governing
our common reality. Here, the more fundamental right to democratic self-organization
shimmers  through  the  negative  right  to  non-interference.  According  to  the  classical
argument  based  on  negative  freedom,  one  would,  however,  have  no  right  to  co-
determine the organization of and use of surplus value in the firm one works in – or in
any other –, because one has the free choice to exit this wage labor relationship and
work  elsewhere  (where  one  will  also  most  likely  not  have  the  right  to  democratic
participation).  Finally,  if  one  is  not  happy  with  the  undemocratic  business  that  one
works in, one theoretically has the right to start a democratic enterprise with others.
According  to  this  logic,  the  exit  option  provides  people  with  the  ability  to  escape
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involuntary domination in “private” associations, but does not provide them with the
right to co-determination in the activities that they perform with others and in those
that they are affected by.
On the one hand, I would agree that we must differentiate between different types of
associations in which people live (e.g. the state versus private firms). On the other hand,
if  we understand freedom as  non-dominated freedom with,  through and against  the
other  in  the  co-determination  of  the  socio-ecosystems  that  one  inhabits,  the  strict
separation between the in-  and out-group becomes less clear.  Put  somewhat simply,
although I do have a choice between different partners,  products or jobs,  due to the
existential necessity of wage-labor (even in its non-dominated and democratic form),
the people of a community are largely affected by and interfered with by the way in
which firms conduct their business. In this sense, it makes a large difference for a society
as for example: how low (or high) wages are; what type of products are being produced
and sold (e.g. chemical or organic fertilizers); and what type of technology is being used
(e.g. whether very little labor or more craft and skill is necessary). Even though these
issues are often understood as private matters concerning, first and foremost, the official
owners of the firm (e.g. the shareholders), they do have large effects not only on the
workers  of  the  firm,  but  also  on  the  surrounding  community  and  the  wider  public
because they share a common reality and are dependent on this reality for their life and
liberty.  Parallel  to  the  dependence  of  an  individual’s  life  and  liberty  on  wage  labor
relationships, we must admit that communities are also greatly affected by, dependent
on and, thus, potentially dominated by the economic activities of “private” associations.
While  Carol  Gould’s  social  labor  theory  of  property  would  widen  this  range  of  co-
determination to those performing the specific collective activities within the firm, the
affected communities nevertheless remain excluded from this process of democratically
negotiated self-organization.  As we see, therefore, the social interpretation of a labor
theory of property is  limited due to its  focus on the performance of labor activities,
which then excludes those human and non-human beings that are largely affected by the
activities yet are not actively participating in them. For this reason, I would argue that it
is necessary to include not only the shareholders and those performing specific labor
activities, but also the largely affected stakeholders in the democratic co-determination
of enterprises, ultimately transforming an economic enterprise and association into a
type of commons (Tortia 2011). Put slightly differently, the arbitrary interference in and
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potential  domination  of  enterprises  in  one’s  private  life  plans  legitimizes  the  non-
arbitrary “interference”  in  or,  rather,  the  co-determination  of  social  activities  of
(re)production  in  economic  organizations  that  effect  one’s  interdependent  common
reality. We will discuss the notion of economic commons associations in greater detail
later,  but let us now turn to the second fundamental problem in the labor theory of
property: The priority of labor over life.  
The  question  that  arises  from  our  previous  discussion  of  economic  activities,  the
division of labor and the affected community is therefore whether labor itself is truly the
ideal justification for the appropriation of resources and the appointment of authority to
determine the allocation and use of resources. I will not discuss the intricate details of
the difficulties in the labor theory of property (Waldron 1988, Ch. 6). Instead, I would
like to begin with Hume and Kant’s general critique of Locke’s labor theory of property
that  a  minimal  possession  of  external  resources  must  precede  any  form  of  labor.
According to them, this prior possession does not arise from labor,  but instead from
simple occupation (ibid., 173-4).75 It is the prior occupation of land and space that, in
turn, enables people to access, labor on and use these resources. Or, more simply put,
property in the world is a precondition of labor – and therefore also for life and liberty.
Only if I can access resources (whether directly or through contract) can I then work on
them in order to survive and, hopefully, live freely. This insight figuratively turns Locke’s
labor theory of value on its head – or, as will become clear, back to its original meaning.
Although I would not necessarily agree with the manner in which Hume and Kant frame
the problem as a warlike state of nature in which each individual must protect his or her
goods from the threatening dispossession by others, I would nevertheless agree with
their general insight. Yet, in a somewhat less individualistic and belligerent rhetoric, we
could  also  say  that  the  original  appropriation  of  external  resources  does  not  occur
through labor, but through people simply being in the world. 
If this argument is correct, it would also require us to reinterpret the notion of the “right
to  property”.  To  do  this,  it  may  be  helpful  to  use  Jeremy  Waldron’s  differentiation
75  In the words of Jeremy Waldron, “Before a man can cultivate a piece of ground,
he must take it into his possession and exclude others from its use; otherwise their exercise of common
rights might make his cultivation impossible” (Waldron 1988, 173).
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between  a  special-right  based  and  a  general-right  based  argument  for  property.76
Waldron defines the concept of “rights” and the different arguments accordingly: 
“A right-based argument for private property is,  as we have said, an argument
which takes an individual interest to be sufficiently important in itself to justify
holding others (especially the government) to be under duties to create, secure,
maintain,  or  respect  an  institution  of  private  property.  A  special-right-based
argument (or  SR-based  argument,  for  short)  is  an  argument  which  takes  an
interest to have this importance not in itself but on account of the occurence of
some contingent  event or transaction.  A  general-right-based argument (or GR-
based argument, for short) is one which does not take the importance of such an
interest to depend on the occurrence of some contingent event or transaction,
but attributes that importance to the interest itself,  in virtue of  its qualitative
character” (Waldron 1988, 115-6).
This distinction enables us to pinpoint a central problem in the labor theory of property.
Put in general terms, John Locke transforms the primary and original general-right to
access resources in the original state of nature into a special and contingent right to
appropriate  resources  through  labor.  Furthermore,  Locke’s  justification  of  private
property was based not only on the right to the fruits of one’s labor, but also on the
increased productivity that was brought about through labor and private ownership.
Simply put, those who produced  more possessed the ultimate right to resources.  For
example,  it  was  the  increase  of  “comforts”  and  “conveniences”  (§41)  through
productivity  gains  in  farming  that  justified  the  taking  of  the  “wild  woods  and
uncultivated waste of America” from the “needy and wretched inhabitants” of the New
World (§37).  Although Locke did not  actually argue for the privatization of common
lands  in  England  (§35),  the  reasons  that  justified  the  violent  expropriation  and
enclosure  of  commons  were  based  on  similar  arguments  (Neeson  1996).  As  Locke
explains,  “God gave the world to men in Common; but since he gave it them for their
benefit,  and the  greatest  Conveniencies  of  Life they were capable  to  draw from it,  it
cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (§34;
emphasis added). This special-rights based argument for individual private property has
grand implications: On the one hand, Locke assumes that productivity and resources
held in common are mutually exclusive; on the other hand, it implies that an increase in
productivity provides people with the right to own resources over those who are less
productive  (i.e.  farming over  hunting  and gathering,  industrial  production over  craft
76  It should be noted, however, that Jeremy Waldron adopted this distinction form
H.L.A. Hart (Waldron 1988, 106).
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work  etc.).  Both  of  these  assumptions  and  arguments  are  still  widespread  today
(Demsetz  2002).  Moreover,  the  priority  of  productivity  leads  to  a  linear,  growth-
oriented justification of property arrangements and economic activities instead of, for
example,  arrangements based on care for  the sustainable reproduction of resources.
That  being  said,  we  may  conclude  that  Locke’s  special-rights  based  argument  of
resource appropriation through productive labor does not secure the general right to
life, liberty and property for all, but instead leads to the privilege of those with greater
strength and skill to extract more common resources from nature and society. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  Carol  Gould’s  labor  theory  of  social  property  attempts  to
mitigate this problem by stating that everyone participating in a specific activity should
likewise control the means of subsistence and production and have a share in the fruits
of labor. Yet nevertheless, a very large asymmetry between those who can produce more
and those who cannot or do not produce much can result thereof. This is precisely the
problem that Karl Marx describes in his  Critique of the Gotha Programme, in which he
criticizes the principle of the equal right to the fruits of one’s (social) labor: 
“The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality
consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor. But
one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor
in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure,
must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard
of  measurement.  This  equal right  is  an  unequal  right  for  unequal  labor.  It
recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone
else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus
productive capacity, as a natural privilege” (Marx 2009, 9-10).
As  Marx  emphasizes,  while  the  focus  on  labor  may  be  correct  according  to  certain
standards of justice and equality, it nevertheless remains an abstraction that negates the
differences  between  individuals’  productive  capabilities  and  activities,  ultimately
creating and legitimizing a material inequality between people. This inequality can then,
in turn, lead to power asymmetries and relationships of domination between people.   In
Waldron’s terminology,  we could say that even a  social labor theory of property is a
special right and thus remains contingent and somewhat arbitrary. According to Marx,
this is due to the focus on the distribution of goods in the “sphere of circulation” after
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the goods have been produced – instead of the distribution of the means of subsistence
and production themselves. 
In order to deal with this problem, I would therefore argue with Jeremy Waldron that we
must shift  our legitimation of property from a specific-right  based to a general-right
based  argument.  This  implies,  in  Lockean  terms,  a  shift  from  the  labor  theory  of
property  “back”  to  the  primary  general  right  of  all  people  to  access  resources  that
originally belonged to all of humanity. But then what would the justification of the right
to use and appropriate goods be based on, if not labor? The answer to this question is
quite simple and has already been mentioned: Needs. As Waldron explains, 
“[A] GR-based argument for private property is not satisfied by the assignment of
one  or  two  trivial  or  useless  resources  to  each  individual;  it  requires  the
assignment to individuals of resources that they take seriously as the basis of
their individual economic well-being. Thus the universal distribution of private
property, required by a GR-based argument is likely, as a matter of fact, to satisfy
the demands of the principle of need, for in seeing to it that everyone has private
property, the proponents of that argument will also in effect be seeing to it that
everyone  has  the  wherewithal  to  satisfy  his  basic  needs”  (Waldron  1988,  440;
emphasis added).
 
According to Waldron, the shift from a special-rights based labor theory of property to a
general-rights  based  needs  theory of  property  places  the  principle  of  occupation  or
rather being, life and self-preservation at the heart of our property arrangement. It can
therefore be said that a labor theory of property reverses the fundamental relationship
with the world from one based on embodied being in relationships with the world to
one based on the unequal opportunity to pursue productive activities. One’s relationship
to the socio-ecosystem is therefore dependent on one’s arbitrary natural endowments
and one’s capability to work and accumulate. The labor theory of property assumes that
humans  should  first  work  and  then eat  and  have  shelter,  even though  they require
shelter,  food  and  most  likely  many more  resources  (e.g.  education)  before  they  can
work. Simply put, basic needs must be fulfilled before work can be performed. Anyone
who has brought up children knows this to be a general fact. For this reason, a more just
theory of property must place needs satisfaction over labor. In Lockean terminology, we
must therefore conclude that a property regime that fulfills this criteria of life, liberty
and property for all is not one based on labor, but on the more general right to existence
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through the access to resources that enables one to satisfy one’s needs. Yet, to be precise
we  must  admit  that  Jeremy  Waldron  is  not  arguing  for  a  general  right  to  common
property or commons. However, although he focuses on individual private property, the
argument also holds true for common property.  And as we have already argued, the
justification for the access to commons instead of individual private property is the fact
that commons provide people with the more adequate institutional arrangement to deal
with conflict in the satisfaction of people’s common and interdependent needs. 
In conclusion, it can therefore be said that the development of a commons theory of
property demands that we critically revise Locke’s renowned labor theory of property.
As  has  been  demonstrated,  this  demands  a  threefold  shift  in  our  understanding  of
property: Firstly, the shift  from (self-)ownership to (self-)guardianship integrates the
wider socio-ecological web of life in institutional property arrangements. Secondly, the
shift from non-interference to non-domination requires that people have direct access to
resources held in common in order to avert arbitrary interference and, in turn, enable
the  co-determination  of  one’s  activities  and  life  conditions.  Lastly,  the  critique  of  a
(social) labor theory of property has demonstrated the necessity to prioritize the more
basic and general right to resources according to interdependent needs satisfaction (i.e.
“being”,  life  or  self-preservation)  over  the  special  right  to  resources  through  labor
appropriation. 
After having worked through this central theory of property, the question arises how
such a right to property should be conceived.  To gain an idea of what such a property
arrangement might look like, let us now to turn to the work of John Rawls, who also
argues  for  the  direct  access  to  resources  or,  in  his  terminology,  an  ex  ante or  pre-
distribution of property in the name of individual freedom and democracy. Parallel to
our  revision  of  Locke’s  theory  of  property,  we  will  now  critically  examine  and
reinterpret Rawls’  notion of pre-distribution and property-owning democracy from a
commons perspective. 
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6.4. Pre-distribution: Commons in a Property-Owning Democracy 
It  can  generally  be  said  that  John  Rawls  is  one  of  the  most  important  political
philosophers of the 20th century. His magnus opus A Theory of Justice (1972/1999)77 has
until today remained a central reference for the arguments and conceptualization of a
free and just society. Within this work and somewhat more explicitly in his later book
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls discusses the property arrangements of
such a society. Here, Rawls develops and defends the notion of pre-distribution, in which
property in  resources  is  understood as a  precondition to one’s  life  and liberty.  This
principle  of  pre-distribution  allows  him  to  develop  a  model  of  property-owning
democracy, which we will analyze here. The question that then arises is whether this
notion of pre-distribution and property-owning democracy can aid our development of a
commons theory of property and if not, how we must reinterpret Rawls’ model. In order
to answer this question I will, firstly, sketch Rawls’ theory of justice and his concept of a
property-owning democracy. Next, I will discuss the relation between the individual and
society and critically analyze the role of the competitive market in this model. Finally, I
argue  that  an  ecologically  sound  pre-distribution  scheme  must  shift  its  focus  from
productive assets  and productivity to shared resources and the care thereof.  Thus,  I
claim  that  common  property  arrangements  would  provide  a  better  background
structure for a sustainable property-owning democracy.
6.4.1. John Rawls’ Property Owning Democracy
In  order  to  grasp  Rawl’s  understanding  of  pre-distribution  and  a  property-owning
democracy, I will first portray and discuss his theory of justice largely with reference to
his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001).
Rawls formulates the fundamental idea of justice as “a fair system of social cooperation
over time from one generation to the next” (JF, 5). He breaks this concept down into his
two principles of justice:   
“(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal  basic  liberties,  which  scheme  is  compatible  with  the  same  scheme  of
liberties for all; and 
77  In my discussion of Rawls’ theory of justice, I will refer to the second edition of
the book A Theory of Justice published in 1999 with the abbreviation “TJ”. The book Justice as Fairness will
be mentioned as “JF”.
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(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).” (JF, 42-3)
The  first  principle  should  enable  the  “fair  equality  of  opportunity,”  which  is  more
generally  understood as  “liberal  equality”  (JF,  44).  The second principle,  on the  one
hand,  refers  to  the  “fair  value of  political  liberties,”  which  should  ensure  the  “equal
chance of influencing the government’s  policy and of attaining positions of  authority
irrespective of their economic and social class” (JF, 46). On the other hand, the second
principle  also  includes  Rawls’  famous “difference principle”  which radically  binds  or
limits  the  individual  accumulation of  wealth to  the  benefit  of  those  least  well-off  in
society.  Within our ecological  understanding of social  reality,  the difference principle
could be understood as a means to express the principle of social interdependence and
the requirement that a society can only flourish when all individuals can also flourish. As
mentioned  previously,  it  can  provide  a  strategy  to  limit  arbitrary  interference  and
domination. 
Rawls conceptualized his theory of justice to lay the foundations for the “basic structure”
of  a  just  and  free  society.  According  to  Rawls,  the  basic  structure78 is  the  “primary
subject of political justice” (JF, 10) and should secure just “background institutions” that
“remain  fair  over  time,  from one  generation  to  the  next”  (JF,  51).  The reason these
institutions  are  in  the  “background”  is  because  they  are  supposedly  founded  on  a
general overlapping consensus of the members of a society and should thus not be put
into question or attacked anew in each period of legislation. These institutions should
make justice and freedom socially sustainable.  
After his first formulation of a just basic structure, Rawls’ theory of justice was believed
for a long time to defend and legitimize welfare-state capitalism. He sparingly revised
this common interpretation for the first time in the preface to the second edition of  A
Theory of Justice in 1999 (TJ, xiv-xvi) and then more extensively in his later book Justice
78  Here,  Rawls  elaborates  on  the  concept  of  the  basic  structure:  “[T]he  basic
structure of a society is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together
into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the
division  of  advantages  that  arises  from  social  cooperation  over  time.  […]  The  basic  structure  is  the
background social framework within which the activities of associations and individuals take place. A just
basic structure secures what we may call background justice” (JF, 10).
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as Fairness in 2001.  Since this reformulation, there has been a growing interest in the
interpretation and further implications of his theory of justice  (O'Neill and Williamson
2012, Cheneval and Laszlo 2013). 
In his discussion of the specific institutions of a just basic structure, Rawls differentiates
between five different regime types: State socialism with a command economy, laissez-
faire  capitalism,  welfare-state  capitalism,  property-owning  democracy  and  liberal
(democratic) socialism. Not very surprisingly, Rawls rejects state socialism because it is
controlled by a single political party and “violates the equal basic rights and liberties, not
to mention the fair value of these liberties” (JF, 138). In this regime type, the economy is
structured according to a general plan that negates both democratic participation and
free  markets.  Yet,  Rawls  also  criticizes  laissez-faire  capitalism,  which  he  calls  “the
system of natural liberty” (JF, 137) because it “secures only formal equality” and rejects
both principles of justice (JF, 137).79 To the surprise of some, however, Rawls also argues
that welfare-state capitalism (WSC) does not live up to the standards of his theory of
justice.   Although WSC does  express  “some  concern  for  equality  of  opportunity,  the
policies necessary to achieve that are not followed” (JF, 138).  Furthermore, WSC also
rejects the second principle of justice, the fair value of political liberties. Due to these
underlying  values,  WSC  “permits  very  large  inequalities  in  the  ownership  of  real
property (productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the economy
and much of political life rests in a few hands” (JF, 138). While WSC generally provides
those in need with a social minimum, the inequalities that bring such needs forth are
themselves not regulated, limited or eradicated.
The only answer to the failings of state socialism, laissez-faire capitalism and welfare-
state  capitalism  is  what  Rawls  calls  property-owning  democracy  (POD)  or  liberal
(democratic) socialism. While he only shortly discusses liberal socialism, Rawls develops
79  In a letter to Philippe Van Parijs, Rawls elaborates on his critique of laissez-faire
capitalism. Here, he sharply criticizes the “large open market” of the European Union, because it “is aim of
the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit” (Rawls and Van
Parijs 2003). This economic class justifies their interests with the “idea of economic growth, onwards and
upwards, with no specific end in sight” (ibid.). He continues that distribution is almost exclusively referred
to  without  the  mentioning  of  welfare-state  redistribution  and  “in  terms of  trickle  down”  (ibid.).  The
problem with such an unregulated market economy is that the “long–term result  of  this […] is  a  civil
society awash in a meaningless consumerism of some kind” (ibid.). With reference to this sharp critique, it
can be said that Rawls rejects large, open markets in general because they are often utilized by economic
(and political) elites to accumulate capital without having to redistribute their gains to other members of
society.  Furthermore,  such a market economy creates individuals that are  merely consumers and not
understood – or do not understand themselves – as political citizens.
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the  differences  between  WSC  and  POD  in  somewhat  more  detail.  Liberal  socialism
consists, according to Rawls, of a regime in which the means of production are owned
“by  society”  (JF,  138).  Yet,  in  comparison  to  state  socialism,  a  plurality  of  parties
compete  and,  therefore,  are  forced  to  share  political  power.  Furthermore,  economic
power is not centralized but “dispersed among [democratically organized; LP] firms” (JF,
138). And, just as importantly, economic activities are structured not by a centralized
plan but through “a system of free and workably competitive markets” (JF, 138). Despite
the few comments on liberal socialism, it appears as though this regime is what many
other intellectuals understand as market socialism: An economy organized by worker-
owned firms and a “free” market economy (Miller 1990). 
Aside  from  liberal  socialism,  the  only  other  social  arrangement  that  realizes  Rawls’
principles of justice is what he calls property-owning democracy (POD).80 Similarly to
liberal  socialism,  POD must,  according to Rawls,  be understood as “an alternative  to
capitalism” (JF, 135-6). However, while liberal socialism emphasizes social ownership,
similar to laissez-faire capitalism and WSC, POD allows for individual private property in
productive  assets.  The  major  difference between WSC and  POD is,  nonetheless,  that
while WSC allows “a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of production,”
POD ensures a “wide and far more equal dispersion of real property and productive
assets” (JF, 161). Importantly, this also includes human capital, “that is, education and
trained skills” (JF, 139). Rawls is, however, rather vague in defining what these primary
goods could be. Besides education and training, the focus is often on what Rawls calls
“productive assets”,  which are interpreted by most of those developing his  notion of
POD  as  “productive  capital”  (O'Neill  2012,  80,  Hsieh  2012,  156,  Freeman  2013,  23,
Thomas 2017, 307). Furthermore, in a POD the distribution of capital and wealth occurs
not  at  the  “end  of  each  period”  (ibid.)  after  the  process  of  production  and  the
distribution of assets through market exchange have taken their course but rather “at
the beginning of each period” (JF, 139). The shift from WSC to POD is thus a shift from ex
post to ex ante distribution. The shift in perspective is important because it intends “not
simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must
be done), but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs on a
footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality” (JF, 139). Put somewhat
80  The concept of POD was adopted from the English economist James E. Meade
(1907-1995),  who explicitly  discussed  the term in  his  book  Efficiency,  Equality  and the  Ownership  of
Property (1964).
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differently, POD attempts to realize the substantive equality in which the right to life,
liberty and property is not merely understood negatively as the  protection of already
existing property relations but also positively as a general right to access the means of
production.  This  shift  from  redistribution  to  pre-distribution  should  transform
individuals  dependent on welfare into  independent individuals capable of equally and
freely  participating  in  social  cooperation.  While  inequalities  and  dependencies  often
lead to class antagonisms and political  apathy,  this material  independence should,  in
turn,  provide  recognition  and  self-confidence  to  all  members  of  society,  ultimately
empowering them to participate in democratic politics (JF, 140). 
6.4.2. Rawls’ Notion of the Individual and Society 
After  having  laid  out  Rawls’  general  understanding  of  his  theory  of  justice  and  a
property-owning democracy, the question arises why he focused on a wide dispersion of
individual private property. Generally, Rawls grounds the priority of individual freedom
and, therefore, individual private property on the “reasonable pluralism” of individual
conceptions of the good. Due to the plurality of ends individuals pursue, Rawls argues
for the priority of the right over the good, which, in turn, should be realized through the
original position and an overlapping consensus. 
To delineate Rawls’ position more clearly,  it  may be helpful here to shortly compare
Rawls’ concept of justice with Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s concept of the commons. On
the most general level, there appears to exist quite an overlap in the conceptualization of
Rawls’ well-ordered, just and democratic society and the Ostroms’ design principles for
the  sustainable  and  democratic  governance  of  resources  and  institutions  held  in
common.  Both  the  Ostroms  and  Rawls  emphasize  the  importance  of  a  shared
understanding of  justice,  the  significance of  shared knowledge of  the  constitution of
society’s basic structure and the necessity of effective self-organization. That being said,
while the Ostroms develop their under-theorized concepts of justice and sustainability
from  empirical  examples  of  pre-contractual  social  cooperation  and  democratic
participation, Rawls grounds his normative position in the thought experiment of the
“veil of ignorance” and the “original position” and in the contractual agreement of an
“overlapping consensus.” 
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Due to the conflicting plurality of individual concepts of the good, the veil of ignorance
and the original position enable people to “be removed from and not distorted by the
particular features and circumstances of the existing basic structure” (JF, 15).  According
to Rawls,  it  is  precisely the thought experiment of  the original  position that  enables
people  to  grasp  the  equality  of  persons  despite  opposing  interests  and  unequal
bargaining  advantages  (JF,  16).  The  aim  of  the  hypothetical  and  ahistorical  original
position (JF, 16-7) is to provide a just procedure in order to arrive at an “overlapping
consensus” or social agreement on the “fair terms of social cooperation between citizens
regarded as such” (JF, 16). While the Ostroms define symmetrical (or more or less equal)
relationships as a central prerequisite for fair and sustainable democratic governance,
Rawls formulates a just procedure that provides a hypothetical symmetry of each party
despite the actual lack thereof. In relation to the “tragedy of the commons”, it could be
said that Rawls’ original position enables humans to overcome tragedy by creating just
and stable social arrangements through contractual agreements based on the insights
from  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance.  The  tragedy  is  overcome  when  all  participants
recognize  both  the  equality  of  all  and  the  mutual  advantage  resulting  from  social
cooperation. 
That  being  said,  the  contrast  between  the  Ostroms  and  Rawls  should  not  be
overemphasized, because more overlap exists than initially perceived. In this sense, I do
not wish to focus on the communitarian-liberalism debate in this short discussion of
Rawls.  As  Sybil  Schwarzenbach persuasively  argues  in  her  article  Rawls,  Hegel,  and
Communitarianism, this debate is a “red herring”  (Schwarzenbach 1991, 564), because
Rawls himself does not advocate the “abstract”, “denuded” and “asocial” individualism
that many communitarians such as Michael Sandel  (1986), Charles Taylor  (1994) and
Michael Walzer (1989, 185) see in his writing. Contrarily, in the third part of A Theory of
Justice Rawls strongly emphasizes the importance of complementary cooperation for the
“social  union”  and the realization of  the  “well-ordered society”.81 Rawls explains,  for
example: 
“The social  nature of  mankind is best  seen  by contrast  with the conception of
private society. Thus human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value
their  common institutions  and activities  as  good in themselves.  We need one
another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the
successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary to our
81  See especially chapter 79 “The Idea of the Social Union”. 
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own good.  […] Thus we may say following Humboldt  that it  is  through social
union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person
can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. We are
led to the notion of the community of humankind the members of which enjoy
one another’s excellences and individuality elicited by free institutions, and they
recognize  the  good  of  each  as  an  element  in  the  complete  activity  the  whole
scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all” (TJ, 458-9; emphasis
added).
As we see, Rawls’ concept of a just society reaffirms our insight of the interdependent
self-organization and convivial flourishing of the individual for the whole and the whole
for the individual. The provision of the access to property enables people to satisfy their
needs in a self-organizing manner that is in accordance with their natural endowments
and capabilities – and those of others. Furthermore, this provision does not simply occur
“magically” through the public institutions of the state, but trough the “collective activity
of justice [which] is the preeminent form of human flourishing” (ibid., 463). This concept
of  justice  as  the  basic  structure  could thus  be  understood as  the  shared norms and
values of a community brought about by and reproduced through civic social actions,
interactions and institutions. 
6.4.3. The Competitive Market and the Problem of Endless Growth
The  problem in  Rawls’  concept  of  justice,  therefore,  does  not  lie  in  the  discrepancy
between  the  individual  and  society  as  is  often  discussed  in  the  communitarian-
liberalism debate. Instead, I would argue the problem lies in two tensions: on the one
hand, a tension between the “private” economic reproduction of society and the “public”
reproduction of a society’s basic structure; on the other hand, a tension between the
non-ideal reality and the ideal concept of justice. Expressed somewhat differently, the
problem in Rawls’ theory of justice is not the individual-society-state relationship, but
rather the market-state dichotomy.  Because we will  discuss the concept of non-ideal
theory in more depth later, let us shortly turn to Rawls’ understanding of the market. 
Interestingly, in both property-owning democracy and liberal socialism, Rawls defends a
wide distribution of property against the backdrop of a competitive market economy.
The combination of a wide distribution of productive assets and a system of “(workably)
competitive  markets”  (TJ,  xiv)  is  meant  to  “prevent  a  small  part  of  society  from
controlling the economy and indirectly political life itself” (ibid., xiv-xv). The assumption
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is that competitive markets “properly regulated secure free choice of occupation and
lead to an efficient use of resources and allocation of commodities to households” (TJ,
244). In their ideal form, regulated competitive markets – coupled with the widespread
distribution of productive assets – should ensure not merely the freedom of association,
but also the efficient use of society’s resources. Finally, it must also be noted that Rawls’
just and well-ordered society does not necessarily require perpetual economic growth;
ex ante distribution in line with the two principles of justice should also, theoretically, be
realizable in a stationary state (JF, 63-4).82 
Although this  might  be assumed,  I  generally question whether the wide dispersal  of
individually owned productive  assets combined with highly competitive markets can
actually  be  realized  and  maintained  over  generations.  Here,  I  would  argue  that  the
economic  “virtues”  (pursuit  of  self-interest,  competitiveness  etc.)  that  are  cultivated
through individual  private property and open and competitive market  arrangements
would  undermine  the  social  cooperation  necessary  for  the  stable  or  “sustainable”
reproduction of the just basic structure of society “over time from one generation to the
next” (JF, 5). This is a common critique of Rawls’ theory of justice and property-owning
democracy  (Krouse and McPherson 1988, 102-3,  Wesche 2013, 106-9, Hussain 2009,
Roemer 2013). Aside from this ethical argument, highly competitive markets inherently
lead to the accumulation and overuse of socio-ecological resources, as we have already
discussed.  This  is  what we understood as the tragedy of privatization and open and
competitive markets.  In this sense,  I would agree with Sybil  Schwarzenbach that the
provision  of  “productive  capital”  is  highly  conducive  to  “exclusive  and  acquisitive”
ownership  (Schwarzenbach 1987, 144) and ultimately to an economy geared towards
perpetual monetary growth. 
The reasons for this are twofold:  Firstly, for capital to be productive, it is invested into a
specific enterprise for interest. This implies that the firm must produce and sell goods,
which, in turn, enables the entrepreneurs to earn profit and pay the interest back. Then,
however, the increased amount of capital is lent again with the aim of receiving interest.
82  In Justice as Fairness, Rawls writes, “A further feature of the difference principle
is that it does not require continual economic growth over generations to maximize upward indefinitely the
expectations of  the least  advantaged (assessed in terms of  income and wealth).  That  would  not be a
reasonable conception of justice. We should not rule out Mill's idea of a society in a just stationary state
where (real) capital accumulation may cease.  A well-ordered society is specified so as to allow for this
possibility.” (JF, 63-4; emphasis added).
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In turn,  more goods are produced and consumers (hopefully) buy more things.  As is
important to note, with each time capital is lent, its amount must be increased, for that is
the reason why it was lent. If the expected rate of interest cannot be paid back, capital is
withheld and the economy slumps or breaks down. This is what Streeck refers to as the
“investment strike” of capital  (Streeck 2013, 50). In this sense, the inherent logic of an
economy based on interest and productive capital is one of perpetual and exponential
growth  (Hardin 1993,  61-68).  Due to  this  dynamic,  the  amount  of  productive  assets
made available to each citizen must, in turn, also be increased in each round of ex ante
pre-distribution.  Secondly,  the reproduction and pre-distribution of capital  separates
the monetary mediation of needs satisfaction from the socio-ecological basis of wealth
production.  This  separation  then  often  enables  humans  to  ignore  and  forget  where
monetary  wealth  originates  and  allows  people  to  believe  that  material  wealth  can
increase  without  limits  –  despite  the  limits  to  economic  growth in  a  world  of  finite
resources. Or, put somewhat differently, the pre-distribution of productive capital not
only  neglects  the  question  of  how capital  is  produced  and  reproduced,  but  also
transforms the means to satisfy one’s needs (through money) into an end in itself (wealth
accumulation and the potential to satisfy ever more increasing needs). Yet, as previously
mentioned, it is not only capital’s “veil of ignorance” that allows us to forget the socio-
ecological foundation of wealth and to develop unlimited material needs and desires, but
it  is  rather  a  central  and  inherent  function  of  productive  capital  to  perpetually  and
exponentially grow. In this sense, the supposed stability that results from an economy
based  on  productive  capital  and  competitive  markets  is  socio-ecologically  highly
unsustainable (Schweickart 2012, 213).
Although Rawls does argue that we could have a steady state economy, I believe for the
aforementioned  reasons  that  the  pre-distribution  of  “productive  capital”  would
nevertheless result in an ecologically unstable growth-oriented economic system – even
if the ex ante distribution of these assets were highly fair and just. The usual answer to
this problem would be that robust laws and a “just background structure” could protect
socio-ecological  resources  from  overuse.  If,  however,  unlimited  growth  is  a  central
feature of the economy then both the people demanding their return on investment and
those  required  to  pay  their  interest  back  will  always  attempt  to  undermine  and
challenge these rules. More generally expressed, and as has already been discussed in
relation to the state-market dichotomy, the separation of the individual and “private”
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economic interests from general, “public” interests ultimately leads to the limitation of
political  regulation  and  democratic  organization  of  socio-ecological  systems.
Consequently, a property arrangement based on “exclusive and acquisitive” ownership
of  productive  capital  will  ultimately  be  unable  to  sustainably  reproduce  the  socio-
ecological just basic structure of society (Schweickart 2012, 213). 
6.4.4. From Productivity to Care 
For this reason, I would defend Rawls’ argument for pre-distribution and a property-
owning democracy,  but I  would argue that an  ex ante distribution must be based on
something  other  than  “productive  capital”  for  overcoming  domination  and  the  self-
organized satisfaction of needs. As can be expected, my answer to this problem is the
access to commons and the practice of commoning in the form of democratic negotiation
over  the  use  of  economic  resources  that  are  held  in  common.  Yet,  because
democratically  organized  activities  can  also  be  structured  according  to  perpetual
growth, I  would argue that it  is  also necessary to shift  our core normative value for
economic activities from productivity to care. To do this, I would like to step back and
analyze the concept of productivity and ecological limits in relation to the work of John
Locke  and  Adam  Smith.  Although  this  jump  back  in  time  might  appear  somewhat
anachronistic,  I  would argue that Rawls’  notion of productive assets appears to echo
John Locke’s and Adam Smith’s focus on productivity as a central feature of a legitimate
socio-economic arrangement. After examining their arguments, I will then relate them
back to John Rawls’ notion of productive assets for a property-owning democracy.
As has already been discussed in relation to Locke, not only labor, but, more specifically,
productive  labor  lays  the  foundations  for  the  right  to  appropriate  resources.  The
cultivation of land is, for example, more productive than hunting and gathering because
it  produces  greater  yields  per  unit  of  labor  and  land  (§41-3).  In  this  respect,  labor
activities that increase the number of material goods in the world are to be understood
as productive. Adam Smith also adopts this normative notion of productive labor and
clearly differentiates between unproductive and productive labor. Unproductive labor
includes, for example, services performed by “churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of
letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers”  (Smith
1994, 361) – and, obviously, people who care for children, the sick and the elderly. The
notion of productivity is therefore limited only to very specific activities, which, in turn,
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provide the supposedly “unproductive” people with food, clothes, homes, computers and
cars. In contrast to Locke, Adam Smith argues, however, that it is not merely an increase
in  material  goods  (use  value)  that  should  be  described  as  productive,  but  also  the
increase in profits that result from the sales of these goods on the market (exchange
value).  Their  emphasis  on  productivity  is  understandable  considering  the  socio-
economic  realities  prior  to  the  industrial  revolution.  In  this  sense,  the  focus  on
productivity has brought about an immense increase in the output of material goods and
monetary wealth over the last two hundred years.  The main reasons given for these
developments are, firstly, individual private property, which enables the individual to
use a specific resource in a manner to increase its yields and then sell the goods for
profit. Secondly, the competition between individual producers that results from open
markets  forces  market  participants  to  perpetually  increase  levels  of  productivity  in
order  to  produce  more  goods  for  a  cheaper  price  and  thus  maintain  a  competitive
advantage.  We have already discussed this issue in detail.  According to Adam Smith,
however, another main reason for the increases in productivity is the division of labor
which can more generally be understood as the rationalization of production processes.
This argument lies at the beginning of Adam Smith’s book The Wealth of Nations. 
Therefore, for us to understand where the increase in productivity in modern economies
comes from, I would like to analyze Adam Smith’s argument for the division of labor in
more detail and, more specifically, his famous example of the pin maker. Adam Smith
argues that the output of pin production could increase greatly if it were not one person
who performed all the tasks to produce a pin, but if, instead, the process of pin-making
were divided into numerous steps that would then each be executed by a different single
person.  By  dividing  up  the  labor  between  many  people,  each  laborer  becomes  a
specialist for one single activity, which increases the efficiency of the work process for
making a single pin, ultimately increasing the number of pins that can be produced in
the same amount of labor time (e.g.  one day).  Lastly,  Adam Smith notes that further
efficiency gains can then also be achieved through the use of machines. This is the usual
story  that  is  told  when  discussing  increases  in  productivity  through  rationalization
processes and specialization. What is noteworthy is that the story being told is linear
and progressive: There is a beginning and an end, and the in the end we have more than
in the beginning. So where does this “more” come from?
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To understand productivity from a socio-ecological perspective, we must shift our focus
from the linear process of production to the reproduction of life in ecosystems. Here, we
must also note that the amount of matter and energy on earth remains more or less
constant over time. From this perspective,  the creation of wealth merely implies the
reconfiguration of existing matter and energy into goods that we then, in turn, define as
wealth. For example, the amount of metal in the world before and after the production
process has remained the same. The increase in the production of pins simply means
that more metal has been extracted from the earth and is transformed into pins within a
shorter period of time. Let us call this the “nature side” of the equation. In this equation,
however, we must also include the wood or coal that is burnt in order to change the
form of the metal. It can generally be assumed that the increase in pin production would
require an increase in use of wood or coal. Today, the source of energy would be oil, gas,
nuclear energy, solar energy or wind energy. On a side note, all these energy sources
have a material base and effect the environment in specific ways, such as, for example,
the materials to build solar panels and wind turbines. But let us leave the question of
new “green” sources of energy out of the picture for the moment. In Adam Smith’s case,
the accumulated energy in the wood or coal is released into the air in the form of carbon
dioxide, which is then transformed back into oxygen by plants through the process of
photosynthesis. While trees can grow back, the cycle of coal (or oil) formation occurs
over hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of years. The point I wish to make here is
that what is often understood as increases in productivity is not only the transformation
of specific resources into use or exchange values, but also the release of accumulated
energy into the atmosphere. More specifically, the increases in productivity are not only
based on the rationalization of labor processes,  but  also dependent on the ability to
release stored energy from coal and oil (Wrigley 2004, 68-86). Expressed in somewhat
different terms, it is not only labor, but also the exploitation of large amounts of the gifts
of  ancient  “buried  sunshine”  (Mitchell  2011,  12) that  allows  humans  to  increase
productivity and “grow”. 
There is also, however, the “social side” of the equation. In a first step, this requires us to
look at the type of labor that is involved in this production process. Because Adam Smith
is discussing a market economy, we may generally assume that he is talking about wage
labor. From a Marxist perspective, the important point here is that the wage laborer had
to sell  his  or  her  labor  at  a  price  lower than the  amount  of  money that  is  realized
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through the sales of the produced goods. One central reason for the low wages is the
competition between the large numbers of people dependent on wage labor for their
survival. This forces wage-dependent people to accept incomes that (barely) cover their
costs of living, even though the employee’s exerted labor power exceeds this value. The
difference between the exchange value for the wages of the laborer and the realized
exchange value in the sale of goods produced, for example, in one day of labor by the
employee is, generally speaking, what Marx understands as surplus value (Marx 1982a,
293-306). According to Marx, this surplus value explains where the “more” is derived
from  at  the  end  of  the  production  cycle,  which  he  symbolizes  as  M-C-M’  (money-
commodity-more money) (ibid.,  247-256).  From this perspective, it is not necessarily
the division of labor, but more precisely the wage contract that enables the employer to
legally appropriate and accumulate the surplus value of productive wage labor. It can
therefore be said that the rate of rationalization will be intensely pursued, not by the
laborers, but rather by the employers, who will then (initially) profit from the increases
in  productivity.83 Interestingly,  much later  in  his  work  The Wealth  of  Nations,  Adam
Smith admits that there are negative social consequences which result from too much
specialization, in which “the [specialized; LP] laborer becomes as stupid and ignorant as
it is possible for a human creature to become” (Smith 1994, 840). Understood within our
socio-ecological framework, this implies that productivity gains should be conceived as
the  time  and  energy  extracted  from  the  employee  by  the  employer,  making  the
employee exhausted and “stupid”. Hence, aside from the extraction from nature, it is also
the  exploitation  of  people  that  enables  labor  activities  to  be  more  productive  and,
ultimately,  transforms  this  increase  in  productivity  into  increases  in  accumulated
wealth. 
It might be argued, however, that in a property-owning democracy this problem would
not occur,  because people have access to resources in the form of productive assets.
Here, it can be argued that this fact would free individuals from entering wage labor
relationships  involuntarily.  Thus,  we  could  say  that  in  such  an  arrangement
asymmetrical wage labor relationships would not exist.  Furthermore, it could also be
83  I say “initially” because the gains only occur when a producer rationalizes his or
her production process before the competitors follow suit. In that time, it can generally be assumed that
consumers will buy the cheaper products from this more efficient producer.  Marx calls this the “extra
profit”  (Marx  1991,  142)  and  compares  it  to  the  average  surplus  value  generated  through  society’s
average rate of productivity, otherwise also defined as the socially necessary labor time that is required to
maintain in order to survive on the competitive market. 
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contended that because the individual possesses productive assets, she could become a
co-owner of  the  enterprise.  This  would  provide  the  individual  to  have  rights  to  the
surplus value that otherwise would have been appropriated by the employer. It is often
assumed that such a democratic enterprise would hinder or even eliminate exploitation.
Although  this  is  partially  true,  if  the  enterprise  exists  on  a  competitive  market,  the
necessity  to  perpetually  increase  productivity  would  remain  in  order  to  satisfy  the
changes in the “socially necessary labor time” (G.A.Cohen 1979). Thus, the necessity to
perpetually  rationalize  one’s  labor  processes  through  new technology and increased
specialization would theoretically also persist. If this is not achieved, it can be assumed
that the enterprise would not be able survive on the competitive market. This would
then simply imply that the workers must exploit themselves. We can understand self-
exploitation here as the exertion of more energy than is required for the regeneration of
the mind and body. The problem of specialization can be interpreted here as the self-
inflicted one-sided development of one’s capacities, which demands the suppression of
other desired activities and the degeneration of these capacities. We already touched on
these problems in our discussion of the tragedy of the market in relation to burnout. To
be fair, a recurring and just pre-distribution of property would slow down the pace of
this process,  but it  would nevertheless still  occur.  The only difference would be that
there  is  no  employer  to  blame.  Instead,  the  exploitation  would  be  self-inflicted  and
enforced through the market dynamics that induce accelerating productivity gains. Here,
we are reminded of Adam Smith’s disciplining mechanism of the open and competitive
market.
Another aspect of this “social side” of the equation of productivity is the specialization of
people towards performing reproductive care work outside of wage labor relationships,
be  this  in  the  household,  the  community  (e.g.  care  for  the  unemployed)  or  for  the
environment  (e.g.  against  pollution).  Although  we  have  already  discussed  this,  it  is
important to note again that  the “free pass” given to “productive  people” puts more
caring obligations on those people performing supposedly “unproductive” activities. The
amazing gains in efficiency through the division of labor have therefore also divided the
social world into those who are rational and productive and those who are emotional
(or,  from  a  purely  economic  perspective  “irrational”)  and  caring.  From  the  linear
perspective  of  output  gains,  the  former  is  obviously  the  more  valuable;  from  the
systemic perspective of reproduction, the latter is essential for survival. But the point is
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not to say which of the two is “better” – both are valuable in their own respect and
satisfy  different  needs  and  desires  of  individuals,  communities  and  ecosystems.  The
point,  however,  is  to  emphasize  that  gains  in  productivity  always  have  social  and
ecological costs that, in turn, need to be tended to and taken care of. Or, put somewhat
more critically, the gains in productivity do not result from the activity of productive
individuals,  but  rather  from  the  extraction  of  matter  and  energy  from entire  socio-
ecological  systems, which then crystallizes in the form of individual private property
while it increases in output. Here, we are reminded again of Garrett Hardin’s “double P –
double C” game, in which profits are privatized and costs are communalized  (Hardin
1993,  237-8).  What some people  interpret  as productive  increases in  the  “wealth of
nations”, others experience as the depletion of their energy reserves.  
That being said, the point is not to get rid of the division of labor or all forms of growth.
These  few  examples  were  merely  presented  to  demonstrate  that  all  increases  in
productivity  have  a  specific  “material”  base  (matter,  energy,  time)  that  cannot  be
eradicated from the equation. Increases in productivity ex nihilo do not exist (ibid., 70-
76). This is not to say that all increases in productivity are based on exploitation. Nor
should this insight imply in any way that John Rawls (implicitly) supported exploitation.
That would obviously be false. But Rawls’  emphasis on productive assets and capital
leaves the question of where productivity gains are supposed to come from unanswered
(Schweickart  2012,  Alperovitz  2012,  Williamson  2012,  303).  I  believe  this  to  be  a
serious  problem in Rawls’  theory of  property-owning democracy that  must  be dealt
with. This short discussion of the origins of productivity gains has merely attempted to
make  the  point  that  productivity  cannot  perpetually  rise  without  having  serious
(negative) effects on society and the environment. In relation to our discussion of labor
and  productivity,  this  implies  that  we  must  shift  our  understanding  of  economic
activities and property arrangements from one based on productivity to one revolving
around cultivation and care.
This emphasis on care in economic activities might initially appear problematic, because
care is often interpreted as an unproductive activity. But this does not imply that labor
would then be  unproductive, but rather that productive activities would not solely be
based  on  a  linear  logic  of  the  maximization  of  material  wealth.  Instead,  its  central
normative  characteristic  would  be  the  concern  for  the  sustainable  creation  and
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reproduction of goods for the satisfaction of common and diverse needs. Along these
lines,  Sibyl  Schwarzenbach  also  argues  in  her  discussion  of  Rawls  that  we  should
reinterpret labor and ownership according to the concept of care. She explains, “By care
is  meant  that  specifically  intelligent  activity  which  appropriately  responds  to  the
concrete  legitimate  needs  of  others  with  the  end  of  encouraging  their  autonomous
capacities”  (Schwarzenbach  1987,  157).  Here,  the  shift  is  not  only  from  the  linear
increase in  production outputs to  cyclical  reproduction,  but  also  to the concern and
responsibility for the satisfaction of the concrete needs of others – be that other humans,
living  beings  or  ecosystems.  Lastly,  concern  for  others  is  not  abstract  –  mediated
through monetary values such as “capital” – but becomes visible through the concrete
activities of caring for the satisfaction of concrete needs in the form of food, housing,
education, health, culture or a clean environment. Conversely, it could be said that needs
decoupled from the activities of care fall into the illusion of unlimited material growth,
which inherently leads to tragedy. In this sense, caring is not an individual and private
activity, as it is often understood, but rather a social and ecological activity of cultivation,
maintenance,  reproduction and regulation that dissolves the boundaries between the
private, the economic and the political, on the one hand, and those between culture and
nature, on the other. 
As  can  be  expected,  placing  care  at  the  heart  of  economic  activities  implies  a
transformation  of  property  arrangements.  Here,  I  would  argue  with  Sibyl
Schwarzenbach that care requires a shift from “exclusive and acquisitive” ownership to
what  she  calls  shared  “joint  guardianship”,  which  is  what  we  have  defined  as  the
commons  (Schwarzenbach  1987,  147,  156-7).  As  already  discussed  in  relation  to
guardianship,  such  a  commons  property  arrangement  would  integrate  those  largely
affected into the management of the economic activities of the specific resource system.
This  integration would provide individuals  with  a  possibility  to  voice  their  concrete
needs and collectively negotiate if and how such needs can be satisfied in relation to the
needs of others. As is to be expected, such democratic governance systems for resources
will often be criticized as inefficient and unproductive. This is the deeply widespread
assumption  that  was  already  voiced  by  Locke  when  he  spoke  of  “common  and
uncultivated” resources. The fear that an economy based on democratic care would be
inefficient  and  unproductive  is,  however,  partially  true.  In  contrast  to  Locke,  the
problem we face today – at least in the north-western hemisphere – is not a lack of
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productivity but a productivity that is not compatible with the socio-ecological reality.
Or, in other words, an economic system based on perpetual material growth is utopian
in  a  world  of  limited  resources.  For  this  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  develop  some
reasonable  alternative  to  such  a  highly  problematic  and  self-destructive  property
arrangement  geared  toward  perpetual  increases  in  productivity.  By  placing
democratically organized caring activities at the center of our background structure, the
short-term efficiency in quantitative output productivity would decrease. That, however,
is precisely the point of such a property arrangement. Moreover, such a system could
very possibly increase the quality of the resource system, the labor activities themselves
and the goods being consumed.  The shift  from productivity  to care  would therefore
connote  a  shift  from quantitative  to  qualitative  growth –  a  shift  from owning more
things to leading a more self-determined and fulfilling life. In this respect, the creation of
the qualitative good life will become more efficient in a commons arrangement. A central
reason for this is that people have the possibility to co-determine the (re)production
process ex ante through democratic negotiation instead of through an ex post consumer
choice  that  occurs  after  the  products  have  been  produced  and  put  on  the  shelf.
Democratic negotiation in commons property arrangements thereby also replaces the
expensive advertisement industry that attempts to convince people that they should buy
the specific goods that are being produced. In this sense, we must interpret my critique
of productivity and growth not as a renunciation of either productivity or growth per se,
but rather as the opening of the possibility for people to democratically co-determine
the  criteria,  organization  and  direction  of  the  sustainable  reproduction  of  their
resources  and  social  activities.  Simply  put,  we  should  put  institutions  that  support
democratic deliberation and care at the heart of “productive” economic activities. This
would be an adequate socio-ecological re-interpretation of John Rawls’ property-owning
democracy.  Accordingly,  the  most  just,  basic  structure  of  society  would  thus  be  a
commons-creating democracy.   
6.5. Consumption Goods: Individual or Common Property? 
Up until now, I have argued that the right to the access to resources is a precondition for
life  and liberty.  More precisely,  I  have argued that a  commons theory of property is
justified due to the necessity of need satisfaction through the access to resources on
which people co-depend. A common property arrangement provides people with the
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institutional  framework  to  solve  conflicts  over  these  shared  vital  resources  and
collectively care for the reproduction of the specific socio-ecological resource systems.
This then leads to a central question that we have not properly dealt with yet: Would all
goods be considered to be common property in such a property arrangement? And if
not, where would the line be drawn between private and common property?  In order to
answer  these  rather  broad  questions,  I  will  in  a  first  step  discuss  the  differences
between individual and social activities and productive and consumption goods. With
reference to the negative ecological effects of consumption patterns, I will then argue
that  we  must  also  conceptualize  consumption  goods  as  commons.  Thirdly,  I  will
demonstrate  that  collaborative  forms  of  consumption  can  enable  relative  material
abundance in a world of limited resources. 
6.5.1.  Different Types of Goods (Part II)
The question of which goods and resources should ultimately be held,  governed and
reproduced in common is  both a simple and a difficult  question.  One simple answer
could be that I,  as a philosopher, do not have the right to determine such things, but
rather that the people themselves must decide which goods they want to organize as
commons. I do, in fact, believe this to be true because commons are not something that
can simply be implemented by philosopher kings or technocrats but require the civic
activity of commoning to bring them forth.  However, this would be an easy way out of
dealing with the problem. Another rather simple approach to the problem would be to
declare that all resources necessary for one’s existence should be held as commons. But
would this include not only the field of wheat, but also the bread that I eat? As we can
see,  this  generalization  is  very  vague  and  not  very  helpful  because,  theoretically,
everything  could  be  declared  as  necessary  for  one’s  existence.  Thus,  my  following
argument is not to be understood as a list of things that should be held privately or in
common, but rather as an attempt to deal with the issue in a somewhat more dynamic
and differentiated manner. To begin, let us recall Carol Gould’s differentiation between
personal and social  property.  According to Gould,  personal property is that which is
“required for the individual’s own subsistence and self-development” (Gould 1990, 180).
In  contrast,  social  property  is  supposedly  that  which  is  “required  by  individuals  in
common in order to realize their joint purposes” (ibid.). This appears to be somewhat
helpful,  but  one central  problem here  lies  in  the  fact  that  subsistence  activities  (i.e.
farming, food processing, cooking) are often not performed individually, but rather in
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groups. In such cases, subsistence resources should actually be understood as social or,
rather, common property. Yet, when these activities do occur individually, as they do, for
example,  in  the  case  of  cultivating  a  small  garden  lot,  it  is  obviously  adequate  to
understand this resource as an individual one. For this reason, we should not only focus
on the differentiation between individual and social activities, but also, as David Held
suggests, on the distinction between consumptive and productive property (Held 1995,
263).84 As already mentioned and along the same line of thought,  Elinor Ostrom and
Charlotte Hess distinguish between the flow of resource units and the resource systems
themselves  (E.  Ostrom and Hess  2007,  338).  Consumptive  property  and  the  flow of
resource units could be, for example, toothbrushes, apples, bread, underpants, bicycles,
coal, personal computers or cash. Production goods and resource systems, on the other
hand, would be things such as apple trees or orchards, coal mines, bakeries, factories for
toothbrushes, underpants or computers, central processor units or capital. However, we
must also differentiate here whether the specific  entity is being used individually or
together  with  others  in  order  to  determine  whether  it  should  be  conceptualized  as
personal or social property. I could, for example, use my bicycle or my computer as a
source  of  income  and  thus  transform  a  consumption  good  into  one  utilized  for
production (e.g. as a bike messenger or a computer programmer). But this would not
transform it into social property, because the activity is performed individually. In this
sense, things are not productive per se, but become productive through their specific
use.  According  to  my  argumentation,  the  social  coordination  of  these  individual
activities  in  an  organization  (e.g.  the  delivery  or  programming  services)  should,
however, be organized in a social and democratic manner, for example as a cooperative,
enabling  the  participants  in  this  specific  organization  to  fairly  distribute  their
individually and collectively generated wealth and to democratically co-determine their
organization of labor. 
Nevertheless, another problem exists in the juxtaposition of individual consumption and
social production. A good that is individually consumed can also be – and, in some cases,
should be  –  organized  as  common  property.  According  to  Locke,  individual  private
property  enables  people  to  use  and  enjoy  a  specific  good  without  the  arbitrary
interference  of  others.  This  enables  them  to  exclude  others  from  the  use  of  the
84  David  Held  also  mentions  financial  property  (i.e.  capital)  as  a  third  type  of
property. In order to simplify the argument, we will focus on the differentiation between consumptive and
productive goods and define financial property as a unit of productive property.
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individual private property. In cases of individual consumptive and productive property,
this often makes sense.  I  would, for example, prefer not to share my toothbrush,  my
underpants, and my shoes with other people. I would also prefer to cultivate my small
garden lot by myself, ride my bicycle and use my computer. By declaring these goods as
individual private property the negative freedom of the individual is secured and the
freedom of other people is not necessarily threatened, assuming the goods are not used
in bothersome or harmful ways (i.e. riding over old people on the street with my bike or
planning terrorist bombings with my computer). These are the usual examples that are
often brought up in discussions  against common property arrangements. The general
point here is that individuals don’t want to have to ask the community if they can brush
their teeth with the communal toothbrush twice or three times a day or if they can put
on  a  pair  of  communal  shoes  every  morning  in  order  to  go  and  get  the  communal
newspaper. The problem with this argument is, however, that it leads to the assumption
that  everything  would  be  held  in  common because,  theoretically,  everything  has  an
effect on someone else (i.e. the color of someone’s T-shirt might not match the color of
my pants, for example). Obviously, these examples are absurd. No one would want such
property  arrangements.  And,  yes,  such  property  arrangements  would  be  highly
inefficient in dealing with our everyday lives. But no one in favor of commons is, per se,
against individual private property in such personal consumption goods. By focusing on
these issues, we are being distracted from a more fundamental one that is at stake: The
problems of exclusion from or overuse of resources that are central for one’s life and
liberty. From this perspective, there are strong ecological or functionalist and normative
arguments  for  the  sharing  of  certain  consumption  goods.  Let  us  now  turn  to  these
arguments. 
6.5.2. Maximizing Consumption and the Population Myth 
Up until now, we have generally argued that resources that affect the larger community
and that are necessary for the satisfaction of common needs should be held in common.
As previously mentioned, this basically implies that (re)productive activities in resource
systems should be organized as commons while the flow of consumption units should be
organized as individual private property. Yet let me introduce an example that questions
this dichotomy. Let us assume that a person has acquired a relative amount of wealth
(for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  we  could  say  within  the  limits  of  Rawls’  difference
principle).  The person wants  to  use  this  money for  consumption goods because the
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reinvestment of this money would transform it into productive property (capital). This
would, in turn, require that the broader community should also have a voice in the use of
this capital. Because this person does not want the community telling them what to do
with this  money,  the person decides to  spend most  of  their  money on consumption
goods such as, for example, numerous large houses, expensive cars, yachts, private jets
and  so on.  And,  to  be  fair,  let  us  also  assume that  this  person is  not  attempting  to
(according to our commons property arrangement) “illegally” use these goods as objects
of  speculation  and  thus  as  “productive  goods”.  In  line  with  the  distinction  between
individual consumptive and social productive property, this would be legitimate and no
one would have the right to interfere with this person’s freedom. 
Nevertheless,  I  would argue that  a  few problems arise here.  Firstly,  the logic of  this
conception of negative freedom implies that individual freedom should be increased if
the scope of one’s non-interfered-with reach over the material world is increased. This
basically implies that the more private consumption goods one has, the better. Although
we have shifted from productive to consumptive goods, our focus on the increases in
material  goods  and  quantitative  growth  remains.  This  inherently  leads  us  to  the
question whether such a notion of maximization is compatible with the limits of the
earth system not only in the sphere of production but also in the sphere of individual
consumption. If there was only one such privileged person in the entire world we could
say that it does not necessarily matter, because the environment would not be too badly
affected. The reality is, however, different: More and more people strive to acquire more
and  more  goods  because  they  interpret  the  increase  in  consumptive  goods  as  an
increase in freedom and well-being (Rosa 2016, 45). It can thus be assumed that this has
very serious negative effects on the environment. 
If  we  remember  Garrett  Hardin’s  argument  in  the  Tragedy  of  the  Commons, this
ecological problem lies not necessarily in the number of goods people accumulate and
consume, but rather in number of people in the world. As he explains in his book Living
Within Limits (1993), by limiting the growth of population, the smaller number of people
should  then  be  able  to  enjoy  more  goods.  Quoting  Malthus  this  would  include,  for
example, a “daily […] glass of wine and a piece of beef for [one’s] dinner" (Hardin 1993,
213, 306). Or, more technically formulated: “[A]t a sustainable size of population, the
quality of life and the quantity of it are inversely related” (ibid., 213; emphasis omitted).
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This  is  the  main  thesis  of  Hardin’s  Tragedy  of  the  Commons,  and  it  is  expressed by
numerous other ecologists such as Paul Ehrlich in his book The Population Bomb (1968)
and more recently by the earth systems scientist James Lovelock, who is a patron of the
Optimum Population Trust. Lovelock stated, for example, 
“Those who fail to see that population growth and climate change are two sides
of the same coin are either ignorant or hiding from the truth. These two huge
environmental problems are inseparable and to discuss one while ignoring the
other is irrational” (Lovelock quoted in populationmatters 26 August 2009).
This conclusion can easily be made by looking at the correlation between population
growth  and  the  increase  in  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  of  over  the  last  200
hundred years (Steffen et al. 2011, 742, 745). Here, the total amount of GHG emissions is
mathematically distributed over the whole of the world’s population. According to this
calculation,  the  countries  with  the  largest  (increases  in  their)  populations  are
responsible for the overuse of the carrying capacity of their resource systems. Garrett
Hardin portrays this in his lifeboat ethics metaphor: 
“Metaphorically,  each rich nation amounts to a lifeboat  full  of  comparatively
rich people. The poor of the world are in other, much more crowded lifeboats.
Continuously,  so to speak, the poor fall  out of  their lifeboats and swim for a
while in the water outside, hoping to be admitted to a rich lifeboat, or in some
other way to benefit from the ‘goodies’ on board” (Hardin 1974, 561). 
The rather simple moral of this story is that the “rapidly-breeding poor” (ibid., 565) is
the cause of the overuse of ecological resources and climate change. In order to save
planet  earth,  we  must  therefore  exclude  the  poor  from  the  wealth  of  the  northern
nations, let the poor people die and, thereby, hopefully limit their ability to reproduce
(ibid., 565).85 According to this argumentation, sharing goods with those who have less
simply pours more oil into the fire of population growth and ecological destruction. 
I do not want to deny that population sizes do not have any effects on socio-ecological
systems.  It  can generally  be  assumed that  there  correlations  between the two exist.
Nevertheless,  the problem with the emphasis  on the correlation between population
size and GHG emissions is that it neglects and conceals the  distribution of the specific
85  In Hardin’s own words: “Every life saved this year in a poor country diminishes
the quality of life for subsequent generations” (Hardin 1974, 565; emphasis omitted). He therefore argues
that we must “[a]dmit no more to the boat and preserve the small safety factor. Survival of the people in
the lifeboat is then possible (though we shall have to be on our guard against boarding parties)” (ibid.,
562)
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“goods” (wealth) and “bads” (pollution) within a specific group and between groups of
people. By looking at the precise distribution of GHG emissions, we encounter, however,
a rather different picture. Perceived in this manner, increases in GHG emissions do not
necessarily correlate with population growth,  but  rather with the increase in wealth
and, thus, in consumption goods available to individuals. For this reason, environmental
scientist David Satterthwaite argues that we should stop using the often-used equation
“total impact equals population times affluence times technology” (I = PAT). Instead, he
argues that we must use the correct equation “impact equals consumers times affluence
times technology” (I = CAT). Satterthwaite explains, 
“It is not correct to suggest that it is the increase in population that drives the
growth in GHG emissions, when the lifetime contribution to GHG emissions of a
person added to the world’s population varies by a factor of more than 1,000
depending  on  the  circumstances  into  which  they  are  born  and  their  life
possibilities and choices. So it is not the growth in the number of people, but rather
the  growth  in  the  number  of  consumers  and  the  GHG  implications  of  their
consumption patterns that are the issue. In theory (leaving aside the difficulties in
measurement), responsibility for GHG emissions should be with individuals and
households and based on the GHG implications of their  consumption,  and not
with  nations  (or  cities)  based  on  GHG  inventories  from  the  production
perspective.  From the consumption perspective,  globally,  the 20 per cent of  the
population with the highest consumption levels is likely to account for more than
80 per cent of all human-induced GHG emissions and an even higher proportion of
historical  contributions.  In  considering  how  to  reduce  emissions  globally,  far
more attention should be directed to reducing this group’s GHG emissions. And as
responsibilities  for  addressing  this  are  allocated  to  national  and  local
governments  (with  city  governments  having  particularly  important  roles),
consider how this 20 per cent of the world’s population is distributed between
nations  (obviously  most,  but  certainly  not  all,  are  in  high-income  nations)”
(Satterthwaite 2009, 564; emphasis added). 
As the journalist  George Monbiot  puts it,  “While there’s  a  weak correlation between
global  warming  and  population  growth,  there’s  a  strong  correlation  between  global
warming and wealth” (Monbiot 2016, 104-5). As we see, the problem is not necessarily
large populations, but the great increase of wealth belonging to a small group of people.
Their ability to accumulate without limit enables them to consume most of the world’s
resources and to consequently produce most of the existing greenhouse gases. For this
reason, the political scientists Ulrich Brand and Markus Wissen call this an “imperial
lifestyle”  (2017) of  the  wealthy  Northern  countries,  which  the  sociologist  Stephan
Lessenich interprets as an “externalizing society” (2016). To put these insights back into
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Garrett Hardin’s metaphor of his “lifeboat ethics”: The reason why the boats are sinking
is not, first and foremost, due to population sizes. Instead, the boats of the affluent are
sinking due to the heavy load of consumption goods that they have collected. In turn, the
boats of the poor are sinking, in contrast, because of the weight of the bads (pollution,
deforestation, rising water levels, oil spills etc.) that the wealthy have externalized. Yet,
while the affluent can build better and larger boats to carry the load, the others are left
to sink. 
If this insight is correct, it should have rather important implications for our discussion
of property arrangements for enabling life and liberty for all living beings. Firstly, we
cannot simply separate production goods from consumption goods. Simply organizing
productive resource units as commons and leaving the sphere of consumption intact as a
sphere of individual negative freedom does not solve the ecological problems societies
are currently trying to deal with. Such a strategy might protect the environment from a
supply-side  perspective,  but  it  does  not  answer  the  problem  from  a  demand-side
perspective  that  results  from  ecologically  destructive  patterns  of  individual
consumption. If people continuously demand more goods for the satisfaction of their
needs and desires, it remains highly questionable if the production of these goods will
also change. 
Secondly,  although  I  have  previously  mentioned  that  it  should  not  necessarily  be  a
problem if only a few individuals own and use numerous amounts of resources, we have
just seen that only a small  portion of the world’s population (20 percent) produce a
large portion of the world’s GHG emissions (80 percent). It is to be expected that if we
delved deeper into the statistics, we could find that an even smaller group of people is
proportionally consuming even more resources than the rest of the world’s population
(Monbiot 2016, 105-6, Oxfam 2017). From this perspective, it would therefore be false
to say that the individual ownership of a bicycle by each person in the world is equally
problematic as the private ownership of jeeps, yachts, jets and numerous houses by a
few. In this sense, we can say that the  unlimited consumption of  specific goods is not
simply a “private” matter, but has far-reaching and serious effects on other people and
the more-than-human world. 
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Third,  it  is  also  important to note that  not  only does  a  small  portion of  the  world’s
population  produce most  of  the  world’s  GHG emissions,  but  also  that  the  very  poor
people of the world produce very little GHG emissions (Satterthwaite 2009, 547). This
might sound like good news for Mother Nature – and, to a certain extent, also for the
wealthy inhabitants of earth because they can simply slightly reduce their consumption
levels so that they are “in tune with nature” and simultaneously hope that the poor will
remain poor. But this cynical answer is not only unjust towards those in need, but also
highly  unfeasible  because  those  in  poverty  obviously  want  to  improve  their  living
standards and increase their freedom. It can generally be assumed that they also want to
realize their rights to life and liberty just as Western societies have done. So how is this
fundamental  contradiction  between  consumption  patterns  based  on  ever-increasing
needs and desires and the limitation of the ecosystems’ resources to be solved?86 
6.5.3.  Collaborative Consumption and Relative Abundance
Because this is a somewhat grand question, it might be helpful to return to our previous
discussion of individual private property in consumption goods in order to answer it. As
was mentioned then,  the underlying principle was that  individuals should be free to
enjoy  their  consumption  goods  without  interference.  Personal  consumption  goods
should remain as the last bastion of negative freedom. This negative freedom is often
understood as one of the fundamental and basic individual types of freedom that lie at
the heart of a liberal political order. 
Within this understanding of freedom, it is then often assumed that the larger the sphere
of one’s negative freedom in consumption goods is, the more options one has to satisfy
different  needs  and  desires.  Although  this  might  be  true,  we  must  also,  however,
recognize  that  different  goods  produce  different  effects  on  the  environment.
Importantly, different patterns of individual consumption in relation to different goods
produce different ecological effects. The increase in my collection of jogging shoes in
86  In this short discussion of levels of consumption, GHG emissions and ecological
degradation, I did neglect one important aspect of the complex situation: The ability of ecosystems to
absorb GHG emissions.  If,  for  example,  we  had  enough  trees  on  earth,  our  consumption  levels  could
theoretically remain at a certain level or even increase because the plants would absorb the emitted gases.
I would, however, argue that it can generally be assumed that high levels of individual consumption are
dependent on the deterioration of ecological systems and their ability to reabsorb GHG emissions. The
most  straightforward  example of  this  is  the production of  meat  with soya feed in  large  areas where
rainforest used to exist. Here, again, we are confronted with the fundamental contradiction between an
endless increase in needs and desires and the limits of ecological resources.
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order to go running more often is, for example, completely different than the increase in
the number of flights I take in order to attend more academic conferences. Yet despite
these differences, the maximization pattern nevertheless assumes that the more goods,
the better. It is important to note here that it does not matter if these goods are bought
with money that I earned through wage-labor on the market or if I have received the
means to buy these goods from a state-orchestrated pre-distribution scheme available
to  all  citizens.  Depending  on  the  type  of  good  and  the  pattern  of  consumption,  the
ecological effects are the same. As we see, it appears as though we have come across a
certain  ecological  paradox  in  the  relationship  between  life,  liberty  and  property  –
irrespective  whether  we  take  sides  with  Locke  or  Rawls.  On  the  one  hand,  we  can
enhance material wealth and individual freedom in the form of consumption goods at
the cost of the environment. On the other hand, we could maintain life on earth at the
cost of poverty and lack of freedom. Within this framework, it appears as though the
needs and desires of humans oppose and contradict the needs of nature. 
Where then is  the way out  of  this  dilemma? Is  humanity simply going to fall  into  a
Hobbesian war of “all against all”? Or will a global state and the managers of production
resource systems rigorously limit  and equally distribute the consumption goods that
each individual  is allowed to have in the name of a just eco-dictatorship? Or is each
individual required to achieve mastery over their endless needs and desires in the form
of self-imposed sacrifice and asceticism? As we see, all these options appear not only
unattractive, but also highly unrealistic – except for the possibility of war, that is. What
other options do we have then? In order to answer this question, let us return to the
basic  question of  what  property rights  are  actually  for.  Informal  or  formal  property
arrangements intend to regulate the use of specific resources so that people can live in
relative  peace  and  liberty.  These  arrangements  should  provide  people  with  enough
security so that they do not have to be afraid that their dearly held goods will be taken
from them. This enables individuals to plan their daily affairs, reproduce their existence
and, possibly, lead a good life. As we see, property arrangements are a means to an end,
such as security, peace, realizing life-plans and, hopefully, a good life. Furthermore, the
freedom involved  in  this  definition is  also  not  an end in  itself.  Freedom is  valuable
because it provides people with choices and capabilities; it is a means for people to be
able to define and realize their own conception of the good life. 
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Locke’s  interpretation  of  this  was  to  define  these  property  rights  individually  and
exclusively: Only if an object is individual private property can the individual consume it.
This is the same logic reproduced in the economic categorization of goods as discussed
in relation to Elinor and Vincent Ostrom: Private goods are subtractive and rival and can
exclude the use and consumption of others. As we already mentioned above, almost all
goods could fall into this category. As the term connotes, rival goods imply that the other
person is a threat to one’s freedom and liberty. But as we have seen, this logic would
imply that  the  increase  in life  and liberty for  all  people  would then necessitate that
everyone  had  individual  private  property  over  an  immense  amount  of  goods  and
resources. Each piece of individual private property provides people with a larger range
of freedom to satisfy their needs and desires and to realize the good life. The question
remains, however, whether the effort in producing and accumulating these goods in the
end provides people with enough time and peace of mind to enjoy a good life. 
An alternative interpretation of the right to life,  liberty and property in consumption
goods could therefore be based not on individual and exclusive rights, but on collectively
shared access rights to consumption goods that are held in common. As we have already
discussed in relation to the classification of goods, an alternative to the categorization of
goods as exclusion, subtraction and rivalry could be inclusion, addition and cooperation.
Here,  “rival”  goods  are  used  and  consumed  individually  but  nevertheless  held  in
common, thereby transforming their subtractive characteristic into an additive feature
of the good. G.A. Cohen discusses this principle in reference to an often-used example of
tools: 
“A homespun example shows how communal property offers a differently shaped
liberty,  in no different sense of that term, and, in certain circumstances,  more
liberty  than the  private  property  alternative.  Neighbors  A  and B  own  sets  of
household tools. Each has some tools which the other lacks. If A needs a tool of a
kind which only B has, then, private property being what it is, he is not free to
take B’s one for a while, even if B does not need it during that while. Now imagine
that  the  following  rule  is  imposed,  bringing  the  tools  into  partly  common
ownership:  each  may  take  and  use  a  tool  belonging  to  the  other  without
permission provided that the other is not using it and that he returns it when he
no longer needs it,  or when the other needs it,  whichever comes first.  Things
being  what  they  are  (a  substantive  qualification:  we  are  talking,  as  often  we
should, about the real world,  not about remote possibilities) the communizing
rule would, I contend, increase tool-using freedom, on any reasonable view. To be
sure, some freedoms are removed by the new rule. Neither neighbor is as assured
of the same easy access as before to the tools that were wholly his. Sometimes he
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has to go next door to retrieve one of them. Nor can either now charge the other
for use of a tool he himself does not then require. But these restrictions probably
count  for  less  than the  increase  in  the  range  of  tools  available.  No one  is  as
sovereign as before over any tool, so the privateness of the property is reduced.
But freedom is probably expanded” (G.A. Cohen 2011, 155).
Although there might be a loss in freedom for certain individuals from one perspective,
the principle of tool commons or a tool library would clearly increase the freedom of
those without the wealth to own all the tools.  Cohen continues, 
“It  is  true  that  each would  have more  freedom still  if  he  were  the  sovereign
owner of all the tools. But that is not the relevant comparison. I do not deny that
full ownership of a thing gives greater freedom than shared ownership of that
thing. But no one did own all the tools before the modest measure of communism
was introduced. The kind of comparison we need to make is between, for example,
sharing ownership with ninety-nine others in a hundred things and fully owning
just one of them. I submit that which arrangement nets more freedom is a matter
of cases.  There is little sense in one hundred people sharing control over one
hundred toothbrushes. There is [however; LP] an overwhelming case, from the
point of view of freedom, in favor of our actual practice of public ownership of
street pavements. Denationalizing the pavements in favor of private ownership of
each piece by the residents adjacent to it would be bad for freedom of movement”
(ibid.,155-6).
As we see, the question of which goods should be held in common cannot be answered
in advance, but must be decided through weighing different pros and cons and, most
importantly, through practical experiments that deal with different goods. And, as Cohen
mentioned,  we  are  not  talking  about  the  collectivization  of  a  person’s  toothbrush.
Nevertheless, the principle can be applied to the use of bicycles, cars, computers, musical
instruments,  games,  gardens,  holiday houses,  or even one’s  own space of  living.  The
point is that in a world in which not everyone can have everything, sharing goods in the
form of commons provides the greatest freedom for the greatest number of people. Here
we can see that the normative argument for an increase in the access to more shared
goods  is  closely  intertwined  with  the  ecological  or  functionalist  argument  for  the
stability of socio-ecosystems through commons. By sharing the access to these goods,
people can increase their freedom without necessarily having to increase the number of
goods that exist. Common property in consumption goods thus provides people with a
key  strategy  that  enables  them  to  increase  relative  material  abundance  in  world  of
limited resources. 
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But is this the answer to the destruction of the environment: Public sidewalks and a
library for tools? No, these are obviously simply some examples of how consumption
goods can be held in common. Nevertheless, the basic principle remains rather simple
and  significant:  By  sharing  goods  with  others,  people  can increase  their  freedom to
access  and  use  diverse goods  while  decreasing  the  overall  quantity  of  goods  being
produced and consumed. The point, however, is not merely to pool preexisting goods,
but also to actively create these common goods with others through the civic activity of
commoning. Thus, by pooling these resources, people not only access more goods, but
they can also overcome the consumption-production divide by using these goods,  in
turn, to satisfy their own specific needs and desires. This is what is propagated with
repair workshops, 3-D printers and the notion of open hardware (Rifkin 2015, Baier et
al. 2016, Siefkes 2008). It is a transformation of individual consumers into co-producers
or peer-to-peer producers (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006) through the equal access to
pooled goods, which not only frees people from the necessity to satisfy their needs via
the market, but also provides people with diverse possibilities of collective productive
or “commoning” activities.
6.6. Interim Conclusion
After this  rather long investigation of a commons theory of  property,  let  me shortly
summarize  our  findings.  In  this  chapter,  I  have  generally  argued that  in  contrast  to
exclusory  private  property,  a  commons  theory  of  property  is  based  on  access  and
democratic  governance.  Instead  of  dominion,  non-interference  and  labor,  common
property  arrangements  uphold  the  principles  of  guardianship,  non-domination  and
need-satisfaction.  Common  property  arrangements  can  thus  increase  the  realm  of
individual freedom both in the expanded access to resources and through the ability to
democratically co-determine their institutional arrangements. They provide people with
the institutions to deal with conflicts over shared resources that are necessary for the
interdependent satisfaction of people’s common needs. This can be interpreted as an
institutional  means  to  care  for  the  sustainable  maintenance,  reproduction  and
flourishing of socio-ecological systems. 
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Put somewhat differently, common property arrangements provide people with a way of
organizing life in a world of limited resources that must not lead to scarcity, domination
or  tragedy.  Instead,  they  enable  people  to  create  a  relative  abundance  through  a
convivial mode of interdependent existence. Relative abundance is, however, not merely
created through contracts that pool the limited quantity of goods being consumed, but
rather  through the  qualitative transformation of  the  relationships  in  the  web of  life.
Thus, the other is not primarily constituted as an existential threat, but rather as a peer
to jointly realize greater outcomes through an ongoing process of negotiation and co-
creation. 
As  can  be  expected,  some  will  find  that  a  society  based  on  common  property
arrangements impose a specific and too narrow concept of the good life. Accordingly, it
is  often  argued  that  in  a  liberal  society  political  institutions  should  be  neutral  and
impartial  in relation to the notions of  the good life  (Dworkin 1991,  127,  Gaus 2003,
North  et  al.  2009,  114,  Hayek  2013,  169-196).  This  is  often  understood  as  the
prioritization of the right over the good (Rawls 1988). As Rawls himself acknowledges,
however,  no  political  arrangements  are  completely  neutral  in  relation  to  diverging
concepts of the good life (ibid., 251). As John Rawls explains in A Theory of Justice, “The
basic structure of society is bound to encourage and support certain kinds of plans more
than others by rewarding its members for contributing to the common good in ways
consistent with justice” (TJ, 373; emphasis added). As we have seen, individual negative
rights  in  private  property  provide  people  with  the  formal  freedom  to  pursue  one’s
economic interests without arbitrary interference. The antagonistic structure of these
property  arrangements,  however,  inherently  leads  to  maximization  strategies  and
tragedy. In turn, individual positive rights attempt to secure life and liberty by providing
equal access to “productive assets”. Yet as we have seen, these arrangements also induce
similar maximization strategies. Thus, we can say that the notion of the good life that
unintentionally  arises  in  both  of  these  property  arrangements  is  caught  in  the
“straitjacket” (E. Ostrom 2003, 25) of maximization strategies and perpetual economic
growth.  
That being said, the problem we are facing here, especially in relation to the problems of
scarcity, domination and tragedy, is not necessarily one of absolute neutrality, but rather
the question of the compatibility of different concepts of the good life. In this sense, the
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concept of interdependent freedom in common property arrangements obviously limits
the scope  of  all  possible  life  plans  that  can be  pursued.  Its  underlying  principles  of
inclusion, negotiated cooperation and care therefore inherently limit life plans that aim
to realize exclusion, competition and domination. This much I must concede. But I would
also argue that these principles of common property are the foundations of a just, free
and sustainable social order. Despite these supposed limitations of the range of choices
within  such  a  property  regime,  the  specific  plans  and  choices  within  such  an
arrangement are not predetermined. On the contrary, common property arrangements
increase  individual  freedom  through  an  expansion  in  access  to  resources  and  the
simultaneous democratic governance thereof. In this sense, it must be emphasized that
in contrast to other property regimes, the freedom to alter and co-determine one’s social
conditions is not merely limited to the public sphere and affairs of the state. Instead, it is
extended to the “private” realms of production, consumption and social reproduction.
Furthermore,  the cultivation of democratic  freedom in these everyday civic  activities
should  hopefully  open up  a  “world  of  possibility”  (E.  Ostrom  2003,  62)  and  enable
people to collectively organize their lives according to their own conceptions of the good
life. For it is these everyday civic practices in common property arrangements that are
the seeds for a flourishing democratic society and the sustainable reproduction of a just
basic structure. 
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7. The Role of the State in a Commons Creating Society 
After having developed a commons theory of property, it is now necessary to turn to the
question of the relationship between commons and the state, on the one hand, and the
market,  on the other.  These questions are of great importance because the notion of
commons is  often interpreted as a  form of  social  organization “beyond markets and
states”  (Ostrom  2010a,  Bollier  et  al.  2012).  As  I  will  demonstrate  in  the  next  two
chapters, I believe this interpretation to be rather misleading because commons appear
to  be  less  of  a  radical  alternative  to  both the  market  and the  state,  but  rather  as a
strategy  to  democratize  these  two  social  arrangements.  In  general,  the  aim  of  this
analysis will therefore be to shift our framework of societal organization from one based
on the state-market dichotomy to one conceptualized as a commons creating society. In
order  to  flesh  out  this  idea,  I  will  sketch  how  the  state  and  the  market  can  be
transformed through the commons institutions and civic practices of commoning. Let us
begin this analysis with the state-commons relationship. 
My  examination  of  the  state-commons  relationship  will  begin  with  some  general,
preliminary  reflections  on  the  state-commons  relationship.  In  a  second  step,  I  will
discuss this role of commons in diverse models of the state, including the monocentric,
the minimal and welfare state. After this, I will then develop a better understanding of
the notion of the state in a commons creating society with reference to the public goods
housing, health care and education. In a final step, I will then discuss the role of the state
in developing commons in a non-ideal world. Here, I will touch on these diverse issues:
the “urgency”  of  climate  change,  the  role of  commons in  “developing”  countries,  the
threat of state oppression and the possibilities of reclaiming and cultivating commons
both within and against the state.  
7.1. Preliminary Reflections on the State-Commons Relationship 
In order to clarify my intentions here, I would like to begin my discussion of the state-
commons relationship with some preliminary remarks on the subject. While it might be
argued  that  commons  exist  as  a  form  of  social  organization  “beyond”  and  thus
independent of the state, I would, contrarily, argue that the state is a central institution
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for the realization and maintenance of commons. This claim might appear surprising
and  fundamentally  wrong  by  those  who  interpret  and  experience  the  state  as  a
hierarchical  and  oppressive  institution  and,  in  contrast,  commons  as  a  form  of
democratic self-governance. Here, the notion of  self-governance appears to contradict
the necessity of an external authority manifested in the state. Yet, the problem with such
an antithetical presentation of the state and commons is that it remains caught up in the
dualistic Hobbesian model of the state: The monopoly of the use of coercion can only be
held by a Leviathan that rules autocratically over society. Here, we must differentiate
between  the  monopoly  on  the  use  of  coercion,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  form  of
organization that exercises this power, on the other. As has been discussed previously,
democratic  self-governance  of  commons  provides  us  with  an  alternative  means  to
overcome the Hobbesian belligerent state of nature. From this perspective, a monopoly
on  the  use  of  force  is  created  through  trust,  reciprocity  and  the  democratically
determined rules and regulations of the commoners. In the words of Anna Stilz: “[T]he
democratic state is a joint practice in which we act together to secure a common end,
and its unity can be explained on lines similar to the unity of other practices in which we
commonly act together” (Stilz 2009, 192). Here, the monopoly of power held by the state
must  be  understood  as  a  form  of  reciprocal  and  public  coercion.  Only  through  this
democratically  legitimized  monopoly  of  power  can  the  affected  people  limit
appropriation  and  free  riding  and,  in  turn,  realize  fair  and  sustainable  social
arrangements. While the enforcement of laws by the state can limit the harm afflicted on
others and the overuse of resources, the state’s ability to collect taxes is also a central
means of alleviating power asymmetries and unequal appropriation possibilities. In its
ideal form, we might therefore say that a democratic state can be interpreted as self-
governed commons. 
In turn, this notion of the state provides us with a reference for our following discussion
on  how  the  state  can  provide  access  to  resources  in  the  form  of  a  commons  pre-
distribution. This is indeed a very difficult question because it is sometimes assumed
that state provision and commons oppose one another. In this case, state provision is
normally conceived as a “top-down” activity, while commons are understood as goods
that are created, reproduced and managed “bottom-up” by those affected. Furthermore,
the  notion  of  state  provision  of  common  property  is  closely  associated  with  the
communism  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  practices  of  dispossession,  coercion  and
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uniformity.  For  this  reason,  the  legal  scholar  Richard  Epstein,  for  example,  harshly
criticizes the provision of common property by the state: 
“Any insistence, however, on mandatory common ownership is a recipe for disaster:
co-owners are not chosen but imposed, so the level of mutual distrust is likely to
be  high.  Disagreement  over  the  common  plan  of  development,  or  over  the
division of benefits and burdens, is virtually certain to produce massive forms of
paralysis from which there is no escape. A division of the property is ruled out by
the inflexible requirement of common ownership; and a sale of the property, or of
any interest therein, is not likely to succeed if a sustainable purchaser cannot be
found –  and who wants  to  buy into  a  lawsuit  or  a  family  dispute?  Boundary
disputes are the price paid in order to avoid the governance problems that arise
from forced associations” (Epstein 1994, 36-7; emphasis added).
Although this portrayal of commons is blatantly crude, the critique nevertheless remains
somewhat  valid:  The forced,  top-down implementation of  a  commons regime would
most  likely  lead  to  tragedy.  The  necessary  state  coercion  involved  in  such  a
transformation  of  social  order  would  oppose  the  notion  of  free  association  and
democratic self-governance inherent in the idea of a commons based society. Therefore,
the question arises how the state can provide common goods without “forcing” people to
collectivize their property. 
Furthermore,  the general  assumption that  commons provided by the state would be
uniform must also be considered. This is, in general terms, a widespread critique of the
satisfaction  of  individual  needs  through  the  paternalistic  state  provision  of  material
equality: People are different and do not want to be provided with the same goods –
irrespective  if  these  goods  are  individually  owned  (e.g.  clothes,  a  home  etc.)  or
collectively  (e.g.  an  education,  public  swimming  pools  etc.).  The  diversity  of  people
requires a choice in the satisfaction of their needs. Therefore, while economic liberals
defend negative liberty and the freedom to choose products on the market,  political
liberals argue that non-dominated positive liberty and the pre-distribution of productive
assets can overcome these problems of coercion and uniformity. Both, however, fall into
a  dualistic  understanding  of  the  state  and  the  individual  that  is  typical  of  the  civil
tradition in democratic thought: On the one side, there is the state and its background
institutions; on the other side, we find the individuals who act within this preexisting
framework.  What  both  camps  fail  to  consider,  however,  is  a  different  and  more
democratic  understanding  of  the  state  and  public  services,  which  can  include  the
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creation of  commons through collective  action.  That  will  be  the  focus  of  the  second
section of this chapter. In order to reinterpret public goods as commons, however, let us
now recapitulate the relationships between commons and the different models of the
state that we have already touched upon in order to then develop our notion of a state-
commons.  
7.1. Varieties of the State and the Role of the Commons 
7.1.1. Commons in a Hierarchical and Monocentric State 
As  previously  discussed,  a  central  figure  in  the  notion  of  the  state  is  that  of  the
monocentric and hierarchical Leviathan that rules over society. In this model, we will
begin with the thought experiment of a Hobbesian, warlike state of nature which can be
interpreted as the tragedy of unregulated commons. Hardin’s response to this problem
was  a  social  contract  of  “mutual  coercion,  mutually  agreed  upon”  (Hardin  1968,
1247)and,  more precisely,  a  Hobbesian Leviathan. Yet,  while  Hobbes’  Leviathan was
created to protect individual property rights, Hardin’s Leviathan was revived in order to
regulate the use of common resources. This form of government is what Vincent Ostrom
called the “monocentric order”. We can either conceive this model rather negatively as a
form of eco-dictatorship or,  more positively,  as a type of enlightened despotism that
rules in  the  name of  the good of the  people.  Although Hardin does  not  propagate a
Leviathan that supports any form of redistribution, we can nevertheless conceive how
such a political  order could provide commons in the form of public goods.  Here,  the
supposedly neutral and benevolent bureaucracy of the state provides commons in a top-
down manner.  Examples of  such commons could range from education to transport,
television, clothing, food and housing. To decrease the costs and increase the efficiency
of the provision of these goods, they would, at least theoretically, be created in a uniform
manner and administered according to uniform rules. These goods would be defined
according to the average statistical values of all individuals combined with the ecological
conditions  that  limit  these  values.  Individual  needs  and  desires  could  be  marginally
considered (e.g.  in  the  case  of  having  a  mental  or  physical  handicap),  but  would be
largely ignored (e.g. in the case of preferring a freestanding home with a garden instead
of an apartment). 
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I do not believe that I need to discuss the problems of such a political regime in detail
once more. Nevertheless, let me summarize these problems in five points. Firstly, and as
previously  discussed  in  relation  to  the  Ostroms,  without  any  means  of  democratic
control and accountability,  government functionaries are no less prone to corruption
than  any  other  humans.  Secondly,  and  regarding  the  regulation  of  common  pool
resources, unitary rules would be defined that do not fit diverse contexts. Thirdly, the
monitoring  and  enforcement  of  these  regulations  would  entail  relatively  high  costs,
making  the  implementation  of  these  rules  rather  fragmented  and  weak,  ultimately
turning them back into quasi-open access resources. Fourthly, the uniformity of goods
cannot take individual needs and desires into account. Equality is understood here as
material equality which tends towards material uniformity. And finally, the provision
occurs  in  a  paternalistic  and  technocratic  manner,  disempowering  citizens  by
transforming them into consumers. Although such state provision might be experienced
as  comfortable  because  it  frees  the  individual  from  many  existential  problems,  it
remains questionable how stable such a regime would be if based on this undemocratic
and hierarchical relationship. To be clear, this critique is not to be misunderstood as a
critique of the state, its monopoly on the power of coercion and public goods per se, but
rather as a critique of the highly undemocratic manner in which such goods would be
produced and provided for. The general implication of this critique is that people are not
truly free if they are simply materially provided for. 
7.1.2. Commons in a Minimal, Market-based State 
These  problems  of  the  state  regulation  and  provision  of  commons  are  greatly
emphasized by economic (neo-)liberals and libertarians (Friedman and Friedman 1980,
Nozick 1999). For this reason, they often argue that the state should be minimalized and
the provision of these goods should occur through the market. Let us therefore now turn
to  the  relation  of  commons  and  the  state  in  a  market-based  society.  In  order  to
understand this  issue,  I  will  focus  on the  work  of  Adam Smith  and  John Locke and
attempt to shed some new light on their work. 
If we begin with the classical understanding of the commons, we must note that Locke
was not confronted with Hardin’s problem of overuse, but rather with the problem of
underuse of  resources  held  in  common.  Although  Locke,  perceived  there  to  be  an
abundance of unowned, common resources in the world (especially, for example, land in
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North America), he nevertheless believed that the goods necessary for a comfortable,
convenient  and  good  life  were  rather  scarce  because  they  were  rare  and  not  very
widespread. Furthermore, Locke understood the total surface area of land on earth to be
limited and, due to the increase in people and the use of money, able to become scarce.
Nevertheless,  it  appears that the limitation of surface area could be compensated by
“depth”. In this sense, I would argue that Locke understood natural resources as a well
that could be drawn from without limit. The ability to draw more from nature would
have depended, however,  on the access to land and on the amount of labor exerted.
Hardin,  in  contrast,  explicitly  –  and,  in  my opinion,  correctly  –  conceives  all  natural
resources to be limited. The reasons for this shift in perspective are rather simple: While
Locke existed in a preindustrial  era,  Hardin existed in a world that  had experienced
around 150 to 200 years of  high levels  of  industrial  productivity that  humanity had
never seen before. 
As we well know by now, for Locke, each person is originally allowed to appropriate
from the unregulated commons as much as he or she can use without letting any of the
resources go to waste and in a manner that there are enough resources left over for
others.  As  Locke  argues,  however,  with  the  introduction  of  money,  individuals  can
appropriate and accumulate larger amounts of resources and use these “productively”
by selling the surplus products for profit on the market. For the other people, the direct
access to the commons has become scarce if not entirely annulled. In turn, productivity
gains  are  provided as  a  compensation for  the  loss  of  access  to  existential  resources
through the private appropriation.  However,  because the other individuals no longer
directly  access  their  means  of  subsistence,  they  are  required  to  enter  wage-labor
relationships in order to earn money to then buy the goods on the market in order to
secure their existence. If we, in turn, add Adam Smith’s concept of the open market to
this narrative, the allocation of goods and services would then occur in a self-regulating
manner in which supply and demand would, over time, exist in a balanced equilibrium.
Even if an absolute scarcity of resources should arise, market exchange and the prices of
goods would theoretically provide the best mechanism for their efficient distribution in
society, both due to its self-regulating capabilities and due to its ability to reduce highly
complex information (e.g. the limited availability of goods and resources) into simple,
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comprehensible data (prices).87 Thus, in a minimal, market-based state it can generally
be said that the commons have been privatized and the direct access to resources has
been replaced by market mechanisms.
In this general description and similar to Hobbes (but not Hardin), the state was created
through a (hypothetical) social contract in order to protect individual property rights.
Here,  the  state  can  be  interpreted  as  a  type  of  second  order  legal  commons  that
generated through the pooling of people’s individual coercive power. Yet, in contrast to
Hardin, the authority of the state should not limit the appropriation of the first order
commons, but rather simply ensure the protection of individual private property. Along
these  lines,  Locke,  Smith  and  many  others  have  argued  that  the  state  should  not
interfere in private accumulation of wealth and the self-regulation of the market. The
protection  or  provision  of  commons  is  thus  limited  to  a  minimum,  including  the
protection of private property rights and the enforcement of contracts by the police, or
the protection of peace and national security by the military. For some, such as Adam
Smith,  the  provision  of  basic  common  services  is  extended  to  those  goods  where
“market failure” occurs.  We will  discuss Adam Smith’s position on this in relation to
education later. Aside from these commons of law and security, basic common services
often include goods such as education or  roads.  Both the  state  and these goods are
financed  through  pooled  resources  (taxes)  that  are  collected  by  the  state.  The
responsiveness  of  the  state  to  the  demands of  the  people  is  supposedly  maintained
through two central means: Through the freedom to move property (i.e. capital) freely
on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  through  the  ability  of  the  enfranchised
population  to  periodically  elect  representatives  from  competing  parties.  In  general
terms, this is a minimalist, legalist notion of democracy based on the state-individual or
public-private dichotomy of the civil tradition. 
As we have previously discussed in relation to both Locke and Adam Smith, there are a
few  fundamental  problems  with  such  social  arrangements.  Firstly,  although  life  and
liberty  are  secured  de  jure through  the  protection  of  property  rights,  due  to  the
asymmetrical  access to resources,  they are not necessarily guaranteed  de facto to all
people. Secondly, and in addition to this socioeconomic injustice, even if the property-
87  To  be  correct,  the  reduction  of  complex  information  through  the  price
mechanism  is  not,  to  my  knowledge,  an  argument  brought  forth  by  Adam  Smith,  but  one  especially
emphasized around 200 years later by Friedrich August von Hayek. 
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less have the right to vote and elect representatives and thus ultimately change their
social  conditions,  the  dependence  of  the  property-less  on  wage-labor  relationships
makes them highly susceptible to having to subordinate their interests to the interests of
their employers and the flow of capital. Historically, this dependency on wage labor was
a central reason why the property-less were not allowed to vote. The dependency on the
movement  of  capital  is  what  we  previously  described  as  a  structural  constraint  of
democratic freedom. Third, the priority of negative individual rights also highly limits
the abilities and powers of the state to interfere in and influence economic matters in
order to alter these property arrangements  (J.  Cohen 1989, 28). While this argument
was originally used by Montesquieu and Adam Smith to defend the freedom of a rising
bourgeoisie  against  the  power  of  absolute  monarchs  and  warring  feudal  lords,  the
freedom of property in the form of capital is used by a small elite against the realization
of life and liberty for large populations today. Fourth, a highly asymmetrical distribution
of property inherently leads to the possibility of capture – and thus corruption – of the
state by wealthy individuals. More correctly, we must note that the foundation of the
modern  state  has  always  been  an  imperative  to  fulfill  the  purpose  of  the  equal
protection of the existing (unequal) distribution of private property. In this sense, the
state has never been a neutral mediator between conflicting interests that has then been
captured by the wealthy, but has rather been a strong protector of property rights and
laissez-faire capitalism for those with property in productive resources from the outset.
Here,  we are reminded not only of  Herman Heller’s  term of authoritarian liberalism
(Heller 2015), but also of the dialectic relationship in the state-market dichotomy. While
universal individual property rights and the market were presented as alternatives to
the absolute power of the state, the Leviathan emerges again, not as an alternative to,
but  more  specifically  as  an  inherent  and  central  component  of  the  self-regulating
market. 
7.1.3. Commons in the Welfare State and a Property-Owning Democracy
One historical and theoretical answer to the problems of a minimal, market-based state
is  that  of  the  welfare  state  and,  more  recently,  Rawls’  notion  of  a  property-owning
democracy.  In  most  general  terms,  both  models  aim  to  mitigate  these  problems  by
providing  individuals  access  to  resources.  These  resources  can  include  public  goods
such as housing,  health care and education or more individualized resources such as
pension plans and productive capital. Simply put, while the welfare state emphasizes ex
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post distribution schemes, the state in a property-owning democracy supports the  ex
ante pre-distribution  of  resources.  Here,  I  will  firstly  discuss  the  state-commons
relationship  with  reference  to  the  welfare  state  and  then  turn  to  the  concept  of  a
property-owning democracy. 
In order to grasp the concept of the welfare state, it is important to also understand its
historical  origins.  Importantly,  the  welfare  state  did  not  develop  from  individual
property rights and self-regulating markets. Instead, these socio-economic rights were
often realized  through struggles  of  property-less  wage  laborers  against  the  negative
rights of  those with property in  productive  resources  (Lavalette  and Mooney 2000).
Furthermore, these welfare rights were largely answers to the chaos and destruction
brought about by a laissez-faire capitalism that led to the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the Second World War (Flora and Heidenheimer 2009). After the Second World War
during  diverse  types  of  the  welfare  state  were  developed  in  countries  throughout
Europe and North America (Esping-Andersen 1990). The aim of these efforts was for the
state to provide its citizens with a minimal level of resources in order for them to secure
a minimum standard of living and, thereby, to ward off the diverse negative effects or
“externalities” of an open and competitive market. 
Let us now compare the welfare state to our notion of commons as previously developed
in  this  paper.  From the  perspective  of  the  commons,  the  ideal-typical  welfare  state
shares risks of “ill health, old age, disability or unemployment” with “shared savings […]
[often;  LP]  financed  by  levies  on  employees  and  employers  and  supplemented  by
revenue from taxes”  (Weale 2013, 45). Additionally, taxation enables the state to pool
and redistribute wealth in the form of public goods such as education and housing, if
necessary.  In this sense,  the principles of reciprocity and mutuality that underlie the
commons are also fundamental to the welfare system (ibid., 47). 
Nevertheless, there are a few important differences between the welfare state and our
notion of the commons. Firstly, while some goods are provided for based on a basic right
to the access of resources (e.g. education), other welfare goods are largely provided for
according  to  the  contributions  principle  and,  thus,  according  to  proportional,
distributive  justice  (e.g.  old  age  pensions,  unemployment  compensation)  (ibid.,  46).
Here, the ability to receive support is relative to the amount paid and not according to
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one’s  needs.  While  this  might  be  considered  fair  in  a  rather  egalitarian  society,  the
principle is problematic when substantial inequalities limit one’s abilities to contribute
to the pooled resources.  Secondly, in line with this argument, I would agree with Albert
Weale that  the welfare state is  therefore a “device of  horizontal  rather than vertical
redistribution”,  because  it  redistributes  income  “across  the  life-cycle  rather  than
between income  classes”  (ibid.,  46).  Therefore,  despite  these  important  measures  in
redistribution, the welfare state leaves the underlying asymmetrical distribution within
society relatively untouched (Esping-Andersen 1990, 23-26). Thus, welfare rights can be
interpreted as a compromise that provides access to basic goods “as compensation for
exclusion” (Brettschneider 2012) from the productive resource systems that were once
held  in  common.  Thus,  the  satisfaction  of  people’s  everyday  needs  is  not  based  on
democratically negotiated self-organization by the affected, but is, rather, largely subject
both  to  the  arbitrary  powers  of  proprietors  and  to  growth  mechanisms  inherent  to
market competition. 
Third, due to the underlying asymmetries in property, the distribution of the resources
and capabilities enabling people to participate in the democratic co-determination of the
welfare  state  is  also  highly  asymmetrical.  In  Rawls’  terminology,  “[w]elfare-state
capitalism  also  rejects  the  fair  value  of  political  liberties”  (JF,  138-9).  Although  the
welfare state jumps in to assist and support those in need, people are not provided with
the necessary  resources  to  partake in  the  democratic  definition and  organization  of
these common goods. In this sense, welfare can be interpreted as a type of charity that
supports  dependencies  rather  than  a  basic  right  that  enables  self-determination.
Furthermore,  the  lack of  democratic  participation in  the provision of  these common
goods leads to the previously mentioned critique that state-provided goods are quite
uniform. Ironically, however, this critique is often voiced not by those demanding the
democratization of these common goods, but rather by politicians who co-determine the
welfare  provision  itself.  Their  answer  to  this  problem  is,  therefore,  not  a  greater
democratization of wealth, but rather a limitation of state welfare and a provision of
these goods through the market. 
In contrast to this move, John Rawls attempts to deal with these problems of the welfare
state  not  through  market  mechanisms,  but  rather  through  an  increase  in  ex  ante
distribution resources in the form of a property-owning democracy (Rawls 2001). Yet, in
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contrast to this differentiation of these ideal models, I would agree with diverse authors
that this contrasting juxtaposition does not hold (Jackson 2012, 47-8, O'Neill 2012, 91-2,
Weale 2013, Krouse and McPherson 1988). On the one hand, the classical welfare state,
for example, also provides the pre-distribution of education and skill  training; on the
other hand, one-off pre-distribution schemes also require continuing redistribution in
order to mitigate unforeseen misfortunes. As these authors argue, the promotion of a
property-owning democracy should not weaken the achievements of the welfare state,
but rather supplement  it  with an increase in  the  direct  access  to resources that  are
provided  to  individuals  early  on  in  their  lives.  In  the  welfare  state  as  well  as  in  a
property-owning democracy,  society’s  resources  are continuously pooled,  divided up
and distributed again. Yet, in a property-owning democracy, the basic right to life and
liberty is interpreted as a basic right to access resources at the beginning of one’s life,
and not only when one is in need. Ideally, this should enable people to self-determine
their  life  plans  and  transform  wage  laborers  and  consumers  into  active  producers,
entrepreneurs  and  investors.  Furthermore,  it  should  also  provide  people  with  the
capabilities to participate in the democratic organization of the state and its background
structures. 
Despite these great advantages gained by combining the welfare state with a property-
owning democracy, a serious problem remains that has already been discussed in our
analysis of Rawls: the competitive market’s tendency to propagate perpetual economic
growth. We have already discussed this problem in detail in the last chapter. Simply put,
both the WSC and POD distribution schemes nevertheless encourage people to overuse
society’s  common,  socio-ecological  resources.  For  this  reason,  I  would  argue  that
organization of common resources in a welfare state and a property-owning democracy
is inherently unsustainable. As an answer to this, we must therefore shift our notion of
pre-distribution from individual ownership in productive assets to the access to basic
common goods that are held and cared for in common. This implies that we must not
only rethink public goods as commons but also the role of the state in the provision
thereof. For this reason, let us now investigate the difference between public goods and
commons which I will illustrate with reference to the examples of housing, healthcare
and education. 
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7.2. Public Goods versus State Supported Commons: Housing, Health
and Education
7.2.1. From Ideal Theory to Non-Ideal, Civic Co-Creation of Public Goods
In order to understand the role of the state in a commons based society, I will briefly
discuss the role of philosophy and philosophical methodology in such matters. Although
I do greatly appreciate Rawls’ extraordinary and quite radical theory of justice and his
notion of a property-owning democracy, he himself emphasizes that his theory of justice
is  an  ideal theory  (TJ,  216).   In  a  similar  manner,  I  could  draft  an  ideal  theory  of
commons and make a list of numerous common goods that people must have access to
in order for them to enjoy life and liberty. The most obvious goods would be clean air
and  a  healthy  environment,  education,  healthcare,  housing,  food  and  a  basic
transportation  system.  A  more  ambitious  list  might  include,  for  example,  clothes,
culture, childcare services, basic bank services (including credit),  travel opportunities
and the like. As with any ideal theory, the activity of defining and defending a specific list
of necessary (common) goods is a fine and noble task because it provides orientation in
a somewhat confusing reality. I believe, however, that there are certain problems with
this procedure. 
Firstly, a central limitation of an ideal theory is voiced by Rawls himself. In A Theory of
Justice Rawls  discusses  the  two  principles  of  justice  and  the  guidance  that  these
principles provide for people in non-ideal situations. Nevertheless, he admits that “[i]n
the more extreme and tangled instances of nonideal theory this priority of rules will no
doubt fail; and indeed, we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at all” (TJ, 267).
This concession of the large gap between an ideal and non-ideal theory leads us to the
second problem of ideal theories.  So long as people do not perceive there to be any
connection  between  their  highly  complicated  “tangled”  reality  and  ideal  theory,  the
focus on ideal theories may possibly disempower individuals, because they only see the
great discrepancy between the two. Third, by defining a list of goods that people should
have,  one  is  automatically  making  oneself  vulnerable  to  the  criticism  of  being
paternalistic. Rawls’ strategy for this problem is twofold. On the one hand, he resorts to
his  original position,  which provides him with the legitimation that everyone should
come to a similar conclusion. On the other hand, he merely develops a “rough” (TJ, 216)
notion of justice and remains somewhat vague by speaking of “productive assets”, while
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those who have further developed his ideas have focused on “productive capital” or,
rather,  money  (O'Neill  2012,  80,  Hsieh 2012,  156,  Freeman 2013,  23,  Thomas 2017,
307).  Money  is  handy  in  this  regard  because  it  is  supposedly  neutral  and  provides
individuals with the freedom to choose how to use it. Yet, as we have already discussed,
in the form of invested capital it also conceals an immanent logic of growth. 
Fourth, I would concede that by defining an ideal theory one would also make oneself
vulnerable to the grave criticism of wanting to implement a utopian design of society in
a top-down and technocratic manner against the will of the people. Obviously, I am not
stating that this is Rawls’ intention. But the focus on the rational, the right and the ideal
from an original position leads to the formulation of a somewhat static political order.
For  this  reason,  Amartya  Sen  describes  Rawls’  ideal  theory  as  “transcendental
institutionalism”  (Sen 2009,  7),  which  appears,  at  least  to  me,  to  sidestep  non-ideal
historical contingencies, democratic deliberation and political resistance. Again, we are
reminded of the civil  tradition of democracy in which there is  a dichotomy between
transcendental background institutions of a society and the individual who acts within
these institutions. Although Rawls deals with the tension between the state and society
in  his  detailed  discussion  of  the  social  preconditions  for  a  just  society,  ideal  theory
nevertheless  demands  “strict  compliance”  from  the  individuals  towards  the  just
background institutions (TJ, 216). This focus therefore neglects not only the question of
how just  institutions  are  created  and  reproduced,  but  also  the  non-ideal  realities  of
social  inequalities,  concentrations  of  power  and  the  destruction  of  socio-ecological
livelihoods that impede the realization of such arrangements. 
For these reasons, I believe it to be necessary to change our perspective when discussing
the state-commons relationship and the provision of resources by the state from ideal-
theory to what Amartya Sen has coined a “realization-focused” (Sen 2009, 7) approach,
which aims at overcoming injustices,  domination and exploitation.  Sen describes this
approach  as  comparative  because  it  compares  diverse  existing  and  emerging
institutional arrangements in different contexts and analyzes how specific injustices can
be overcome given the present possibilities. Here, freedom, justice and commons are not
implemented from without or  above,  but  rather  grow out  of  the  “crooked timber of
humanity” (Berlin 2013, Kant 2006, 9, 8:23). In order to overcome injustice, Sen argues
that we should focus on democratic deliberation and the exchange of arguments of those
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affected  in  both  local  and  global  public  spheres  of  modern  societies.  In  line  with
Habermas and many others, Sen defines this deliberative understanding of democracy
as “public reasoning” and his understanding of the state as “government by discussion”
(Sen 2009, 321-337). Sen argues that the organization of state and social arrangements
is thus not merely dealt with through periodic elections of competing elites, but rather
through  the  perpetual  expression  of  concerns  and  the  exchange  of  ideas.  Through
participation in this process of democratic deliberation, people develop their capacities
to define the legal framework of the state and the goods that best satisfy their needs. In
short,  people  develop  capacities  in  democratic  self-governance  and  are  thus  able  to
overcome injustice and improve their security and social welfare (Sen 2009, 345-54). 
I  would  argue  that  to  systematically  realize  this,  broad  public  deliberation  must  be
institutionally secured through the inclusion of diverse groups of  people in both the
legislature and executive functions of government. The integration of citizens in such
functions  could  occur  through  the  inclusion  of  representatives  of  different  affected
groups (ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, consumer associations, neighborhoods,
environmental groups etc.), for example by volunteering or allotment. In contrast to free
association,  sortition is an age-old form of political  selection in which people from a
population are semi-randomly nominated to  take office in  diverse political  functions
(Buchstein 2009, Dowlen 2008). One serious drawback of such a mechanism is the lack
of accountability towards the public due to the inability to be reelected.  Despite this
drawback, sortition and other forms of political  inclusion can undermine the capture
and  corruption  of  the  state  by  politico-economic  elites  (Lockard  2003).  More
importantly, it can enable a broader population to co-determine and participate in the
co-production of the goods and services provided by the state. Here, top-down provision
of  public  goods  through  experts  is  replaced  by  or,  rather,  supplemented  with,  local
knowledge of needs, desires and the contexts of “common” people. Classical examples of
such forms of co-determination and co-production are habitat conservation planning,
participatory budgeting and functionally specific neighborhood councils for education,
policing or health care (Fung and Wright 2003). By considering Michael Walzer’s work,
we could understand this as the socialization of the welfare state (Walzer 1988). Within
democratic  theory,  this  notion  of  inclusion  is  often  referred  to  as  participatory
democracy  (Pateman 1970,  Barber 1984,  Roussopoulos and Benello 2005) and is an
important means of “deepening democracy”  (Fung and Wright 2003). Although many
226
theories of participatory democracy usually go beyond the state, we can argue here that
such political  inclusion  can  transform the  state  provision  of  public  goods  into  state
supported  commons  through  commoning.  Last  but  not  least,  these  practices  of
commoning enable people to develop the necessary civic virtues that help uphold and
reproduce the democratic institutions of the state and of a commons-creating society
(Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006). 
In summary, the implementation of a democratic, commons-based society requires for
us  to shift  our understanding of  the  state  from ideal  theory to a  realization-focused
approach  that  deals  with  injustices  and  other  non-ideal  realities  through  public
deliberation  and  broad  political  participation.  I  argue  that  a  “realization  approach”
would ultimately transform the provision of public goods by the state into commons. In
order to better understand this difference between public goods and commons, I will
now analyze  and  discuss  concrete  examples  of  housing,  healthcare  and  education.  I
choose these three goods because there is a widespread consensus in many Western
countries  and  across  diverse  political  camps  that  they  are  necessary  resources  for
people to lead a life in liberty.88 By analyzing these three basic goods, I hope to flesh out
the  concept  of  commons  and  their  relationship  to  the  state.  Let  us  begin  with  the
example of housing. 
7.2.2. From Public Housing to Housing Commons
In general, public housing is provided for by the state for people in need, which is often
interpreted to mean people with low incomes. To understand the problems of public
housing, let us begin with the more commonplace critiques of such state provision. 
Proponents  of  economic  liberalism  often  criticize  the  provision  of  public  housing
because it supposedly distorts the self-regulating mechanism of the market. While this
might be true,  it  is also the intention of public housing to provide people who could
otherwise not afford a home on the “free” market due to the discrepancy between their
88  Along those lines, articles 25.1. and 26.1. of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights state that the access to housing, healthcare and education is considered to be basic human rights
(UDHR 1948). Article 25.1. of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food,  clothing,  housing and medical  care  and necessary  social  services  […]”.  Article  26.1.  affirms  that
“[e]very one has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages” (UDHR 1948).
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low wages and the high rents of a home. If we value the satisfaction of needs over the
functioning  of  unregulated market  processes,  then we  can rather  easily  discard this
critique. Another more relevant critique of public housing for our discussion here is the
already  often-previously  mentioned  assumption  that  state  services  are  uniform  and
unresponsive to individual needs and particular contexts. Although this may be true, one
can say,  conversely,  that  unregulated market  processes are also unresponsive to the
individuals in need. While markets cater to those with more purchasing power, the state
caters  to  those  with  less  –  the  market  as  well  as  the  state  being  uniform  and
unresponsive  in  their  own  profit-oriented  or  bureaucratic  manner.  Aside  from  this
common critique, we must also acknowledge the concentration of poverty and, in turn,
criminality,  that  results  from  both  housing  markets  and  more  generally,  misguided
urban planning (Goering et al. 1997, Hui et al. 2015, Freedman and McGavock 2015).
I  would  say  that  the  answer  to  these  problems  in  the  form  of  property-owning
democracy is to provide people with housing capital so as to enable people to buy and
design  their  own  homes  wherever  they  want.  All  citizens  would  thus  become
independent  homeowners.  Yet  some  problems  arise  from  this  independent  housing
model,  such  as  suburban sprawl,  long  travel  distances  from  home  to  work  and  the
increased dependency on automobiles, to name just a few (Williamson 2010). Another
problem  is,  however,  the  explosion  of  the  cost  of  housing  through  real-estate
speculation, which would be increased due to the provision of capital for all citizens. The
“neoliberal”  and  anti-egalitarian  interpretation  of  a  homeowner  property-owning
democracy  has  been  realized  since  the  1980s  in  the  USA,  Britain  and  many  other
European countries by deregulating and systematically keeping the mortgage credits
low, thereby enticing people with low wages to buy houses that they could not afford in
the long run. This “privatized Keynesianism” (Crouch 2009) led to a run on real estate,
which created a property bubble and, ultimately, the financial crisis of 2007/8 (Howell
1984, Streeck 2013, Levitin and Wachter 2012, Jackson 2012, 47). 
What, then, are alternatives to the problems of uniformity, urban sprawl, poverty and
speculation? These problems are obviously very complex and cannot be settled with
simple  solutions.  Yet,  I  believe  that  the  systemic  and  process-oriented  approach  of
commons could provide us with insights to fix at least some of these problems. So, what
would a commons approach to the housing question look like? As discussed, commons
228
should not be understood as entities (e.g. public housing), but as a systemic and process-
oriented approach to creating common goods. In the case of public housing, this implies,
first  and  foremost,  the  integration  of  the  potentially  affected  people  into  the
development  and  design  of  a  housing  complex,  a  residential  area  or  an  entire
neighborhood. This determines the groups of people who will live there and, to a much
lesser degree,  the neighbors.  This  would mean that  people should apply for such an
apartment not after, but before the complex is built. The prospectively affected should be
able  to  express  their  diverse  needs  and  negotiate  how these  can  be  accommodated
within the existing financial and ecological budget. In some cases of public housing, lack
of funding is a central  problem that leads to uniformity and “ghettoization”. I do not
believe, however, that the lack of funds per se must lead to these problems. The problem
of  “ghettoization”  could,  for  example,  be  rather  easily  alleviated  by  building  in  the
centers of cities, which would mean that city planning would not be left to the planning
of real estate speculators and unregulated forces of the market. 
In  turn,  while  it  is  often  assumed  that  a  lack  of  funds  must  lead  to  uniform
administration  and  provision,  the  integration  of  prospective  dwellers  into  the
development and design of such a complex enables people to  creatively explore  the
existing possibilities within certain ecological and financial limits. And where money is
lacking,  it  should be possible for people to literally determine and shape their living
conditions with their  own hands.  Moreover,  from a systemic approach,  the layout of
housing commons would also provide diverse spaces for people to come into contact
with each other and develop their living spaces not just before the building process, but
also while they live there. This could include shared spaces for shared goods (shared
tools and household appliances, a repair workshop, shared cars etc.), but also shared
gardens, playgrounds and wild green areas, or possibly even a weekly local market and a
café. These examples might sound trivial,  but my main point is that the environment
would never be entirely brought to completion but always open to the continual and
evolutionary process of co-creation that can be adapted and developed by the diverse
people that live in such environments. 
The  belief  that  the  management  of  such a  diverse  and  creatively  assembled  habitat
would be impossible for the state to manage is, to a certain extent, correct. It would be
difficult and costly for state authorities to administer such self-organized groups. That is
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one reason why governments often realize uniform goods with uniform rules. But this is
where  Elinor  Ostrom’s  insights  on  commons  governance  come  in:  The  costs  of
management  can  be  strongly  reduced  while  increasing  the  robustness  of  the
institutional  structure  of  the  ecologically  diverse  resource  system  by  enabling  (and
requiring)  the  dwellers  to  democratically  manage their  own housing  commons.  This
would necessitate that both institutional and physical space for public deliberation are
provided  for  and  maintained.  Responsibilities  would  be  devolved  and  delegated  to
subgroups for respective resources, goods and services. More importantly, these groups
would provide the institutional possibility to voice problems and mediate conflicts: Such
groups would maintain the mutual monitoring and graduated sanctioning necessary to
reproduce  commons  on  diverse  levels.  They  would  also  provide  the  state  with
information for the background administration and support of housing commons. But
would everyone have to participate in these deliberation and administration processes?
The  right  to  receive  an  apartment  in  such  a  housing  common  could  require  a
commitment of  the inhabitant to fulfill  certain basic duties that go beyond the mere
compliance  with  basic  rules.  These  could  include  minimal  participation  in  the  co-
management and reproduction of the housing common.  But the precise definition of
these commitments would have to be defined by the inhabitants themselves.
Another question that arises in this discussion is whether housing would be provided
for without charge and whether the state or the residents would be the proprietors of
the housing commons. This is a central question that differentiates housing commons
from public housing. Simply put, a central feature of commons is that the people who use
the  resource  system  also  manage  it.  Ideally,  the  people  who  use  the  common  also
collectively own it in the form of common property or a trust. I suggest that a housing
commons could be arranged in the following manner: The land could be owned by the
state in the form of a Community Land Trust. The Community Land Trust manages the
land in a form of guardianship towards the people of the village or the city and leases the
land to the residence of the housing complex at affordable prices. The Community Land
Trust would be comprised of politicians, experts, residents and other people from the
broader community. The housing complex would then be owned as a cooperative by the
people who live there (Conaty and Bollier 2014, 14-16, Lewis and Conaty 2012, 85-110).
They would have to buy themselves into the cooperative. Yet,  as diverse examples of
housing  cooperatives  and  other  cooperative  enterprises  demonstrate,  this  amount
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cannot be extremely high because the prices for real estate are not to be driven up by
speculation and the costs of housing are shared by the many residents. For those who
lack the necessary funds, there could be other means of accessing this capital – hopefully
without falling into debt traps. To avoid this problem of debt, it is also imaginable that
citizens  would  be  provided  with  housing  commons  coupons  of  a  certain  value  (e.g.
$20’000) at the age of 18 years in order for them to become a member of a housing
commons project.  If the cooperative share exceeds this amount, the individual would
have  to  pay  the  difference.  But  these  are  only  some  ideas  of  how  the  specific
arrangement could look like. The important point, then, is that people have actual stakes
in the housing commons that they live in, which not only cultivates responsibility for the
management and maintenance of the commons, but also frees people from the arbitrary
interference by external owners such as the state or private investors. 
Now, let us analyze the role of the state in such a housing commons scheme. According
to  my  layout  above,  its  role  should  be  conceptualized  as  the  administrative  and
institutional back-up of a housing commons. The function of the state is to “be there” for
the  commoners:  To  initiate  and,  in  certain  cases,  to  support  the  processes  of  self-
governance, to aid the realization of certain large-scale projects and, most importantly,
to democratically develop urban and regional planning policies that provide adequate
land for housing commons.  The state would,  therefore,  not  manage people and their
habitats,  but  would  rather  provide  people  with  the  opportunity  to  democratically
manage their own lives and habitats. The power of coercion would not be exercised by
the state itself in the form of a monopoly, but would provide citizens with the necessary
possibilities and powers to democratically self-govern their own habitats. Here, the state
is not understood as an authoritarian leviathan, but rather as a partner in realizing the
democratic and interdependent freedom of its citizens. 
Having discussed the idea of a housing common, let us now turn to the question of how
the  public  provision  of  healthcare  can  be  conceptualized  as  and  transformed  into  a
common. 
7.3.2. From Public Healthcare to Health Commons
The right  to health care is  generally  based on the  right  to life  and well-being.  More
technically  it  can  be  expressed  as  a  “positive  right  to  basic  human  functional
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capabilities” (Ram-Tiktin 2012). While this might sound rather reasonable for some, the
public provision of health care is highly contested (Epstein 1997). After discussing the
problems of both a market and state provision of health care, I will develop the notion of
a health commons in relation to medical research and development, on the one hand,
and in relation to the idea of community health center commons, on the other
One central problem of the public provision of healthcare in many, if not most, Western
countries  is  its  increasing  costs  (Qidwai  2013).  A  common  reason  given  for  these
substantial  costs is the increase in demand for medical services.  Garrett Hardian,  for
example,  describes  this  problem  as  the  “laissez-faire”  provision  of  state  services
according to the Marxist principle “each according to his need”  (Hardin 1977b, 1993,
242-3). Accordingly, he states, “It takes no great insight to realize that hypochondriacs,
as a class, will  victimize the healthy in such a system” (Hardin 1993, 243).89 Without
testing the empirical validity of this rather cynical explanation, I would argue that the
reasons for  the  rises  in costs  in  healthcare  are not  merely due to  “hypochondriacs”.
Other important factors include, for example, the increase in population size, longer life
expectancy and higher standards of health. Yet,  some academics see the problem not
merely on the demand side,  but  rather in a  feedback loop of supply and demand in
which  greater  investments  in  healthcare  lead  to  improved  health  (and  longer  lives,
larger populations and higher expectations) and thus require even greater expenditure
in medical care. This is what some call the “Sisyphus Syndrome in Health” (Zweifel et al.
2005, Zweifel 2007). Zweifel et al. explain this feedback loop, 
“Initially, politicians decide to allocate more resources to health. If effective this
intervention causes people that would have otherwise died to survive. With more
survivors around, there will be additional demand for health care services. To the
extent that this  is  financed out of  private resources,  there is  not too much of  a
problem.  Individuals will adjust their health insurance policies accordingly and
allocate a greater share of their income to health care. However, most of these
services are covered by public  health insurance.  Rather than accepting to pay
themselves,  especially  older  voters  have  an  incentive  to  get  politicians  to
reallocate  the  public  budget  in  favor  of  health.  The  increase  in  health  care
expenditure (HCE) again creates survivors. Thus, the Sisyphus syndrome can go
into its next turn” (Zweifel et al. 2005, 127; emphasis added).
89  To be precise, Hardin actually sees the problem in rising expenditure on health
care in the in lawsuits of people against their doctors, on the one hand, and in expensive insurance and
diagnostic tests as a means to protect doctors against these lawsuits on the other (Hardin 1993, 242-3).
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Despite the plausibility of this hypothesis, their conclusion seems somewhat peculiar:
The  central  problem  does  not  necessarily  lie  in  rising  medical  costs,  but  more
specifically in the increasing  public expenditure on healthcare. According to Zweifel et
al.,  one  solution  to  this  problem  is,  therefore,  the  privatization  of  healthcare.  The
expenditure  on  healthcare  then  depends  on  one’s  purchasing  power  and  the  “free”
choice  to  spend  one’s  money  on  one’s  health.  Here,  it  is  assumed  that  through
privatization, supply and demand would eventually balance each other out. Generally
speaking, this belief that privatization would yield better outcomes in healthcare has
become  increasingly  popular  since  the  1980s  in  many  Western  and  non-Western
countries (Collyer and White 2011). 
The problem here is, however, that agents competing on an open market must pursue
profit-maximizing  strategies  in  order  to  survive  economically.  It  can  therefore  be
assumed that the profit maximization strategy would therefore not lead to a decrease in
costs for healthcare, but rather to an increase in costs. The reason for this is that private
firms  who  are  in  the  medicinal  and  pharmaceutical  industry  are  not  necessarily
interested in lowering private expenditure on health services and products but, instead,
in the perpetual increase thereof. Aside from using their monopoly power in patents to
raise  the  prices  of  drugs,  this  is  also  achieved  by developing  highly  specialized  and
exclusive treatments for those with greater purchasing power. Similar to the housing
market, this implies that medical and pharmaceutical companies are not interested in
the needs of those in need, that is, of those with ill health and little money. The necessary
care  for these  people  would therefore be  allocated to charity organizations  or,  as  is
mostly the case, to untrained and often already overworked family members of the less
well-off. However, in other cases, these people in need will not receive any care services
or medicinal treatment. A privatized healthcare system would thereby not be fulfilling
its proper function of providing all people with adequate healthcare services. Instead,
good health would become a means of social distinction and possibly even a luxury good
for the rich. 
However, and more fundamentally, a healthcare system that is structured according to
profit  maximization  is,  ironically,  not  necessarily  interested  in  a  long-term  and
sustainably healthy society. This is not to say that general levels of health in Western
countries have not increased over the last two hundred years or that pharmaceutical
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and biomedical corporations produce malfunctioning or harmful drugs. The point being
made  here  is  another.  The  reason for  this  underlying  disinterest  of  businesses  in  a
substantially healthy society lies in the problem that if everyone were healthy, people
wouldn’t go to a doctor or need drugs. Sales would sink and profits would plummet –
and people would lose their jobs.  The underlying and long term interest of a profit-
oriented health industry is  therefore not  healthy citizens,  but,  rather,  sickness and a
perpetual increase in desire for more medicine and more healthcare services (Brownlee
2007). Stated somewhat crudely, profits feed off the sick. 
However,  the described problem is not limited to an entirely privatized provision of
healthcare.  If  profit-oriented corporations  provide  the  drugs,  machines  and  material
infrastructure for a public healthcare system, the supply-side problem of perpetually
rising healthcare expenditure remains. This problem is otherwise known as the medical-
industrial complex (Relman 1980, Wohl 1984, Geyman 2004, Moskowitz and Nash 2008,
Ehrenreich 2016, 39-77). Here, we are reminded again of Hardin’s “double-P double-C
game” in  which the  profits  of  the  health industry are  privatized while  the  costs  are
communalized.  As  we  see,  with  a  background  arrangement  based  on  profit
maximization, both private and public systems are unsatisfactory and lead to rising costs
in  health  –  either  at  the  cost  of  increasing  public  expenditure  or  at  the  cost  of  an
unhealthy  and  run-down  lower-class  population.  Contrary  to  Zweifel  et  al.,  we  can
therefore  conclude  that  it  is  not  simply  public  spending that  leads  to  the  “Sisyphus
Syndrome”, but also a profit-oriented healthcare system that leads to ever-rising costs
for society. 
Parallel to the problem of housing, a possible answer to this conundrum could be the
conceptualization  of  healthcare  as  a  common.  But  what  would  such  a  health  care
common look like? I cannot provide a blueprint of what a health care common could
look  like  here.  Nevertheless,  I  can  provide  a  few  ideas  that  might  be  helpful  in
understanding how a healthcare commons could be organized. For this, however, let us
take a step back: The more general problem we are faced with is how to create a healthy
society that cultivates well-being instead of a society that values efficiency gains and
economic growth. From a systemic perspective, a health care common implies a general
and fundamental right to a clean and healthy environment  (Weston and Bollier 2013).
As Smith-Nonino notes,  “Certainly,  a  de facto public  health commons exists  in  every
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municipality that provides clean water, sewage disposal, or subsidized inoculations for
communicable  disease  –  services  often  taken  for  granted  by  most  citizens”  (Smith-
Nonini 2006, 233). In this sense, we must emphasize that healthcare is not something
that is realized simply through the provision of medication or an operation, but that it is,
rather,  an ongoing process and interaction of the individual  with its  socio-ecological
environment. While not denying individual responsibility for one’s health, a commons
approach sees  the  individual  in  a  complex web of  interdependent  relationships  that
influence  the  individual’s  own  well-being  and  the  well-being  of  others.  From  this
perspective, good health is not merely an individual effort,  but also achieved through
social arrangements and interactions. In order to understand what this might mean in
more detail let us analyze two facets of a health care common: medical research and
development and the community provisioning of health care services. 
As just discussed, a central problem of profit-oriented health care systems is that they
cater to the needs and desires of those clients with greater purchasing power rather
than  widespread  diseases  that  primarily  affect  poorer  people.  This  problem  is
accentuated by another related issue: The privatization of research and development or,
more specifically, complex and overlapping patent rights therein. Intellectual property
rights are often understood as important incentives because they secure property rights
in one’s labor, or rather one’s discovery, and enable people to reap greater benefits from
their research and development.  The flip side of these patents is,  however,  that they
simultaneously prevent other researchers and organizations from accessing and using
the specific knowledge. This is one case of what Michael Heller has coined the “Tragedy
of  the  Anticommons”  (Heller  1998,  Heller  and  Eisenberg  1998) or  the  “Gridlock
Economy” (Heller 2008, 49-78). In contrast to the tragedy of the unregulated commons
which leads to the  overuse of resources, the tragedy of the anti-commons leads to the
underuse  of  resources.  Here,  highly  fragmented  exclusive  ownership  rights  impede
innovation that could enable researchers to develop cheaper or possibly even better
drugs. It is in this sense that Heller argues that fragmented patents can literally cost lives
(ibd., 55). 
One commons-based answer to this would be – parallel  to the open-source software
movement  –  to  organize  medical  R&D  as  an  open-source  health  commons  where
information is shared freely among researchers and health organizations  (Tenenbaum
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and Wilbanks 2008).  In their whitepaper on Health Commons, Marty Tenenbaum and
John Wilbank explain, 
“We envision a Commons where a researcher will be able to order everything
needed  to  replicate  a  published  experiment  as  easily  as  ordering  DVDs  from
Amazon.  A  Commons  where  one  can  create  a  workflow  to  exploit  replicated
results on an industrial scale – searching the world’s biological repositories for
relevant  materials;  routing  them  to  the  best  labs  for  molecular  profiling;
forwarding the data to a team of bioinfomaticians for collaborative analysis of
potential  drug  targets;  and  finally  hiring  top  service  providers  to  run  drug
screens against those targets; with everything – knowledge, data, and materials –
moving smoothly from one provider to the next, monitored and tracked with Fed-
Ex  precision;  where  the  workflow scripts  themselves  can become part  of  the
Commons, for others to reuse and improve. Health Commons' marketplace will
slash the time, cost, and risk of developing treatments for diseases.” (Tenenbaum
and Wilbanks 2008, 3-4)
However, the point of such open-source health commons would not only be to cut costs
or to produce, but also to democratize the medical industry. Here, it can be assumed that
the open-source structure of  a  health commons in research and development would
enable  more people  to  participate  and collaborate  in  the  “peer  production”  of  more
innovative medical knowledge and needs-oriented treatments. 
From a more systemic perspective,  the democratization of  healthcare can also more
generally be encouraged by empowering people to take control of individual and social
causes  of  illnesses.  On  a  very  basic  level,  this  can  begin  with  preventative  health
education  in  schools.  With  reference  to  medical  training,  this  could  imply  the
development of a profession of community doctors,90 who would combine knowledge of
family doctors, care workers, pharmacists and therapeutic knowledge. The community
provisioning  of  health  care  services  could,  for  example,  be  organized  in  community
health care centers. Here, a community doctor and other care workers would provide
basic and accessible healthcare services to the public. Furthermore, the people seeking
help in such community health commons would not simply be consumers, but would be
integrated in empowerment processes of knowledge diffusion and self-help practices.
This could include, for example, groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, in which people with
common,  widespread,  complex  problems  such  as  chronic  back  pains,  migraines,
90  As  an  example  of  such  community  doctors  see,  for  example,  the  “barefoot
doctors” that used to exist in China (Zhang and Unschuld 2008, WHO 2008).
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burnout, (minor) depressions and obesity can discuss their problems and how they deal
with  them.  An  important  advantage  would  be  that  people  would  learn  to  listen  to
themselves and their peers instead of having to entirely depend on expensive experts.
Such a community health common could also provide simple health activities led by
volunteers that aim to increase people’s individual well-being. Because care work is very
time-consuming  and  care  workers  are  rather  limited  in  number,  a  time  bank  or
exchange circle could be organized in which people could offer their help in simple care
services  in  exchange  for  other  goods  or  services.  But  these  are  merely  some  fairly
concrete ideas of how such a community health common could be organized. On a more
general level, the principles of democratic planning and self-organization would lie at
the heart of community health commons. This would, in turn, enable affected people to
define for themselves how they would like to organize their local provision of healthcare
services. 
As we see, the cultivation of health and well-being requires, if not a lot of money, then
still a lot of time for caring activities. This leads us to the more political side of such a
health  commons  and  the  necessity  of  an  institutional  framework  that  supports  the
creation  of  a  healthy  society.  Although  this  is  often  associated  with  awareness
campaigns, a systemic approach to the notion of good health would go beyond the focus
on single, isolated problems and would avoid the top-down implementation of certain
notions  of  the  good.  Instead  it  would,  for  example,  aim towards opening  spaces  for
people to care for themselves and for others. First and foremost, this must include the
limitation  of  the  working  day  that  would  provide  people  with  the  time  for  these
activities.  Other  elements  of  such  health  policies  could  include,  for  example,  good
pathways for walking and bicycling and parks for people to exercise and relax in.  In
more  general  terms,  city  and  regional  planning  is  also  an  important  aspect  of  the
creation of a healthy and ecologically sustainable environment. All of this might sound
quite self-evident and mundane, but a commons twist to these policies would entail the
democratic integration of the affected people and the democratic co-determination of
their environments. Furthermore, a commons approach to health, well-being and public
space would involve a transformation of our understanding of public space. From the
commons persepctive, public space is not understood as a neutral space for everyone
and no one, but rather as a common space that is shaped by the people who use it. How
these different aspects of democratic participation, common space, community building
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and health issues are integrated can be illustrated with the upcoming and rather popular
example of urban gardening (Lewellen 2016, Baier et al. 2013, Seitz 2009). As we see,
we have moved from the question of health to that of community organizations to that of
city planning, which would normally appear to have little to do with one another. The
point  of  the  commons  is,  however,  to  see  the  systemic  relationships  between  its
individual  components.  More  generally,  the  democratic  integration  of  the  affected
people in such processes of community health commons implies that people can define
and develop their own understanding of health and wellbeing. But beyond this, it implies
that individuals’ health and well-being is not only an interdependent component of a
healthy society, but also of a healthy and sustainable environment. 
In summary, we can conclude that notion of a democratic health commons clearly goes
beyond the state provision of basic healthcare services. Nevertheless, its emphasis on
open-access  medical  research  and  development,  on  the  one  hand,  and  community
provisioning,  on the other,  could provide strategies to improve the health of citizens
without perpetually increasing healthcare costs. 
7.3.3. From Public Education to Education Commons
After having analyzed the notions of housing and health care as commons now let us
turn to our final example: Education. In contrast to housing and health, however, it can
generally  be  said  that  education  is  one  of  the  most  acknowledged  public  goods  in
Western countries. In this section I will compare the notion of public education to an
education commons. In order to do this, I will firstly discuss arguments for and against
education as a  public  good.  Secondly,  I  will  argue that  the access  to  knowledge is  a
central aspect of public education. Here, I focus on the problem of the privatization of
scientific knowledge in academic journals and argue that scientific knowledge must be
organized as open-access commons. In a third step, I discuss how public schooling can
be organized as a commons. 
7.3.3.1. The Defense and Critique of Public Education
The  general  understanding  of  education  as  a  universal  public  good  is  based  on  the
critique of earlier  social  arrangements,  most importantly of feudalism,  in which only
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aristocrats could afford to educate their children, and the children of peasants and lower
social classes learned only those skills necessary to fulfill their occupations. Despite his
defense  of  private  enterprise  and  a  free  and  competitive  market,  this  opinion  is
expressed rather clearly by Adam Smith. As we have already discussed in relation to
Smith, an increase in the division of labor leads to the problem that laborers become “as
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human to become” (Smith 1994, 840). In the
terms  of  the  tragedy of  an  unregulated  commons,  the  state  provision  of  mandatory
public education is necessary in order to overcome the problem of an entirely private
education  that  leads  to  the  exploitation  of  lower  classes.  We  will  come  across  this
problem again when discussing vocational education and the competitive market in the
next chapter on markets. According to Adam Smith, a “civilized and commercial society”
therefore requires the “education of the common people […] more than that of people
with rank and fortune” (ibid., 841). He continues, 
“But  though  the  common  people  cannot,  in  any  civilized  society,  be  so  well
instructed  as  people  of  some  rank  and  fortune,  the  most  essential  parts  of
education,  however,  to read, write,  and account,  can be acquired at so early a
period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest
occupations,  have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those
occupations.  For a very small expense the public can facilitate,  can encourage,
and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of
acquiring those most essential parts of education. The public can facilitate this
acquisition  by  establishing  in  every  parish  or  district  a  little  school,  where
children may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common labourer
may afford it […].” (ibid., 842-3)
The  aims  of  a  public  education  are  therefore,  according  to  Adam Smith,  to  educate
people  in  order  to  make  them  “more  decent  and  orderly”,  “more  respectable”  and
“therefore  more  disposed  to  respect  […]  superiors”  (ibid.,  846).  Although  Smith
concedes that the state “derives no advantage” from public education, these qualities do,
however, provide for a more stable and orderly society. More generally, educated people
are “less liable […] to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition” and “more disposed
to examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and
sedition” (ibid.). In turn, public education enables people of lower social classes to be
“less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of
government”  (ibid.).  Here,  we  see  the  enlightened  impetus  that  has  continued  until
239
today in which education is believed to create more reflected and critical citizens who, in
turn, uphold an orderly and civilized society. 
While  this  basic  defense  of  public  education  has  become  widespread  since  the  18th
century, its concept has been greatly expanded since then. Today, public education is not
simply  limited to  the  basics  of  reading,  writing and arithmetic,  but  includes  general
knowledge of history, politics and society and sometimes extends to vocational training,
university education and further, adult education. Here, education is not only provided
to increase social stability or, in Rawls’ terminology, a “well-ordered society”, but, more
importantly, in order to provide people with “fair equality of opportunity” (JF, 139). Put
somewhat  more  generally,  public  education  should  provide  people  with  necessary
intellectual resources in the form of knowledge and the cognitive skills of learning that
enable them to develop and realize their capacities and to freely choose their occupation
(TJ, 243, 374). Similar to Adam Smith, according to Rawls’ difference principle, resources
in education should be allocated so “as to improve the long-term expectation of the least
favored”  (TJ,  87).  Here,  educational  and  vocational  training  are  defined  as  central
aspects of a property-owning democracy that should be dispersed widely throughout
society by the state (JF, 139). As Rawls explains, 
“I assume […] that there is fair (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity.
This means that in addition to maintaining the usual kinds of social overhead
capital, the government tries to insure equal chances of education and culture for
persons similarly endowed and motivated either by subsidizing private schools
or  by  establishing  a  public  school  system.  It  also  enforces  and  underwrites
equality  of  opportunity  in  economic  activities  and  in  the  free  choice  of
occupation.” (TJ, 243)
Not only should the access to education resources create a just background structure for
a free society, but it should also support the reproduction of the system over time. As
Rawls explains, 
“Their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of
society  and  enable  them  to  be  self-supporting;  it  should  also  encourage  the
political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in
their relations with the rest of society.” (JF, 156)
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The role of  public  education is  therefore both an institutional  and a moral  one:  The
institutional  access  to  educational  resources  should  support  the  social  cooperation
necessary to uphold such a just system. This is, at least, Rawls’ ideal theory of a public
education provided by the state.  Although not always realized in this ideal form, the
widespread provision of public education by the state in many Western countries can be
understood as an extraordinary achievement. 
Despite “the great aspiration” (Oelkers 1989) of these ideals that developed during the
19th and 20th centuries, public education has been accompanied by its critics since its
beginning.  As  with  most  public  institutions  and  services,  a  common  “progressive”
critique has always been that state education is bureaucratic, uniform and unresponsive
to the needs of the children and the community (Oelkers 2010, Hayes 2007). Often, these
critiques focus on the disciplining techniques of educational practices and the overall
aims of educational policies that produce subservient and diligent workers in the name
of economic utility, productivity and growth, but not critical, creative, and free citizens
for a democratic society  (Dewey 2008, Freire 2012, Illich 1972). Furthermore, and in
spite of the widespread expansion of public education since the Second World War, state
provision of education appeared to be unable to counter social inequalities. In contrast,
numerous studies demonstrated how public schools merely reproduced the inequalities
that already existed in society (Bernstein 1973, Willis 1981, Lareau 2003, Bourdieu and
Passeron 1990). 
Increasingly in Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s, this critique of public education
was,  however,  used  by  “conservatives”  to  support  an  economic  liberalization  of  the
provision  of  education  (House  1998,  Apple  1996,  2000,  2006).  Caught  in  the  state-
market dichotomy, the only alternative to the top-down state provision of education is
therefore  thought  to  be  “free  choice”,  which  is  interpreted  as  the  introduction  of
competitive market mechanisms and the privatization of public  education  (Friedman
1955,  2002,  Murray  1984,  Walberg  and  Bast  2003).  With  David  Bollier,  we  could
understand this process as an enclosure of state provided education commons (Bollier
2013,  Björk 2017).  At elementary and high school levels,  this  can occur through the
influence of corporations on educational policy (including curricula and textbooks) and
school  campuses  (Neumann  2014,  House  1998).  More  generally,  a  market-oriented
public school system focuses on the output and comparison of grades (e.g. PISA), the
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competition between schools and, most importantly, the free choice of schools through
voucher systems. At a higher level, this can be seen in decreases in public funding of
college and university education, higher tuition fees and students’ debts in Anglo-Saxon
countries  (Mortenson  2012,  Goodnight  and  Hingstman  2013).  Furhter  effects  can
include a general increase in the competitive acquisition of external, third-party funds
for scientific research in Europe  (de Boer et al. 2007, Bolli and Somogyi 2010) and a
boom in expensive, private academic journals  (Tenopir and King 2000, Guédon 2001,
Kranich 2007). We will discuss the problem of these journals shortly. Although not all of
these  reforms  and  developments  can  blatantly  be  declared  as  wrong,  the  general
tendency towards privatization of education brings us back to the problem we initially
attempted  to  overcome  through  a  widespread  provision  of  public  education:  The
inequality of access to educational resources. By declaring that the “government has not
solved  the  problem[s]  of  education  because  government  is  the  problem”  (Maclaury
1990, ix), we end up in the same position we originally found ourselves in: A private
provision of education is not interested in the needs and desires of those less well-off. As
Adam Smith already argued from a utilitarian standpoint, this is problematic because it
decreases  society’s  productive  or,  for  us  from  a  commons  perspective,  caring
capabilities  and  threatens  the  social  order.  From Rawls’  normative  perspective,  this
inequality denies the less well-off the opportunity to develop their her capacities. Thus,
the privatization of education appears to be something like attempting to put out a fire
with burning sticks.
What, then, is the alternative to a top-down provision of education by the state and a
more private provision based on competitive market mechanisms? Here, we must again
bring in the notion of commons as an alternative to the state-market dichotomy.  For
education,  this  generally  implies  a  democratization  of  governance  processes,
institutions, the practices and the resources of education.  A commons interpretation of
education builds  on some of  these  critiques,  yet  places  democracy at  the core of  its
arrangements. To understand what this could mean in more concrete terms, let us begin
with  higher  education  and  the  educational  resource  information  and  then  turn  to
governance, institutions and the contents of elementary and high school education. We
will discuss vocational education in the following chapter. 
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7.3.3.1. Open-Access Information Commons: Scientific Knowledge and Academic
Journals  
Higher, university education can generally be understood as a central means of how a
society creates experts and intellectuals in diverse fields of knowledge. In the tradition
of the Enlightenment, a central aim of universities is to produce scientific knowledge
that will hopefully advance people in their understanding of the world. It is assumed
that this knowledge will make people more free in both the sense that it will free them
from false beliefs and increase the range of possibilities for action. This occurs through
the broad dissemination of information and knowledge to the wider public – and the
ability of non-experts to access this information. Scientific information is thus a vital
resource for political participation, critical deliberation and effective policy-making in
democratic  societies.  In  this  sense,  we  can  say  that  universities  and  scientific
information have a public function to educate society. 
If we look at the state of higher education and scientific information in many countries
around the world today, it is unclear whether universities currently fulfill this purpose.
Here however, we will not focus on the well-known problems of soaring university fees
and student debt. My focus will, instead, be on what some might consider a sideshow:
Academic journals. Simply put, the problem of academic journals is that they enclose
and privatize scientific information. The costs of access to individual scientific articles
for people who are not affiliated with academic institutions (which is the greater part of
the world’s population) are generally very high.91 One reason for these high costs is,
largely,  the  concentration  of  ownership  of  academic  journals  in  the  hands  of  a  few
corporations (Larivière et al. 2015). As can be expected, profits in this field are therefore
also very high.92 But the more fundamental  reason for these large profits is  that the
knowledge is provided to these corporations for free. Importantly, and in contrast to
newspapers,  for  example,  the  information is  not  created,  reviewed  or  edited  by the
journals  themselves,  but  instead  provided  for  free  by  academics  (Bergstrom  2001,
McGuigan and Russel  2008).  Additionally,  the  copyrights  for  the  articles  are  usually
91  The price for a single article can go up to $35 a piece (Monbiot 2016, 194). In
2011, British university libraries spent up to 65% of their budgets on academic journals (Economist 2011)
which can range in prices from $500 to over $20,000 a year (McGuigan and Russel 2008, Monbiot 2016,
194).
92  Some estimates speak of a turnover of $10 billion worldwide (Björk 2017, 101),
while others have already approximated in 2008 the revenue of these companies in North America alone
to  be  $11.5  billion (McGuigan  and  Russel  2008).  In  2010  Elsevier,  the  largest  publisher  of  academic
journals worldwide, had an operating-profit margin of 36% (Economist 2011).
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handed over to the journals  (Hilty 2007). Academics, universities and the public must
therefore buy their own research back from the corporations that merely package the
publicly  funded  information.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  private  journal  publishers
extract profit from research communities by enclosing and restricting access to publicly
funded scientific knowledge commons (Berg 2012). From a socio-economic perspective
and similarly to the problem of research and development in the field of  health and
medicine, I would argue that the privatization of information can limit collaboration and
innovation  and  lead  to  the  tragedy  of  an  anti-commons  –  not  necessarily  between
researchers,  who often have access to the journals,  but rather between the scientific
community  and  the  broader  non-academic  public.  Perceived  from  a  socio-political
perspective, expensive, private academic journals ultimately undermine the educational
function  of  science  and  universities  for  an  informed  and  self-reflective  democratic
society. 
The widespread privatization of scientific  information in academic journals  is  rather
particular for two reasons. Not only is the infrastructure and labor for the research often
funded by the public. Furthermore, digital information – and knowledge in general – is
often considered to be  the exemplary non-rival and non-exclusory good (Stiglitz 1999,
Hess and Ostrom 2007). In our terminology, we could say that digital information and
knowledge  is  highly  additive  and  inclusive.  The  fact  that  one  person  can  consume
information and simultaneously enable other people to benefit from it makes it an ideal
resource to provide in an open-access manner  (Verschraegen and Schiltz 2006). The
best contemporary example of this is the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia and the
Project  Gutenberg  which  can  be  understood  as  an  open-access  information  or
knowledge commons (Safner 2016). The philosopher Peter Suber defines open access in
the following manner: 
“Open access (OA) is free online access. OA literature is not only free of charge to
everyone with an Internet connection, but free of most copyright and licensing
restrictions.  OA literature  is  barrier-free  literature  produced by removing the
price barriers and permission barriers that block access and limit usage of most
conventionally  published literature,  whether  in  print  or  online”  (Suber  2007,
171)
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If we thus understand open access information in this manner, what would differentiate
its  organization  as  a  public  good  from  a  commons?  According  to  Suber,  one  main
difference lies in the author’s rights. By putting the work in the public domain, no rights
are retained: There are authors, but no legal owners of the text. In contrast, a commons
is  constituted when the author consents for all  legitimate scholarly uses.  The author
thereby  voluntarily  gives  up  certain  rights  (which  they  also  do  when  publishing  in
private  journals),  but  retains  the  right  to  block  the  distribution  of  falsified  or
misattributed copies and block the commercial reuse of this (ibid., 171, 179). From this
perspective, the intellectual commons is possibly more attractive for authors because
they are still  the owners of the text,  but can still  provide the information to a wider
public.
Aside from the question of the ownership of texts,  a public provision of open-access
information  differs  from  a  commons  provision  with  respect  to  ownership  and
management  of  its  infrastructure.  One  possibility  of  a  pubic  provision  of  access  to
scientific information would require the state to set up and manage open-access internet
platforms for the general public. This is often done with in-house government research
that is funded by taxpayers. It is questionable, however, whether governments should
also do this for academic journals.  If we look at other OA projects, Project Gutenberg is,
for example,  a private non-profit  corporation that is financed through donations and
managed  by  the  CEO  and  Board  of  Directors.  Wikipedia  is,  in  turn,  a  non-profit
organization that is administered by a seven-member board of trustees and also funded
through donations. For academic journals, it is evident the academic community itself
would  provide  and  manage  the  infrastructure  for  the  open  access  to  scientific
information. The existing expenses could be covered by public funds (e.g. in the form of
salaries  of  university  and  library  employees),  publication  grants  and  donations.
Importantly,  open access implies  free access  to  information,  which means that  there
would  be  no  subscription  fees  –  for  readers  or  libraries.  Yet,  because  much  of  this
publishing  work  is  already  done  for  free  by  academics,  the  remaining  costs  can  be
estimated to be rather low. But as Suber says, “[T]here is not just one way to cover the
expenses of a peer-reviewed OA journal” (ibid., 174). While the contents, in all of these
cases, are provided for in an open-access manner, the management is conducted either
through  government  officials,  entrepreneurs,  civil  society  or  professional  societies.
While all this information should be understood as an information commons, I would
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argue that open access created through peer production and managed by those largely
responsible  for  and  affected  by  this  content  should,  more  generally,  be  considered
commons in their institutional sense. In relation to our four examples, it appears that
Wikipedia  and  open  access  scientific  journals  provided  by  the  academic  community
would come closest to this notion of a commons. 
Lastly, however, it must be noted that from the perspective of the access to educational
resources,  the  value  of  open  access  to  information  stands  above  the  organizational
provision thereof. The question of how this intellectual resource should be managed is
therefore  secondary.  Despite  the  existing  risks  of  tragedy  in  creating  intellectual
commons (Wenzler 2017, Suber 2007, 183-7), the advantages of a commons over public
provision are based on the innovation that results from inclusive user-generated content
production and the democratic  accountability  of  its  administration.  In  this  sense,  an
information  commons  can  ideally  decrease  the  knowledge  gap  between  scientific
experts  and  the  wider  population,  not  simply  by  educating  the  public  but  also  by
providing people with the means to participate in and utilize science for the democratic
co-creation of their shared, common reality.  
7.3.3.2. Schools and Schooling in an Education Commons
After this discussion of the educational resource of information commons, let us now
turn to the more general question how public schooling can be organized as a commons. 
On the institutional level,  this implies,  first and foremost, that the people affected by
public  education  should  have  the  right  to  co-determine  the  arrangement  thereof.
Democratic participation must be understood as the answer to top-down uniform state
provision of education and as an alternative to market mechanisms and privatization
that  cater  to  the  well  off.  By  understanding  public  education  as  a  common,  welfare
recipients  and  market  consumers  are,  ideally,  transformed  into  active,  participating
citizens  or,  in  our  vocabulary,  commoners.  This  principle  of  democratic  co-
determination can be applied to diverse levels of decision-making: Educational policy at
national,  state and municipal  levels,  the administration of schooling districts  and the
management  of  individual  schools.  Because  it  is  often  believed  that  political
participation is more difficult on the national level, political participation in educational
246
affairs is most commonly achieved through organizational bodies such as local school
councils, parent-teacher associations and interschool student councils. Another type of
organizational body could be a Local Education Forum as discussed by Richard Hatcher,
which “would be a body open to all with an interest in education, including of course
teachers and other school workers, school governors, parents and school students” and
enable these people to “discuss and take positions on all key policy issues”  (Hatcher
2012, 37). The general aims of these organizations and instruments are to increase the
effectiveness and accountability in the provision of education according to the needs and
desires of the affected people. Despite the importance of this idea for the provision of
education by the state, I will not focus on these issues because the ideas are not new and
there already is a rather large body of international literature on this topic (Golarz and
Golarz 1995,  Brehony and Deem 1995,  Fung 2003a,  Lewis and Naidoo 2006,  Arvind
2009, Smit and Oosthuizen 2011, Long 2014, Jung et al. 2016). However, it is important
to  note  that  despite  this  emphasis  on  the  local  democratic  control  of  education,  a
national government is necessary to mitigate substantial inequalities between different
school  districts.  Decentralized  democratic  bodies  are  incapable  of  dealing  with  this
problem  that  arises  at  higher  levels  between  districts.  The  question,  then,  is  how
democratic participation can be strengthened not only on the local level, but also on the
national or even at supranational levels of educational politics and policy making.  In
general  terms,  democratic  participation  should  hopefully  transform  a  top-down
provision of public education into an education commons structured as a multilayered
and polycentric governance system. 
Aside from policymaking and the management of schools, it is also necessary to discuss
the notion of an education commons in relation to schooling. In most general terms, I
would like to emphasize the importance of democratic and ecological knowledge and
values for schooling in an education commons. The reason for this should hopefully be
rather clear from the preceding discussions. Nevertheless, let me shortly summarize my
reasons again. In general terms, democracy should enable people to co-create and co-
determine  their  socio-ecological  conditions.  The  importance  of  democracy  in
educational  matters  is  not  only  due  to  its  instrumental  value  for  overcoming  social
dilemmas  and  tragedies,  but  also  due  to  the  intrinsic  value  of  collective  action  and
convivial modes of living. The focus on democracy thereby emphasizes the importance
of individual freedom in relation to the freedom of others. This is what we have defined
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as ecological freedom: The freedom in, through and against others. The underlying value
a democracy should cultivate is thus the recognition and respect for oneself and the
other.  This  reciprocity  lays  the  foundation for  the  deliberation and negotiation over
other social  values and the organization of interdependent individual existences in a
shared reality. As previously mentioned in our discussion of democracy, this principle of
autonomy should, however, be integrated in a larger framework that includes not only
the human world but also the more-than-human world.  This,  in turn, leads us to the
importance of  ecology in  educational  matters.  Essentially,  ecology is  a  principle that
should  enable  people  to  recognize  environmental  limits,  understand  the  relational
functioning of eco-systems and negotiate the intrinsic and instrumental value of other
interdependent living beings. In terms of norms, ecology should cultivate the values of
diversity, reciprocal interdependence, care and sustainability. This is what Capra, Mattei
and others have called eco-literacy (Capra and Mattei 2015, 174-8, Kahn 2010, Peacock
2004). As we see, however, ecology and democracy should not be considered to be two
separate entities, but rather as complementary means to realize a just and sustainable
evolution  of  life.  Thus,  the  principles  of  ecology  should  be  combined  with  those  of
democracy, ultimately fostering an understanding for ecological democracy in education
(Houser 2009). 
Let us shortly discuss at this point what that implies for schools and teaching. On the one
hand, it would imply that democracy and ecology would be taught at schools as subjects.
In many schools, this is already the case: Democracy is integrated into a class called civic
or  citizenship  education,  which  is  sometimes  subsumed  into  history  or  some  other
subject;  ecology,  in  turn,  is  normally  taught  in  geography  or  biology  class.  Here,
democracy and ecology are solely treated as educational contents or as objects that exist
“out there” in the world. I believe this to be the traditional approach to these topics.
Although sometimes pedagogically necessary, this approach is somewhat problematic
because  it  reproduces  the  Cartesian  divide  between  res  cogitans and  res  extensa or
subject  and  object  that  underlies  our  false  man-nature  dichotomy  of  our  common
ecological reality. For this reason, an education commons would interpret democracy
and ecology not merely as educational contents, but also as educational forms, as ways
of  learning.  This  would  imply,  on the  other  hand,  that  learners  do not  only  acquire
knowledge of democracy and ecology, but also experience and practice these principles
in an interactive and systemic manner. As John Dewey already argued over 100 years
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ago, this means that democracy is not simply taught, but that it is also a way of learning
and, more generally, a way of life (Dewey 2008). Similarly, we could say that ecology is
not merely something to be learned about, but also a way of learning. A democratic and
ecological education would thus attempt to recognize the necessity and importance of
each person in collaborative learning processes. Learning would therefore not simply
occur as independent self-organization, but rather as an interactive and interdependent
cooperative  process  that  is  negotiated  between  the  diverse  pupils  and  teachers.
Admittedly, this notion of cooperative learning is not new  (Slavin 1996,  Gillies 2007,
Johnson  and  Johnson  2009).  An  ecological  twist  to  this  approach,  however,  would
integrate  one’s  environment  into  these  interactive  processes.  For  elementary  school
children, this could imply co-designing and helping to build a playground that fulfills
their  needs  and  desires  –  and,  possibly,  integrates  ecological  niches  for  plants  and
animals  (Lozanovska and Xu 2013).  For high school students,  such an interpretation
could be a project-based form of learning in which the school itself is developed towards
more sustainability. Here, for example, pupils could plan and organize the installation of
solar panels on the school’s roof – or they could possibly even learn how to assemble
solar  panels  themselves.93 In  this  sense,  the  aim  of  this  democratic  and  ecological
approach to educational praxis would be to foster engaged citizens who can collaborate
with  others  and  develop  skills  in  order  to  actively  co-create  and  transform  their
common reality in a sustainable manner. 
In summary, we can conclude that an education commons differs from public education
in two significant manners. As we saw in the discussion of information and knowledge,
an open access information commons would provide the wider public with the access to
academic research that  is,  in turn,  managed by the researchers and institutions that
generate this information. Secondly, I argued that an education commons would imply
that  policymaking  and  the  management  of  schools  are  democratized.  This  would
increase possibilities of the wider public to organize their education according to their
needs and desires. Furthermore, I contended that democratic and ecological knoweldge
and values should be integrated into schooling. This should provide children and young
adults  to learn in an individualized yet  cooperative manner in interaction with their
93  While  this  might  appear  to  some  as  too  complex  and  thus  unrealistic,  the
construction of solar panels is learnt and practiced at the “Barefoot College” in Tilinia, India (O'Brien 1997,
Roy and Hartigan 2008).
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environment. At all levels, the aim of education in an education commons is therefore to
empower people to become commoners for a commons-creating society.
7.4. Creating Commons in a Non-Ideal World: In and Against the State
I must admit that my “realization-approach” portrayal of a state supported commons-
creating society might appear rather rosy and utopian.  Returning to our preliminary
discussion of ideal and non-ideal theory, it seems as though I have slipped back into a
“transcendental  institutionalism”  in  my  comparison  of  public  and  common  goods.
Nevertheless, I hope that this discussion has provided us with a better understanding of
the relationship between the state, public goods and commons. The question that now
arises is, however, what the relationship between the state and the commons looks like
in non-ideal world. Or more concretely: How can such a social arrangement be realized
when democratic participation is not given? Does global warming force us to give up our
notion of democratic participation in a commons state? And does this focus on local,
nation-state  answers  not  forget  the  large,  global  picture  of  immense  poverty  and
ecological  degradation in  other  countries?  In  this  last  section on the  state-commons
relationship I will therefore touch on these issues: the “urgency” of climate change, the
role  of  commons  for  “developing”  nations,  the  threat  of  state  oppression  and  the
possibilities of reclaiming and cultivating commons.  
7.4.1.  The Urgency of Climate Change 
Form these diverse problems in a non-ideal world that I have just listed, let us begin
with the problem of climate change. As we already discussed, there exists an unequal
distribution  of  goods  and  bads  in  the  world:  20  percent  of  the  world’s  population
produce 80 percent of the world’s GHG emissions (Satterthwaite 2009). A part of this 20
percent belongs to the middle class in Western countries, while the rest belongs to the
affluent  people  who  reside  throughout  the  world.  While  there  might  be  a  growing
population  that  longs  for  socio-ecological  change  in  the  direction  that  has  been
portrayed in this book, there are, nevertheless, many people who prefer to cling to their
habits, privileges and power. If this is true, the small difference a few experiments in tool
sharing,  repair  workshops,  co-housing  and  democratic  city  planning  would  make
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appears somewhat laughable. Here, we are confronted with a few concrete and serious
questions regarding non-ideal political theory: How can the socio-ecological injustices
be overcome that result from this relatively affluent global population? What if a large
portion of this population – including many representatives thereof – is not interested in
such a democratic socio-ecological transformation? And finally, do we have enough time
considering the  urgency of  climate  change?  In  this  section we will  focus  on the  last
question. 
In  the  eyes  of  some,  these  interrelated  socio-ecological  problems  –  and  especially
climate change – are so urgent that we do not have the time to deal with them through
democratic  means.  Ivo  Wallimann-Helmer,  for  example,  explains  in  his  article  “The
Republican Tragedy of the Commons – The Inefficiency of Democracy in the Light of
Climate Change”: 
 “[A]lthough the normative ideal of republican democracy provides resources to
overcome the risk of such tragedy, it is inefficient all along the line. It is potentially
inefficient  both  in  guaranteeing  adequate  decisions  concerning  international
agreements  for  mitigating  GHG  emissions  and  with  regard  to  the  discussed
possible redesign of its institutions to overcome its inefficiency. On a global level,
where negotiations on international agreements to mitigate GHG emissions are
concerned, respecting the relevance of  democratic legitimization in republican
-democracies makes it very plausible that not all nation states (democracies) will
subscribe. This shows why […] the intragenerational dimension of climate change
should be treated as if  it  were a tragedy of  the commons even though under
optimal circumstances it could become a simple coordination problem. It should
be  treated  this  way  because  there  is  a  risk  that  in  republican  democracies
necessary political decisions are not reached in due time.”  (Wallimann-Helmer
2013, 14)
Interestingly, Wallimann-Helmer does not, however, provide us with an answer to this
very serious problem. He leaves us hanging at the end of his article with the passage
quoted above. 
Considering the urgency of the problem and the supposed inefficiency of democratic
change,  what can be done? One option could be, at least theoretically,  a type of eco-
dictatorship, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, yet achieved either through a
single democratic vote or a revolution. This is obviously not very attractive because we
would sacrifice our liberty for ecological sustainability, yet without being assured that
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the  dictator  will  be  wise  and  benevolent.  Another  apparently  more  pleasant  option
might  be what John R.  Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse call  “Stealth Democracy”
(2004).  In  a  nutshell,  their  thesis  is  that  people  are  fundamentally  uninterested  in
politics and simply want to be left alone (ibid., 129). According to Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, the only reason why people would nevertheless choose to participate in politics
is to limit corrupt and rent-seeking behavior of politicians. But if these people had the
illusory  option  of  “government  by  non-self-interested  elites”  (ibid.,  130),  a  majority
would choose it. In such an arrangement, we could simply allow some neutral yet good-
willed  scientific  experts  who  are  familiar  with  the  facts  of  climate  change  and  the
importance of equality for our individual and social well-being. Here it is believed – or
hoped for – that intelligent scientists would not be dictators, but friendly experts, who
would slowly but surely implement the correct evidence-based policies that would turn
us into a good and sustainable society in no time. And their benevolent and subtle art of
“nudging” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) would make it seem as if we wouldn’t even have
to seriously change our way of life or have lost our privileges and power on the way.
Such  a  political  arrangement  would  free  people  from the  time-consuming  and  dirty
conflicts involved in democratic debates and negotiations – providing us with more time
for  self-development  and  convivial  activities.  Ideally,  these  experts  would  also
implement  a  robust  firewall  that  would  forever  shield  politics  from  big  money  and
private interests. This is at least how I envision a stealth democracy. 
The obvious problem with such a political model, however, is the same as we confronted
with the eco-dictator and as Vincent Ostrom already made clear with reference to the
monocentric  and hierarchical  state:  Such neutral  and good-willed elites do not exist.
Such an arrangement is only attractive if the experts’ opinions correspond with one’s
own opinion. If this is not the case, I have no possibility of influencing the policy-making
processes.  Furthermore,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  such  experts  could  “peacefully”
implement rules and regulations that would fundamentally change people’s lifestyles,
privileges and powers without them noticing or resisting. A few examples of such rules
and regulations that come to mind could be: A strict limitation of wealth accumulation in
the name of equality; the prohibition of real estate speculation in order to provide access
to affordable housing for all citizens; the definition of decent minimal living wages and
the limitation of working hours so that people have more free time for caring activities;
the  prohibition  of  specific  things  that  are  ecologically  detrimental  (i.e.  plastic  bags,
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throw-away  coffee-cups,  eating  too  much  meat,  the  creation  of  new  fashion  every
season,  unjustified  use  of  SUVs  or  flying  by  airplane  etc.);  and,  lastly,  the
communalization of individual property in certain consumer goods and in the means of
subsistence and production, more generally. Overcoming social and ecological injustices
would require at least some, if not all, of these rules and regulations. Nevertheless it is
highly  unlikely  that  people  would  accept  these  changes  implemented  from  above
without  much  resistance.  As  we  see,  even if  people  deeply  desire  to  be  freed  from
political responsibilities, conflicts, and burdens, stealth democracy is an illusion.   
To the reader, the trajectory of the argumentation so far will have appeared to be quite
circular: The urgency of the issues involved makes us desire strong national and, even
better, international laws that would simply prohibit socio-ecologically unjust activities,
while we can generally assume that a large portion of the population in affluent Western
countries would vehemently oppose such radical changes. So where is the way out of
this conundrum? Assuming an eco-dictatorship or stealth democracy is neither desirable
nor realistic, the options we have appear to be somewhat limited. It seems there are no
quick answers to these problems. But how should social change occur if more affluent
and powerful people resist the loss of their privileges, despite their negative effects on
many other people and ecosystems around the globe? We will attempt to answer this
problem shortly, but before that let us now turn to another problem in the non-ideal
world that has is interrelated with this problem: the global socio-ecological inequalities
and the role of the commons for “developing” countries. 
7.4.2. Commons-Oriented Strategies in “Developing” Countries
As  we  have  just  discussed,  the  smaller  but  more  affluent  population  of  the  world
consumes a large portion of  the world’s  resources.  This  is  not  to say that  the more
affluent Western countries are at fault for all the problems that occur in the rest of the
world.  Nevertheless,  an  analysis  of  the  global  flows  of  commodities,  capital  and
greenhouse gas emissions create a fairly clear picture of this global disparity: While the
goods (cheap products, capital etc.) flow to the wealthy populations and most often to
Western countries in the northern hemisphere of the globe, the “bads” such as pollution
and poverty are often externalized to the South. Obviously, there are no simple answers
to such complex and historically entrenched problems. Nevertheless, I would assume
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that the commons perspective could possibly provide some basic insights in how some
of these problems might be alleviated. 
In principle,  the concept of commons remains the same, whether we are speaking of
countries in the North or the South: The commons approach generally entails that the
local people dependent on and affected by a specific resource system should have the
collective rights in property and the ability to democratically manage these resources
(Wenar  2008,  Hendrix  2008).  In  order  to  minimize  rent-seeking  corruption,  these
resources should be held under democratic stewardship towards the larger community
and  the  eco-system  (Weis  2015,  Westra  2011).  This  might,  however,  imply  that  a
community could nevertheless have the right to exploit their resources within certain
ecological limits if the entire community desires to do so. The difference to the existing
system of “plunder” (Mattei and Nader 2008) would be that the financial returns from
this exploitation would not flow to those who are already wealthy, but should go directly
to those who are overusing and losing their material means of living. 
Thus, the general policy that is proposed here to alleviate poverty in the global South is
by “realizing property rights”  (de Soto and Cheneval 2006). A good point of reference,
here, is the report Empowering the Poor Through Property Rights (Cheneval 2008) that
was a result of the working group of the United Nations Development Programme and
the Commission on Legal Empowerment of  the Poor.  As this  report  acknowledges,  a
main problem in developing countries is that “the absolute majority of the people in
developing countries are not  [legally;  LP] protected in theory or practice” (Cheneval
2008,  64).  This  makes  people  economically  and  politically  vulnerable,  most  notably
women, indigenous people and urban slum dwellers (ibid. 65).  A main feature of this
report is the state recognition of informal or “extralegal property systems” (Cheneval
2008, 66) based on customary tenure and “vernacular law” (Weston and Bollier 2013,
104).  This  principle  is  basically  a  reformulation  of  Elinor  Ostrom’s  seventh  design
principle,  which  supports  the  recognition  of  people’s  rights  to  devise  their  own
institutions (E. Ostrom 2008a, 101). Importantly, the report emphasizes the necessity of
a wide “range of possibilities of ownership by individuals, members of collectives, and
by collectives” (Cheneval 2008, 87). Simultaneously, the report repeatedly emphasizes
the importance of common property arrangements (ibid., 71, 73, 83-4, 87-9, 105). These
can  be  realized  through  the  recognition  of  existing  collectively  “indigenous  tenure
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systems” (ibid.,  79).  Echoing the work of Elinor Ostrom the political philosopher and
rapporteur of the report, Francis Cheneval, writes: 
“The  majority  of  the  rural  poor  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  non-arable
resources such as forests,  pastures,  swamplands,  and fishing grounds.  These
resources  require  careful  management  to  avoid  rent-seeking  and  corrupt
practices that result in environmental degradation and economic inefficiencies.
The state should enhance the asset base of the poor by enabling community-
based ownership and management of private commons, but it will have to play
the role of conflict manager among the communities and among individuals.”
(ibid., 71)
While these examples focus on the rural poor, in the case of slum dwellers and the urban
poor the report supports the promotion of “associative property structures” (ibid., 87).
Such associative property arrangements can be created not simply through the formal
recognition of their property rights, but also through “leverage by pooling assets” (ibid.).
As the report mentions, however, the process of realizing such property arrangements
are not easy. The report mentions a few problems, of which I would like to focus on one
specifically:  “Protecting  customary or  indigenous  rights  while  enacting  the  ability  of
communities and individual households to explore new economic opportunities” (ibid.,
90).94  This  can  also  be  understood  as  the  possibilities  of  individuals  to  opt-out  of
common property arrangements. I believe this to be of central importance, because the
support  of  common  property  arrangements  cannot  be  interpreted  as  a  top-down
implementation thereof.  Hence, while I emphasize the importance of commons in order
to enable ongoing democratic self-governance, it is also necessary to underline the prior
democratic  deliberation  over  the  desired  mix  of  individual  and  common  property.
Accordingly, Francis Cheneval writes, “For implementation at all levels, reforms must be
based on deliberation and inputs from those that they are intended to affect” (Cheneval
2008,  70).  The  emphasis  on  democratic  deliberation  in  the  realization  of  property
arrangements is  thus central  to avoid the implementation of institutions that do not
correspond with the people’s needs and environments. Here, we are reminded of Elnor
Ostrom’s  second  and  third  design  principles  (E.  Ostrom  2008a,  92-3).  The  report
understands this  as a  “context-based legal reform” (Cheneval  2008,  69) that  I  would
define as essential in all attempts to alter property arrangements and realize commons. 
94  The other difficulties include: “Identifying communities and evolving practices”;
“balancing respect for local decision-making with human rights and accountability”; and the “challenge of
capacity and conflict” (Cheneval 2008,  90).  I omitted the capitalization of all  the main words in these
phrases in order to make them more reader-friendly. 
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Related to the question of the mix between individual and communal property is also
the  question  of  the  role  of  the  market  in  such  policies.  While  the  UNDP  report
emphasizes the importance of common property arrangements, it also underlines the
importance of  markets  for  entrepreneurial  activities  and “value addition”  (ibid.,  74).
That being said, the rapporteur also admits that there existed “conflicting views” on the
“role  of  the  state  [and]  the  market”  (ibid..  75).  While  some  argued  that  the  market
provides  opportunities  for  the  poor,  others  emphasized  the  “fact  that  market  forces
marginalize the poor and drive them into misery” (ibid.). In this sense, this ambivalent
approach contrasts somewhat with the approach propagated by Hernando de Soto, who
largely  focuses  on  the  legal  recognition  of  individual  private  property  in  order  to
provide  those  in  poverty  with  security  and  the  access  to  markets  (de  Soto  2001).
Considering the problematic effects of individual private property coupled with market
access  that  we  have  already  extensively  discussed,  I  would  argue  that  it  is  more
desirable  to  support  the  livelihoods  of  individuals  from  a  “subsistence  perspective”
(Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999) and the structural interdependence of individuals
through communal property rights and community wealth building.  As in the report
Empowering  the  Poor,  “[T]hrough  sustainable  ownership  and/or  security  of  tenure
individuals and communities becomes more autonomous” (Cheneval 2008,  73).  Here,
autonomous can be interpreted both as independent from market mechanisms as well
as democratically co-determined. This would not prohibit individuals and communities
from producing goods that they also sell on the market. Instead, the focus on democratic
rights, community building and economic self-sufficiency intends to make people less
vulnerable to the negative effects of the open-access, competitive market. Or, again with
reference to the UNDP report: “The idea [of associative property structures; LP] is to
provide a form of ownership to balance the interests of the individual or family with
those of a broader community” (ibid., 87).  
While the notion of subsistence might sound somewhat backward-looking here, I in no
way intend to imply that the poor should remain poor. Instead, it aims to conceptualize
an alternative understanding of sustainable development based on ecological democracy
(Kothari  2014,  Kothari  and  Demaria  2017,  Kothari  2018).  Strengthening  democratic
practices  and  institutions  within  local  communities  empowers  people  with  the
capabilities to then determine how they desire to develop and grow as a community.
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Coupled with economic subsistence through common property arrangements this can
potentially free people from the necessity of  perpetual monetary growth. Importantly,
however, these strategies of democratically co-determined development do not simply
apply to countries of the South but can and should also be developed in more affluent
Northern societies.  
While this process of recognition might sound grand for people with informal tenure
rights and small resources that can be pooled, this is not the case for those without any
property  in  external  resources.  As  Cheneval  writes,  “Increasing  security  of  property
rights will have limited direct benefits for those who do not have any real assets at all”
(Cheneval 2008, 105). In order to mitigate this problem of no direct access to material
resources,  the  commission  supports  not  only  rental  markets  and  the  recognition  of
informal settlements, but also a community-based land reform (ibid., 105-6). The aim of
such a reform would be to provide people with access to material resources or, what
they  call  “real  property”  (ibid.,  105).  In  order  to  do  this,  they  suggest  people  are
provided  with  funds  in  order  to  then  access  resources.  Recognizing  the  potential
negative side-effects of a “market-based” strategy, the report argues that the solution is
“legally less complicated and politically less sensitive than in compulsory acquisition
programmes”  (ibd.,  106).  Although  I  would  absolutely  agree  with  this  insight,  it
nevertheless remains questionable where these funds will come from and if the state
has the possibilities and the will to provide these citizens with such funds. The question
then arises  how substantial  property  rights  can  be  realized for  those without  much
political and economic power. This problem brings us to our next topic in our discussion
of the state-commons relationship: the problems of elite resistance and state oppression
in attempts to realize common property arrangements. 
7.4.3. Reclaiming the Commons
As Francis Cheneval recognizes in the UNDP report on Empowering the Poor, a central
difficulty in realizing property rights for the poor is the “resistance of powerful social
actors” (Cheneval 2008, 80). In relation to the realization of commons arrangements, it
can  be  argued  that  this  problem  is  accentuated,  because  it  conflicts  with  the
prioritization of individual private property and the principles of free trade (McCarthy
2004, Mattei and Nader 2008, Driessen 2008). Moreover, it can be said that this problem
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of  resistance “from above”  exists  not  only  in  developing  countries  but  also  in  more
developed countries  (Heyn et al. 2007, Gerbasi and Warner 2007). Generally put, the
reasons for elite resistance are that the realization of commons arrangements not only
limit their appropriation of more wealth but also often require the dispossession of their
existing individual private property. Or put somewhat differently, elite resistance is a
reaction against the transformation of appropriated resources back into commons. In
general, I see two methods of dealing with this problem of resistance and oppression
from  politico-economic  elites  and  state  authorities:  confrontation  and  “interstitial”
activities of commoning. In this section we will focus on the strategy of confrontation.
But before that let us discuss the role of the state in elite resistance in a little more detail.
It  is  noteworthy  that  in  comparison to  “bottom up” resistance  in  the  form of  social
movements, it appears as though elite resistance is much less documented. I believe the
difficulty in conceptually grasping elite resistance lies in its interwoven structure with
the state. While “bottom up” resistance is often visible because it occurs in public spaces,
top-down  resistance  is  much  more  “civilized”  and  invisible  because  it  results  from
“investment  strikes”  (Streeck  2013,  50) and  (supra)national  governing  bodies.  This
might be a reason why there is significantly less explicit reference in academic literature
to the  elite  resistance to  commoning than on social  resistance to  privatization.  That
being  said,  the  two  can  be  interpreted  as  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  Interestingly,
however,  the  widespread  focus  on  bottom  up  resistance  implicitly  naturalizes
privatization tendencies and normatively connotes social protest as a resistance to this
natural  development.  I  would  argue  that  this  naturalization  occurs  due  to  the
interwoven  interests  of  powerful  economic  and  political  actors.  Because  individuals
with more resources can utilize their greater power to influence politicians and politics
through  non-democratic  means,  the  state  and  supranational  governing  bodies  are
therefore sometimes discretely and illegitimately used as a means to defend individual
property arrangements and competitive markets. We already discussed this problem of
“capture” in relation to the minimal, market-based state. Here, powerful social actors
utilize state authority to uphold the often invisible and seemingly natural background of
social arrangements. Attempts to realize common property arrangements are therefore
sometimes confronted not only with elite resistance but also with state oppression.
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In  such  cases,  “bottom  up”  confrontation  can  provide  a  means  to  protest  against
illegitimate  social  arrangements  and  grave  injustices  that  are  often  neglected  by
politicians, the media and the public. Such confrontation can occur either through the
work of NGOs who spread information on such injustices or, more classically, through
protest  and  demonstrations  on  the  street.  This  latter  form  of  confrontation  is  a
performative and collective means of expressing one’s opinion, yet without reverting to
the exchange of arguments. While protest is often understood as undemocratic because
it  is  performative  and  not  based  on  reciprocal  deliberation,  it  must  nevertheless  be
understood as a democratic means of bringing suppressed issues and conflicts to the
fore. More importantly, it  is also a means to force powerful actors who free-ride and
resist  democratic  deliberation  to  the  negotiation  table  (Tully  2014,  70).  In  our
discussion of socio-ecological justice, protest can thus be understood as a strategy to
shame and blame people, corporations or institutions for their destruction of livelihoods
and  the  environment.  Confrontation  could  therefore,  more  generally,  be  a  means  to
create  public  awareness  of  socio-ecological  injustices  and  possibly  alter  the  legal
framework to limit appropriation and transform individual into common property.
Although  confrontation  is  often  necessary  to  create  public  pressure  on  political
representatives to act in a certain manner, the question still remains whether this will
suffice for broader social-ecological transformation in general and the development of a
commons-creating society, more specifically. In order to deal with this problem, I would
suggest that it is necessary to widen our traditional understanding of confrontation to
include  the  practice  of  “reclaiming  the  commons”  (Klein  2001).  “Reclaiming  the
commons” is generally a practice of legal or illegal occupation and re-appropriation of
goods, services and institutions that are considered to be originally held in common yet
have  been “enclosed”  trough privatization  or  nationalization  –  and,  in  most  cases,  a
mixture  of  both,  as  in  public-private  partnerships.  Historically,  this  process  of
“reclaiming the commons” is  a  phenomenon that  has,  most  likely,  existed since time
immemorial  in  struggles  of  people  (“commoners”)  against  the  dispossession of  their
basic resources by elites. One well-known example of “reclaiming the commons” are the
activities and demands of the Diggers – and, to a certain extent,  also the Levellers –
during  the  enclosures  of  common  lands  during  the  English  Civil  War  (1642–1651)
(Hessayon 2008,  Macpherson 2011,  107-159).   A less well-known but possibly more
significant historical example is the re-establishment of subsistence rights to enter and
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use forests for commoners in the Charter of the Forest of 1217, which was a central yet
forgotten sub-article of the Magna Carta (Linebaugh 2008, Babie 2016). These activities
of reclaiming the commons are not something to be put off as a thing of the past, but
must  be  understood  as  struggles  that  are  presently  occurring  all  over  the  world  in
relation to numerous and diverse private and public goods and services such as water,
land,  seeds,  information,  public  space,  education  and  healthcare  (Łapniewska  2015,
Shiva 2005, Harvey 2013, Assies 2003, Wolford 2010, Karaliotas 2016). 
In the case of public goods, we might assume that they are already a form of commons,
but  as  our  discussion  has  shown,  public  goods  are  often  not  to  be  equated  with
commons, either due to the general lack of provision by the state or due to the lack of
needs-orientation and democratic governance by the affected. In cases where “the state”
and  government  officials  do  not  grant  their  citizens  the  rights  and  possibilities  to
democratically  manage  their  resources,  the  activity  of  “reclaiming  the  commons”
becomes a central aspect of commoning in which people take (back) democratic control
over the socio-ecological conditions of their lives. This sheds new light on the collective
civic activities, which James Tully also understands as “cooperative democracy.” Here,
democracy is not limited to deliberation, but is based on the activity of “joining hands
and working together” (Tully 2014, 97). The strength of this activity is that it empowers
people  to  take  matters  into  their  own hands without  having  to  wait  for  benevolent
government officials to kindly provide citizens with the opportunity to participate in
democratic governance orchestrated by governmental officials and within predefined
boundaries.  Here,  commoning  must  be  understood  as  a  constituent  power  of  social
movements  (Bailey and Mattei 2013) that opens the political field for the democratic
redefinition  of  the  boundaries  between  the  private,  public  and  common,  ultimately
reconfiguring the organization of social reality. 
7.4.4. The Interstitial Civic Activities of Commoning
Because this confrontational activity of “reclaiming commons” can,  in some cases,  be
challenged with severe opposition by the state and politico-economic elites, it would be
important  to  support  these  activities  with  more  subtle,  yet  just  as  important
“interstitital” activities of commoning. In his book Envisioning Real Utopias (2010), Erik
Olin Wright describes interstitial strategies and activities as “various kinds of processes
that occur in the spaces and cracks within some dominant social structure of power”
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(Wright 2010, 322). The aim of these activities is to “build […] alternative institutions
and deliberately  foster  […] new forms of  social  relations  that  embody emancipatory
ideals and that are primarily created through direct action of one sort or another rather
than  through  the  state”  (ibid.,  324).  From  a  historical  perspective,  traders  and
entrepreneurs utilized this strategy to open markets in highly regulated feudal social
arrangements  (Braudel 1986). Considering the pressing socio-ecological injustices we
face today, I would argue that it is therefore of utmost importance to not only focus on
the confrontation and transformation of the state, but also on these independent and
interstitial activities of commoning. With reference to the inability of the limited political
options to deal with these problems within the existing political and legal frameworks
and the resulting injustice, I therefore agree with James Tully that 
“[t]he remedy to this injustice is not only to exchange public reasons in hopes of
influencing governments, for this has its limits. For cooperative democrats, the
response is to non-cooperate with this undemocratic  mode of  production and
consumption,  to  withdraw  one’s  producing  and  consuming  capabilities  from
commodification  and  to  exercise  productive  and  consumptive  capabilities  ‘in
common’  in  democratically  run  cooperatives  and  community-based
organizations  that  are  re-embedded  in  social  relationships.  Such  grass  roots
democracies  then  produce  and  distribute  the  basic  public  goods  that  are
privatized under the dominant form of democracy: food, shelter, clothing, health
care, clean water, security and so on” (Tully 2014, 91).
In relation to our discussion of Amartya Sen, Tully also mentions that “[t]his tradition [of
civic cooperative democracy; LP] is also practice based and ‘realization focused’, yet in a
more  immediate  way,  and  it  works  around,  rather  than within,  the  basic  structure”
(Tully 2013b, 223). Obviously, such activities must also be understood as an activity of
“reclaiming commons”, yet the focus has shifted from confrontative re-appropriation to
the collective creation of commons – irrespective of state support and the existing legal
structure. 
Here, the goods that we have generally understood up until now as a basic right for the
satisfaction  of  one’s  needs  and  that  originally  should,  in  some  form  or  another,  be
provided  for  by  the  state  are  now  provided  as  commons  by the  people  themselves
through collective civic activities. Again, in the words of Tully,
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“This is the tradition of democracy as non-violent cooperative self-government:
of  the  people  exercising  the  capabilities  of  self-government  together  in  their
social  and economic activities on the commons.  This is  the classic meaning of
democracy:  of  the  demos exercising  kratos (political  capacities)  in  public
reasoning and acting together for the sake of public goods” (ibid.; emphasis i.o.).
Here,  Tully  interprets  public  goods  as  commons  because  these  goods  are  created
through  democratic,  collective  action.  As  he  emphasizes,  this  activity  is  non-violent
because  the  cooperation  necessary  for  democratic  self-governance  can  only  occur
through non-violent means of communication and interaction. It is clear that one should,
however,  not  over-romanticize  these  commoning  activities  because  they  often  arise
when  people  are  in  distress  and  misery  due  to  the  breakdown  of  older  forms  of
provision, whether through communal ties, the market or the state  (Karaliotas 2016).
Yet, whatever the motivation for these activities may be, they still must be understood as
a  central  answer  to  the  deafness  and  unresponsiveness  of  the  state  and  politico-
economic elites to the basic needs of people. But as we have already discussed, the goal
is not for the state or economic elites to paternalistically provide goods and services for
people, but for citizens to be able to democratically provide for themselves – ideally with
the support of a democratized state and the aid of what we have previously called eco-
law. 
In this sense, I must reaffirm more generally that democratic and socioeconomic rights
themselves were rarely, if ever, simply granted to people by those in power, but were
often  developed  by  people  in  need  and  finally  realized  through  non-cooperative
confrontation with state authorities. For example, the development of the welfare state
since the times of Otto von Bismarck should be understood not as a well-intentioned and
benign gesture, but as a bribe that was intended to pacify the masses by increasing their
loyalty to the state and by simultaneously undermining  workers’  demands for  more
democratic self-management over their conditions of living  (Palier 2010, 36-7). Put in
this perspective, although the satisfaction of basic needs could be understood as a basic
right  that  should  be  provided  for  by  the  state,  state  provision  can,  ironically,  if  not
organized  in  a  democratic  manner,  easily  undermine  the  democratic  skills  and
institutions necessary for a commons-creating society. For this reason, these interstitial
civic activities of commoning are of fundamental importance not only for people to be
able  to  satisfy  their  own  needs,  but  also  to  cultivate  the  experiences,  skills  and
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institutional examples necessary for the widespread development of commoning and
commons – both in and against the state. 
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8. Commons and the Market 
After having discussed the relationship between commons and the state, let us now turn
to a central question that has been touched upon repeatedly yet incompletely so far: The
relationship between commons and the market. Since we have already discussed the
justification  and  problems  of  the  open  and  competitive  market,  let  us  only  shortly
recapitulate these arguments. Most importantly, the open and competitive market was
justified so  as  to bring peace and unleash productivity.  Wealth was to be generated
through the protection of individual negative rights in private property and through the
self-regulation of supply and demand on the market. Yet, while this negative freedom
has  increased  the  freedom  of  individuals  with  direct  access  to  property  in  external
resources, other individuals have become increasingly dependent on hierarchical wage
labor relationships to secure their existence. Furthermore, the competitive dynamic of
the open market forces agents to perpetually grow in order to survive. This requires that
ever more resources are extracted and individually appropriated from common goods
that  other people are  dependent on,  ultimately reproducing the  original  discrepancy
between haves and the have-nots and increasing the deterioration of peoples’  socio-
ecological habitats. As we have seen, the priority of individual negative rights and the
self-regulation of the market also undermine and severely limit people’s abilities and
possibilities to collectively solve these problems and to democratically co-create and co-
determine their shared living conditions. 
Therefore,  the questions that we face now are,  firstly,  whether these problems are a
result  of  the  market  per  se  or  of  the  specific  social  arrangements  of  the  open  and
competitive market. Secondly, we must ask how the concept of commons can provide us
with  insights  that  enable  us  to  transform  our  understanding  and  organization  of
markets. To answer these questions, I will begin by analyzing the role of the market in
commons literature. After this, I will discuss the relationship between commons and the
market from a historical perspective. In a third step, I will develop the notion of a market
commons that will, hopefully, provide us with an alternative and democratic concept of
economic relationships. 
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8.1. The Market in Commons Literature
Generally speaking,  there is no single understanding of markets and the relationship
between  markets  and  commons  within  the  literature  on  commons.  After  discussing
these  diverse  interpretations,  I  nevertheless  hope  to  develop  a  more  general
understanding thereof within the following analysis. 
As we remember, the Ostroms only marginally speak of market arrangements. Elinor
Ostrom rarely discusses the market but describes the open and competitive market once
as  a  “straightjacket”  that  leads  to  “maximization  strategies”  (Ostrom  2003,  25).  In
contrast,  Vincent Ostrom defends  competitive market arrangements for a polycentric
order  (Ostrom 1991,  229-231),  while  he advocates the notion of a “moral  economy”
elsewhere and the democratic self-management of economic activities  (Ostrom 1997,
106,  145).  As we see,  the Ostroms’ views on the market are of a mixed valence and
rather vague.
From  Capra  and  Mattei’s  point  of  view,  the  legal  system  underlying  the  open  and
competitive market enables people to “exploit and plunder the web of life”  (Capra and
Mattei 2015, 29). Yet elsewhere, they also mention local farmer’s markets as examples
of institutions that exist for the satisfaction of common needs (ibid., 143). In relation to
economic  activities  in  general,  they  propagate  a  notion  of  economic  democracy  or
“democratic  oversight  of  the  economy”  (ibid.,  162).  Here,  it  appears  that  they
understand economic democracy as a type of common. Furthermore, they clearly state
that a common “may be anything a community recognizes as capable of satisfying some
real,  fundamental  need  outside  of  market  exchange”  (ibid.,  150;  emphasis  added).
Therefore,  it  can  generally  be  said  that  their  stance  is  highly  critical  of  open  and
competitive markets or “global capitalism” (ibid., 115-117) – and the legal institutions
that uphold these – while defending local markets and the democratization of economic
activities. 
If  we turn to other scholars who work on commons,  a similar mixture of views and
positions can be found. Yochai Benkler, for example, defines in his influential book The
Wealth of Networks (2006) individual private property and commons arrangements as
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opposites (ibid., 60). Furthermore, he argues that open commons (i.e. information and
material  infrastructure  such  as  roads  and  the  internet)  play  an  essential  role  for
economic  growth  in  market  societies  (Benkler  2013).  Another  influential  commons
activist  and  scholar,  Peter  Barnes,  criticizes  the  detrimental  ecological  impacts  of
unregulated  markets  while  maintaining  that  “[p]rivate  corporations  and  organized
commons  [should;  LP]  enhance  and  constrain  each  other”  (Barnes  2006,  77).  He
understands this type of market as “capitalism 3.0”,  as the title of his book is called,
which enables trade within limits  (ibid.).  In  their  book  Green Governance:  Ecological
Survival, Human Rights and the Law of the Commons (2013), Burns H. Weston and David
Bollier are quite critical of the market and also develop the notion of the “tragedy of the
market”  (Weston and Bollier 2013,  6-15). Accordingly,  they argue for the democratic
control over economic institutions within commons arrangements. They explain:   
“Commoners  shall  have  collective  control  over  the  surplus  value  they  create
through the collective management of their shared wealth and resources. To this
end, commons- and rights-based ecological governance  shall not be cash-driven
or market-mediated except with the explicit consent of commoners and clear rules
for personal use and resource alienability. The freedom of commoners to limit or
ban the monetization of their shared assets shall not be compromised.” (Weston
and Bollier 2013, 277; emphasis added)
According  to  Weston  and  Bollier,  then,  the  question  whether  commons  are  to  be
monetized or market-mediated is left up to the commoners. Simultaneously, the role of
the market outside of the commons remains undefined.  
Other scholars emphasize the antagonistic relationship between markets and commons
and  openly  propagate  the  end  of  market  arrangements.  Similarly  to  other  authors,
commons are understood here as “beyond” or “outside” of the market (De Angelis 2007,
240, Bollier et al. 2012). The emphasis here is, however, on the idea that commons are
interpreted as a new “cellular” mode of production that will eventually lead us beyond
capitalist markets (Euler 2016). Nick Dyer-Witheford, for example, argues in his article
“Commonism”: 
„If  the cell  form of capitalism is the commodity,  the cellular form of a society
beyond  capital  is  the  common.  A  commodity  is  a  good  produced  for  sale,  a
common  is  a  good  produced,  or  conserved,  to  be  shared.  The  notion  of  a
commodity,  a  good  produced  for  sale,  presupposes  private  owners  between
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whom this exchange occurs. The notion of the common presupposes collectivities
– associations and assemblies – within which sharing is organised. If capitalism
presents  itself  as  an  immense  heap  of  commodities,  ‘commonism’  is  a
multiplication of commons. The forces of the common and the commodity – of the
movement and the market – are currently in collision across the three spheres
we  mentioned  before:  the  ecological,  the  social  and  the  networked”  (Dryer-
Witherford 2007, 82).
As  we  see,  there  appears  to  be  a  strict  contradiction of  categories  in  this  literature
between  markets  and  commons.  The  antitheses  presented  in  this  literature  are  the
juxtapositions  of  scarcity  versus  abundance,  exclusion  versus  inclusion,  subtraction
versus  addition,  the  “commodity  form” versus  the  “commons form”,  atomism versus
relational systems, competition versus cooperation, productivity versus care, exchange
versus reciprocity,  hierarchical  market monopolies versus decentralized peer-to-peer
relationships,  profit  versus  needs  orientation  and  many  more  (Euler  2016,  Helfrich
2012b). Conclusively, commons scholar and activist Stefan Meretz writes that “Markets
are not commons – and vice versa” (Meretz 2012). He justifies this point in the following
manner: “The fundamental principle of the commons is that the people who create the
commons also create the rules for themselves” (ibid.). While commons are institutions
that can be democratically adapted by those affected by them, market arrangements are
understood as institutions that are abstract and unalterable. As has become clear in my
argument  previously,  I  would  generally  agree  with  these  ideals  juxtapositions.
Nevertheless, I ask myself whether these dichotomies can be upheld for all economic
activities and, more generally, whether markets can be entirely replaced by commons. 
Simply put, it seems unlikely to me that the existing problems of competition, inequality,
exploitation and perpetual growth can be overcome by replacing  all market relations
with commons arrangements. I find this highly unlikely because, if we assume that life in
a common is not entirely autarchic and self-sufficient, there must be interactions with
other organizations or commons that produce other goods. It is then often argued with
reference to people like Andre Gorz that the dependency on markets – and especially
wage labor – could be minimized if people were provided with an unconditional basic
income and people could participate in diverse, multiple activities of production (Gorz
1989, 2005). Obviously, the concept of a basic income is very attractive because it can
balance the asymmetrical bargaining positions in wage-labor relationships or even free
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people from wage labor entirely  (Van Parijs 2003, Widerquist 2013). For a commons-
creating society, a basic income would be ideal because it would enable people to engage
in volunteer care activities and commons-based peer production. While a basic income
might  lessen the dependency on  hierarchical  wage-labor  relationships,  it  would  not,
however, free us entirely from (re)production processes and the exchange of goods and
services.  The  question  also  remains  of  who  will  produce  the  tools  such  as  sewing
machines, fishing boats, pasta machines, computers and cars for these (re)production
processes. Here, some people argue that these “convivial tools”  (Illich 1973) could be
built  with  3-D  printers  (Rifkin  2015) or  open  hardware  (Siefkes  2008),  ultimately
making a market for such tools  and machines superfluous.  Although I  support  these
aspirations and endeavors, I nevertheless believe social arrangements without any form
of exchange between people and groups to be somewhat unrealistic. The answers to this
problem of necessary exchange could be Time Banks, Local Exchange Trading Systems
(LETS) or “free contributions” which are all forms of exchange – or, rather, contribution
– systems that do not rely on money (Amanatidou et al. 2015, Pacione 1997, Siefkes et al.
2016). Again, I must repeat that my argument here is not against the development of
these non-monetary exchange systems. The point I wish to make is simply that, despite
all  my  criticism,  I  do  actually  believe  money  and  the  market  to  be  quite  useful
instruments  and  institutions  that  enable  people  with  different  skills  and  goods  to
interact with each other without having to exist in compact social relations  (Demsetz
2002). I must concede this much to market advocates such as Adam Smith and Friedrich
Hayek. Yet, despite this concession, the question then arises of  how to shape the social
institutions of money and the market to satisfy people’s needs.95 Or, in other words, the
question arises if markets can be organized as a common and what this would imply. 
Interestingly to me, it appears that this fundamental question is often grossly under-
theorized and neglected in commons literature. I believe that this may have something
to  do  with  the  actual  predominance  of  market  relations  in  our  everyday  lives.  The
neglect of  the market in commons literature might be due to a desire to change the
symbolic framework through which we see and constitute reality. As is well known, it is
“the  norm”  today  to  perceive  reality  not  as  a  common,  but  rather  as  market
relationships.  Here,  we often interpret  reality  as  scarce,  hostile  and competitive  and
95  Because a discussion of money would exceed the scope of this analysis, I will not
discuss money, but focus solely on markets instead. 
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value the world according to monetary costs-benefit analyses. The commons critique of
this  worldview  is  often  expressed  in  pejorative  terms  such  as  privatization,
commodification,  exploitation,  valorization,  marketization  and,  more  generally,
economization.  In  opposition  to  these  negatively  connoted  processes,  the  focus  on
commons is an attempt to enable us not only to “see the commons” (Mattei 2012b) but
also to “think like a commoner” (Bollier 2014). More generally speaking, this focus is an
attempt  to  bring  an  epistemological  revolution  about  that  constitutes  a  commons-
oriented reality  (Mattei 2013a, 17). Although I agree with all of these critical analyses
and intellectual efforts, I nevertheless believe that if we disregard the question of the
precise role and organization of markets in a commons-creating society, we might be
disregarding  the  elephant  in  the  room.  I  believe  it  necessary,  therefore,  to  not  only
“reclaim  the  commons”,  but  also  to  “reclaim  the  market”.  My  point  is  that  by
understanding the market as a commons we can, in turn, justify the re-appropriation,
democratization and transformation of this dominant social institution.
To understand this relationship between markets and commons and how markets could
be interpreted as commons, I would like to back up a little and discuss the historical
development of open-access competitive markets. 
8.2. Enclosing Commons and Opening Markets 
A  widely-quoted  account  of  the  development  of  a  competitive  market  economy  has
already  been  discussed:  John  Locke’s  somewhat  idyllic  portrayal  of  the  individual
appropriation of commons. Here,  Locke understands commons as a  res nullius which
belonged to everyone and no one. By conceptualizing the commons as a res nullius in a
state of nature, the individual appropriation of communal resources through one’s labor
was legitimized. In a second step, money was invented as an answer to the problems of
barter and introduced through “tacit consent”, which then led to the spread of markets.
Despite  the  increasing  scarcity  of  access  to  natural  resources  for  many  people,  the
increase in productivity has led to an overwhelming abundance that can,  in turn,  be
accessed  with  money  derived  from  wage-labor  relationships.  This  is  the  prevalent
narrative  that  supposedly  explains  and  legitimizes  our  contemporary  market-based
social arrangements. 
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In contrast to this somewhat mythical tale, a more historical account of the development
of open and competitive markets in Western societies tells us a slightly different story.
We have already discussed this historical process in our critical discussion of Locke, so
there is no need to repeat it here in detail. As I have mentioned previously, this historical
development  is  most  famously  described  by  Karl  Marx  as  “the  so-called  primitive
accumulation” and by Karl Polanyi, more generally, as the enclosure of commons which
has been occurring at least since the 12th century in England, and later on the Continent
and in European colonies (Marx 1982a, 871-940, Polanyi 2001, Neeson 1996, Linebaugh
2008). Here, peasants were violently dispossessed of their rights to use commons which
were  primarily  fields  and  forests.  Marx  argues  that,  although  this  process  freed
numerous  people  from  feudal  bonds,  it  also  separated  them  from  their  means  of
subsistence.  Polanyi,  in turn,  described this development as a process in which land,
labor  and  money  were  dis-embedded  from  their  regulated  webs  of  interdependent
social  and  ecological  relationships  and transformed into  commodities,  ultimately  re-
embedding  them  in  “abstract,  competitive  and  non-democratic  global  market
relationships”  (Tully  2013b,  227).  While  this  enclosure  movement  is  sometimes
understood as the “dirty prehistory” of capitalism (G.A. Cohen 1995, 121), other scholars
argue that this dispossession is an ongoing process that enables the creation of profits
and  the  accumulation  thereof.  More  contemporary  forms  of  enclosure  occur,  for
instance,  through  land  grabbing,  gentrification,  patents  on  genes,  seeds  and  medical
knowledge and the privatization of water, scientific research and public services. The
general  point  being made in this  literature is  that  the vast  amount of  wealth that  is
accumulated by certain people is not simply due to labor,  but more precisely gained
through  perpetual,  systematic  and  sometimes  violent  enclosure,  privatization  and
commodification of common resources. According to this narrative, and as has already
been discussed, the answer to this problem then lies in “reclaiming the commons” and
the  “decommodification”  of  our  resources  and  relationships  by  organizing  the
reproduction of life without a dependency on market relationships.  
What this commons-oriented narrative somewhat neglects, however, is the question of
the  role  of  markets  in  both  pre-capitalist  societies  and  a  future  commons-creating
society. Let us therefore analyze this historical development not from a commons but,
rather,  from a market perspective. Generally,  the creation of an abstract,  competitive
market was not only possible due to the enclosure of commons, but also through the
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opening  up  of  highly  regulated  local  markets.  I  would  agree  with  Karl  Polanyi  and
Fernand Braudel that, although most of human history was based on subsistence and
gift economies, exchange, trade and certain types of local markets are not necessarily a
new phenomenon  (Polanyi 2001, 66, Polanyi et al. 1957, 257-70, Braudel 1986, 32-5,
41). Nevertheless, we should not equate all forms of money and markets with an open
and  competitive  market  economy  that  is  structured  according  to  a  self-regulating
“supply-demand-price mechanism” (Polanyi 1977, 124). As both authors demonstrate,
local  markets  simply  bring  production  and  consumption  together  and  enable  the
acquisition  of  “goods  that  are  not  available  on  the  spot”  (Polanyi  et  al.  1957,  257,
Braudel 1986, 42). To be more precise, the local market is a place that enables people to
exchange  goods  that  they do  not  produce themselves  either  through barter  or  with
money. For most of human history, the exchange of goods was socially embedded and
highly regulated by customs and social institutions. 
One  such example  of  an  exchange-based  market  is  the  guild  system that  developed
during the process of urbanization in western Europe between 900 and 1300 CE (Schulz
2010). In her highly insightful article “The Silent Revolution: A New Perspective on the
Emergence  of  Commons,  Guilds,  and  Other  Forms  of  Corporate  Collective  Action  in
Western Europe”  (2008),  Tine De Moore argues  that  the  development  of  guilds  and
commons in the Netherlands demonstrates similar institutional forms of regulation of
common resources through collective action. De Moore understands commons as highly
regulated  natural  and  agricultural  resources  (i.e.  common-pool  resources)  such  as
water, pastures and forests. In contrast, craft guilds are urban institutions that regulate
common resources such as labor, skills, technology, prices, information and, ultimately,
the  market  itself.  With  reference  to  Dutch  historians  Lourens  and  Lucassen,  she
generally defines craft guilds as 
“organizations that – with the agreement of the local authority – unite members
of the same occupational group, with as their most important goal the furthering
of their economic interests, but not without taking into account the general well-
being of their group as well” (Lourens and Lucassen in De Moor 2008, 187).
Although  she  admits  that  it  is  difficult  to  prove  whether  guilds  always  fulfilled  this
function,  the principles of guilds nevertheless fit  into our understanding of relational
and interdependent  freedom in  which  the  thriving  of  the  individual  depends on the
271
flourishing  of  the  community  –  and  vice  versa.  According  to  De  Moore,  despite  the
differences  in  resources,  the  goals  and regulative  mechanisms of  guilds  were  rather
similar to those of commons: 
“To make their collective projects work, guilds and commons relied heavily for
enforcement  mechanisms  on  group  norms,  as  opposed  to  formal  legal
enactments.  They designed most  of  the rules themselves,  with or without the
involvement of the local powers […]. With a large set of rules, commoners and
guild members tried to regulate the behaviour of their fellows – to prevent them
from free riding – and to control the effect their surroundings could have on the
behaviour  of  the  members.  They developed a  system  of  market  regulation  in
order to protect their ‘own little world’. Measures were taken by both guilds and
commons to achieve a reasonable income for their members and to eliminate the
disruptive effects of the market, which was still at an early stage of development
when commons and guilds were set up in Europe.  Institutions such as guilds
could make functioning within those settings less risky, though without losing too
many of the advantages the market offered” (De Moor 2008, 197).
These similarities between guilds and commons are noteworthy because they provide
us  with  a  historical  example  of  social  organization  that  utilized  the  market  for  the
exchange of goods in order to satisfy basic needs. Here, the market was not regulated
“from without” by the state,  but rather by the producers themselves to protect them
from the negative dynamics of free-riding and competition such as poaching, hoarding
and  price  and  income  instability.  Simultaneously,  the  collective  action  aimed  at
generating positive effects through pooling resources in order to share risks and create
advantages of scale (De Moor 2008, 202-5). 
If  we  understand  a  commons,  in  the  general  sense,  as  a  resource  system  that  is
democratically  self-governed  by  those  largely  affected  by  it,  we  could  also  define
medieval  guilds  as  a  type  of  labor  commons.96 Parallel  to  fisheries  in  which  the
individual fishermen own their own boats and equipment, the craftspeople in the guilds
also  own  their  own  workshops,  yet  share  and  regulate  the  specific  knowledge,
technologies and skills of a specific craft. Although this skilled labor is used to produce
things that are sold on the market, it could nevertheless be argued that a guild limits the
commodification of labor power through its self-defined rules and regulations. 
96  For a more recent example of labor commons, see Dario Azzellini’s analysis of
worker-recuperated companies in Latin America and Europe (Azzellini 2016).
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Aside  from  the  regulation  of  labor  within  the  market,  however,  we  could  also
understand pre-capitalist markets themselves as second-order commons institutions. In
contrast to the concept of a labor commons, the notion of a market commons appears to
be  –  at  least  at  first  glance  –  inherently  contradictory.  The  reason for  this  seeming
paradox  lies  in  our  contemporary  and  rather  narrow  interpretation  of  markets  as
institutions  structured  according  to  competition,  commodities  and  profits  while
commons  are  based  on  cooperation,  concrete  goods  and  use-values.  Furthermore,  a
market is often understood as institutionally open (North et al. 2009), while the goods
that are exchanged must be private and closed (Demsetz 1967). According to some, an
open-access market can also be interpreted as a commons (Carroll et al. 1979) or, more
precisely, as a Hardinian unregulated and open-access commons. Although the members
of guilds do produce private goods that are exchanged on the market, the pre-capitalist
market itself is more or less closed. Sellers and prices were generally defined in advance
by the guilds to protect producers from competition and the “tragedy of the market”. In
this  sense,  the  market  of  the  guilds  created  through  their  self-defined  rules  and
regulations was a type of “embedded market” (Polanyi) or “moral economy” (Thompson
2010) that  was  organized  according  to  the  satisfaction  of  needs  instead  of  a  self-
regulating price mechanism and profit maximization. In this sense and depending on its
institutional framework, I would argue that a market could theoretically be defined as a
democratically self-regulated commons. Yet, despite this similarity, I would argue that
medieval markets regulated by guilds should  not be understood as commons because
they did not include a large group of people who were greatly affected by this resource
system through the institutional regulation of it: the consumers. This was the reason for
Adam Smith’s critique of guilds; they did not act in favor of consumers. Yet, while Smith
advocated the  deregulation of  markets  in  the  name of  lower prices  for  customers,  I
would argue in favor of the integration of consumers in the democratic regulation of
markets. We shall return to this problem later, but first, we must understand how the
highly  regulated  medieval  markets  were  transformed  into  open-access,  capitalist
markets.  
With  historian  Fernand  Braudel,  I  would  argue  that,  parallel  to  the  enclosure
movements,  which  privatized  common  pool  resources,  the  rather  closed  medieval
markets were gradually opened since the 15th century in Europe. This transformation
occurred,  most  importantly,  through private  or  “counter-markets”  for  foreign  goods,
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which  existed  outside  of  local  medieval  markets.  Here,  individual  traders  became
middlemen between producers and consumers outside of the traditional and collectively
regulated  circuits  of  exchange.  Both  the  access  to  mobile  capital  and  the  superior
knowledge of both ends of  the exchange relationship gave the merchant an unequal
quasi-monopoly position in trade and enabled him to generate and accumulate large
profits  (Braudel  1986,  50-53).  This  “privatization”  of  local  markets  was  in  turn
supported by state colonialism and its foreign trade relationships. Furthermore,  both
Braudel and Polanyi show that the mercantilist nation state also opened local markets,
ultimately  creating  a  protected  yet  internally  open  domestic  market  (ibid,  88,  97,
Polanyi 2001. 63-70). Due to the growing critique of this state intervention in economic
matters  by people  such as  Adam Smith,  the  state slowly withdrew and loosened its
protectionist measures, gradually and carefully transforming the internal open market
into a more open international market regime  (Chang 2002, Shaikh 2007). Over time,
the socially embedded and collectively regulated local  markets of the guild economy
were transformed into one open, “common” capitalist market. 
With this very simple sketch of the development of markets in recent human history, I
hope to have demonstrated that we must speak of markets in a differentiated manner.
Furthermore,  I  hope  that  I  have  shown  that  markets  often  were  and,  thus,  can  be
collectively regulated in order to serve social needs and desires. The importance of this
short  excursion in the history of markets for my argument is  that we can,  or rather
should, integrate these insights into our understanding of a possible commons-creating
society.  Therefore,  now let  us  turn to  the  concept  of  a  market  commons that  I  will
develop in the following section. 
8.3. The Market as a Common
8.3.1. Ecological Foundations of a Market Commons
By defining the market as a common, economic activities are primarily to be understood
within an ecological framework. The economy is not only understood as a subsystem of
society, but also as a subsystem of the even larger and more encompassing ecosystem.
This  notion  is  best  portrayed  with  Kate  Raworth’s  rather  recent  idea  of  “doughnut
economics” (2017) in which she illustrates the economy in the following manner:
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Figure 3: Kate Raworth’s Diagramm of the embedded economy (Raworth 2017, 62)
While I would agree with her general depiction of an embedded economy, I have argued
here that a democratic and ecologically sustainable society should expand its commons
both in the sphere of the state and the sphere of the market. Nevertheless, a strength of
this model is that it embeds economics within society and society, in turn, within the
larger and limited ecosystem. Here, the dynamic reproduction of systems is understood
as the metabolic flow of matter and energy within and between systems. 
More fundamentally, because matter and energy are limited on planet earth, economic
activities are then generally understood as a zero-sum game: The gains of some people
are losses for others. The question that results from this problem is how to minimize the
losses and create a relative abundance despite absolute limitations of existing resources.
In a capitalist market, this implies that we understand relationships in both material and
symbolic  (monetary)  relationships  in  which  the  accumulation  of  wealth  should  be
understood as the monetary accumulation of “good” matter and energy in the hands of a
few and the widespread distribution of “bad” matter and energy in the form of pollution
and ecological degradation. Here, profits are understood as the extraction, privatization
and accumulation of previously non-commodified goods such as individual labor power
(including physical strength and creativity), genomes, water, land or fossil fuels. On a
symbolic level, this implies the unequal distribution of access to resources (matter and
energy) through one’s purchasing power. One form of such an unequal distribution of
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symbolic  wealth  is  found  in  the  large  asymmetries  between  creditors  and  debtors.
Similarly, profits earned through speculation could be understood as gains that increase
the  costs  of  goods  (i.e.  food)  and,  in  turn,  decrease  the  access  to  this  resource  for
numerous other people. The accumulation that results from speculation would thus be
interpreted as a form of extraction from other people’s purchasing power and access to
a certain good or resource. 
In this ecological understanding of economy, we could understand the flow of resources
with  the  metaphor  of  an  irrigation  system.  This  irrigation  system  can  either  be
democratically organized according to the needs of individual users and therefore be
very finely tuned in distributing water to all regions of an ecosystem. Or, conversely, it
can be organized according to supply and demand, purchasing power and the Matthew
Principle in which the irrigation system is modeled with increasingly large levees and
dams that contain and accumulate the water for the use of only a few. Using such a
metaphor,  migration can,  for example,  be understood as people simply following the
metabolic  flow  of  “good”  matter  and  energy  on  the  planet  earth.  These  people  are
coming  to  drink  from  the  dam  of  accumulated  matter  and  energy.  With  such  an
ecological  perspective,  we  must  abandon the  belief  that  economic  growth will  solve
socio-ecological  problems,  because,  as  we  have  seen,  accumulation  and  its  highly
unequal distribution of wealth inherently increases these conflicts. In the face of these
serious problems, the concept of market commons provides us with an understanding of
markets  that  attempts  to  take these  ecological  limits  into  account  by democratically
negotiating its institutional framework and the coordination of its basic activities. Thus,
the  aim of  the  democratic  market  commons is  to  transform absolute  scarcity  into  a
relative abundance through the mechanisms of cooperation, sufficiency and conviviality.
The  general  point  of  such  a  market  commons,  however,  is  not  merely  democratic
inclusion,  but the reconceptualization of the market itself as an institution that must
fulfill basic needs such as the provision of decent, respectable and, ideally, meaningful
and  fulfilling  jobs  and  the  access  to  essential  goods  and  services  –  within  certain
planetary boundaries. This is what one group of scholars has coined the “foundational
economy”  (Bentham et al. 2013), which is “that part of the economy that creates and
distributes  goods  and  services  consumed  by  all  (regardless  of  income  and  status)
because they support everyday life” (ibid., 7). Therefore, by conceptualizing the market
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as a common, the market’s  primary function is not  to endlessly increase wealth,  but
simply  to  satisfy  essential  needs  by  bringing  people  who  need  things  together  with
people  who produce things.  This  is  the  basic  function of  markets  that  is,  at  least  in
theory, originally intended to be brought about by open and free markets. Free markets
are supposed to fulfill  this  function better than other markets and better than other
institutions such as the state or the community. Yet, in contrast to the intellectuals who
believe that this can only occur when the market is self-regulating, I would argue instead
that it requires the support of democratic governance mechanisms to perpetually adapt
the institutional  framework to changing social  needs and socio-ecological  conditions.
Furthermore,  a  focus  on  market  commons  transforms  the  overarching  and  often
abstract rules and regulations of an open competitive market into decentralized socio-
ecological  niches  in  which  the  default  rules  of  the  institutional  framework  foster
cooperation, fairness and the sustainable reproduction of socio-ecological systems. We
could  call  this  a  type  of  “democratic  experimentalism”  (Dorf  and  Sabel  1998) in
ecological economics. 
Within  the  context  of  open  and  competitive  markets,  such  strategies  are  often
pejoratively  called  protectionist.  In  this  critique,  protectionism  is  conceived  as  a
situation in which one party protects its gains while harming others. In contrast, because
the  market  commons  landscape  is  understood  as  diverse  and  contextually
interdependent,  the  rules  of  a  specific  market  will  always  attempt  to  protect  the
sustainable reproduction of its resource system within its interdependent relationships
to other socio-ecological  overarching systems.  The precise aim of the endeavor is  to
protect  sustainable  and  (re)generative  forms  of  economic  activity  that  enable  the
thriving of its members without harming other living beings elsewhere. Lastly, I would
argue that a market commons would shift  our focus,  whenever possible,  from global
commodity chains to local or regional economic cycles. The re-localization of economic
activities and market interactions could not only have a positive ecological effect due to
shorter  transportation  routes,  but  could  also  provide  affected  people  with  greater
incentives and possibilities to democratically govern the institutional framework of their
market commons. Similar to democracy in the political sphere, the more local it is, the
shorter the chains of accountability are,  the greater the trust,  and the more effective
mutual monitoring and sanctioning can be. 
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Nevertheless,  a  market  commons must not  solely focus on the local  or  regional,  but
should enable people throughout the world to co-determine and adapt their economic
institutional frameworks through network forms of governance in order to fulfill their
similar yet conflicting needs. That being said, it is of great importance to emphasize that
an economy of market commons requires a larger, overarching political framework that
fosters the decentralization of ecological  economic activities.  But as we have already
discussed in  relation to the  commons provision of  basic  goods and services such as
housing and healthcare, a market commons cannot simply be implemented top-down
from  a  single  center  of  authority,  but  must  be  demanded  and  jointly  developed  by
people in their diverse socio-ecological habitats.    
8.3.3. Market Commons and Corporatist-Associative Democracy
In  order  to  better  understand  this  idea  of  a  market  commons  and  its  democratic-
economic governance, I will now compare it to the idea of corporatist and associative
democracy  as  presented  by  Streeck  and  Schmitter  (1985) and  Paul  Hirst  (1996).97
Similarly to these theories, the notion of a market commons must be understood as a
critique of the strict separation of the “private” and economic from the “public” political
and political sphere. Here, economic activities are not understood as strictly private, but
rather  as  “public”  or  as  common  affairs  that  affect  a  large  range  of  people.  Yet,  in
contrast  to  top-down  state  regulation,  people  can  negotiate  and  coordinate  their
economic  activities  themselves  through  associations.  Similarly  to  my  notion  of
democratic  governance  in  a  market  commons,  Paul  Hirst  describes  the  inclusive
character of such associative governance bodies in the following manner: 
“Associationalism tries to view the economy from the standpoint of the interests
of  a  wide  range  of  economic  agents  including  those  who  are  economically
inactive as well as the active, the consumer and the producer, the worker and the
manager  –  and  does  so  in  terms  of  a  wide  range  of  substantive  goals.  It  is
democratic in that it seeks to incorporate the widest possible range of actors as
full participants in economic governance, and not just as the objects of decision-
making and management” (Hirst 1996, 97).
A key aspect of this inclusion is not only the inclusion of the largely affected, but rather
the negotiation over matters in which people exist in interdependent relationships. By
97  For other notions of associative democracy see also Cohen and Rogers  (1995)
and Archon Fung (2003b).
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bringing people with apparently antagonistic interests together (i.e. cheap products for
consumers, jobs for workers, profits for managers, livable neighborhoods for families
etc.),  it  is  assumed  that  negotiated  answers  can  be  found  that  satisfy  different  and
conflicting needs. Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck discuss these relationships
and  functions  in  the  comparison of  a  local  community,  the  market  and  the  state  to
corporatist-associative organizations: 
“In  a  first  approximation,  this  logic  can  be  characterized  as  follows.  In  a
community order,  actor preferences and choices are interdependent,  based on
shared norms and jointly produced satisfaction. In a market order, the actions of
competitors are supposed to be independent since no one singular action can
have  a  determinant  and  predictable  impact  upon  the  eventual  allocation  of
satisfactions.  In a  state order,  the  actors are  dependent  upon hierarchical  co-
ordination  which  makes  their  choices  heteronomously  determined  and
asymmetrically predictable according to the structure of legitimate authority and
coercive capability. In a corporative-associative order, actors are contingently or
strategically interdependent in the sense that actions of organized collectivities
can  have  a  predictable  and  determinant  effect  (positive  or  negative)  on  the
satisfaction of other collectivities' interests, and this induces them to search for
relatively  stable  pacts.  […]  Basically  what  seems  to  happen  is  a  shift  in  the
'rationality'  of  social  choice.  In  communities,  the  calculus  rests  on  'satisfying
identity',  in markets, economic or political, on 'maximizing advantage'/building
'minimum  winning  coalitions',  in  states  on  'minimizing  risk'  and 'maximizing
predictability'. What associations in a corporative order strive for is something
more  prosaic,  but  quite  rational  given  the  structural  complexity  and
informational  overload  of  modern  society,  namely  'satisficing  interests'.  By
deliberate  mutual  adjustment  and  repeated  interaction,  these  comprehensive,
monopolistically  privileged actors  avoid the  temptation to  exploit  momentary
advantages  to  the  maximum,  and  the  pitfall  of  landing  in  the  worst  possible
situation. In short, they avoid the prisoner's dilemma through inter-organizational
trust backed by what we shall call […] 'private interest government'” (Streeck and
Schmitter 1985, 125-7; emphasis added).
As  we  can  see,  such  corporatist-associative  organizations  are  created  due  to  the
contingent  interdependence  of  affected  people  and  parties.  This  would overlap  with
what  we  have  otherwise  called  the  networked  community  that  shares  a  contingent
reality.  Furthermore,  with the aid of a “private-interest government”,  which we have
otherwise called a background partner state,  problems of freeriding and exploitation
can, at least theoretically, be mitigated. For these reasons, Waheed Hussain argues that
such a corporatist system is the “most just stable regime” and should be integrated in a
Rawlsian theory of justice in order to stabilize and democratize the competitive market
(Hussain 2009). 
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Just as important, I would argue with Axel Honneth that such an arena of deliberation in
economic  associations  would  bring  forth  a  “discursive  flexibilization  of  seemingly
objective  [economic;  LP]  constraints”  (Honneth 2014,  193).  Through this  democratic
deliberation and negotiation, non-monetary values can be integrated in the evaluation
and organization of economic activities and goods  (Anderson 1993). Economist Diane
Elson understands this as the socialization of the market. As she explains in her more
demanding model of a democratic market, 
“the social relations between buyers and sellers must be changed so that they are
not antagonistic; the price formation process must be a public process, not one
controlled by enterprises;  and information must be shared,  with the nexus of
trust,  reciprocity  and  goodwill  setting  the  limits  within  which  the  market
operates,  rather  than  being  subordinate  to  the  market”  (Elson  1988,  27;
emphasis i.o.).
Here,  the  aim  is  to  transform  the  private  processes  of  price  formation  through  the
“invisible  handshakes”  of  exclusive  gentlemen’s  clubs  and  corporate  networks  into
public bodies (ibid.).  Elson calls these public bodies Price and Wage Commissions which
should bring fragments of information in the market together and make the creation of
prices transparent. The collection of and debate over information should not, however,
be limited to prices, but must include other information about non-monetary, conflicting
values,  for example in relation to the quality of living and respect of the more-than-
human world. Succinctly, the three functions of such a commission would be “facilitation
of information exchange; enforcement of information disclosure; and an interactive role,
in this case in the design and specification of goods and production” (Elson 1988: 34).
Importantly, such a commission would enable people to co-determine which goods are
produced, how they are produced and how they shall be accessed. Accordingly, a shift
occurs from individualistic and contractual ex post to collective and democratic ex ante
decision-making. The shift, however, does not lead to a negation of individual  ex post
price-oriented decision-making, but merely complements and democratically embeds it.
This  process  can  therefore  be  understood  as  a  re-embedding  and  partial  de-
commodification  of  economic  goods  and  activities.  More  generally,  the  associative
democratic  governance  of  economic  activities  can  thus  mitigate  the  coercive
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mechanisms of open markets that are merely structured according to competing prices
and geared towards perpetual growth. 
To a certain extent, we could argue that corporatist-associative governance mechanisms
transform  the  open,  competitive  and  liberal market  into  what  Peter  Hall  and  David
Soskice have named a coordinated market economy in their theory on the “varieties of
capitalism”  (Hall  and Soskice 2004).  However,  there are a  few important differences
between the notion of a coordinated market economy and a market commons. Firstly,
the  coordination  that  occurs  in  coordinated  markets  focuses  on  labor  and  the
governance thereof, whether through collective wage bargaining or the maintenance of
vocational education and training (VET), which we will discuss in more detail shortly. In
contrast, a market commons would not only deal with labor and skills but would aim to
democratically  coordinate  all  economic  activities  and  goods.  Second,  although  such
economies  are  somewhat  coordinated,  they  are  still  structured  according  to  the
principles of competition and perpetual growth – although possibly less so than liberal
markets.  A  market  commons  therefore  attempts  to  replace  the  competitive  core  of
coordinated market economies with democratic cooperation.  This does obviously not
connote that all economic competition will be transformed into cooperation, but rather
that  the forms and extent of  competition will  be democratically negotiated over and
institutionally regulated. Third, although the notion of a market commons builds on the
model  of  corporatist  regulation  of  a  coordinated  market,  it  pushes  the  notion  of
participation much further and bases the concept on more social and ecological grounds.
It  is  an  attempt  to  transform  the  stale  backdoor  politics  of  corporatism  into  more
dynamic open-door politics of collaborative network governance. This is what Paul Hirst
has attempted to do with his idea of associative democracy. Put somewhat crudely, the
meeting room in a skyscraper filled with older white men in suits should be replaced by
a more accessible meeting place close to home and, more importantly, a more diverse
crowd. In this sense, my notion of a market commons is much more akin to Paul Hirst’s
concept of associative democracy than Streeck’s and Schmitter’s corporatist-associative
model.  
To elucidate this concept of a market commons in contrast to corporatism a little more, I
refer to a more concrete example that is often consulted in this context: Skill formation
and  the  labor  market.  Skill  formation  or,  more  precisely,  vocational  education  and
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training has a long history in German-speaking countries and Northern Europe and has
its roots in the previously mentioned guild system. Both the apprenticeship systems of
guilds and those of VET were developed to reproduce high quality skills through socially
regulated corporatist institutions. While these institutions and regulations were largely
defined by craftspeople in guilds, the VET system is based on corporatist intermediary
institutions  between  the  market  and  the  state  that  bring  people  with  conflicting
interests together, including those of competing firms, employees and municipalities. 
Historically,  corporatist  institutions  for  the  collective  management  of  skill  formation
were developed as an answer to the problem of economic liberalization after the ban of
guilds.98 The  ban  of  guilds  led  to  the  problem  of  skill  degradation  and  employee
poaching  (Ritter  2014).  Due  to  competition  with  large  factories,  smaller  producers
wanted to increase the specialization of their workers to make them more efficient and
thus to provide products on the market for lower prices. Furthermore, if more energy
were invested in a worker to develop diverse skills in a specific field, there would also be
the risk that this worker would then be stolen or “poached” by competing firms who did
not  invest  in  their  worker’s  skill  formation.  Regarded  within  the  framework  of  the
tragedy of unregulated open-access market commons, we could therefore say that skill
degradation was a  result  of  the  over-use  of  labor  power  through specialization  and
employee  poaching  as  a  form  of  free  riding.  As  an  answer  to  these  problems,  the
development of the collective management of skill formation was an attempt to defend
and upgrade the quality of craftsmanship in workshops and manufactories against the
threats of the tragedy of the competitive market.
For these reasons, affected actors including small businesses, wage-laborers and certain
politicians  attempted  to  solve  these  problems  through  collective  action.  Here,  the
conflicting needs of firms and workers (e.g. the balance between time on the job and
time for  general  education in  school)  are expressed in  bodies that  possess  the  legal
authority to define, implement and regulate the education of workers. This does not only
occur  in  semi-public  vocational  schools,  but  also  in  private  “training  associations”
(Ausbildungsverbünde) in which numerous firms have pooled their resources to provide
more  professional  institutional  support  for  their  apprentices  (Leemann  and  Imdorf
98  The literature that I refer to here is based on the example of Switzerland, but I
will assume from this point onwards that the mechanisms and historical development of VET systems out
of the guild system are somewhat similar in other European countries. 
282
2015). More generally, the “supply” of skills is coordinated with the demand of skills in a
decentralized  and  democratic  manner  –  with  the  support  of  the  state,  yet  without
annulling  the  labor  market  and  price  mechanisms.  Through  the  inclusion  of
municipalities  and  the  state  into  the  governance  bodies  of  skill  formation,  it  can
generally be said that economic planning has also become more democratic and more
accountable to the wider public. 
The importance of the VET system for our discussion of market commons should be
fairly obvious. First, it provides us with a very concrete understanding of how market
regulation can occur where an economic good (skills and labor power) is produced and
organized  in  a  decentralized  and  democratic  manner.  Second,  the  historical
development of the VET system – at least in Switzerland – also shows that it was not
simply  implemented  by  the  state,  but  was  developed  in  a  strenuous  process  of
confrontation,  negotiation  and  deliberation  between  diverse  parties  with  diverging
interests. In this sense, VET is a superb example that is rather widely acclaimed of a
well-functioning  democratic  regulation  and  coordination  of  economic  goods  and
activities. 
However, despite the similarities, I would argue that the contemporary VET systems in
many countries would have to increase their democratic potential to become part of a
market commons. First, this would involve the inclusion of those most affected by its
policies:  The apprentices themselves.  Second,  the  discourse  of  the VET system often
revolves  around  the  question  of  the  needs  of  “the  economy”.  Here,  it  is  implicitly
assumed  that  if  the  needs  of  businesses  are  satisfied  (competitiveness,  efficiency,
productivity, profit maximization etc.), people will have jobs and society will prosper. I
would contend, however, that although people do appreciate having a job, the interests
of  private  businesses  are  not  equal  to  those  of  society  in  general  or  to  those  of
ecosystems.  For this reason,  I  would emphasize the importance of the integration of
other  civil  society  associations  in  the  democratic  governance  of  VET  systems.  The
question a VET system must then deal with is not merely one of how to satisfy the needs
of  businesses,  but  also  of  how  to  develop  the  capabilities  and  skills  of  the  wider
population to provide everyone with sustainable livelihoods. This would, however, go
beyond merely “greening skills”  (Evans and Stroud 2016) and would integrate more
complex social skills that are founded on more democratic and ecological principles of
283
interdependent  thriving.  This  is  not  to  say  that  these  efforts  and  tendencies  do not
already exist, but simply that a VET system would need to be developed in this manner
to reproduce the necessary institutional  framework and practical  skills  for  a  market
commons.
8.3.4. Social and Solidarity Economy as a Market Commons
To develop my notion of a market commons further, I would like to turn to another
example of what a market commons could look like: the social and solidarity economy.
The social and solidarity economy (SSE) is generally understood as organizations and
companies that pursue economic goals that are based on social and ecological values.
Concrete examples of the social and solidarity economy include organic farming and fair
trade networks, community economic development organizations and socio-ecological
investment funds as found in the Social Economy of Quebec  (Reed 2010, Parvathi and
Waibel 2013, Wilson 2013, Raynolds et al. 2007, McCall 2003, Simon 2001, Neamtam
2005,  Mendell  and Neamtam 2008).  The United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on
Social and Solidarity Economy defines SSE in the following manner: 
“SSE  refers  to  the  production  of  goods  and  services  by  a  broad  range  of
organizations and enterprises that have explicit social and often environmental
objectives. They are guided by principles and practices of cooperation, solidarity,
ethics  and  democratic  self-management.  SSE  includes  cooperatives  and  other
forms  of  social  enterprise,  self-help  groups,  community-based  organizations,
associations of informal economy workers, service-provisioning NGOs, solidarity
finance schemes, among others” (UN 2014, iv).
Despite  the  general  goals  of  integrating  social  and  ecological  values  into  economic
activities, due to its emphasis on democratic participation, the goals can be realized in a
plurality of forms that are best fitting to people’s diverse needs and conditions. A social
and solidarity economy is therefore not a negation of the market but a transformation of
the  relationships  that  constitute  it.  It  aims  to  replace  narrow  self-interest  with
negotiated cooperation,  reciprocity and mutual interests  (Exner and Kratzwald 2012,
38, Nyssens and Petrella 2015, 184). 
Importantly, a social and solidarity economy is therefore quite different from liberal or
market  socialism  in  which  individual  firms  are  owned  by  the  workers  and
democratically  run  (Pateman  1970,  Dahl  1985,  Miller  1990).  Democratic  self-
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management  of  firms  is  an  important  aspect  of  the  democratization  of  economic
activities  and  institutions  because  it  overcomes  the  antagonism  between  labor  and
capital. Nevertheless, it leaves the antagonistic and conflicting interests between other
isolated economic agents (e.g. producers vs. consumers and producers vs. producers)
intact. Simply put, this democratic self-management leaves the isolation paradox at the
heart of the open and competitive market untouched, which, in turn, brings about the
tragedy of the unregulated market. In contrast, social and solidarity economy attempts
to  deal  with  this  problem of  competitive  markets  by  fostering  cooperation  between
conflicting economic agents.  In this sense,  the previously mentioned mutual interests
are  not  a  result  of  a  homogenous and harmonious group but  rather  come about  by
bringing different individuals and groups with diverging interests together and enabling
them  to  discuss  and  deal  with  their  problems  collectively.  As  Marthe  Nyssens  and
Francesca  Petrella  explain  in  their  article  “The  social  and  solidarity  economy  and
Ostrom’s approach to common pool resources” (2015), diverse stakeholders are part of
the organs of governance: “the direct beneficiaries of the activity,  the employees,  the
volunteers, the public authorities, donors or the local community” (Nyssens and Petrella
2015,  181).  In  contrast  to  the  competitive  market  that  suppresses  conflict  and
transforms  it  into  competition,  social  and  solidarity  economy  and  market  commons
bring  conflict  to  the  fore  and  attempt  to  solve  problems  through  deliberation,
negotiation and cooperation.  
Furthermore,  this  more  inclusive  democratic  network  of  stakeholders  also  has
implications  for  the  property  arrangements  that  differ  between  capitalist  and
democratic firms: “[T]he property regimes of the SSE […] also deviate from the principle
of  joint  possession  of  the  right  to  residual  control  and  residual  earnings”  (ibid.).
Concretely, in an SSE association, the “investors are not the owners of the organizations”
(ibid.). This reminds us of our discussion of common property arrangements that are not
based on ownership but rather on stewardship and guardianship towards the wider
community  and  the  environment.  Here,  the  diverse  members  of  the  association
collectively co-determine the reinvestment and distribution of the residual earnings. The
democratic control and co-determination of reinvestment is chosen via the individual
rights of owners and investors to a share of the collective enterprise’s profits. In this
sense, an SSE is not per se against profits. As the UN Task Force explains in this wider
frame of reference,  
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“Rather than assuming that the benefits of growth will ‘trickle down’, or rely on
safety nets to protect the vulnerable and on technological  fixes to protect the
environment, SSE seeks proactively to mobilize and redistribute resources and
surplus in inclusive ways that cater to people’s essential needs. Furthermore, SSE
promotes  environmental  protection  and  the  economic  and  political
empowerment  of  the  disadvantaged  and  others  concerned  with  social  and
environmental  justice.  While  profitability  is  a  feature  of  many  types  of  SSE
enterprise, profits tend to be reinvested locally and for social purposes. […] SSE is
an economic approach that favours decentralization and local development and
is driven by ethical values such as solidarity, fair trade, voluntary simplicity and
Buen  Vivir.  It  is  holistic  in  the  sense  that  SSE  organizations,  enterprises  and
networks  simultaneously  pursue  some  combination  of  economic,  social,
environmental and emancipatory objectives” (UN 2014, ix).
In a social and solidarity economy, profits are thus not pursued for the sake of profits,
but rather to improve the concrete living conditions of a wider community and to enable
them to lead a co-determined good life. Additionally, the broad inclusion of diverse civil
society associations in democratic governance makes it possible to include ecological
aspects  in  their  calculations,  thereby  attempting  to  align  economic  and  ecological
demands. 
As we see, many of the values and goals of the SSE overlap with those of a commons-
based  economy,  including  social  and  ecological  justice,  democratic  self-governance,
economic decentralization and sufficiency. The SSE attempts to bring economic activities
in line with principles of social development and ecological thriving. Furthermore, the
property arrangements underlying social and solidarity economy resemble the principle
of guardianship in commons. However,  if  a social  and solidarity economy appears to
uphold and exemplify the underlying values of a commons in market arrangements, why
utilize the term of market commons at all and not simply stick with SSE? Despite the
similarities  and strengths of the social  and solidarity economy,  I  would nevertheless
advocate the use of the term market commons. The main reason for this is that although
the SSE attempts to change relationships from “within” the market, it appears to lack the
theoretical  framework to  more fundamentally  transform and democratize  the  entire
market. Simply put, it seems to remain – both in theory and practice – as a niche within
open and competitive markets. In order to change the broader institutional framework
of  open  and  competitive  markets,  I  would  therefore  argue  that  it  is  necessary  to
conceptualize the market itself as a commons. And most importantly, by defining the
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market  itself  as  a  common  implies  that  people  have  the  right  to  reclaim  and  co-
determine its institutional framework in order to satisfy their needs and maintain their
livelihoods within the ecological systems that they inhabit. 
8.3.4. Market Commons and Community-Supported Modes of Production
Finally, I would like to discuss one last example of such a market commons that goes
beyond  previous  examples  of  corporatist  coordination  and  social  and  solidarity
economy: Community-supported agriculture (CSA). Here, in contrast to the previous two
models, I will argue that community-supported modes of production demonstrate how
supply and demand can be democratically coordinated through a subscription system,
ultimately enabling people to re-localize economic activities. 
Community-supported agriculture is a concrete answer to the problems of farming in an
open and competitive market. Without going into detail, it can generally be said that the
open and competitive  market  is  highly  problematic  for farming and agriculture.  The
reason for this is the mechanism inherent in the tragedy of the open and competitive
market that I  have previously discussed.99 One commons-based answer to this  wide-
scale  tragedy  is  community-supported  agriculture  (CSA)  which  has  been  developed
since  the  1970s  in  Japan,  Switzerland,  North  America  and,  more  recently,  in  other
countries  (Dyttrich  and Hösli  2015,  Monson 2017,  Krul  and  Ho  2017,  Balázsa  et  al.
2013). Simply put, CSA organizations enable producers and consumers to come together
and  democratically  negotiate  over  and  collectively  organize  their  production  and
distribution  of  food.  The  main  feature  of  this  system  is  actively  co-creating  a
decentralized and democratic “food commons” (Vivero Pol 2013) in which people take
99  Here,  farmers  compete  against  each  other  to  produce  cheaper  food  for
customers.  As  in  other  markets,  one  can  find  antagonistic  relationships  between  both  individual
producers among themselves and between producers and consumers. This antagonism leads to a “race to
the bottom” in which farmers are forced to produce more and more output for less and less money. This is
euphemistically called “efficiency gains” and “structural adjustments” in agriculture. The effects are often,
however,  rather  problematic,  such  as  the  exploitation  of  humans  and  animals,  the  use  of  poisonous
pesticides, pollution, the overuse of and even the creation of unemployment, hunger and migration for
those who cannot compete with larger and more industrialized farms – and obesity for those consuming
the goods.  Other problems in agriculture that arise from a profit maximization imperative include, for
example,  land grabbing,  the  deforestation of  rainforests  for  large  soy or  palm-tree monocultures,  the
privatization  of  seeds  and  the  increasing  concentration  of  power  of  a  few  large  multinational  agri-
businesses (Friedmann 1993, Shiva 2002, 2005, 2009, Otero 2008, Bello 2009, Lang and Heasman 2009,
McMichael  2009,  Maurin  2011,  Duflot  2011,  Ziegler  2011,  Ziegler  et  al.  2011,  Sekinger  et  al.  2014,
MultiWatch et  al.  2016,  Torrado 2016).  From this  perspective,  a  food regime based on the open and
competitive  market  results  in  socio-ecological  devastation  and  relationships  of  dependency  and
domination. 
287
(back) control  over their  local  food systems.  Although models  of  CSAs differ largely,
most CSAs require that consumers become members of the specific food cooperative
and subscribe to a weekly ration of food that can either be individually determined or
that is put together according to what is momentarily ripe and available on the farm.
From  an  ecological  perspective,  this  system  is  attractive  because  it  creates  short
distances  between  producers  and  consumers  which  minimizes  transport  routes  and
greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Furthermore,  all  the  edible  goods  are  passed  on  to
consumers,  which  reduces  food  waste  that  occurs  when goods  are  not  accepted  by
retailers due to their imperfect appearance or are simply not bought by customers at the
market or in grocery stores. Lastly, CSA farms typically produce organically  (Monson
2017, 83). 
Aside  from  the  ecological  aspects,  the  financing  scheme  of  community-supported
agriculture  is  highly  interesting  because  it  solves  many  problems  that  result  from
normal market arrangements. The subscription system provides producers with definite
consumers for an entire season or year or a type of “guaranteed market” (Monson 2017,
85). This implies that the costs for the enterprise are paid for in advance and that the
risks are shared among all the members of the organization: “If part of the crop fails,
then the consumer receives a smaller share” (ibid.). The commitment of consumers to
their subscription also frees farmers from uncertain sales,  volatile market prices and
powerful middlemen. More generally, a subscription system enables farmers to decrease
expenses (e.g.  in marketing,  packaging and delivery),  secures their  income and frees
them from the necessity to grow in order to survive on a competitive market. This not
only allows the money to flow directly to the producers but also allows them, if possible
and necessary, to create new jobs for others. 
In  community-supported  agriculture,  the  price  of  a  subscription  is  democratically
determined and primarily aims to provide producers with living wages that are often
higher than normal market wages. Because intermediate buyers are bypassed, products
can be less expensive than products of equal quality sold in stores. Nevertheless, due to
the smaller scales of production, this is not always possible. One interesting answer to
this problem is the notion of “offer rounds” that is, for example, practiced in some CSA
projects in Germany. At the yearly general assembly of the organization, each member of
the cooperative contributes however much he or she can give. If the necessary amount
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of money for the yearly production process is not attained, another round of “gift-giving”
is required  (Siefkes et al. 2016). Interestingly, according to classical economic theory,
this would inherently lead to free-riding, but practice has shown that it not only works,
but it  is  also a method to practice concrete cooperative solidarity between members
with different purchasing power. Another means to deal with cheaper food prices on the
competitive market is the “unpaid” participation of members in the production process.
From a commons perspective, we could understand this as a form of commons-based
peer  production.  This  not  only  sinks  costs,  but  also  provides  the  participants  with
enriching experiences of community and nature. This active participation enables goods
and  production  processes  to  be  valued  differently,  creating  a  “non-monetary  profit”
(Bloemmen et al. 2015, 113) that results from an increase in knowledge and skills, new
friendships and social networks, the connection to a place and landscape and a sense of
meaning, efficacy and responsibility (Cone and Myhre 2000). For farmers, this can also
include an increase in recognition for their work and appreciation of their products. In
general terms, this democratic and non-monetary form of accounting aims to replace
quantitative  forms  of  value  with  more  qualitative  notions  that  are  based  on  the
“enjoyment of life” (Bloemmen et al. 2015, 113). 
The fields in which the model of community-supported agriculture could also be applied
are basically endless:  A bakery,  the production of pasta, clothes and shoes or even a
restaurant in which one subscribes for lunch or a dinner once a week. But can these
projects  still  be  considered  market commons,  or  have  they  not  simply  overcome
fundamental  market  mechanisms  such  as  the  price  mechanism  itself  and  become
commons associations? The question is difficult  to answer because such community-
supporting  organizations  dissolve  the  original  market-commons  dichotomy.  Some
features  of  the  market  remain,  such  as  the  opportunity  to  exit  relationships,  the
existence of prices and the exchange of money for goods. Yet, at the same time, people
do  not  buy  their  individual  goods  at  the  (super)market.  Instead,  they  commit  to  a
subscription  that  simply  provides  them  with  what  is  produced  –  similarly  to  a
subscription to a newspaper or magazine. Yet,  in contrast to these prevalent types of
subscriptions, prices are not solely defined by producers and the market, but also by
consumers.  The  contract  understood  as  quid  pro  quo or  exchange  of  equivalents  is
replaced by a type of social contract resulting from deliberation. Here, not merely prices,
but also the technology, the institutional framework and the utilization of surplus value
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are  collectively  determined.  Maybe  we  could  understand  this  as  the  democratic
development of what is otherwise understood as bargaining between two parties on a
farmer’s market or in a bazaar. And in contrast to collective bargaining between trade
unions  and  employers,  the  democratic  negotiation  of  prices  in  these  community-
supported associations is not an attempt to shortchange the other party but,  at  least
ideally, to solve problems that more or less suit the divergent needs and demands of
different parties. In the case of offer rounds, the notion of market prices and costs are
even more undermined in this way. Therefore, it is not exactly clear whether we can still
consider such organizations to be markets. While money is still used in all these projects,
the exchange of equivalents is somewhat dissolved and economic activities and goods
are partially de-commodified. In the end, however, I believe that it might not actually
matter if such organizations are still  understood as market arrangements or not. The
emphasis  in  all  these projects  should be laid  on their  commons aspect  and on their
ability to overcome the tragic, vicious circles brought about by open and competitive
markets. 
8.4. Responses to Possible Critiques of the Market Commons
After having discussed these different models of economic arrangements that provide us
with insights of  what a  market commons may look like I  would now like to turn to
possible critiques of this concept in a final step. Some of the central problems of the
democratic  governance  of  economic  activities  that  are  often  expressed  are  that  the
freedom of choice is reduced for consumers, that the diversity of products and the drive
to innovate is annulled for producers and that not all goods and services can be planned
in advance. Most importantly, it  is criticized that democratic governance in economic
affairs  is  inefficient.  Other  limitations  are  that  people  lack  the  time and interest  for
democratic participation and that such a model cannot be scaled up for a global world
economy. I will shortly address each of these problems one at a time.  
Let  us  begin  with  the  problem  of  consumer  choice.  Here,  it  can  be  argued  that  a
consumer loses the freedom to choose if production and distribution arrangements are
organized  through  democratic  forms  of  governance.  Firstly,  I  would  answer  that
consumer choice is not eradicated because people can still buy their goods in stores or
order them in subscriptions. A market commons merely enables people to co-determine
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the  default  settings  and  institutional  framework  of  the  market  –  and  not  to  pre-
determine  what  each  person  shall  consume.  Similarly,  subscription  systems  are
voluntary economic associations that not only provide different goods to choose from,
but can also be exited. In this case, while the consumer does voluntarily give up some of
their freedom to choose what they wish to buy every day, they are also freed from the
necessity  of  shopping.  More  fundamentally,  however,  the  most  important  point  of
democratic governance in economic affairs is precisely to overcome the problems that
arise  if  all  economic  decisions  were  made  on  an  individual  basis.  In  the  case  of
subscriptions,  this implies that  while the consumer might “lose” a part  of  his  or her
sovereignty,  they would nevertheless receive access to a world of production that is
otherwise closed off  and gain the  possibility  to  collectively co-determine the way in
which the specific good is being produced and distributed. 
On the producer’s side of the relationship, it is often argued that democratic governance
in economic affairs undermines innovation and product diversity: Entrepreneurs and
producers are limited in their creative potentialities. A main problem of this critique is
the  misconception  of  democracy.  Democracy  is  sometimes  misunderstood  as  the
implementation of the will of the majority over the will of all:  The collective dictates
what  the  individual  must  do  (Queralt  2018,  288-9).  However,  as  we  have  already
mentioned  in  our  discussion  of  ecology,  democracy  should  be  understood  as  the
negotiation of interests and the flourishing of each individual within overlapping socio-
ecological systems. Within the framework of negative rights, this can be interpreted as
the pursuit of individual interests as long as they do not harm other individuals. This
individual negative freedom is the principle that also underlies the open and competitive
market. Here, the freedom to innovate is always bound by the ability to sell one’s goods
and, more importantly, to generate profits to survive on the market. In turn, innovation
is  perpetually  required  to  maintain  economic  growth.  In  such  a  system,  however,
innovation is also limited to those with the skills and free capacity to innovate while
others implement and realize these inventions. In contrast, the democratic governance
in a market commons aims to mitigate the existential competition in economic activities
to provide more space for innovation in goods and services that people need and desire
– rather than those goods and services which merely generate the largest profits.  In
subscription schemes, the financial security provided by the commitment of consumers
concretely provides  producers  with  more free  time and energy to  develop new and
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better goods which ultimately leads to a greater diversity in their products, as existing
CSA projects  demonstrate.  Furthermore,  in a market commons, the knowledge,  skills
and  capabilities  to  innovate  are,  at  least  ideally,  diffused  among  all  the  affected
participants:  These  diverse  members  have  the  possibility  to  bring  in  new  ideas  of
products  or  of  how to  optimize  the  organization and institutional  framework of  the
existing economic activities. Collaborative peer-to-peer networks in a market commons
thus provide fertile ground for an even broader dispersion of innovative potentialities
than a competitive market economy.  
In  response to this,  it  is  sometimes argued that  democratic  governance in  economic
activities is impossible because economic affairs are too complex and therefore cannot
be planned (Hayek 2013, 34-52). Simply put, I believe the argument of complexity to be
a  theistic  argument  that  aims  to  veil  and  immunize  economic  affairs  from
democratization. The problem of complexity has not stopped humans from flying to the
moon,  deciphering  the  genome  –  and  developing  the  stock  exchange.  The  question
whether  we  can should  not  replace  the  normative  imperative  that  we  should
democratize them. As previously argued, it is clear that the tragedy of the competitive
market can only be overcome through the democratic governance of economic affairs.
Here however,  we must differentiate between democratic governance of institutional
arrangements  and  democratic  planning  of  economic  activities.  The  democratic
governance of the institutional framework of a market commons does not imply that all
future activities are planned in advance, but rather that the institutional arrangement of
the market is perpetually adapted to the changing conditions of the ecosystem and the
needs and  desires  of  the  affected people.  Prices  can,  for  example,  be  democratically
negotiated without determining in advance what each individual will consume. In more
general  terms,  a  market  commons  increases  the  ex  ante democratic  governance  of
economic  affairs  without  negating  the  possibility  of  people  “spontaneously”  buying
goods ex post. However, a market commons can also support democratic planning in the
form of  democratic  network  collaboration  and  coordination  between producers  and
consumers.  Here,  everyday  economic  planning  activities  within  a  firm  are  simply
extended  to  a  wider  community  of  agents.  Both  the  democratic  governance  of  the
market common and the collaborative democratic planning of individual networks must
be understood as decentralized and overlapping bodies that re-negotiate their interests
when novel issues arise.  Democratic governance and planning in a market commons
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should not be interpreted as a top-down five-year plan developed and implemented by
states  and  large  corporations,  but  rather  as  an  interactive  and  ongoing  process  of
negotiation and coordination between diverse actors and on different levels.  
But  is  such a democratic  governance of economic affairs  efficient? This  is  a classical
critical question that implicitly assumes that all forms of allocation that are not based on
the  open  and  competitive  market  are  inefficient.  As  we  have  already  seen  in  our
discussion of the justification of the open and competitive market, efficiency is one of the
main sources of legitimation: Competition forces enterprises to produce more efficiently
to survive on the market.  This critique applies not only to the model of community-
supported agriculture, but also to social and solidarity economy and to the concept of
market commons in general.  Despite this  general  assumption,  our discussions of the
problems  of  privatization  and  the  market  have  demonstrated  that  an  open  and
competitive  market  might  be  efficient  in  perpetually  generating  and  concentrating
monetary  wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few,  but  not  necessarily  efficient  in  maintaining
sustainable  livelihoods  and  ecosystems.  Considering  this  fundamental  inefficiency  of
open  and  competitive  markets,  our  examples  of  democratic  governance  and  active
participation  in  production  processes  provide  us  with  positive  models  of  how  to
organize economic activities and the institution of the market in more efficient ways. A
market commons is thus more efficient than a competitive market in two central ways.
Firstly,  widespread  democratic  economic  governance  is  efficient  because  it  enables
people to express their needs and desires before the production process occurs, rather
than after all the goods have been brought to and in hope that they will be sold on the
market.  Collaboration  and  coordination  can  increase  the  production  of  goods  that
people  want  and decrease the  large number of  goods that  are  not  sold.  Second,  the
democratic governance of economic activities and institutions also enables people to co-
determine processes and co-create outcomes that include non-monetary values that are
often neglected in competitive prices and quantitative measurements of prosperity (e.g.
GDP) such as culture, beauty, well-being or conviviality. 
But do people have the time to partake in so many democratic negotiations and other
unpaid productive activities? Here, it might be important to note that it is not expected
that  everyone will  participate  in  all  processes  everywhere.  This  would obviously  be
impossible.  In  relation  to  democratic  participation,  a  rather  simple  answer  to  this
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problem would be the representation of the affected either through election or through
sortition. Nevertheless, the problem of time for these activities remains, considering the
high demands of contemporary jobs and the necessity for many people to work long
hours to pay their bills. This is a reason why, for example, we find that it is mostly the
women  in  full-time  householder  positions  or  who  work  part-time  that  actively
participate in CSA projects  (Cone and Myhre 2000, 193). This is also the reason why
there are most likely educated, middle and upper class families who both desire and are
able to partake in such projects  (Monson 2017, 87). The unequal distribution of time,
money  and  education  is  a  fundamental  socio-political  problem  that  limits  the
participation in both parliamentary politics and the democratic governance of economic
activities. One rather simple answer to these problems is that the participation in these
activities would be rewarded in some manner, be that in the form of money, vouchers,
free subscriptions or more generally recognition. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that
a market commons – let alone individual projects therein – cannot fundamentally solve
or mitigate these problems. To structurally provide people with more resources (e.g.
better  education,  higher  minimal  wages,  fewer  working  hours  per  week),  collective
political action is necessary. Despite these limitations, it must be noted, however, that
people  often  do  have  time  outside  of  wage-labor  relationships  that  they  spend  on
different  activities  such  as  shopping,  hobbies,  sports  and  volunteer  work  in  other
associations. The question that then arises is how this time is spent and what priorities
are set. The energy that many people already exert in such activities could be channeled
into the co-creation of democratic market commons.  
But  are  people  interested  in  these  forms  of  participation  in  economic  affairs?  This
question reminds us of our short discussion of stealth democracy. Here, it might suffice
to note that people will probably not experience the necessity to exert time and energy
in democratic economic governance as long as an open and competitive market appears
to be more or less functioning. The more people perceive and experience the ecological
and economic crises that  result  from an economic system based solely on individual
negative  freedom,  the  more  willing  people  might  be  to  invest  time  and  energy  into
coordinated, collective action. Therefore, interest in democratic economic governance is
not  merely  an  abstract  ideal,  but  also  an  attempt  to  alleviate  real  insecurities  and
injustices,  by  solving  concrete  problems  of  hunger,  unemployment,  exploitation  and
environmental degradation. This does not mean that we must wait until things get much
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worse  for  a  market  commons  to  develop,  but  rather  that  interest  in  democratic
participation  often  arises  out  of  a  desire  to  change  existing  social  arrangements  –
whatever the causes for this desire might be. 
Let us now turn to the final critique of democratic economic governance in a market
commons:  The  problem  of  up-scaling.  Here,  it  is  often  argued  that  the  open  and
competitive market is global and that it  is  therefore impossible to create democratic
institutions that can coordinate and regulate these economic activities. Similarly to the
complexity argument, the problem of global commodity chains should not necessarily
hinder  people  from  taking  control  of  their  economic  activities  at  home  and  in
collaboration with people elsewhere. While some of my examples were rather local and
small-scale, this should in no way imply that larger institutional frameworks could not
be developed to foster these socio-ecological enterprises in different places. Although
such  community-supported  commons  associations  would  generally  imply  a  re-
localization  of  economic  activities,  they  could  theoretically  also  be  developed  with
producers on the other side of the world. The same can be said, more generally, for the
democratic  governance  of  global  market  commons.  This  is  what  James  Tully
understands as “glocal” cooperative networks of democratic  economic governance in
which the global emerges out of the interaction and collaboration between diverse local
socio-ecological systems. 
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9. Conclusion 
After this long journey examining the relationships between democracy, markets and
commons, let us now return to the original problem and question with which we began
our  investigation.  We  commenced  this  study  with  the  question  whether  democratic
capitalism truly was the best and only social arrangements that humans could imagine
and realize. With reference to diverse political, socio-economic and ecological “crises”,
we recognized that democratic capitalism is facing fundamental challenges: decline in
political  participation,  democratic  deficits,  rising  inequalities,  economic  instability,
ecological degradation and, last but not least, climate change. The question then arose to
what extent democratic  capitalism brings these possibly interrelated problems about
and whether the institutional arrangements of democratic capitalism has the potential
to solve them. Assuming that this is not possible, we then asked whether the concept of
the commons could provide us with social arrangements that might be more adequate
for this task. More specifically, I asked  whether – and if so, how – the concept of the
commons  can  strengthen  democratic  practices  and  institutions  by  limiting  or  even
overcoming the negative  political,  socio-economic and ecological  effects  of  open and
competitive markets. 
Generally put, the conclusion that can be made after this endeavor is positive. We can
conclude that commons are highly conducive to democracy,  which we defined as the
rights  and  capabilities  of  people  to  co-determine their  social  conditions  or,  in  more
ecological terminology, to co-create their shared socio-ecological realities. The central
reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, commons enhance individual freedom in a limited
world through the direct access to resources, ultimately enabling them to secure their
interdependent  lives  and  liberty.  Secondly,  the  democratic  governance  structure  of
commons  allows  humans  to  collectively  solve  diverse  conflicts  and  problems,  by
perpetually adapting with changing socio-ecological conditions. In order to understand
this conclusion more fully, let me summarize the central arguments of the book again. 
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9.1. Democracy
We began our examination of democratic capitalism with an analysis of the concept of
democracy.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  democracy  has  historically  and  theoretically
turned out to be one of the central means to legitimize social arrangements. As we saw,
it is often assumed that democracy is understood as representative democracy. Here,
people participate in periodic elections in order to elect representatives who will define
the rules and regulations of society in deliberative arenas called parliaments. Here, it
was acknowledged, however, that although representative democracy might be the most
widespread  form  throughout  the  world,  this  in  no  way  implies  that  it  is  the  most
desirable. We therefore asked ourselves what other concepts of democracies exist and
discovered a plethora of diverse models and highly contested concepts of democracy.
With reference to the work of Wolfgang Merkel and others, we broke these concepts into
a three-tier system of  minimal,  medium-range and maximalist  models  of  democracy.
Simply put, the minimal model understands democracy as a competitive elitist system;
the  medium-range  model  emphasizes  the  just  procedures  and  civil  rights;  and  the
maximalist model underlines substantive socio-economic rights as a central component
of  democracy.  Merkel  argued  that  the  minimalist  model  is  unsatisfactory  because  it
remains unclear to what extent people possess possibilities to influence political affairs.
In turn, he also criticized the maximalist model for being too demanding and therefore
unrealizable.  Thus,  he  concludes  that  we  shall  uphold  a  medium-range  model  of
democracy.  I  argue,  however,  that  this  conclusion  is  highly  problematic  because  it
appeared to  transform the historically  contingent  existing  form of  democracy into  a
universal  model  of  the best  political  arrangement.  Unsatisfied with this  conclusion,  I
argued  that  democracy  has  an  underlying  “surplus  meaning”  that  always  has  the
tendency  to  dynamically  go  beyond  and  transform its  existing  form.  Furthermore,  I
argued  that  the  form  and  substance  of  democracies  (e.g.  formal  civil  rights  versus
substantial  socio-economic  rights)  does  not  hold,  because  all  forms  of  democracy
endorse specific substantial values. Thus, I conclude there exists a notion of democracy
that lies at the heart of all three models democracy. With reference to David Held, we
ultimately  defined  this  notion  of  democracy  as  the  “principle  of  autonomy”,  which
provides people with the rights and capabilities to co-determine their social conditions.
With this definition, democracy cannot, however, be limited to the sphere of politics and
the state, but rather must be understood as a principle that applies to all spheres of life. 
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9.2. The Market
After having  arrived at this  definition of  democracy,  I  then turned to the concept of
capitalism or, rather, the open and competitive market and its relationship to both the
state and democracy. With reference to Hobbes, we discovered that an absolute state is
of central importance for the protection of individual private property and the creation
of  a  competitive  market.  In  turn,  the  justification  of  the  market  was discussed  with
reference to Adam Smith and more contemporary economists such as Friedrich August
von  Hayek.  Here,  we  discovered  that  individual  private  property  coupled  with
competitive markets brings about social order and a perpetual growth of wealth. Within
this framework, social order is created through the free or self-regulating interaction of
producers and consumers, which not only should bring the most efficient allocation of
resources about but also disciplines market agents to be more productive. Importantly,
this  self-regulating  mechanism  of  the  market  requires  that  state  intervention  in
“private” economic affairs is limited and that markets are opened up beyond the level of
the  nation-state.  I  therefore  call  this  economic  institution  the  open and  competitive
market.   After having discussed the relationship between the market and the state, I
then analyze its relationship with democracy. Here, we interestingly discover that both
Adam  Smith  and  Hayek  recognize  that  most  people  do  not  necessarily  desire  such
market arrangements, because of their “egotistical” interest to lead a secure and stable
life. The question then arises who can politically implement and uphold such a social
order.  Due  to  the  resistance  against  these  arrangements,  Hayek  openly  argues  that
democratic politics must be “dethroned” and replaced with wise and impartial rulers,
who are elected once in their lifetime. Due to the substitution of democratic politics with
quasi economist kings, I argued with reference to Herman Heller that this market-state
arrangement  can  be  interpreted  as  a  type  of  authoritarian  liberalism.  But  we  then
discovered that even with periodic elections the possibilities of politicians and the state
to influence economic activities and correct market outcomes are highly limited. The
reason for this is the free movement of private property that enables investors or what
we called the Marktvolk to move their capital to where the rates of accumulation are the
greatest. As we saw, when the Staatsvolk and politicians attempt to limit accumulation
strategies and redistribute wealth, this second constituency can indirectly punish them
simply  by  withholding  investments,  thereby  causing  unemployment  and  economic
crises.  Hence,  I  contended  that  the  structural  constraints  of  open  and  competitive
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markets severely limit and undermine peoples’ democratic possibilities to alter and co-
determine  their  social  arrangements.  Accordingly,  I  then  concluded  that  democratic
capitalism and its underlying state-market dichotomy is most likely highly incapable of
institutionally  adapting  and  solving  the  diverse  social,  economic  and  ecological
problems that exist. 
9.3. Commons
Due to this conclusion, I asked whether the concept of the commons provides us with
different social arrangements that might mitigate or possibly even solve the antagonism
between  the  market  and  democracy.  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  I  began  my
investigation with a discussion of Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons from 1968.
Simply put, this influential article or, rather, metaphor presented us with a situation in
which individuals using a commonly owned yet unregulated, open-access pasture find
that it is rational for each herder to put more and more cows on the field despite its
limited  carrying  capacity.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  each  herder  can  privatize  the
benefits (e.g. milk and meat) and externalize the costs (e.g. degeneration of soil fertility).
Because it is assumed that each will act in this manner, the herders are compelled to
pursue maximization strategies in order to survive, which, however, paradoxically leads
to the overuse and destruction of the resource system. From this perspective, it can thus
be assumed that unregulated resources held in common inherently lead to tragedy and
therefore do not present us with a viable alternative to democratic capitalism. This is at
least a widespread interpretation of Hardin’s article. That being said, Hardin’s answers
to  the  tragedy  also  remain  caught  in  the  state-market  dichotomy  of  democratic
capitalism: privatization or socialization (i.e. nationalization). 
Another answer to this problem is that presented by Elinor and, to a certain extent, her
husband  Vincent  Ostrom.  Most  generally  put,  Elinor  Ostrom  demonstrates  that  the
sustainable and democratic self-governance of commons is possible and an alternative
form of  organization “beyond markets  and states”.  In  her  work,  commons are  more
technically  defined  as  common pool  resources  (CPRs)  such  as  pastures,  forests  and
water, on the one hand, and common property arrangements, on the other. CPRs are
characterized by the fact that their goods (e.g. fish, wood) are rival and that it is difficult
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(i.e. costly) to exclude others from using the resource system. As Hardin demonstrated,
the  difficulty  to  regulate  these  resource  systems  often  leads  to  tragedy.  The  vast
empirical work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues show however, that tragedy can be
averted  and  overcome  –  not  through  privatization  or  nationalization,  but  through
democratic  self-governance.  Or  more  precisely,  the  utilization  of  democratically
structured common property arrangements can enable the sustainable governance of
common  property  resources.  In  her  work,  Elinor  Ostrom  develops  eight  design
principles that support the sustainable use of such resource systems. Here, I would like
to focus on one important feature in her findings for our concluding reflections on her
work. From a normative perspective, the most significant insight is that the people who
use and are highly affected by resources should also have the rights to democratically
regulate them. This enables people to develop and enforce rules and regulations against
free-riding  and  unlimited  appropriation.  This  enables  not  only  the  ecologically
sustainable use of the resource system, but also the fair appropriation of goods within a
specific group. Because the people who use the resources can define these rules, they
often have much more knowledge of the existing specific contexts and can perpetually
adapt these rules when conditions change. As we see, this understanding of democratic
governance comes very close to our previously developed definition of democracy: the
right and capability of people to co-determine their social conditions. It can be said that
Elinor  Ostrom  provides  the  empirical  evidence  that  this  form  of  democratic  self-
governance is not simply possible, but also socially and ecologically robust. From these
insightful findings, it can generally be concluded that “the commons” provide us with a
viable alternative to democratic capitalism. 
As I showed, there exist, however, some limits to the Ostroms’ work on the commons.
Despite  their  focus  on  existing  and  functioning  commons  arrangements,  a  central
problem lies  in  their  lack  or  sometimes  problematic  critique  of  states  and  markets.
Although they do defend commons as a superior form of organization to hierarchical
“monocentric  orders”,  they  do  not  deal  with  the  problems  that  arise  through
privatization and the competitive market.  Let us shortly summarize these arguments
again. Here, the Ostroms argue that hierarchical monocentric orders often define unified
rules  that  are  either  not  adapted  to  specific  contexts  or  not  implemented  at  all.  If
implemented,  this  then  leads  to  a  form  of  oppression;  if  they  are,  however,  not
implemented,  this  then transforms  the  state  owned  resources  into  a  de  facto  open-
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access  common  that  will  probably  be  overused.  We  called  this  the  tragedy  of  the
hierarchical  and monocentric  orders.  As an alternative  to this  problem, the  Ostroms
propagate  a  type  of  overlapping  multi-scalar  and  polycentric  governance  system.
Although I agree with their critique of hierarchical and uniform management schemes,
Vincent Ostrom’s vehement critique of  the state is  somewhat problematic because it
appears as to throw the baby out with the bathwater. As we discovered with Elinor’s
work on the commons, a pooling of individual coercive power is necessary in order to
limit freeriding and overcome tragedy. In this sense, the simplified model of commons
also provides us with a monocentric structure. For questions of democratic governance
beyond the nation-state this insight would become rather central, for it would imply that
the  arrangement  must  be  monocentric  while  simultaneously  being  multiscalar  and
overlapping. We will return to this problem later. 
But more importantly, a central problem in their theory lies, as previously mentioned, in
their lack of a critique of privatization and competitive markets. Here, Vincent Ostrom
remains silent.  Elinor Ostrom, in contrast,  argues that privatization will  not  occur in
common pool resources, because it is rather costly. Obviously, this economic reasoning
provides a rather weak argument against privatization. For this reason, I argued that
privatization  is  highly  problematic  because  it  excludes  others  from  the  access  to
important resources that are necessary for their life and liberty. As we will later see, this
leads  to  power  asymmetries  and  domination.  We  may  call  this  the  tragedy  of
privatization. In relation to markets, Elinor Ostrom provides us, however, with a little
more  insight.  Using  the  model  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma,  Elinor  argues  that  highly
competitive  markets  force  people  to  pursue  maximization  strategies  and  ultimately
create  a  “straitjacket  situation”  in  which  people  have  “no  alternative[s]”  (E.  Ostrom
2003, 25). Despite this insight, she does not pursue the problems of markets any further.
For this reason, I developed an argument that aimed to bring the models of the open and
competitive  market  and  the  unregulated  commons  together.  Both  institutional
arrangements  are  structured  according  to  what  is  technically  called  the  prisoner’s
dilemma  or  the  “isolation  paradox”  (Amartya  Sen)  and  lead  to  the  necessity  to
perpetually appropriate and accumulate more and more wealth. Yet while Adam Smith
and other economists praise this  system for its  ability to perpetually  generate more
wealth,  Hardin’s  metaphor  presents  this  same  competitive  dynamic  as  one  that
increasingly  destroys  ecological  resources  and  other  resources  held  in  common.  I
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argued, however, that this would also occur if all goods in the world were privatized,
because the competitive growth dynamic between proprietors would remain. In existing
societies,  this  market  mechanism  also  leads  to  the  increase  in  socio-economic
inequalities,  the  destruction  of  livelihoods  and  economic  crises,  thereby  ultimately
undermining  the  institution  of  the  market  itself.  Last  but  not  least  I  argue  that  the
incessant  necessity  to  increase  productivity  reinforces  the  structural  constraints  of
democratic  deliberation  and  governance.  Here,  we  clearly  see  how  the  diverse
ecological, economic and political crises are interrelated. And again, we see that the open
and  competitive  market  highly  limits  people’s  capabilities  to  alter  their  intuitional
arrangements in order to collectively solve problems. I thus argue that the tragedy of
privatization ultimately also leads to the tragedy of the (open and competitive) market. 
If we return to the Ostroms, it must now also be said that even with a better-formulated
critique of hierarchical monocentric orders and competitive markets, two fundamental
problems  remain  in  their  work.  Firstly,  the  Ostroms  also  lack  explicit  normative
arguments  for democratic  commons  arrangements.  Secondly,  their  focus  on  the
management of common pool resources, makes it appear as though only goods that are
rival and non-exclusory (e.g. waters, forests, alpine meadows etc.) should be managed
with common property arrangements. The two problems are obviously interrelated. The
lack of  general,  normative arguments for common property arrangements inherently
supports the assumption that commons are merely something that refer to pastures and
forests.  Accordingly,  commons will  most  probably maintain a  rather  marginal,  niche
existence  despite  the  possibility  to  apply  the  concept  to  a  wide range  of  goods and
resources, thereby potentially creating not only a more sustainable, but also a more just
and free society. After recognizing these shortcomings of the Ostroms’ work I therefore
attempted  to  develop  a  more  explicit  and  elaborate  normative  argument  for  the
commons. 
9.4. Nature
In order to do this, I began by developing a normative argument for the commons from
an  ecological  perspective.  The  aim  of  this  step  was  to  break  with  the  framework
provided by Hardin in which nature is portrayed as a background stage and, ultimately,
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a limit to human freedom. Furthermore, the problem with such a Malthusian model is
not only that nature is dealt with in an instrumental and, possibly, exploitative manner,
but also that the basis of existence is assumed to be the antagonistic conflict between all
living  beings.  Simply  put,  I  argue  that  this  is  not  only  false,  but  also  cannot  lay  the
foundation  for  a  sustainable  and  democratic  society.  Here,  it  must  again  be
acknowledged  that  simply  by changing  one’s  conception  of  the  world,  one does  not
automatically  change  the  organization  thereof.  That  would  be  solipsistic  and  naïve.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that concepts, models and metaphors do play a central
role in our interaction with one another and the arrangements of the world. If this were
not the case, we would not have to take on the trouble of writing books and discussing
ideas. Accordingly, I argue that our understanding of nature is highly relevant not only
for our relation to the environment but because it provides a type of symbolic backbone
for  all  other  relationships.  I  therefore argue that  we must  shift  from a  dualistic  and
anthropocentric to an interrelated and ecocentric model of nature.  With reference to
Andreas  Weber  and  others,  I  develop  the  notion  of  self-organizing  organisms  that
dynamically adapt in and with their environments, ultimately taking an active part in the
interdependent co-creation of reality. The concept of interdependence provides us with
a key principle for developing an understanding of abundance in a limited yet shared
common reality.  Here,  other living beings are understood as a precondition for one’s
own freedom and flourishing.  From here,  I  developed an ecological  understanding of
freedom, which I  define as freedom with,  through and against  the other.  Within this
framework of interdependence, the central principle of care for the other is apparent.
Yet  despite my emphasis  on empathy,  cooperation and shared,  common realities,  by
combining intrinsic, instrumental and antagonistic principles in this notion of freedom,
we are able to comprehend our interactions with other beings in a complex, multivalued
and conflictual manner. Here, the simple fact that we share a common reality does not
only imply that people always cooperate,  but rather that conflicts arise and must be
dealt with. Freedom is thus defined as an ongoing process of negotiated cooperation in
the  co-creation  of  a  shared  common  reality.  This  presents  us  with  an  ecological
reinterpretation of our original definition of democracy,  which we defined as the co-
determination  of  social  conditions.  With  reference  to  the  work  of  James  Tully,  I
understand this as a civic notion of democracy that emphasizes the dynamic adaptation
and transformation of institutions through civic practices of collective action. This civic
understanding  of  democracy,  in  turn,  provides  us  with  an  adequate  theoretical
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framework for the commons. Here, I discuss Ugo Mattei and Fritjof Capra’s notion of
eco-law as a second order commons that is based on these civic activates of democratic
negotiation and cooperation.  This  ultimately  leads  us  to  a  new interpretation of  the
commons, which is not understood merely as a resource, an institutional arrangement
or the relation between the two. Instead, commons are comprehended as a performative
civic  activity  of  self-organizing  or  commoning  that  brings  common  goods  and  our
common reality about through a process of co-creation. 
9.5. Property
After  presenting  this  ecological  reinterpretation  of  freedom,  democracy  and  the
commons, I then attempted to develop a commons theory of property. With reference to
my  previous  discussion  of  socio-ecological  interdependence,  I  argue  here  that  a
commons theory of property revolves around the concept of access to and democratic
governance of shared resources for the satisfaction of one’s similar yet conflicting needs.
With this general notion,  I  then aim to critically reflect and reinterpret John Locke’s
famous labor theory of property. In a nutshell, Locke’s theory of property declares that
in a state of nature people have the right to individually appropriate resources from a
commons that was originally given to everyone. I discuss this theory in relation to three
central  concepts:  (self-)ownership,  non-interference  and  labor.  Here,  I  argue  with
reference to G.A. Cohen that the concept of self-ownership is based on the prioritization
of  freedom  from  all  non-contractual  claims  and  obligations  towards  the  wider
community. This is basically the principle of non-interference. Put somewhat differently,
ownership frees the individual from considering the negative effects of one’s actions on
the  other.  Considering  our  notion  of  ecological  freedom,  this  is  highly  problematic,
because it negates the inherent, pre-contractual interdependence between beings and
the  underlying  conflicts  that  result  from  constituting  this  shared  reality.  While  the
owner of individual property can enter cooperative relationships through contracts, she
is  systematically  freed from having  to  deal  with  existing conflicts.  For  this  reason,  I
argue  that  we  must  develop  another  notion  of  property  that  is  more  suiting  to  the
principles  of  interdependence.  In  relation to  Michael  Sandel  I  then contend that  the
concept  of  guardianship  or  stewardship  is  more  adequate  for  a  commons  theory  of
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property,  because  it  aims  to  integrate  other  affected  beings  into  its  governance
structure. 
In a second step, I discuss the notion of non-interference, in more depth. Here, I argue
that  non-interference  is  problematic,  because  the  un-interfered  or  unlimited
appropriation and accumulation of resources by individuals inherently interferes with
the  freedom  of  other  people.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  it  changes  the  amount  of
resources that other people have access to. Simply put, if someone appropriates a plot of
land,  I  cannot  use  it.  Assuming  unequal  possibilities  to  appropriate,  the  access  to
resources can thus become highly unequal. Those without the direct access to resources
must then pursue wage labor in order to exchange labor for money and money for food.
Due to this dependency on wage labor relationships the person without resources must
enter wage-labor relationships. And due to the underlying power asymmetries between
the employer and the employee in such a constellation, I understand with reference to
Philipp Pettit  wage labor  relationships as problematic  due to the threat  of  arbitrary
domination.  In  short,  non-interference  can  lead  to  serious  forms  of  arbitrary
interference and, importantly, domination. I therefore argue that a commons theory of
property  must  replace  the  principle  of  non-interference  with  the  notion  of  non-
domination. In a third step, I argue that we must replace the central category of labor in
Locke’s theory with that of needs. According to Locke, labor is the central justification
for the right  to appropriate resources.  With reference to Carol  Gould,  I  argue that  a
commons theory of property would emphasize the social appropriation of resources in
joint activities. The problem that arises here is, however, that people and groups have
highly  unequal  productive  capabilities.  This  could  theoretically  lead  us  to  a  similar
asymmetrical  distribution  of  resources  and  thus  to  relations  of  domination.  As  an
answer  to  this  I  argue  with  Jeremy  Waldron  that  this  special  right  to  appropriate
resources  through  labor  must  be  replaced  with  general  right  to  access  resources
according to need. Yet in contrast to the unlimited access to resources as conceptualized
in  Locke’s  original  commons,  our  interpretation  of  this  commons  would  be
democratically regulated. 
After  this  critical  reinterpretation of  Locke’s  theory of  property,  I  then turn to  John
Rawls.  For  us,  Rawls’  property-owning  democracy  presents  an  interesting  social
arrangement that also emphasizes the positive access to resources as a precondition for
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life and liberty in a democratic society. Schematically portrayed, in comparison to the ex
post distribution schemes of the welfare state in the form of housing and health care for
those in need, Rawls conceptualizes this positive right as an ex ante or pre-distribution
of “productive assets”. While I agree with much of his reasoning, I contend that these
individualized  resources  coupled  with  competitive  markets  is  highly  problematic
because they inherently induce maximization strategies and perpetual economic growth
as already discussed in relation to the tragedy of the market. For this reason, I argue that
not only must we be critical of the emphasis of the competitive market, but we must also
shift our focus in such a pre-distribution scheme from productivity to care. I interpret
here care, however, not as the supposedly “unproductive” activities of housekeeping and
social work, but rather as the emphasis on the sustainable re-production of resources
through labor activities. Accordingly, I argue with Sybil Schwarzer that this is best done
with common property arrangements that are more conducive to care and sustainability
due to their inclusive and democratic governance structure. 
In  order  to  avoid  possible  misunderstandings,  I  would  like  to  generally  mention
something important in relation to my numerous claims that we must “shift from X to Y.”
Throughout my investigation I have argued that we must change concepts that underly
other concepts. These “shifts” include, for example: from anthropocentric to ecocentric,
from dualistic to systemic, from ownerhsip to guardianship, from non-interference to
non-domination from labor to needs and, finally, from productivity to care. I must admit,
that  this  sure is  a  lot  of  shifting.  Critical  readers of  my argument will  have noticed,
however, that I regularly fall back on old terms that I had just criticized. Often enough
such a shift rarely implies that the previous term should be entirely annulled. Let me
illustrate this with reference to a few examples. In my discussion of nature and ecology I
argue  that  we  must  replace  our  dualistic  understanding  of  nature  with  a  systemic
concept thereof. This does not, however, mean that all linguistic distinctions between
mind and body or culture and nature simply disappear. The point is that although we
differentiate these things symbolically, they remain organically interrelated parts of a
whole.  In my discussion of Locke,  I  argued that we must replace the special  right to
resources through labor with the general right to access resources according to needs.
While I maintain that this is true, I do not, however, intend to imply that all rights to the
fruits  of  one’s  labor  should  be  denied.  Instead,  the  shift  to  a  needs-orientation  in
property theory thus simply implies its prioritization over the value of labor, without
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necessarily negating it. This is also the case in relation to non-interference, which should
be replaced by the notion of non-domination: Obviously, non-interference remains an
important  value,  but  should be  positioned under  non-domination  in  the  ordering  of
principles. Similarly, my critique of the focus on productivity in Rawls’ property-owning
democracy does not free me from using this term. I  cannot simply replace the word
productive with care, because no one would then understand what I am talking about.
Here, I intend not to banish the word productivity from our vocabulary. Instead, this
discussion hopes to replace its connotation with endless monetary growth with one of
care, sustainable reproduction and qualitative growth. That being said, let us now turn
to the last discussion of a commons property theory, in which I, again, utilize the term
productive.  
In the final step of my commons theory of property the relation between productive and
consumptive goods is discussed. Here, I ask myself whether we should utilize common
property arrangements only for specific  (productive) activities  and specific  goods.  In
this discussion, I refer to the problem of green house gas emissions and the unequal
distribution thereof. Here, 20 percent of the world’s wealthier population produces 80
percent of the world’s green house gas emissions. This problem provides us with the
insight that strategies of accumulation do not only occur in the sphere of production, but
also  in  the  sphere  of  consumption.  Furthermore,  strategies  of  consumption
maximization  are  largely  interrelated  with  accumulation  strategies  in  production.  I
argue that this maximization strategy occurs in the sphere of consumption, because it is
assumed  that  my freedom is  increased,  if  I  extend my reach over  my possession  of
goods. More goods equal more freedom. And because the access to these consumption
goods are normally structured according to the principle of individual private property
and non-interference, the central means to access more goods is simply to buy them.
This leads to the situation where everyone strives to own increasingly more and more
things. As we well know, this is problematic in a world of limited resources. A commons
approach to this problem is rather simple: If people share these goods they can increase
their access to resources, without necessarily having to produce and buy as many goods.
Thus, the direct access to common goods can substantially expand the range of people’s
individual freedom. This is a concrete example of how abundance can be created within
planetary boundaries. 
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9.6. The State
After  having  developed a  commons theory of  property  I  then turned to  analyze  the
relationship  between  the  state  and  the  commons.  The  focus  here  was  not  the
organization of governmental bodies, but rather the question if and how the state should
provide citizens access to common resources. Before turning to this question, however,
it is important to shortly mention the theoretical organizational structure of a state in a
commons based society. As previously mentioned in my discussion of Vincent Ostrom’s
critique of hierarchical monocentric orders, from a commons approach the democratic
state should be interpreted as a pooling of coercive abilities through collective action.
Ideally, democratic state power is then understood as a form of reciprocal and public
coercion. Importantly, in order to deal with the problem of free-riding, the state must be
structured  in  a  monocentric  manner.  The  problems  of  a  monocentric  order  result
therefore not from its monopoly on the use of force, but rather from its undemocratic
internal  organization.  In  order  to uphold a democratic  structure within,  the  internal
organization  of  the  monocentric  state  should,  however,  consist  of  multilayered,
overlapping democratically governed bodies. This is normally understood as federalism.
The  unity  of  the  superstructure  would,  in  turn,  aim  to  limit  the  competition  and
freeriding between the individual units. 
Before continuing with the summary of my argument, I would like now briefly touch on
an  issue  that  is  under-examined  in  my  analysis:  supranational  global  governance.
Theoretically,  the  insights  also  applies  to  a  system of  global  governance.  It  must  be
admitted  that  this  issue  was  underdeveloped  in  my investigation.  For  this  reason,  I
would like to briefly touch on the problem here. Concretely these insights imply that in
order  to  overcome  global  tragedies,  a  type  of  monocentric  global  government  is
theoretically  required.  A  democratic  organization  of  such  a  federal,  supranational
structure can be understood with David Held’s notion of a cosmopolitical order  (Held
1995) or with Francis Cheneval’s concept of a “demoicracy”  (Cheneval 2011). At first
glance, this conclusion would imply a rather important break with the Ostroms’ theory
of a polycentric order. Here, we might ask ourselves why the Ostroms did not see this
inconsistency in  their  theory.  One reason for  their  emphasis  on polycentricity  could
have been of  pragmatic  nature.  Knowing that  the  world  is  messy and supranational
collective  action  can  be  difficult  to  realize,  they  simply  opted  for  a  more  viable
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alternative.  Another  explanation  could,  however,  be  that  an  overarching  global
government  is  not  necessary,  because  only  the  individual  global  commons  (e.g.  air,
Internet  etc.)  need governing  bodies and not  the  world per  se.  Here,  the concept of
territorial units would be replaced with functionally defined jurisdictions. To be fair, I
can  imagine  that  it  is  this  notion  of  a  plurality  of  functional  governing  bodies  over
commons  that  they  imagined.  Here,  it  can  nevertheless  be  asked  whether  the
coordination  of  these  diverse  bodies  do not  also  require  a  higher  level  monocentric
order. According to the arguments presented here, my assumption is that they would.
Whether such a monocentric order is realizable is, however, another question. 
 Let us now return to the level of the nation-state and examine the role of the state in the
management and provisioning of commons. In order to do this, I began this analysis with
a  recapitulation  of  diverse  models  of  the  state  and  their  principles  of  organizing
common  resources.  Let  me  shortly  summarize  these  findings.  As  we  know,  the
hierarchical and monocentric state manages common resources in a top-down manner
according to unitary rules. Theoretically, the range of commons managed by the state
depends on the will of the sovereign. As we already mentioned, the problems here can
range  from oppression,  paternalistic  provisioning  or  tragedy.  In  a  minimal,  market–
based  state  common  resources  are  generally  minimalized.  Within  the  Lockean
framework, we can say that the resources of the original commons have largely been
enclosed and privatized. A later expansion of commons by the state is limited due to the
structural constraints of the open and competitive market. I then turned to the welfare
state  and  a  property  owning  democracy.  I  mention  the  two  models  together  here
because  both  aim to  provide  individuals  access  to  resources  that  have  been pooled
through  the  collection  of  levies.  The  distributed  resources  are  often  understood  as
public goods that are provided for by the state and often consumed individually (e.g.
housing,  healthcare,  education).  While  this  model  provides  people  with  access  to
resources, it is often criticized that this occurs in a paternalistic manner. A property-
owning democracy aims to mitigate this problem by providing people with productive
assets.  As  we already discussed,  coupled with  competitive  markets  this  leads to  the
problem of perpetual growth, which tends to overuse society’s common, socio-ecological
resources. 
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After having gone over these models, I asked myself how the state would provide access
to commons in a commons based society.  Furthermore, I asked which resources and
goods a state should provide. Beginning with the second question, I shortly discussed
the problem of ideal theory in political theory. My main claim here was that ideal theory
can not only disempower people, but can also lead to a type of paternalism in which
people (e.g. philosophers) create lists of the goods that the state should provide. For this
reason,  I  argue  with  Amartya  Sen  that  instead  of  such  a  “transcendental
institutionalism”,  a  “realization approach”  might  be a  more suitable to answer these
questions. According to Sen, this realization approach focuses on injustices and aims to
overcome them through widespread democratic deliberation and participation. In this
manner people can express their own concerns, needs and desires and are empowered
in their democratic capabilities. From a commons perspective, this also includes the civic
activities of commoning in the state provisioning of public goods. This would generally
imply the democratic co-production of public goods. In order to understand this in more
detail  I  then  compared  three  examples  of  the  provision  of  public  goods  with  state
supported commons arrangements: housing, healthcare and education. In most general
terms, public goods as commons implies that the (potentially) affected people have the
rights and capabilities to create and manage the common resources. The state would
provide an enabling role.  For this  reason I  refer here to the notion of a background
partner state. In the case of housing, this would imply that the people actually co-owned
their housing units; the land could in turn be organized as a Community Land Trust. The
access to a home could occur, for example through the provision of housing commons
coupons. In the case of health care, I discussed the problem of rising costs and increased
patents in medical research and development. One answer to this that I discussed was
the notion of an open-access health commons for research in which information can be
shared freely. Another example I described was a model of community health centers
that can be understood as a commons. Lastly, I discussed education as a commons. With
reference  to  the  problem  of  the  enclosure  of  scientific  information  through  private
academic journals, I again propagated a model of an open-access information commons.
In  relation  to  schools  and  schooling  I  emphasized  the  democratic  participation  in
education policymaking and the actual governing of schools. Furthermore, I discussed
the importance of ecological and democratic principles in schooling, both in relation to
teaching content and the organization of learning processes.  Importantly,  this  would
imply the individual and collective self-organization of learning in relation with one’s
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concrete environment. In most general terms, I conclude that the state should not simply
provide commons, but rather support the co-creation and maintenance thereof. 
After having fleshed out the difference between public goods and commons, I then turn
to some final questions of the state-commons relationship in a non-ideal world. Firstly, it
is  important  to  recognize  that,  in  a  non-ideal  world,  possibilities  to  democratically
participate  in  the  processes  of  commoning  are  not  necessarily  given.  It  can  also  be
expected that powerful social  actors resist these practices,  because they largely limit
their appropriation possibilities and might even transform some of their resources back
into  commons.  Due  to  the  power  of  such  actors,  they  are  often  able  to  influence
politicians and politics, ultimately illegitimately utilizing the state monopoly to protect
their  private  interests.  Considering  such  illegitimate  social  arrangements  it  can  be
expected  that  both  fewer  common  resources  are  provided  to  citizens  and  that
democratic participation is limited. In such cases, I argue that it is necessary to widen
our understanding of democratic participation. This can include, for example, practices
of confrontation. Confrontation understood as social protest can provide people with a
means  to  criticize  injustices  and  illegitimate  social  arrangements  through  collective
action. When politicians do not hear these voices, another strategy that is practiced is
that of “reclaiming the commons” in which privatized resources are re-appropriated that
are considered to be originally held in common.  Besides confrontation, another strategy
of  dealing  with  elite  resistance  and  state  oppression  is  through  “interstitial”  civic
activities of commoning. Here, people actively create commons in the cracks of existing
social  arrangements by pooling resources and collectively organizing common goods
and services for the satisfaction of their needs and desires.
9.7. Market Commons
In  the  last  step of  our  investigation I  finally  examined the  relationship between the
market  and  the  commons.  Despite  my  rather  fundamental  critique  of  open  and
competitive  markets,  I  asked  here  whether  the  institution  of  the  market  could  be
organized in  a  different  manner.  The reason for  this  is  that  I  believe  that  the  basic
principle  of  contractual  exchange  of  goods  and  services  is  a  very  practical  social
institution.  The question therefore  is  whether  we can have democratically  regulated
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exchange-based  markets  without  having  the  self-regulation  of  supply  and  demand
through competitive prices as the dominant form of social organization. Interestingly, a
quick review of commons literature on markets shows that many authors criticize the
market  and  defend  democratically  organized  firms,  but  few  deal  with  this  rather
important issue. In order to develop an understanding for this problem I approached the
topic from a historical perspective. With reference to Karl Polanyi and Fernand Braudel I
argue that, albeit only marginally, markets have existed throughout human history. This
is not to say that exchange or markets are inherently “natural” practices or institutions,
but  rather  that  a  historical  perspective  might  provide  us  with  illustrations  of  other
market arrangements. Importantly, the competitive market only slowly developed since
the 15th century and increasingly gained importance and influence since the 18th century.
Here, I interpret this development as a process of opening socially embedded markets
up that occurred parallel to the enclosure movements that transferred common fields
and forests into private property. In order to comprehend how markets were possibly
organized before the existence of open and competitive markets, I discuss the role of
guilds in medieval markets. Importantly, guilds defined rules and regulations for specific
markets that limited competition and stabilized prices in order to protect themselves
from  potential  economic  instabilities  and  existential  threats.  Importantly,  market
institutions were regulated and adjusted in order to satisfy people’s “egotistical” needs
and  desires.  Although it  can be  questioned to  what  extent  this  regulation was  truly
democratic,  it  nevertheless  was  a  means  to  utilize  an  exchange  system  yet  without
allowing  market  competition  and  monetary  growth  to  determine  their  economic
activities. 
After this rather short historical excursion, I then attempted to develop a concept of a
social  embedded  and  democratically  regulated  market,  which  I  coin  the  market
commons. The aim is thus to transform the open and common market into a market
commons. By defining the market as a commons I argue that we must conceptualize the
market within an ecological framework. Here, we must keep in mind the flows of matter
and energy that is brought about through monetary exchange. Furthermore, I argue that
a market commons must be structured according to the democratic regulation of the
largely  affected  people.  Ideally,  democratic  governance  of  economic  institutions
provides people with possibilities to collectively organize their economic activities in
order  to  satisfy  their  similar  yet  conflicting  needs and  desires.  Here,  the  concept  of
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wealth itself would be democratically defined thereby replacing a purely quantitative
monetary notion of growth with a plurality of forms of qualitative development. The aim
of such arrangements is to enable people to maintain local and regional economic cycles
without,  however,  negating  interregional  and  global  exchanges.  In  this  sense,  the
democratic  governance  of  the  market  commons transforms  the  overarching  and
transcendent rules and regulations of an open competitive market into decentralized
socio-ecological niches, in which the default rules of the institutional framework foster
cooperation,  fairness  and  the  sustainable  reproduction  of  socio-ecological  systems.
Acknowledging the problems of uneven development and regional disparities, such a
decentralized  arrangement  would,  however,  necessarily  also  require  higher-level
democratic governing bodies for the co-determination and perpetual adaptation of its
overall framework. 
After laying out this somewhat idealized model, I then discussed some other concepts
and examples of markets in order to flesh out the idea of a market commons. I begin this
exploration  with  a  corporatist-associative  notion  of  democracy.  Generally  put,  Paul
Hirst’s understanding of associationalism comes rather close to my concept of a market
commons  in  that  it  emphasizes  the  widespread  democratic  inclusion  of  the  largely
affected in its governance practices. Similarly, Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter
discuss  the  notion  of  corporatist-assciative  organizations  that  aim  to  overcome  the
prisoner’s dilemma in competitive markets through process of negotiation of conflicting
parties. Put somewhat differently, it enables people to complement  ex post individual
decision-making  in the  market  with  ex  ante collective  decision-making  about the
market.. With Axel Honneth, I understand this as a “discursive flexibilization” of market
mechanisms, in which other non-monetary values can be expressed and integrated into
the evaluation of resources, goods and services. I more generally understand this as a re-
embedding and de-commodification of economic goods and activities. 
In  general,  this  notion  of  corporatist-associative  democracy  can  be  interpreted  as  a
transformation of the competitive, liberal market into a socially embedded coordinated
market.  As  Hall  and  Sokice  argue  in  their  Varieties  of  Capitalism (2004),  a  classical
example  of  such coordinated  market  is  the  labor  market  and,  more  specifically,  the
production of skills through a vocational education and training (VET) system. VET is
interesting  for  us,  insofar  as  it  exemplifies  concrete  corporatist  “intermediary”
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institutions between the market and the state that  possess legal  authority to define,
adapt  and  enforce  its  own  rules  and  regulations.  Importantly,  VET  is  a  governance
system that  was  historically  developed  in  order  to  mitigate  employee  poaching  and
overcome the tragedy of  skill  degradation  that  result  from competitive  markets.  Yet
despite these similarities to a market commons, there do exist fundamental differences
to a corporatist arrangements and existing VET systems. A main problem in existing VET
systems is focus on the needs of “the economy” and not on the needs and desires of the
wider  public,  due  to  its  limited  democratic  inclusion,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
structuring principles of the wider competitive market that it is in. 
For this reason, I then turn to another example of what a market commons could look
like: The social  and solidarity economy. The social  and solidarity economy is quite a
broad term that aims to organize market arrangements according to the principles of
fairness, ecological sustainability and democratic self-governance. A central feature of its
institutional arrangements is the satisfaction of basic needs. Classical examples of the
social and solidarity economy are fair trade and organic farming networks, community
development  organizations  and socio-ecological  investment  funds.  In  contrast  to  the
notion  of  market  socialism,  in  which  firms  are  democratically  run  in  a  competitive
market setting, here, the isolation paradox is overcome through negotiated cooperation
between producers and consumers. Other, diverse stakeholders are also integrated into
the governance schemes thereby creating arenas for conflict management and collective
action. Importantly, the governing body of these market arrangements often have the
right to collectively co-determine the reinvestment strategies of these funds,  thereby
democratizing the flow of capital. As we remember from our original discussion of the
state-market  relationship,  the  private  control  over  capital  is  a  central  cause  of  the
democratic  structural  constraints.  An  inclusive,  democratic  governance  structure  for
such  economic  activities  thus  provides  the  institutional  framework  that  can  foster
principles of guardianship towards the wider community.
My last example of a market commons is what can generally be called community modes
of  production.  The  most  prevalent  type  of  this  is  community-supported  agriculture
(CSA),  which  can  be  understood  as  a  practical  response  to  the  diverse  and  severe
negative effects of open and competitive markets in agriculture. CSA can generally be
understood as a “food commons” (Vivero Pol) that aims to re-appropriate the control
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over one’s local food system. A central feature of CSAs that goes beyond the social and
solidarity  is  that  consumers  normally  subscribe  to  a  weekly  ration  of  food,  which
finances the enterprise prior to production processes. This small change in the payment
structure  frees  the  producers  from  having  to  sell  their  goods  “on  the  market”  and
thereby enables them to plan the production process in accordance to the needs of the
members of the association.  Importantly,  this  interesting trick suspends the coercive
market mechanisms that forces one to perpetually produce more and more goods for
less and less money. Furthermore, the payment in advance leads to a socialization of the
entrepreneurial risks between all the members of the group. Acknowledging that such
organizations  might  not  be  affordable  to  everyone,  some  CSAs  have  even
institutionalized  “offer  rounds”  in  which  the  members  pay  for  their  subscription
according to their abilities. These offer rounds provide a somewhat new interpretation
of  monetary  exchange  that  replaces  competitive  prices  with  practices  of  gift  giving.
Furthermore, possibilities for the members to participate in the production process not
only decrease the costs of the subscriptions but also demonetizes the value of the goods
being produced and consumed. All in all,  production and consumption become social
activities  that  are  not  organized  simply  according  to  efficiency  gains,  but  rather
according  to  shared  notions  of  a  convivial,  good  life.  Theoretically,  this  model  of
community supported modes of production could be applied to any other goods and
services. 
Now, in my very last section I will bring my paper to a close with a short recapitulation
of the defense of market commons against possible critiques. A first critique that might
be raised is that a democratic  market commons limits and eradicates market choice.
Here, it must be emphasized that choice is not eradicated, because the buying of goods
“on the market” or in the (super)market still remains. Instead, a market commons aims
to alter the institutional framework of the market and its principles that structure the
choice  of  products.  Furthermore,  the  democratic  governance  of  these  institutions
provides  people  with  the  abilities  to  co-determine  these  arrangements  according  to
their shared and conflicting needs and desires. Lastly, in some cases feedback loops exist
in  which  consumers  can  influence  the  creation  of  production  before  they  are  even
produced. From an ecological perspective, this ex ante choice and co-determination is of
great  importance  because  it  coordinates  supply  and  demand  through  democratic
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deliberation and negotiation processes,  ultimately replacing the invisible hand of the
competitive market with the transparent and democratic self-determination of people. 
A  second  critique  is  that  economic  affairs  are  too  complex  to  be  democratically
regulated. I argue that this widespread belief is nothing else than a theistic argument
that aims to immunize economic activities from democratization. Here, the question is
not necessarily if we can, but rather if we should (attempt) to break up the complexity
into  more  transparent  and  manageable  units.  Nevertheless,  we  must  importantly
differentiate  here  between  the  democratic  planning  of  economic  institutions  and
activities. The democratic governance of the institutional framework does not imply that
all  activities  will  be  planned  in  advance.  Instead,  it  connotes  that  the  institutional
framework  can  be  perpetually  adapted  to  the  changing  socio-ecological  conditions.
While prices can be democratically co-determined, the  ex post choice in the market is
individually and “spontaneously” chosen. Beyond this,  however, democratic economic
institutions can also provide producers and consumers to coordinate their  economic
activities in overlapping networks. In this sense, democratic planning must not occur in
a  uniform,  top-down  manner,  but  can  occur  in  decentralized  organizations  that  are
created through the free association of consumers and producers. 
 A third critique that is often heard in these debates is that democratic governance of
economic  activities  is  not  efficient.  This  is  another  knockout  argument  that  aims  to
silence  all  changes  to  the  competitive  market.  As  we  have  seen  from  our  extensive
discussion of the open and competitive market, this institutional arrangement might be
efficient in generating wealth for the few but not at maintaining sustainable livelihoods
for the many. In this sense, the democratic governance of economic activities is more
efficient in two ways. As just mentioned, democratic governance can, firstly, increase the
ex ante deliberation over what shall  be produced thereby short-circuiting the rather
costly and energy-intensive feedback loop of the market based on purchasing choices.
Secondly,  democratic  governance  can  allow  people  to  co-determine  their  economic
institutions and activities according to non-monetary values that competitive prices and
regular  commodities  cannot  take  into  account.  In  this  sense,  we  can  conclude  that
democratic  economic  governance is  significantly  more efficient  in  satisfying  people’s
diverse and rich needs than one-dimensional competitive markets. 
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A fourth critique is  that  people do not  have the  time for  and interest  in  such time-
consuming civic activities of commoning. Time is used for a plethora of activities. The
question of  time is  therefore  more a question of  priorities  in  the  valuation of  these
activities.  This  leads us to actual key question: will  people desire to partake in such
democratic  activities  of  economic governance? This  is  a  question that  theory cannot
answer.  But  assuming  that  people  are  reflexive,  sentient  beings  that  aim  to  solve
problems, it can be assumed that they will take interest in such activities of commoning
as an answer to the diverse socio-economic, ecological and political challenges that they
face. 
Last  but  not  least,  the  market  commons  will  most  likely  be  criticized  because  it  is
assumed that it cannot be scaled up. Here, we are dealing with the general problem of
globalization. If we interpret globalization as a unified entity, it will be a difficult nut to
crack. But fortunately, globalization can be broken down into existing commodity chains
and real, interdependent relationships. While some or most of my examples might have
appeared to focus on the local, regional and national, this is because it is in the local that
the global social  relations are anchored. The global and the local are interwoven. By
taking democratic control over one’s local economy in no way negates the possibility to
communicate  and  collaborate  with  people  on  the  other  side  of  the  world.  Thus,  by
understanding the market as a glocal commons aims to provide people with the rights
and capabilities  to reclaim, co-determine and adapt their institutional frameworks on
diverse scales in order to satisfy their needs and maintain their livelihoods within the
changing ecological systems that they inhabit.
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